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Abstract 
The University of Manchester  
Pao-Chen Lee 
The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities 
Thesis Title: The Audit Committee as an Additional Mechanism of Corporate 
Governance in China 
Mar. 2011 
As the title suggests, this thesis focuses on the issues arising from the establishment of 
audit committees in listed companies in China, which hitherto have been adopted by 
companies on a voluntary basis alongside the pre-existing structure of supervisory 
boards, rather than as a mandatory requirement. Regarding this unique practice in 
China, this thesis attempts to address three research objectives: 
1. To understand the effectiveness of supervisory boards (SBs) and audit committees 
(ACs) in China  
2.  To understand how the operations of SBs and ACs improve the effectiveness of 
supervisory governance functions in China. 
3. To understand the co-ordination between SBs and ACs in organisations 
The first objective is investigated by applying quantitative methods of ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression and analysis of panel data. It is discovered that the 
companies with audit committees have more effective supervisory functions when 
companied to those without audit committees. The second objective was pursued by 
applying qualitative methods in the form of two case studies constructed using 
interviews and surveys conducted both via telephone and in face-to-face interviews. It 
is found that in both the case studies audit committees were established with the 
expectation of enhancing the effectiveness of the companies’ supervisory functions. 
Furthermore, the face-to-face interview survey of five listed companies reveals that 
companies with audit committees in China still face issues of overlapping and 
missing supervisory functions between supervisory boards and audit committees. 
Thus the third research objective, regarding the co-ordination between the 
supervisory board and the audit committee in the organisation to find solutions to this 
very problem, is particularly relevant for corporate governance in China. This 
objective is investigated by interviewing two governors and conducting telephone 
surveys. The results highlight that there is the general expectation that these structures 
should be co-ordinated as one unit. There is also a demand to establish an 
independent control system to strengthen oversight functions, to reduce oversight 
costs, and to ensure the independence of the supervisors and audit committee 
members in order that they can execute oversight tasks, and to empower them against 
the executive directors and senior managers by promoting their status in the 
organisation.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter highlights the internal supervisory mechanism as the focal point of the 
analysis of Corporate Governance (hereafter referred to as CG), and goes on to 
discuss China’s adoption of its own form of Audit Committees in addition to 
Supervisory Boards (hereafter referred to as SB) based on voluntary choice to form a 
unique internal supervision mechanism in the country. It is an intriguing development 
within a non-Western environment, which spurred the motivation to conduct the 
present study at the beginning of this chapter and this thesis. The conclusion of this 
chapter highlights the thesis’ structures for every chapter on this topic.  
1.2 Research Motivation 
The Audit Committee’s (hereafter referred to as AC) role in CG has been one of the 
most significant monitoring themes of research. In the aspect of governance, CG 
seeks to establish a mechanism to maximise the corporate value of promoting what is 
beneficial, such as pursuing the maximum returns for stakeholders, shareholders, 
creditors and employees alike. In the aspect of monitoring, CG strives to create a 
mechanism to minimise the chances for what is harmful, such as reducing the 
possibility of fraudulent accounting practice (OECD, 1999; OECD, 2004a), such as in 
the case of Enron. The establishment of ACs has become a legal requirement, and 
directly exposed the responsibilities of management authorities to the possibility of 
facing public litigation. 
 According to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Sec.2 (a) (3), the audit 
committee is a committee (or equivalent body) established by and among the 
board of directors of a listed company. The audit committee’s purpose is to 
oversee the accounting and financial reporting processes of the issuers and to 
audit the financial statements of the listed company. If no audit committee 
exists within a listed company, the entire board of directors concurrently 
serves as audit committee members. 
 As stipulated in the July 2003 Combined Code on Corporate Governance Sec. 
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C3.1, the board of directors of a listed company are required to establish an 
audit committee comprising at least three members, or in the case of a smaller 
company comprising two members, they are also both required to be 
independent non-executive directors. Additionally, the board of directors are 
required to see to it that at least one member of the audit committee has recent 
and relevant financial experience 
Both Section 2(a) (3) of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Section C3.1 of the 
UK Combined Code on CG stipulate that an AC is required to be established by and 
among the BoD of a listed company. Establishing an AC is compulsory in both the 
US and UK, whereas China’s Code of CG merely stipulates that the board of directors 
(hereafter referred to as BoD) of a listed company may establish an AC. In other 
words, establishing an AC is voluntary, not mandatory, in China.  
However, the internal supervisory mechanism of CG is not compulsory in the 
“unique” process of some other countries too. National conditions determine whether 
these countries develop their own mechanisms of CG. The regulations of AC’s 
forerunners, namely the US and UK, stipulate that establishing an AC is compulsory 
for every listed company (SOX, 2002; SOX, 2003; FRC, 2008; FRC, 2010). To the 
contrary, China’s Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) regulations for 
establishing the monitoring system of CG – ACs – states that establishing an AC is a 
voluntary choice, not a compulsory requirement. Accordingly, the dual systems of 
establishing a SB alone or SBs plus ACs may exist together at the same time. Thus, 
comparing Chinese regulations with those of the US and UK also raises the question 
of whether it is necessary to establish ACs in China. China’s unique regulations 
prompted me towards this research through the empirical study surrounding the 
effectiveness, operations and co-ordination of the AC as an additional mechanism of 
CG in China.  
 Section 52 of the Code of CG for Listed Companies in China stipulates that 
the board of directors of a listed company may establish a corporate strategy 
committee, an audit committee, a nomination committee, a remuneration and 
appraisal committee and other special committees in accordance with the 
resolutions of the shareholders’ meetings. All committees shall be composed 
solely of directors. The audit, the nomination, the remuneration and appraisal 
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committees shall be chaired by an independent director and independent 
directors shall constitute the majority of the committees. At least one 
independent director from the audit committee should be a professional 
accountant. 
These striking differences between the regulations in the West and in China suggest 
that the necessity of establishing ACs in China should be viewed as an educational 
issue. As has been mentioned, establishing an AC is not a must but merely a voluntary 
choice in China. The AC’s structure was first developed in Western corporations; 
however, after being adopted in a non-Western environment, it has raised questions 
regarding its impact and appropriateness. Shareholders and creditors who invest their 
assets in a company may suffer losses if there are risks in the company (Spira and 
Page, 2003). Normally they are so-called third parties, who seek to safeguard their 
legitimate business interests by setting up and improving the mechanism of CG. 
Hence various international organisations and national CG have generally required, 
and in some cases proposed, the setting up of external and internal supervisory 
mechanisms. 
In 2002, China started to enact CG. According to the Chinese “Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies”, ACs may be established alongside the existing 
monitoring system of SBs at the same time. The regulations governing the 
establishment of ACs in listed companies in China have inspired in me the interest to 
conduct further research on this topic.  
1.3 The Structure of This Thesis 
The thesis is organised into seven chapters. After this introductory chapter, the 
remaining chapters cover the issues outlined below.  
Chapter 2: Research Question  
In 2002, China enacted its CG. According to China’s “Code of Corporate Governance 
for Listed Companies”, ACs may be established alongside the existing monitoring 
system of SBs. Thus in China, setting up an AC is not legally mandatory but a 
voluntary choice. Two groups of listed companies of SBs alone and SBs plus ACs co-
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exist in China to form a special phenomenon of internal supervisory mechanisms, 
which are different from those practised internationally. Research questions are 
formulated through comparison of relevant components of the laws and regulations 
between SBs and ACs in China. Three key research objectives with five key questions 
and two sub-questions relating to the effectiveness, operations and co-ordination of 
two systems’ listed companies of SBs alone and SBs plus ACs are defined for the 
purposes of this research.  
Chapter 3: Research Theory and Literature Review  
The effectiveness, operations and co-ordination of SBs and ACs may be explained 
distinctively by different theoretical perspectives. This thesis will apply two dominant 
theories of shareholder and stakeholder theories and the other four approahes by 
clarifying the relevant theories’ influence to the current internal supervisory 
mechanism of CG, in order to justify the theories applied in this thesis.  
Two dominant theories: First, the importance of AC’s functions is highlighted by the 
assumptions of agency theory underpinned within the concept by a separation of 
ownership and control. Meanwhile, the concept of stakeholder theory expects SBs to 
take care not only of the interest of shareholders; but by expanding to the stakeholders. 
Both theories are key dorminant to the assessment of reliability: by monitoring the 
tendencies of manipulation in financial reporting, internal control and auditing. 
Therefore, the operations and co-ordination by SBs and ACs in China will be 
explored by both theories in this thesis.  
The other four approaches: Managerial hegemony theory forms a concept with which 
to study the effectiveness of supervisory functions. Political model theory and 
institutional ownership theory both lead this study to introduce the political and 
shareholding background: forming the chapter of “The Background” in this thesis. 
The resources dependence theory is employed to understand the roles of ACs played 
in China: in order to reveal whether the sub-committees of BoD – ACs – contribute 
to the companies in addition to exercising independent control. 
Viewing ACs from a conceptual perspective, the setting up of ACs as newcomers in 
addition to SBs is assumed to improve the effectiveness and relevant characteristics of 
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supervisory functions, in order to advance the CG. It is therefore down to the review 
of the regulations and academic works of researches relating to ACs to identify the 
possible factors of dependent and independent variables for evaluation of the 
effectiveness, operations and co-ordination of the Chinese internal supervisory 
mechanism. Afterwards, the research hypothesis and variables for evaluating this 
effectiveness are selected and applied; the implementation processes associated with 
the operation are identified; and the dynamic relationships between ACs and SBs are 
defined as the attributes for assigning the research methods in this thesis.  
Chapter 4: The Background  
This chapter examines the development of supervisory mechanisms in CG in China. It 
shows how that development has involved the adoption of components of governance 
from differing governance models internationally, and considers whether the resulting 
combination of mechanisms is likely to be appropriate and effective in the Chinese 
context. In the next section of the chapter, the historical development of the 
“standard” CG model of the UK and the US is examined, in order to illustrate the 
development of the supervisory mechanism. The following section contrasts different 
CG models, to illustrate how each reflects particular contextual factors and problems, 
and discusses the principles of CG regarding supervision. The development of 
supervisory mechanisms of CG in China is then introduced and the problems in 
governance and supervision are analysed. In particular, an overview of the Chinese 
political environment relating to the development of supervisory mechanisms of CG 
and an overview of the relationship between the shareholding structure and internal 
supervisory mechanism in China are discussed as the background to the Chinese 
internal supervisory mechanism.  
China’s internal supervisory structure involves a unique interaction between two 
mechanisms of ACs and SBs, and the function’s effectiveness, operations and co-
ordination between these two governance elements represent important subjects for 
research. Therefore, the following chapter of research design and method to achieve 
three objectives of empirical studies are then introduced.  
Page 26 PhD Thesis, University of Manchester Pao-Chen Lee 
Chapter 5: Research Design and Methodology 
This chapter employs applied research methods in order to achieve three key 
objectives, which in turn will provide the evidence to answer five key research 
questions and two sub-questions. This research examines three phases’ empirical 
studies of the effectiveness, operations, and co-ordination of SBs and ACs in China 
by deploying both quantitative and qualitative methods.  
Objective I: The effectiveness is explored by the quantitative method of t test and 
linear regression of Panel data model by Stata / SE 9.1. The p value of t test is 
appraised for evaluating which system is more effective of SBs alone or SBs plus ACs 
in China. Meanwhile the growth trend of the market response to earnings (PER) is 
observed to enhance the understanding of the effectiveness. The AC’s contributions to 
the effectiveness in improving the characteristics of supervisory functions in China 
are explored by the linear regression of Panel data model via Stata / SE 9.1. 
Furthermore, the test results with significance are compared between two systems of 
SBs alone and SBs plus ACs in China: the better system being supplied with a better 
impact with significance after the comparison.  
Objective II: The operations are explored by the qualitative method of interviewing 
the members of SBs and ACs of two listed companies in China. The role of ACs 
played in China is revealed through a telephone survey of 330 listed companies; and 
the overlapping status of supervisory functions between SBs and ACs is assessed by 
preparing the checklist of process operating items as the basis for face to face surveys 
of five listed companies. The operating items are defined through the studies of the 
related regulations and charters; and the overlapping items and percentages between 
two supervisory institutions are researched through the survey of five listed 
companies with experience in implementing the ACs. The operations of the two 
supervisory institutions by the methods of interview and survey is recorded and 
compared to conclude the findings of this phase’s research.  
Objective III: The co-ordination is explored by the qualitative method of interviewing 
two governors and the telephone survey of 330 listed companies in China. With 330 
listed companies among 635 companies that have implemented the ACs in 2007, this 
constitutes over 50% of all the listed companies in China. The two systems with or 
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without ACs exist according to the understanding of two governors’ assertions and 
opinions on the framework of legislation and management of government; and the 
preferred co-ordination is collated from the telephone survey, analyzing the responses 
of interactions between SBs and ACs in different organisations. The findings are then 
summarised, which will conclude this phase’s study.  
Chapter 6: The Empirical Studies  
The empirical study is aimed to find the evidence in order to attain the three defined 
research objectives of answering five key research questions and two sub-questions, 
defined as the following:  
6.1 Objective 1: Effectiveness  
The SB and AC structures were introduced at different stages of China’s economic 
and business development. The introduction of ACs in addition to SBs is assumed to 
confirm that SBs had failed to fulfil their function in practice. Many Chinese 
companies have been willing to voluntarily install ACs in order to enhance 
supervisory governance within their companies. In order to achieve the first research 
objective – to understand the effectiveness of SBs and ACs in China – this section 
provides for two hypotheses to answer two questions by comparing two groups of 
listed companies with and without ACs. This section summarises the hypothesis and 
the definition of variables and measures; defines the empirical models; describes the 
sample by demonstrating the industry, correlation and coefficient analysis; and 
descriptive statistics for the sample, evidence for proving two hypotheses and to 
analyse the results of t test, trend analysis, OLS and Panel data analysis as the 
findings for answering two questions. After the comparison of the findings, the 
effectiveness of the listed companies after adding in ACs is appraised and presented 
in the summary. 
6.2 Objective II: The Operations  
The Chinese approach to supervisory CG structures in companies contains a 
combination of the AC of the British and American governance models and the SB 
founded in the German model. This dual-layered governance structure has been 
created to suit China’s unique economic, social and political environment. The 
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implementation of the singular governance structure of the AC on top of the bipolar 
one of the SB with dual monitoring institutions in the internal supervisory mechanism 
in China is also explored. The criteria of independence, expertise and operation of 
implementing supervisory functions are examined in turn by conducting interview 
members of SBs and ACs and surveying the listed companies. This phase’s study 
includes the evidence of two sampled companies and the interviewees, the features of 
SB/AC within both sampled companies, and the background of SB/AC members in 
both companies. Face to face interviews are recorded and summarised; and two sub-
questions of the role of AC played in China and the overlapping status between two 
supervisory institutions answered by the findings from the surveys. In terms of 
functions, this research adopts both different CG models, as both are the supervisory 
institutions functioning in one model, and finds that the function of both SBs and ACs 
has led to overlapping, redundancy and even conflict between them in fulfilling their 
functions in financial reporting, auditing and internal control. By way of face-to-face 
survey with five listed companies in China, the functions of the SB and the AC in 
practice are identified in order to clarify the overlaps and gaps in their respective 
functions and to promote effective supervision.  
6.3 Objective III: Co-ordination 
The current relationship between the AC under the BoD and the SB under general 
shareholder meetings in China has remained ambiguous. Both have been set up as 
supervisory institutions and both also perform internal supervisory functions. In terms 
of the future, the two systems with or without ACs exist according to the 
understanding of two governors’ assertions and opinions on the framework of 
legislation and management of government. In terms of organisation, no vertical 
relationship between the SB and the AC is identified. The constructive interactions 
between them are yet to be established. To suggest a viable structure of the 
supervisory mechanism for mutual interaction in practice, this research proposes 
various organisational charts and analyses their specific points. The preferences of 
Chinese companies for the linked interactions presented in these charts are obtained 
through the telephone survey of 330 listed companies. This survey indicates the 
connections and interactions in the hierarchy between the two different supervisory 
institutions. Their preferred organisational interaction is illustrated according to the 
statistics derived from the survey.  
Pao-Chen Lee PhD Thesis, University of Manchester Page 29 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
After three objectives’ empirical works have been carried out and presented 
accordingly, the achievements of the research objectives in terms of the consistency 
between the findings and questions will be assessed in this final chapter. First, the 
empirical research results will be checked, in order to establish whether these conflict 
or support the two main applied theories and the other four approaches relied upon in 
this thesis. This chapter integrates the empirical studies of three objectives by 
summarizing the findings on the effectiveness, operations and co-ordination based on 
the criteria of independence, expertise and operation in order to enhance the 
effectiveness of the internal supervisory mechanisms between two supervisory 
institutions of SBs and ACs in China. Following on each of the summarised findings, 
the limitations of this research conclude with a discussion of several areas suitable for 
further research in the future. It concluded by summarizing whether the research goals 
have been achieved and academic works been contributed to by this thesis.  
Page 30 PhD Thesis, University of Manchester Pao-Chen Lee 
Chapter 2 Research Question – The Regulation 
Comparison between the AC and the SB in 
China 
2.1 Introduction  
Passed in December 1993, the Chinese Company Law was the legislation that first 
specified that every listed company establish a SB to supervise the company’s 
financial activities and the conduct of its directors. Subsequently, additional 
regulations regarding the appointment of independent directors were introduced. In 
1997, this course of action was optional, but became compulsory for listed companies 
in 2005. The main stages of this development are presented in the table below:  
Table 1. Timeline of the Development of the System of Independent Directors in China 
(Source: Author, as supported by reference contained within) 
Time Related Documents Regulation 
December 
1997 
Section 112 of the 
Guidelines on the 
Constitution of Listed 
Companies 
Optional regulations on the installation of the independent 
directors by the listed companies. Companies can appoint 
independent directors if necessary. 
1999 On Further Promotion of 
Regulated Operation and 
Reform of Offshore 
Companies 
Companies should increase the percentage of the 
independent directors. Upon reorganisation of the BoD, 
independent directors should hold more than half of the 




On the Installation of 
Independent Directors by 
the Listed Companies 




Section 52 of the Code of 
CG for Listed Companies 
in China. 
“The BoD of a listed company may establish a corporate 
strategy committee, an AC, a nomination committee, a 
remuneration and appraisal committee and other special 
committees in accordance with the resolutions of the 
General Meetings of Shareholders. All committees shall 
be composed solely of directors. The AC, the nomination 
committee, and the remuneration and appraisal 
committee shall be chaired by an independent director, 
and independent directors shall constitute the majority of 
the committee. At least one independent director from the 
AC shall be an accounting professional.”  
October 
2005 
Section 123 of the 
Company Act 
The detailed regulations on independent directors in listed 
companies are determined by the state department. The 
appointment of independent directors by listed companies 
is made mandatory by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission. The legal position of independent directors 
is officially defined by the revision of the Company Act. 
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Governance systems relying on independent directors typically include related 
structures with specific supervisory functions, such as ACs made up of independent 
directors. In countries such as the US and the UK, it is compulsory for listed 
companies to establish an AC to oversee aspects of the company’s internal control 
and financial reporting (SOX, 2002: Sec.2 (a) (3); Combined Code, 2003: Sec.C3.1). 
In China, under the equivalent regulation in the Code of CG for Listed Companies in 
China (CSRC and SETC, 2002: Section 52), the establishment of an AC is voluntary 
rather than mandatory. This has resulted in a dual system in practice, wherein some 
companies have ACs in addition to and separate from the SBs while others have only 
established SBs. It should also be noted that the SB in the Chinese system has some 
similar functions to the AC in the Anglo-American system.  
This chapter begins by assessing the willingness among listed companies in China to 
voluntarily install ACs, in order to justify the formation of the research objectives in 
this research. Furthermore, it reveals the gaps from the comparison between SBs and 
ACs in China, and analyses the reasons of these gaps, so that further research 
questions are engendered. 
2.2 Research Objectives  
In practice, an increasing number of Chinese companies have installed ACs in recent 
years. The statistics for the period between 2000 and 2007 on the proportion of listed 
companies with ACs increased from 1% (12 companies) to 41% (635 companies), as 
shown in the table below:  
Table 2. Chinese Companies Introducing ACs between 2000 and 2007  
(Source: Author, as supported by the CCER Database) 
Year  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 
No. of Co. 1092 1140 1205 1266 1355 1351 1434 1545 1299 
Increase in No. of Co.   48 65 61 89 -4 83 111 57 
Increase in % Of Co.   4.40% 5.70% 5.06% 7.03% -0.3% 5.79% 7.18% 4.36% 
No. of Co. with AC 12 73 312 483 604 641 640 635 425 
Increase in No. of Co. 
with AC 
 61 239 171 121 37 -1 -5 78 
% of Co. with AC 1.13% 5.38% 19.92% 38.15% 44.61% 47.45% 44.63% 41.10% 30.3% 
These figures suggest that there is positive willingness amongst listed companies in 
China to voluntarily install ACs, probably to enhance their internal supervisory 
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mechanisms and meet international expectations for governance structures for 
monitoring and supervision. Given that many Chinese companies have introduced 
ACs to their governance structures, it is interesting to consider whether this reflects a 
lack of public confidence in the effectiveness of SBs. This study addresses this 
question by investigating its effectiveness, to verify or disprove the assumption that 
the setting up of ACs reflects a lack of public confidence in the effectiveness of the 
SBs. By comparing two systems of listed companies with SBs alone and SBs with 
ACs together in China, it will be revealed which system has the more effective 
supervisory functions (Key Research Question 1(1.1)). More specifically, the first 
objective of this research is to understand whether ACs contribute to improving the 
effectiveness of supervisory functions in China relating to the three key attributes of 
independence, expertise and diligence (Key Research Question 2 (1.2)).  
Additionally, though the implementation of the Chinese model of ACs is still at its 
experimental stage, questions should also be asked regarding its operations:  it is 
indeed a peculiar system of implementing a singular mechanism of the AC on top of 
the bipolar supervisory mechanism of the SB. The purpose of establishing the AC is 
to strengthen the supervisory function of the BoD and to prevent internal 
manipulation, which is also the key purpose of implementing the SB in China. 
Because of this duplication of supervisory functions, it is assumed that there are 
problems and difficulties in implementing both the AC and the SB in the Chinese 
model. Accordingly, an assessment of the operations of the supervisory functions by 
these two institutions in China is set as the second objective of this research. It is 
especially needed in order to understand the operation process and the problems and 
difficulties faced by the supervisory institutions in implementation (Key Research 
Question 3 (2)). 
As China’s internal supervisory structure involves a unique interaction between the 
AC and the SB, their interactions in terms of organisation represent a further 
important subject for research. Thus the third objective of this research is to reveal the 
co-ordination between the SB and the AC in terms of organisation in the Chinese 
model. The third objective is achieved by answering two key research questions: How 
will the two systems with or without ACs exist in the future (Key Research Question 
4 (3.1)) and what is the preferred interaction between the SBs and the ACs in 
organisation (Key Research Question 5 (3.2)). 
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2.3 Research Questions  
2.3.1 Definition of the Supervisory Board  
According to German regulations on CG, the SB (Aufsichtsrat) oversees and advises 
the BoD (Executive Board, Vorstand), and has control over fundamental and 
important decisions. According to Paragraph 1 of Article 111 of German Company 
Act (Aktiengesetz; AktG), the SB has the right and responsibility to oversee 
(überwachen) the operations of the company (Chen, 2007: 154).  
The characteristic of the current German system of CG is that the SB plays the role of 
overseeing the operations and finance of the company. In addition to the appointment 
and removal of directors, the most important right and responsibility of the SB is to 
oversee the operations of the directors (Yang, 2004: 102).   
In the Japanese system, the SB is responsible for overseeing the operations and 
finance of the company, whereas the BoD is responsible for both the execution and 
supervision of the operations of the company. The SB and the BoD are of the same 
rank and work in parallel, unlike the arrangement in the German system where the SB 
is for governance and the BoD is for management (Wu et al., 2001: 81).  
In the Chinese system of CG, there are two institutions under the Shareholders 
Assembly Meeting: the BoD is responsible of making important day-to-day 
managerial decisions, the removal of managers, and the execution of day-to-day 
operations, whereas the SB is responsible for the supervision of the company’s 
finance, the violation of laws, regulations or company constitution by the directors 
and managers in their execution of their duties to the company (Yang, 2004: 165).  
In both the German and Chinese systems, it is the right and responsibility of the SB to 
oversee the conduct of the BoD. In the German system, the SB is a rank above the 
BoD, whereas in the Chinese system, as well as the Japanese one, the SB is the same 
rank as the BoD. This structural difference might have some impact on the 
supervisory effectiveness, as well as the powers and roles, of the SB in both systems. 
Now, with the addition of the AC, there are two institutions in the Chinese system that 
both have the functions and responsibilities to supervise the finance and operations of 
the company. To understand this seemly redundant arrangement, the position of the 
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AC is investigated by comparing its definitions in the various regulations and 
academic researches, e.g. SOX Section 404 (2002), Klein (2002), Collier (1992), 
Marrian (1988), Peat Marwick McLintock (1987), and Braiotta (1981). It is also 
compared and contrasted with the SB with regard to their service scopes and 
hierarchical levels, their compositions in terms of independence, nomination and 
appointment, expertise, their powers, functional positions and responsibilities, as well 
as their operations in terms of sizes and numbers of meetings. By understanding the 
differences, insights may be gained as to their effectiveness, operations, co-operation 
and interactions with each other in fulfilling their supervisory functions.  
Below is a list of comparisons between the AC and the SB in terms of these 
characteristics. Based on these comparisons, areas worthy of further investigation will 
be identified and research questions can then be formulated.  
2.3.2 A Comparison between the AC and the SB 
A detailed characteristic-by-characteristic comparison between the AC and the SB is 
presented below. 
Independence of Composition 
The Chinese Company Act states that the SB comprises of employee supervisors and 
stakeholder supervisors. It is difficult for employee supervisors to be independent in 
carrying out their supervisory obligations because they themselves are subject to the 
company’s administrative hierarchy, and their wages and positions are determined by 
the management. The Company Act provides no administrative protection against this 
threat. Therefore, questions need to be answered as to what extent this lack of 
independence impacts upon the effectiveness of SB in China. This will be performed 
in reference to the attribute of independence according to the studies of Beasley 
(1996), Abbott et a. (2002), Klein (2002a), Klein (2002b), Carcello and Neal (2003), 
Xie et a. (2003), Abbott et a. (2004), Bedard et al (2004), Chiang (2006), Tsai (2009), 
and Kao (2009). 
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Table 3. Comparison of the Characteristics of the AC and the SB  
(Source: Author, as supported by CSRC (2001), CSRC and SETC (2002), 
and NPC (2006))  
Characteristics The SB The AC 
1. Independence of 
composition 
Composed by stockholders and 
employees 
Composed by majority of 
independent directors 
2. Nomination and 
appointment 
Directly elected from the 
stockholders and employees.  
Independent directors are 
elected from nominees external 
to the company, and others are 
elected from the internal 
directors who are in turn 
elected from nominees 
amongst the stockholders.  
3. Expertise of 
Composition 
Supervisors shall have 
professional knowledge or work 
experience in such areas in law 
and accounting (Code of CG for 
listed companies in China)  
At least one is professional in 
accounting etc.  
4. Powers (cf. The 
comparison of the 
powers of the AC and 
the SB) 
Does not have the right to 
engage external auditing or 
consulting institutions, and may 
consequently not be able to 
oversee due to lack of 
professional capabilities; does 
not have the right to nominate, 
appoint or dismiss the directors 
or senior managers. The effect of 
its oversight could be 
compromised consequently. 
Does not have the rights to 
oversee the board of the 
management and directors’ 
conducts, to directly report to 
the China Security Regulatory 
Commission and other 
institutions, or to demand the 
management or directors to 
correct their questionable 
conducts. The effect of its 
oversight could be 
compromised consequently.  
5. Size At least 3 members At least 3 members 
6. Annual number of 
meetings  
At least once a year  At least once a quarter in a year 
Overseeing the BoD on behalf of 
the stakeholders.  
Overseeing the management 
on behalf of the BoD and 
balancing the internal directors 
within the BoD.  
Overseeing the company’s 
financial reporting, the directors’ 
compliance to standards, 
disclosure principles as well as 
the management and directors’ 
legal conducts. 
Overseeing the company’s 
financial reporting as well as 
the management and directors’ 
questionable conducts such as 
related transactions.  
7. Functional position 
and responsibilities (cf. 
The comparison of the 
functions and 
responsibilities of the 
AC and the SB) 
Overlapping with the 
responsibilities of the AC. 
Overlapping with the 
responsibilities of the SB. 
Responsible to the society and 
the scope of its service extends 
beyond the company as it can 
report to the China Security 
Regulatory Commission and 
other institutions. 
Responsible to the company 
and the scope of its service is 
within the company. 
8. Service scope and 
hierarchical level 
Report directly to the general 
meetings of shareholders in 
overseeing the BoD, and 
subsequently the AC. 
Reports directly to the BoD; its 
recommendations need to be 
approved by the BoD before 
their implementation. 
In the Chinese system, over half of the members of the AC need to be independent 
directors, but not all members need be independent. In comparison, in the US and UK, 
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every member of the AC is required to be an independent director. A comparison of 
chartered requirements of the AC in the US and UK and SBs in China is presented in 
the table below. A further comparison on the requirements of the charter of ACs 
across the American, British and Chinese systems are presented in Table 11 in 
Chapter 3. This difference suggests a number of potential deficiencies that could 
undermine the effectiveness of the SB and the AC in the Chinese system in 
implementing effective supervisory functions.  
Table 4. The Comparison of Chartered Requirements for ACs in the US and UK and 
SBs in China 
(Source: Author, as supported by SOX (2002), FRC (2008), FRC (2010), 
CSRC (2001), CSRC and SETC (2002), and NPC (2006))  
Since the intention of introducing the AC into the Chinese CG structure is to 
strengthen the control over the serious problem of internal control by internal people, 
the independence of the AC and its members should become the essential prerequisite 
to work out the supervisory functions in CG, yet the regulation does not demand all 
Countries US UK China 
Supervisory 
Bodies 







Code on CG of 
the UK 
The Guidelines for Listed 
Companies on the Establishment 
of the System of Directors, the 
Company Act and the Code of 




Every member of the 
committee needs to be 
an independent 
director, and there 
have to be at least 








there have to 
be at least 
three 
members or 
two for smaller 
companies. 
There shall be at least three 
members on the board. The 
members consist of 
shareholders’ and stakeholders’ 
(employee) supervisors. 
(Company Act)  
“The members and the structure 
of the SB shall ensure its 
capability to independently and 
efficiently conduct its supervision 
of directors, managers and other 
senior management personnel 
and to supervise and examine 
the company’s financial matters.” 
(Code of CG for Listed 
Companies in China) 
Expertise 
Requirements  
“An AC financial 
expert” 
SOX Act mandates 
that the firm must 
disclose in its filings 
whether the committee 
has a financial expert, 
and if not to explain 
why. 
At least one 
member of the 




Supervisors shall have 
professional knowledge or work 
experience in such areas a law 
and accounting (Code of CG for 
Listed Companies in China). 
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members of the AC are independent. So it might be necessary to improve the laws and 
regulations governing the AC and the SB for its effective operations. To assess the 
situation, more research is needed on the independence of the AC and the SB in China.  
Nomination and Appointment 
The members of SBs are directly elected from the stockholders and employees. The 
AC’s independent directors are elected from nominees external to the company, and 
others are elected from internal directors who are in turn elected from nominees 
amongst the stockholders. Although the law states that the employee supervisors are 
appointed by the shareholders’ meetings and democratically elected by the employees, 
there is no explicit regulation concerning the rights to nominate and approve the 
candidates. Under the strong cultural influence of Confucianism, employees tend to 
be submissive to their employers, so it is not uncommon for the management and the 
BoD to nominate the candidates themselves. The ‘elected’ employee supervisors may 
have close personal relationships with the directors and managers, and are 
administratively controlled by the latter, so it may therefore be difficult for them to 
perform their supervisory duties effectively. If the general meeting of shareholders 
often simply rubber-stamps the decision, the independence of a SB can be seriously 
compromised. Obviously, greater attention should be given to the voting system for 
election of shareholders representing supervisors, in order to increase the effective 
voting power of the small shareholders and expand the opportunity for their voice to 
be heard in the SB. 
By considering the essential attribute of independence to perform effective 
supervisory function, it is a challenge for China at present whether the independence 
of members of SBs can be strengthened by instituting regulations taking into account 
the interests of the stakeholders of the company, by preventing the members being 
influenced by insiders, and by setting the appropriate external independent directors. 
By stipulating that SB members should be independent directors, the protection of the 
interests of the small and medium shareholders can be enhanced. This would offer a 
check and balance against the high concentration of shareholdings in listed companies 
in China.  
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Therefore, given the shareholding structures and shareholdings of SBs in Chinese 
listed companies, these issues inevitably lead to concerns regarding insider control 
(These two indicators are thus considered as independent variables for evaluating the 
effectiveness of supervisory functions). As the stakeholder members of the SB are 
elected by the Shareholders’ Meeting, there is no constraint against the big 
shareholders controlling a SB. It is therefore possible for big shareholders to control 
both the BoD and the SB, and in the event of serious conflicts between them, it would 
be difficult to maintain effective, just and objective supervision. . 
China’s regulations are such that only half of the members of the AC have to be 
independent; the independence of the rest being highly questionable. The key function 
of ACs is monitoring, yet independence is the most essential factor in executing this 
function. Therefore, it raises questions regarding the performance of the ACs since the 
remaining half of members may be formed by non-independent directors.  
Even if more than half of the members of the AC are formed by independent directors, 
these directors might not be competent enough. Companies may overly focus on their 
social status and the reputation of individuals in appointing independent directors to 
the AC, regardless of whether the appointed person has the time or competence to 
hold the post. Currently, many independent directors are appointed by government 
officials, the BoD or its Chairs, and the power to appoint and remove the members 
rests in the hands of the senior management of the companies. Hence, the 
independence of the independent directors is compromised. There is no clear cut 
restraining mechanism for the independent directors as it is unclear who is to play the 
role of overseer.  
Moreover, it is hard to guarantee independence: since candidates for independent 
director can be recommended by the BoD, the SB, and the shareholders singularly or 
collectively holding 1% or more shares of the company. It is also common to find 
companies dominated by one shareholder or controlled by internal persons. It is 
therefore questionable whether an independent director selected by a big shareholder 
would be able to protect the interests of small and medium investors. Furthermore, the 
positions of the independent directors are also tarnished by the rewards given them, 
significantly compromising their independence.  
Pao-Chen Lee PhD Thesis, University of Manchester Page 39 
So what are the statistics on the number of independent directors in the BoD in China? 
(The percentage of independent directors divided by the size of BoD is defined as an 
independent variable, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of supervisory functions). 
This research examines whether the listed companies have at least three independent 
directors in ACs, according to the Anglo-American requirement of the composition of 
AC’s. This research will also discover whether the listed companies in China have 
complied with local stipulations: i.e., one third of the members of the BoD and half of 
the members of the AC.  
Expertise  
Although Chinese guidelines discuss the need for supervisors to have professional 
knowledge or work experience in such areas a law and accounting (Code of CG for 
Listed Companies in China), it is not yet a mandatory requirement. That said, at least 
one member of a Chinese AC must have expertise in accounting, and at least one 
member must also have recent and relevant financial experience in the US and UK as 
shown in the previous table (Table 4) and Table 11 in Chapter 3.  
A deficiency that could lead to ineffectiveness in SBs in China is the absence of a 
clear-cut requirement on the expertise of board members. Although there are some 
brief comments in the Code of CG for Listed Companies in China stating that the 
members should have expertise in law and accounting, the legal status of that code 
has so far not been established, and it therefore does not constitute an enforceable 
mandate. Hence, there is no guarantee that a SB has in its membership the basic 
expertise for the fulfilment of its roles. That could mean that SB membership is 
essentially an honorary title with no effective function in practice. Therefore, levels of 
expertise relating to the effectiveness of SB in China must be put under the 
microscope. (The financial, legal and internal audit expertises of SBs are defined as 
the independent variables for evaluating the effectiveness of supervisory functions.) 
The attribute of expertise is referenced from the studies of DeZoort and Salterio, 
(2001); Abbotte et a., (2002); Abbotte et a., (2003); Xie et al., (2003); Abbott, Parker, 
and Peters, (2004); Bedard et al, (2004); Defond et al, (2004); Defond et al, (2005); 
Tsai, 2009; Kao, (2009). 
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It is the common challenge for both supervisory systems to make efforts to guarantee 
the quality of members who execute supervisory functions. It is important to establish 
the mechanism for professional training of members of the supervisory institutions to 
ensure their professional level of competency. The requirement of expertise of AC 
members in China is similar to the Anglo-American system. The AC’s 
implementation of practice concerning expertise in China is therefore interesting for 
further research. 
Powers  
A comparison of the powers of the SB supervisors and the AC independent directors, 
who form the majority of the members of the AC, is presented in the table below: 
Table 5. The Comparison of the Powers of the AC’s Independent Directors and the 
SB’s Supervisors 
(Source: Author, as supported by CSRC and SETC (2002), CSRC (2006), 
and NPC (2006)) 
 Powers The SB supervisors The independent directors 
The right to propose the 
appointment and dismissal of the 
accounting firms  
Yes Yes 
The right to propose the call for 
interim general meetings of 
stockholders 
Yes Yes 
The right to independently engage 
external auditing and consulting 
institutions 
Except when it needs 
assistance, it can only 
nominate the external 
auditing and consulting 
institution to appoint.  
Yes 
The right to confirm major related 
transactions (at least 3 million 
RMB or 5% of the latest audited 
net assets of the listed company) 
No Yes (right to consent) 
The right to public call for 
stockholders’ votes 
No Yes 
The right to nominate, appoint or 
dismiss the directors 
No No but can issue 
independent opinion 
The right to appoint or dismiss the 
senior managers 
No No but can issue 
independent opinion 
The right to determine the rewards 
of the directors and senior 
managers 
No No but can issue 
independent opinion 
The right to oversee the directors’ 
and senior managers’ performance 
Yes No 
The right to directly report to the 
China Security Regulatory 
Commission or other institutions  
Yes No 
The right to demand the directors 
and managers to correct their 
questionable conduct that may 
harm the interests of the company. 
Yes No 
As we can see, the SB do not have the right to engage external auditing or consulting 
institutions, and may consequently not be able to oversee due to lack of professional 
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capabilities; nor does it have the right to nominate, appoint or dismiss the directors or 
senior managers. The effect of its oversight could be therefore compromised. The 
ACs do not have the right to advise the board on the management and directors’ 
conduct, to directly report to the China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and 
other institutions, or to demand the management or directors to correct their 
questionable conduct. The effect of its oversight could be compromised in this case 
too.  
From the comparison of the specified powers of the ACs’ independent directors and 
the SBs’ supervisors, it is found that not every responsibility as specified has a 
corresponding power in order to assist its operation. For instance, the SB does not 
have the power to directly engage external professionals to assist it in financial 
supervision. Neither does it have the power to nominate, appoint or dismiss the 
directors or the senior managers whom it is supposed to oversee. The AC is supposed 
to guard against the questionable conduct of the management, yet it does not have the 
power to demand the directors or senior managers correct their misconduct, nor can it 
directly report such incidences to the external regulatory institutions. As such, the 
effectiveness of its control is bound to be negatively affected. Even though the AC 
has the function of proposing the appointment or dismissal of the external audit 
institutions, such proposals cannot take effect until approved by the BoD. As the BoD 
is more than likely controlled by the major stockholders, it is difficult to ensure the 
independence of the external auditing simply by having the external chartered 
accountants appointed by the AC.  
(A) What should be considered to be adequate rights and roles for SBs in China under 
laws and regulations by comparison with the situation in Germany, as an international 
comparison whereby an equivalent structure is also relied upon for supervisory 
governance?  
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Table 6. Comparative Rights and Roles of SBs in Germany and China 
(Source: Author, as supported by CSRC (2001), CSRC and SETC (2002), 
NPC (2006))  
 Rights Germany China 
1 The right to appoint and remove the directors Yes No 
2 The right to approve specific business dealings Yes No 
3 The right to limit the directors’ commercial activities Yes No 





5 The right to supervise Yes Yes 
 
Stages Supervisory Roles in Germany Supervisory 
Roles in China 
Prior 
supervision 
(1) intended operational policies and other fundamental 




(2) conditions of the company’s profits and pay-back 
powers 









(5) The SB and its members may request the BoD at 
anytime for special situation reports of the company. 
(6) The BoD must actively report to the chairperson of the 
SB any important decision or resolution it has made. 
Not specified 
Under the Company Act and the Code of CG for Listed Companies in China, SB 
members have the right to propose, supervise and report, but they have no powers to 
appoint or remove directors or determine their remuneration or benefits, while their 
German counterparts have powers and the rights that enable them to control the BoD. 
These include the right to appoint and remove directors, approve specific business 
dealings, limit the directors’ commercial activities, and represent and supervise the 
company. The German and the Chinese system are compared in the following aspects:  
(1). The right to appoint and remove directors  
Section 84 of Die Aktien des Gesellschaftsrechts stipulates that the SB has the 
right to appoint and remove the chairperson and the members of the BoD, and 
decide their remuneration and benefits. The SB in the Chinese system has no 
equivalent power.  
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(2). The right to approve specific business dealings 
Under the German system, a SB cannot replace the BoD in running the operation 
of the company but it can arrange for certain operation to be executed only with 
its approval, although it may not interfere with the managerial activities of the 
BoD. Given the practical difficulty of setting a clear-cut boundary between 
managerial and the supervisory responsibilities, this provision could lead to 
conflicts between SBs and BoDs. There is no equivalent right for Chinese SBs. 
(3). The right to limit the directors’ commercial activities 
Members of the BoD in Germany cannot engage in any commercial activity 
outside the company’s business or any commercial activity in the company that 
solely benefits themselves without the approval of the SB. Again the Chinese 
system has no provision of this kind.  
(4). The right to represent the company 
Under the German system, a company is normally represented by the BoD but, 
under certain conditions, it may be represented by the SB. The SB in the Chinese 
system does not have this right but it can bring cases on behalf of the company 
against the directors who violate the company’s interests. The 2005 revision of the 
Chinese Company Act further provides that a SB can also call for and host the 
General Meetings of Shareholders when the BoD fails to do so. The SB in China 
owns the right to directly report to the China Security Regulatory Commission or 
other institutions. 
(5). The right to supervise 
The fundamental responsibility of a German SB is to supervise the BoD in their 
work of controlling the business operation. In order to supervise properly, it has 
the right to understand the operation of the company, and to examine relevant 
accounting books, documents and the financial situation. The BoD must therefore 
report to the SB about business development, business policies and corporate 
profits. 
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Having identified the supervisory right of SBs in China, it is necessary to further 
examine operational procedures in evaluating the quality of supervision exercised. 
Only three sections of the Company Act in China concern the operational procedures 
of SBs. Section 55 states that the SB may be presented at meetings of the BoD and 
raise questions or offer suggestions for resolutions at the meetings. The SB – or 
individual supervisors in the absence of a SB – may also investigate any suspected 
abnormality in the company’s operation, and costs incurred in so doing will be 
covered by the company (Section 57). Section 151 stipulates a general provision that 
the directors and senior managers should provide correct data and information needed 
by the SB and should not obstruct its efforts or those of individual members in 
exercising their powers. In practice, because SBs do not have a role with respect to 
management decisions, their supervisory role effectively constitutes supervision after 
the event.  
On the other hand, Section 90 of Haftungsrecht in Germany states that the BoD must 
report to the SB regularly. Information reported is for prior, concurrent, post and 
provisional supervision, as listed in the table above. The German system explicitly 
gives a SB the right to supervise the business operation of the company and to 
examine its financial condition. The Chinese system could possibly be enhanced by 
giving SB similar rights to regularly and provisionally investigate the business 
operation of the company and to demand reports from the directors.  
(B) What should be considered to constitute adequate rights for ACs in China under 
laws and regulations by comparison with the situation in US, as an international 
comparison whereby an equivalent structure is also relied upon for supervisory 
governance and what should be the roles that ACs play in China? 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, 2002) was produced in response to a series of 
scandals around the turn of this century, perpetrated by Enron and others. It extends 
the responsibilities and status of the AC. Sections 201 and 202 revise the powers of 
the AC in that all audit and non-audit services provided by the external auditors1 to 
                                               
1
  “An external auditor is an audit professional who performs an audit in accordance with specific 
laws or rules on the financial statements of a company, government entity, other legal entity or 
organization, and who is independent of the entity being audited. Users of these entities' financial 
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the company must first be approved by the AC. Section 301 significantly extends the 
overseeing powers of the AC. SEC prohibits the listing of companies which do not 
comply with the conditions listed in the table below:  
Table 7. Comparison between the Powers and Rights of the AC as Specified in the 
Laws and Regulations in the US and China  
(Source: Author, as supported by CSRC (2001), CSRC and SETC (2002), 
SOX (2002), and SSE (2000))  
 Power USA China 






2002: Art. 54  
2 The power to independently employ outside experts to 





2002: Art. 54 
3 The right to know (receiving complaints) Yes: Section 301(m)(4) No 
4 The right of disposition managers Yes: Section 301(m)(4) No 
5 The right to have funds available for its use Yes: Section 301(m)(6)  No 
 
Power  USA China 
Power 1:  
 
The power to appoint or 
remove external audit 
agencies 
As specified in SOX Section 301 (m) 
“STANDARDS RELATING TO ACS”,  
“(2) RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO THE 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS.—
The AC of each issuer, in its capacity as 
a committee of the BoD, shall be directly 
responsible for the appointment, 
compensation, and oversight of the work 
of any registered public accounting firm 
employed by that issuer (including 
resolution of disagreements between 
management and the auditor regarding 
financial reporting) for the purpose of 
preparing or issuing an audit report or 
related work, and each such registered 
public accounting firm shall report directly 
to the AC.” 
According to Article 54 
of CSRC and SETC 
(2002), the main 
responsibilities of the 
AC include “to 
recommend the 
engagement or 
replacement of the 
company’s external 
auditing institutions”. 
(CSRC and SETC, 
2002: 7) 
 
Power 2:   
The power to 
independently employ 
outside experts to assist 
in the execution of tasks 
 
As specified in SOX Section 301 (m) 
“STANDARDS RELATING TO ACS”,  
“(5) AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE ADVISERS.—
Each AC shall have the authority to 
engage independent counsel and other 
advisers, as it determines necessary to 
carry out its duties.”  
According to Article 54 
of CSRC and SETC 
(2002), the main 
responsibilities of the 
AC include “to 
recommend the 
engagement or 
replacement of the 
company’s external 
                                                                                                                                      
information, such as investors, government agencies, and the general public, rely on the external 
auditor to present an unbiased and independent audit report.” (Wikipedia, Externall audit,  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/External_audit, as of July 2007) 
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Power  USA China 
auditing institutions”. 
(CSRC and SETC, 
2002: 7) 
Power 3: The right to 
know (receiving 
complaints) 
Without a clear 
assertion of this right, 
the AC, having most of 
its members as 
independent directors 
who are external to the 
company, would find it 
difficult to get sufficient 
and up-to-date 
information of the 
company’s operation for 
the vigilant and 
informed oversight of 
the quality of the 
financial reporting 
process and the 
effectiveness of the 
internal control of the 
company.  
As specified in SOX Section 301 (m) 
“STANDARDS RELATING TO ACS”,  
“(4) COMPLAINTS.—Each AC shall 
establish procedures for—  
(A) the receipt, retention, and treatment 
of complaints received by the issuer 
regarding accounting, internal accounting 
controls, or auditing matters; and  
(B) the confidential, anonymous 
submission by employees of the issuer of 
concerns regarding questionable 
accounting or auditing matters.” 
Not specified. 
Power 4:  The 
right of disposition 
The AC can put 
sufficient pressure on 
the management if it 
has the power to 
dispose managers who 
have acted 
questionably.  
As specified in SOX Section 301 (m) 
“STANDARDS RELATING TO ACS”,  
“(4) COMPLAINTS.—Each AC shall 
establish procedures for—  
(A) the receipt, retention, and treatment 
of complaints received by the issuer 
regarding accounting, internal accounting 
controls, or auditing matters; and  
(B) the confidential, anonymous 
submission by employees of the issuer of 
concerns regarding questionable 
accounting or auditing matters.” 
Not specified. 
Power 5: The right to 
have funds available for 
its use 
 
As specified in SOX Section 301 (m) 
“STANDARDS RELATING TO ACS”,  
“(6) FUNDING.—Each issuer shall provide 
for appropriate funding, as determined by 
the AC, in its capacity as a committee of 
the BoD, for payment of compensation—  
(A) to the registered public accounting 
firm employed by the issuer for the 
purpose of rendering or issuing an audit 
report; and  
(B) to any advisors employed by the AC 
under paragraph (5).” 
Not specified. 
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(B.1) Two of the five powers or rights specified in the American system are 
present in the Chinese system: 
(1). China is equipped with the power to appoint or remove external audit agencies: 
both the Anglo-American and the Chinese models specify that the AC is responsible 
for the oversight of the external auditors. The AC is the only body that has the power 
to determine the continuation and termination of the employment of the independent 
auditors and the cost and reward of the auditing activities, as well as all other non-
audit activities provided by the external auditors. This provision improves the 
truthfulness of financial reporting and strengthens the responsibility of supervising the 
independence of the external auditors. The provision that external auditors report to 
the AC instead of the management means that any new situation or development 
significantly enhances the independence of the external audit. The AC also benefits 
from this power in its unhindered communication with the management and the 
external and internal auditors because of its improved independence, objectivity and 
authority.  
(2). The power to independently employ outside experts to assist in the execution of 
tasks: in the US, the AC has the authority to utilise advisers to engage whatever 
independent counsel and other advisers it deems necessary to carry out its duties. Yet 
in China the only stipulated responsibility of the AC includes “to recommend the 
engagement or replacement of the company’s external auditing institutions”. In other 
words, the AC in the US has more powers, and a much wider range in employing 
outside experts.  
(B.2) Three of the five powers or rights specified in the American system are not 
present in the Chinese system: 
(1). China is not equipped with the right to know of complaints about a company: 
without a clear assertion of this right, the AC, having most of its members as 
independent directors who are external to the company, would find it difficult to get 
sufficient and up-to-date information of the company’s record for vigilant and 
informed oversight of the quality of the financial reporting process and the 
effectiveness of its internal control; 
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(2). China has no right of disposition managers: the AC of US can put sufficient 
pressure on the management if it has the power to dispose managers who have acted 
questionably as specified in SOX Section 301 (m) “STANDARDS RELATING TO ACS”, 
“(4) COMPLAINTS. 
(3). China has no right to have funds available for its use: each issuer shall provide for 
appropriate funding, as determined by the AC, in its capacity as a committee of the 
BoD, for payment of compensation to the registered public accounting firm employed 
by the issuer for the purpose of rendering or issuing an audit report; and to any 
advisors employed by the AC.  
Based on the comparison of the powers of the SBs between the Chinese and German 
models, and the powers of ACs between the Chinese and Anglo-American models, 
only two identified powers of SBs and ACs are ever mentioned in Chinese regulations. 
Hence it remains to be seen whether the powers of SBs and ACs should be further 
regulated by legislation in order to strengthen its protection and supervision. 
It is commonly understood that it is important to maintain the balance between the 
powers and the responsibilities of SBs and ACs. It can play its part in overseeing only 
if such balance is maintained. For CG, it is better to have a system in which the body 
that has the controlling right is also the risk-bearer and the body with residual claim. 
This is not the case under the Chinese model, where the AC has the oversight and 
control rights but is not the risk-bearer and does not have residual claim. Furthermore, 
compared to its American counterpart, the AC in the Chinese model does not have the 
right of disposition or the right to know about complaints. This means that in the 
Chinese model there is an imbalance between its powers and responsibilities (see the 
responsibility comparison presented in Table 8), and it becomes difficult for it to 
oversee the internal agents of the directors. 
Size  
The sizes of SBs and ACs are the same: at least 3 members. Under the Company Act 
the minimum number of members of a SB is three, and there is no specification of a 
maximum limit. In comparison, in Germany and Austria the range is 3 – 20 members 
and in France 3 – 12. The actual number is determined by the company, rather than 
the General Meetings of Shareholders, in accordance with the volume of its shares, 
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the number of employees and the relationship between investors and managers, as 
specified in its constitution. The SEC (1999) mandated that ACs consist of a 
minimum of three directors encouraged by the BRC and the accounting profession 
(IIA, 1991). In China the code of CG mandates at least 3 members in ACs – but its 
actual practice is still questionable. The statistics for the size of SBs and ACs across 
China are therefore reserved for more research. The size of supervisory institutions is 
referenced from Yermark (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998); SEC (1999); Xie et al. 
(2003). The size of the supervisory institutions is defined as the independent variable 
to evaluate the effectiveness and operations of supervisory functions. 
Annual Number of Meetings 
Section 56 of the Chinese Company Act stipulates that the SB has to hold at least one 
meeting annually. The international norm is that ACs have to hold at least three or 
four meetings annually. The meeting frequency has been noted as a measure of due 
diligence in executing the supervisory functions. The annual number of meetings of 
the SB and the BoD is defined as the independent variable to evaluate the 
effectiveness of supervisory functions by reference to the studies of McMullen and 
Raghunandan, (1996); Abbott et al. (2000) and DeZoort et al. (2002); Xie et al., 
(2003); Abbott et al., (2004)). The number of meetings including both specified in the 
charter and actually taken in practice can be used to gauge the level of diligence. In 
practice, the distribution of companies may hold different numbers of meetings year 
on year. Therefore, the annual number of meetings of supervisory institutions is 
defined as an independent variable to evaluate the effectiveness and operations of 
supervisory functions.  
According to the comparative study of regulations of rights and the aforementioned 
elements in China and Germany and the US and UK, the following questions are 
raised: 
Key Research Question 1 (1.1):  Which system with or without ACs has more 
effective supervisory functions in China? 
Key Research Question 2 (1.2):  Will the AC contribute to the effectiveness of the 
supervisory functions in China?  
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Key Research Question 3:  What are the operation processes, problems and 
difficulties faced in the implementation of the 
supervisory functions by SBs and ACs in 
empirical practice in China? 
And Sub-Question 1 (2.1):  What is the role of the AC played in China? 
Functional Positions and Responsibilities  
The SBs oversee the BoDs on behalf of the stakeholders. The ACs oversee the 
management on behalf of the BoDs and balance the internal directors within the BoDs. 
A comparison of the functions and responsibilities of the SB and AC is described in 
the Table below. 
Table 8. Comparison of the Functions and Responsibilities of the SB and the AC  
(Source: Author, as supported by reference CSRC and SETC (2002), NPC 
(2006) and SSE (2000)) 
No. The SB The AC 
1 Examining the company’s finance. Auditing the company’s financial information 
and its reporting. 
Examining accounting policies, financial 
conditions and financial reporting procedures 
of the company. 
2 Supervising the directors and senior 
managers in the executions of their 
responsibilities. Giving 
recommendation of the dismissal of 
directors or senior managers on the 
violation of laws, regulations, 
company’s constitution or 
shareholders’ resolutions 
Examining the company’s observation of laws 
and regulations  
3 Demanding corrections from the 
directors or senior managers against 
their harmful behaviours to the 
company 
Examining and supervising the behaviours and 
regulations of the company 
4 Submitting proposals to the general 
meetings of shareholders 
Reviewing the internal control and internal 
auditing functions, supervising the company’s 
Internal Auditing system and its operation.  
5 Proposing the holding of provisional 
the general meetings of 
shareholders. Calling for and hosting 
the general meetings of shareholders 
when the directors fail to do so 
according to the regulation.  
Giving proposals on the hiring or changing 
external auditory institutions; 
Giving recommendations and hiring accounting 
firms; 
Communicating with accounting firms following 
the auditing procedures.  
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No. The SB The AC 
6 Handling legal proceedings against 
the directors or senior managers who 
fail to call the General Meetings of 
Shareholders according to the 
regulations  
Providing communication between the internal 
and external auditing bodies.  
7 Providing supervisory reports as 
important evidences in the 
evaluations of the directors, 
managers and other senior 
management.  
Examining and supervising all forms of risks, 
including financial risks and information 
systems security risks. 
8 Providing supervisory reports directly 
to the BoD and the General Meetings 
of Shareholders; Reporting violations 
of regulations to the CSRC.  
Examining the internal control2 of the company.  
9 Other responsibilities specified in the 
company’s constitutions  
Other responsibilities given by the BoD  
The SB and AC are the supervisory institutions under different CG models. It is 
assumed that incorporating both into one model will result in functional overlaps and 
gaps. As the functions both of ACs and SBs are essentially supervisory, having both 
the AC and the SB may lead to overlapping, redundancy and even conflict between 
the two. From this comparison, it can be seen that there are two areas in which the 
functions of the two institutions overlap. First, both are internal supervisory 
                                               
2
  “Under the COSO Internal Control-Integrated Framework, a widely-used framework in the 
United States, internal control is broadly defined as a process, effected by an entity's board of 
directors, management, and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding 
the achievement of objectives in the following categories: a) Effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations; b) Reliability of financial reporting; and c) Compliance with laws and regulations. 
 COSO defines internal control as having five components: 
(1) Control Environment-sets the tone for the organization, influencing the control 
consciousness of its people. It is the foundation for all other components of internal control. 
(2) Risk Assessment-the identification and analysis of relevant risks to the achievement of 
objectives, forming a basis for how the risks should be managed 
(3) Information and Communication-systems or processes that support the identification, 
capture, and exchange of information in a form and time frame that enable people to carry 
out their responsibilities 
(4) Control Activities-the policies and procedures that help ensure management directives are 
carried out. 
(5) Monitoring-processes used to assess the quality of internal control performance over time. 
 The COSO definition relates to the aggregate control system of the organization, which is 
composed of many individual control procedures.” (Wikipedia, Internal control, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internal_control#Definitions, as of July 2007) 
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institutions focusing on financial supervision. This could confuse the corporate 
structure and could lead to reduce effectiveness of supervision. Second, both are 
responsible for safeguarding against the possibility of illegal behaviour by the 
directors and managers, such as serious improper transactions, and this could cause 
conflict between the operations of both institutions.  
It is therefore questioned:  
Sub-Question 2.2:  What are the overlapping and missing items and 
percentages between the SBs and the ACs in terms 
of functions?  
Service Scope and Hierarchical Level 
The SBs are responsible to broader society, and the scope of its service extends 
beyond the company, as it can report to the China Security Regulatory Commission 
and other institutions. The ACs are responsible to the company and the scope of its 
service is within the company. The SBs report directly to the general meetings of 
shareholders in overseeing the BoDs, and subsequently the AC reports directly to the 
BoDs; its recommendations need to be approved by the BoDs before their 
implementation. Both the ACs and the SBs are the internal supervisory organisation 
of the listed companies. The AC is one of the committees under the jurisdiction of the 
BoDs. The SB is the unit parallel to the BoD. 
There is no vertical relationship between the SB and the AC. Constructive 
interactions between them are yet to be established. In order to construct a perceived 
structure of supervisory mechanism through the interactions of ACs and SBs in 
practice, and to explore the co-ordination between two institutions in their linkage of 
interactions, the following questions are raised:  
Key Research Question 4 (3.1):  How will the two systems with or without ACs 
exist in the future according to framework of 
legislation and management of government? 
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Key Research Question 5 (3.2):  What is the preferred linkage of interactions 
between the SBs and the ACs in terms of 
organisation? 
2.4 The Research Objectives and Questions Identified through the 
Comparisons  
41% of 635 listed companies in China have already established ACs as of the end of 
2007. This raises the assumption that the establishment of ACs reflects a lack of 
public confidence in the effectiveness of SBs. Meanwhile, imposing the singular 
mechanism of ACs on the bipolar supervisory mechanism of SBs in turn raises 
questions about the effectiveness of ACs in China. Therefore, to understand the 
effectiveness of SBs and ACs in China is set as the first objective in this study.  
According to the regulation comparison, the actual practice of the operations of the 
supervisory functions by SBs and ACs in China is set as the second objective, in order 
to explore their operation processes and the problems and difficulties faced in their 
implementation.  
Currently, there is no vertical relationship between the SB and the AC in organisation. 
The constructive interactions between them are yet to be established. In order to 
construct a perceived organisation structure of internal supervisory mechanisms of 
the interactions of the SB and the AC in practice, the priority is to explore the co-
ordination between two institutions in functions, which inevitably have overlaps and 
gaps. Revealing the actual co-ordination of SBs and ACs is set as the third objective 
of this thesis.  
Through the comparison of the laws and regulations between SBs and ACs in China, 
the research questions and corresponding research objectives are summarised in the 
list and table below. 
Objective 1:  To understand the effectiveness of SBs and ACs in China 
Question 1.1:  Which system with or without ACs has more effective 
supervisory functions in China? 
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Question 1.2:  Will the AC contribute to the effectiveness of the supervisory 
functions in China?  
Objective 2:  To understand how the operations of SBs and ACs improve the 
effectiveness of supervisory governance functions in China. 
Question 2:  What are the operation processes, problems and difficulties faced 
in the implementation of the supervisory functions by SBs and 
ACs in empirical practice in China? 
Sub-Question 2.1:  What is the role of AC played in China? 
Sub-Question 2.2:  What are the overlapping and missing items and percentages 
between the SBs and the ACs in terms of functions?  
 
Objective 3:  To understand the co-ordination between SBs and ACs in terms 
of organization in China. 
Question 3.1:  How will the two systems with or without ACs exist in the future 
according to framework of legislation and management of 
government? 
Question 3.2:  What is the preferred linkage of interactions between the SBs and 
the ACs in terms of organisation? 
Table 9. Research Objectives and Questions 
(Source: Author) 





Which system with or without ACs 
has more effective supervisory 
functions in China? 
1.2  
Will the AC contribute to the 
effectiveness of the supervisory 
functions in China? 
Objective 2: To understand how the operations of SBs and ACs improve the 




2. What are the operation processes, problems and difficulties faced in the 
implementation of the supervisory functions by SBs and ACs in empirical 
practice in China? 
Sub- 
Questions 
(2.1 & 2.2): 
 
2.1  
What is the role of the AC played 
in China? 
 
2.2 What are the overlapping and 
missing items and percentages between 
the SBs and the ACs in terms of 
functions? 
Objective 3:  To understand the co-ordination between SBs and ACs in terms of 
organization in China 
Key 
Questions 
(4 & 5) 
3.1  
How will the two systems with or 
without ACs exist in the future 
according to framework of 
legislation and management of 
government? 
3.2  
What is the preferred linkage of 
interactions between the SBs and the 
ACs in terms of organisation? 
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Chapter 3 Research Theory and Literature Review 
3.1 Research Theory 
3.1.1 Introduction  
The theory is under development rather than finalised, and the theory is applied in 
certain purpose with certain condition, so the theory is not almighty, cannot be 
applied in every condition, nor can be worked out in every environment (Wang, 2005). 
The theory is developed in certain condition by the human being, so it is essentially 
limited, but the theory can have critical influence when there are problems to be 
solved. Robert W. Hamilton (1971) states that the nature of the corporation is not final, 
but changes as soon as conditions are different. Therefore, it depends on the problems 
to be solved. Different CG theory will have its specific value, but every theory has its 
own limitation, so certain eras and certain conditions need certain CG theory.  
The World Bank (1993) reports that the CG mechanism covers two parts of internal 
and external mechanism respectively. The internal mechanism mainly solves the 
relationship and structure problems among stockholders, directors and managers, such 
as the internal supervisory mechanism and inspiration mechanism. The external 
mechanism constitutes the external power to impact and control the behaviour and 
performance of the company, mainly covering two powers of the market and 
governance. Chang (1999) also acknowledges this: “The narrow definition indicates 
the system arrangements relating to the company’s functions, structures of BoD, and 
the powers of the stockholders; the broad definition indicates a whole set of legal, 
culture and system arrangements relating to the company’s control rights and the 
residual demanding right for allocation.” OECD (1999) defines the structure of CG 
involving a series of relationships among the company’s managers, BoD, stockholders 
and the other stakeholders. The position of the stockholders among the series of 
relationships is outstanding in the “Principles of CG” issued by OECD: one approach 
is to protect the rights of the stockholders; another approach is to request the BoD to 
take responsibilities for the stockholders. The narrow definition of CG structure 
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defines the shareholders as the target for protection; the broad definition of CG 
structure defines the stakeholders as this target. 
The internal supervisory mechanism in connection with the effectiveness, operations 
and co-ordination of SBs (SBs) and ACs (ACs) in China is the key research objective 
for this thesis, as stated in the chapter of Research Questions. The effectiveness, 
operations and co-ordination of SBs and ACs may be explained by different 
theoretical perspectives. The various theories on CG seem ambitious in trying to 
explain the role of acting supervisory functions.  
This section’s study of research theories starts with an interactive model of CG 
structure, then moves on to clarify the relevant theories’ influence upon the current 
internal supervisory mechanism of CG. The research theory is then reasoned and 
concluded with a summary of research theories applied in this thesis. 
3.1.2 An Interactive Model of Corporate Governance Structure 
An interactive model expressing the interactions amongst the political institutions, 
product markets, capital markets, stakeholders, shareholders, firms, BoD, SBs, ACs, 
internal auditors, external auditors, managers and employees is shown in the figure 1: 
 
Figure 1. An Interactive Model of CG Structure 
(Source: Author’s adaptation of Yakasai (2001)) 
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The shareholders, BoD, SBs, ACs internal auditors, managers and employees 
comprise the relationships within the company and interact within the CG structure. 
Many aspects of legal, economic, political, social and other forces continually involve 
in these interactions. This figure can help us to better understand the impact on the 
current internal supervisory mechanism and help to explore the future in attempting to 
improve the level of understanding of CG. The theories related to the CG of the 
company could enrich the benefits of every party. The various theories on CG are 
then studied and analysed as the following.  
3.1.3 The Theories on Internal Supervisory Mechanism of Corporate 
Governance  
The following theories of CG will now be referred to individually:  
(a) Shareholder Theory (Agency) 
(b) Stakeholder Theory  
(c) Managerial Hegemony Theory 
(d) Political Model Theory  
(e) Institutional Ownership Theory  
(f) Stewardship Theory  
(g) Resource Dependency Theory 
Shareholders 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) refer to moral hazards arising from conflicts of interest in 
the relationship between owners and managers. A basic assumption under agency 
theory is that managers will act opportunistically to further their own interests before 
that of shareholders, and that there are agency costs to keeping managers’ interests 
aligned with those of the owners. Fama and Jensen (1983) further point out that CG 
research should focus on agency problems and how to reduce agents’ costs. On the 
other hand, Shleifer and Veshny (1997) state, “The problem is that most future 
contingencies are too hard to describe and foresee, and as a result, complete contracts 
are technologically unfeasible” – but a basic conclusion of agency theory is that the 
value of a firm cannot be maximised because managers possess discretions which 
allow them to expropriate value to themselves. They emphasise that CG should be 
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established to safeguard the financial capital from investors and lenders, and to 
protect the returns on investment from that capital. In other words, they maintain the 
core task of CG is to ensure the capital suppliers' interests. The shareholder model, 
applied in the UK and the US, shows that when shareholder wealth is maximised, 
social wealth will also be maximised. 
Shareholder's theory suggests that when the executives of enterprises are the same 
bodies as the owners of enterprises, they both have the right to ask for the enterprise’s 
entire surplus, and are therefore motivated to work hard. When the executives of 
enterprises are different bodies from the owners of enterprises, it can give rise to 
proxy shareholder problems. The harder the agent works, the higher the cost of the 
agent’s fee. The larger the incomes of enterprises, the more profits the owner will 
make, wherein the agent may become discontent, which may cause inevitable conflict 
of interests on both sides. The shareholder's proxy theory suggests that since the agent 
has more information than the shareholder there is an information asymmetry that 
may affect the shareholder’s rights. The relationships between the agent, the 
shareholders and the executives can be defined as a contract and, because of the 
incompleteness of the contract, problems under agency theory are unavoidable. 
Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) state managers are pressured to produce immediate 
results, thus ignoring investments that could have long payback periods. Shareholder's 
proxy theory argues that the following four basic problems exist (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976):  
(1) Since the executives pursue their own interests, there is no reason or evidence 
indicating that they are unselfish, or that they will keep unanimity with the 
shareholder's interests naturally; 
(2) There can be information asymmetry – no-one can have complete information, 
information is distributed between the individuals; it is likely that those inside the 
company (such as the BoD) will have more information than those outside (such 
as shareholders);  
(3) The risk of moral problems and reverse choice may exist. It is supposed that since 
the agents are prone to opportunism, this will result in the agent post being 
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neglected in the course of acting for, incurring damage to and encroaching on the 
shareholders’ interests;  
(4) The market environment is full of uncertainty, making it difficult to judge whether 
the agent's behaviour indicates his having worked hard or not.  
Cochran and Wartic (1988) asserted that CG solves specific problems through 
interaction among senior executives, shareholders, the BoD and other relevant parties 
within a company. In order to solve the aforementioned four basic problems of 
shareholder’s proxy theory, the mechanism of CG can be improved through the triple 
channels of 1) restraint, 2) incentive and 3) recruitment of the right agent for reaching 
the goal of maximizing shareholder's interests.  
1. The agent's restraint / supervision problem: The main theme of CG is to maintain 
mutual checks and balances between shareholders and managers within a company. 
The reason for this is that the agents and shareholders have the following information 
asymmetry problems:  
(1) The agents understand their own ability and partiality far better than the 
shareholders;  
(2)  The behaviour of the agents is hard to judge when based only on appearance;  
(3) The agents understand far more clearly than the shareholders regarding:  
(a)  The true state of the company's external environment,  
(b)  The market change and  
(c)  Internal operation.  
The information asymmetry increases the degree of difficulty for shareholders to 
supervise the agent and this in turn increases the cost of supervision. 
2. The agent's incentive problem: Fama and Jensen (1983) believe that the past and 
present performance of managers will determine their future value in the market for 
management staff. The pressure of competition will compel the manager to work 
harder, thus reducing the agency cost and increasing the likelihood that the manager 
will seek a larger incentive. 
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3. The agent's recruitment problem: Developing human resources is a very important 
way in which the value of an enterprise is created and increased. Since the manager's 
ability is difficult to assess, a major challenge for owners is to design a set of 
mechanisms for distinguishing and selecting managers to recruit the most loyal and 
most competent managers, and to make them wholly responsible to the investors.  
Shareholder’s proxy problems not only exist among the shareholders and managers, 
but also between minority and large shareholders, also known as ‘control 
shareholders’ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Normally, the minority shareholders have 
no will to participate in shareholders' meetings. Therefore, a problem develops as to 
who is going to control supervision in respect of shareholders and managers, which 
explains why it is more difficult to protect the interests of shareholders. The control of 
shareholders might deprive other shareholders of their utilities in much of the same 
way that the managers might deprive shareholders of their utilities. These two kinds 
of agency problems are often interlinked. The mechanism of CG is therefore to solve 
these two kinds of agency problems and to determine which mechanism can be 
regarded as a security measure for the protection of minority shareholders from the 
larger ones. In other words, it is mandated to protect the external body of shareholders 
from encroachment by the internal management and control shareholders.  
Since the interests of the shareholders and managers are usually inconsistent, the 
mechanism of CG is used to alleviate the proxy problems between them. Its essence is 
to protect shareholder's interests from being infringed upon, and at its core is a set of 
rules and systems to provide protection for shareholders and to guarantee that 
shareholders can receive fair repayment from their investment. The owners’ checks 
and balances on the managers are performed through the supervisory mechanism of 
CG. Shareholder’s proxy theory is especially focused on the internal supervisory 
mechanism within the company, with a view to analysing the internal structure and 
internal relationships within the enterprise, which are not controlled by market 
strength. In essence, it is a kind of internal agreement, in that the shareholders hold 
the decision-making power to change the management team members’ qualification, 
the corporate structure and the disbanding of the company. The aim is to design a 
good mechanism with the power of checks and balances to maximise the company's 
value. 
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Modern enterprises regarded combining internal management levels as the foundation 
of expanding business on a large scale; and therefore considered the division of the 
rights of control between ownership and management to be the essential feature. The 
difficulty lies in the balancing of ownership rights between owners (shareholders) and 
managers, for if this problem is not managed through an effective CG mechanism to 
resolve any imbalance in interests and information inconsistency, it will further 
escalate to involve the potential agency problem from the commission’s management 
level of the company linkage. Eisenhardt (1989) assumes that managers are 
opportunists intent on gaining self-satisfaction instead of maximising profit on behalf 
of the principal, so she points out there is potential conflict of interest of risk sharing 
between the enterprises and agents. Furthermore, she argues that agency theory has a 
clear implication for the monitoring and control role of the BoD but its position 
regarding the strategy role is not definite. Zahra and Peace (1989) highlight the 
importance of the BoD role in establishing guidelines for operations and effective 
control. Fama (1980) states the BoD is viewed as “the ultimate internal monitor of the 
set of contracts called a firm”. Hill (1995) concludes that agency theory does have 
implications for the strategy role of BoDs on the meaning of corporate control. 
McNulty and Pettigrew (1999: 50) comment that “little has been said by agency 
theorists about strategy as a means of control over managers.” 
It is generally acknowledged that the British and the American CG models fall under 
the category of the shareholders’ model (Wang, 2005). This shareholders’ agency 
model shows that when their wealth is maximised, social wealth will also be 
maximised. China adopted the ACs of the British and American CG system. ACs are 
established for the purpose of strengthening the internal supervisory mechanism to 
safeguard the interests of all shareholders, particularly the small ones.  
Stakeholders 
Fort and Schipani (2000) defined stakeholder theory of CG as ensuring the conditions 
of the responsibilities to the various stakeholders to create value and co-ordinate the 
management levels among various stakeholders including stockholders, employees, 
customers, creditors, suppliers, competitors, even the whole society. 
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Freeman (1984: 31) argues, “A stakeholder in an organisation is any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s 
objective”; and “those groups without whose support the organisation would cease to 
exist.” On the other hand, Blair and Machlary (1995) suggested that the interested 
parties are all those who contributed to the special purpose assets to the enterprise, 
and who become persons or groups to bear the result of risk investment. Moreover, 
Aggestam (2001) reports that stakeholders are involved in the operation of the firm as 
both contributors and recipients of benefits. Depending on the state of a company, in 
the case of normal management, the ownership of the company belongs to its 
shareholders. In the case of a state of bankruptcy, the ownership of the company is 
relegated to its creditors as the first order to claim on the company’s assets. Should 
the company be unable to pay the salaries of its staffs, the staffs become the legitimate 
controllers of the company. From the perspective of forming the company, relations 
with its suppliers and other cooperative partners shape the invisible cooperation that 
can help to continually reduce the cost of investment. The company, consumers and 
distributors form a reliable relationship, which can help to maintain a high rate of 
employment, so that the company’s existence and development, and the stakeholders, 
including the shareholders, creditors, staff, suppliers and consumers, are all closely 
related. Porter (1992: 17) suggests the “nominat[ing of] significant owners, customers, 
suppliers, employees, and community representatives to the BoD”. 
Clarkson (1994: 322) defines stakeholder theory in these terms: “The firm is a system 
of stakeholders operating within the larger system of the host society that provides the 
necessary legal and market infrastructure for the firm’s activities. The purpose of the 
firm is to create wealth or value for its stake holders by converting their stakes into 
goods and services.” Sternberg (1997) reports stakeholder theory as the doctrine that 
enterprises should be run not for the financial benefit of their owners but for the 
benefit of all their stakeholders. Though there is no agreed definition of stakeholder 
theory, the term is widely described as the duty of the management to take into 
account the interests of anyone who has a significant “stake” in the firm (Rose and 
Mejer, 2003). Jones and Wicks (1999) state that the theory is concerned with the 
nature of these relationships in terms of both processes and outcomes and focuses on 
managerial decision-making; the interest of all legitimate stakeholders have intrinsic 
value, and no set of interests is assumed to dominate others. Therefore, stakeholders’ 
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theory has suggested that a company should allow other stakeholders in addition to 
shareholders to participate in CG (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997; Hart, 1995).  
Stakeholders’ theory starts from a more extensive perspective observing the problems 
of CG, in order to attain an overview of the conflict of interest between the 
shareholders and stakeholders. The shareholders’ interests lie in the protection of the 
interests of shareholders or minority shareholders, while the view of stakeholders’ 
interest is to maximise the company’s interests by emphasizing the internalization of 
the external stakeholders. Therefore, stakeholders' theory emphasises a specific set of 
rules and mechanisms to guarantee every stakeholder gets fair repayment on the 
investment in enterprises, and to protect those investors who offer external funds to 
the company. The stakeholders’ theory also presents a set of rules and mechanisms to 
protect shareholders and creditors from deprivation by management and internal 
individuals.  
Clarke and Clegg (1998) write that “stakeholder theory is not just a moral imperative 
but a commercial necessity in a world where competitive advantage stems more and 
more form the intangible values embodied in human and social capital”. They also 
mention that enterprises should survive public supervision if the companies take into 
account long-term interests. Theoretically speaking, a company exists because it is a 
subject of responsibility as well as value creation. In other words, a company bears 
certain responsibilities to society to create wealth for the shareholders and society at 
the same time. While the process of the company’s existence and development should 
consider the shareholder's interests, it must also consider the balance across other 
stakeholders’ interests in order to realise a multiple win solution.  
The German and Japanese CG models have been identified as stakeholders’ models 
(Wang, 2005). Both models provide the possible means to liberate the management 
teams from shareholder pressure. Furthermore, the stakeholder model provides more 
rights and influence in the running of the company to interest groups, such as banks, 
customers, the general public and employees, who are not necessarily owners, 
including influencing the BoD. China adopted the SB of the German and Japanese 
systems in order to balance the interests of both large and minority shareholders 
through the shareholders meeting election of staff representatives to the SB.  
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Managerial Hegemony Theory  
Managerial hegemony theory mainly asserted that the BoD is a legal fiction and 
dominated by professional management in the organisation (Mace, 1971; Vance, 1983; 
Lorsch and Maclver, 1989). “The BoD is an important ceremonial and legal fiction.” 
(Drucker, 1974) Most boards only perform effectively during the period of crisis 
(Mace, 1971; Clendenin, 1972). Hung (1998) adds that the governing board of a 
company serves simply as a “rubber stamp”. Whisler (1984) and Lorsch (1989) state 
that directors are constrained from setting strategies although they would often like to 
get involved. Ingley and van der Walt (2001) prove that, in practice, boards are not 
involved in setting up strategies. It may be due to boards lacking, in relative terms at 
least, the required knowledge of the organisation (Hung, 1998).  
Some points have been ascribed for explaining managerial hegemony theory as 
follows:  
(1) On the assumption of the separation of ownership and control (Berle and 
Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), a state of diffuse ownership 
pattern perhaps lead to relative weakness in shareholder control, so as to give 
management a relatively stronger foothold over the board’s control of the 
company.  
(2) By the nature of information asymmetry between non-executive directors and 
management, clearly the management holds an advantage over in-house 
information. A board principally composed of non-executive directors would 
be deemed more passive regarding the activities and information within the 
company than the management.  
(3) Internal directors rely on the decision of the chief executive officer (CEO) for 
compensation and career advancement, and invariably report to him in 
practice. In this circumstance, it is unavoidable that the internal directors 
support the CEO at board level, which reduces the effectiveness of BoD by 
rendering the balance of power against external directors. Moreover, the 
management may escalate their influence in order to control the board. 
(4) Managers can also use retained earnings to decide financial investment 
independently (Mizruchi, 1983; Byrd et al., 1998), allowing them to reduce 
control from the board.  
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(5) In most instances, the management handpick the board members (Pfeffer, 
1972); therefore, the board directors are deemed to be in control by the 
management for selection processes.  
Similarly, Herman (1981) states that the board only plays a superficial review and 
approval role, likened to a “rubber-stamp” function.  
Some studies stand against managerial hegemony theory. Zeitlin (1974) argues that 
the growth of ownership by the large shareholders and interlocking directorships 
considerably reduce the ability of management to control boards. Mizruchi (1983) 
argues with some vehemence that the board has ultimate control over the management 
through their designated right to hire or fire the CEO. Therefore, Stiles and Taylor 
(2001) conclude that empirical support for hegemony theory is limited, emphasising 
its dependence on the definition of the term “control”.  
Political Model Theory  
Political model theory is defined as an approach “… in which active investors seek to 
change corporate policy by developing voting support from dispersed shareholders, 
rather than by simply purchasing voting power or control” (Pound, 1993). “This new 
form of governance based on politics rather than finance will provide a means of 
oversight that is both far more effective and far less expensive than the takeovers of 
the 1980s” (Pound, 1992). Accordingly, “an understanding of the political 
marketplace is essential to appreciate the role that capital-market mechanism can play 
in CG” (Gundfest, 1993).  
In essence, political model theory stresses how governments favour their various 
constituencies, so that stakeholders influence allocations of corporate power, 
privileges and profits between owners, managers and other stakeholders. At the micro 
level, this is subject to the macro framework, which is interactively subjected to the 
influence of the corporate sector.  
Compared to Western societies, CG – especially with regard to the internal 
supervisory mechanism – developed over a relatively short period of time in China. It 
developed as a consequence of the reform and transition from a planned economy to a 
socialist market one. Within China’s unique political environment, the settlement and 
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development of internal supervisory mechanisms has several characteristics. It has 
been subject to the external pressure of “government behaviour” (Zhuang, 1997). It is 
important for companies to establish and improve the self-control system in this 
period of transformation in China. Jou (1997) asserts that “at that time, such 
compulsory means was necessary for the open door policy, and was essential under 
the condition when the planned economy was turning to a market economy.”  
Institutional Ownership  
Institutional Ownership theory mainly argues that, as institutional shareholdings are 
so large, it is difficult to switch their invested capital from one firm to another. As a 
result, they play an important role in the decision-making processes of the firms in 
which they have invested (Changati and Damanpour, 1991). The key concept of this 
theory is the logic that the greater concentrated shareholders have greater impact upon 
the BoD. Changati and Damanpour (1991), argue that stocks owned by institutional 
investors are significantly associated with return on equity (RoE). Duggal and Millar 
(1999) find a positive relationship between bidder gains and institutional ownership, 
and that institutional ownership is greatly determined by firm size, insider ownership 
and the firm’s presence in the S&P 500 Index. Yet, Duggal and Millar (1999) and 
Craswell, Taylor and Saywell (1997) do not find evidence to support the idea that 
institutional ownership is an important determinant of corporate performance, and 
even no relationship at all between institutional ownership and firm performance.  
In respect of supervisory function, the control over managers under institutional 
ownership theory is featured as a special background, influenced by concentrated 
shareholders. Institutional ownership theory can be viewed as a part of the political 
model theory to enhance the understanding of the background in influencing the 
control policy.  
Stewardship Theory  
The concept of stewardship theory derived from psychology and sociology and linked 
to the managerial behaviour literature (MaClelland, 1961; Argyris, 1964; Herzberg, 
1966). Donaldson (1990: 375) stresses that managers are motivated by “a need to 
achieve, to gain intrinsic satisfaction through successfully performing inherently 
challenging work, to exercise responsibility and authority, and thereby gain 
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recognition from peers and bosses”. Under stewardship theory, achieving high 
performance and the ability to use a high level of discretion to act for the benefit of 
shareholders are viewed as the key interest of managers (Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  
Collectively, stewardship theory is considered within non-financial motives of 
managerial behaviour, which is opposed to that taken by agency theory. Perrow (1986: 
234) argues the limitation of the shareholder agency theory, as it neglects “the 
enormous amount of neutral and other-regarding behaviour that exists…and the 
structures that might increase it”. This suggests that shareholder agency theory should 
enhance the relationship between the management and shareholder by providing a 
vivid and complete picture. Donaldson and Davis (1994) summarise the main features 
of stewardship theory in these terms: “Managers are good stewards of the 
corporations and diligently work to attain high levels of corporate profit and 
shareholder’s returns”. Furthermore, they assert that “managers are principally 
motivated by achievement and responsibility needs” and “given the needs of 
managers for responsible, self-directed work; organisations may be better served to 
free managers from subservience to non-executive director dominated boards”.  
Davis et al. (1997) stress that stewardship theory “relies heavily on trust, between 
principles and managers”. The directors can be trusted and will act as stewards over 
resources of the enterprise because the directors’ fiduciary duties are based on 
stewardship theory under English law (Tricker, 1996) The trust concept of 
stewardship theory is opposed to the checks and balances concept by “monitoring and 
control” of agency theory.  
Hawley and Williams (1996) highlight stewardship theory in relation to the board 
structure as, “the logical extension in either towards an executive-dominated board or 
towards no board at all”. McGregor (1967: 145) states, “With a group, leader, or 
course, he is in effect saying that the goals and values associated with that cause have 
become his own. He then self-consciously directs his efforts towards those goals.” 
Managers identify themselves by gaining intrinsic satisfaction through their 
achievement. Therefore, a positive view of control and monitoring among owners and 
managers under stewardship theory has developed, whereby the relationship between 
shareholders and managers is not in conflict. Rather, managers actively pursue 
business challenges in order to meet shareholders expectations. This contrasts with 
Page 68 PhD Thesis, University of Manchester Pao-Chen Lee 
shareholder agency theory, which advocates goal conflicts by the control structure of 
the separation of ownership and management. Burton (2000) distinguishes the 
difference between stewardship theory and shareholder theory by stressing that the 
former focuses on trust rather than monitoring; involvement rather than control and 
intrinsic non- financial motives rather than extrinsic motivations generally understood 
to be of a financial nature. Therefore, external control mechanisms are not necessary 
in order to impact upon the interest of owners (Argyris, 1990). Dulewicz and Herbert 
(2004) argue that management arrives at the required scope and latitude to implement 
effective control by allowing the required levels of co-ordination to be achieved.  
However, criticisms of stewardship theory are unavoidable. Tricker (1994: 56) states 
it “ignores the dynamics of boards, inter-personal perceptions of roles and the effect 
of board leadership”. Tricker focuses on the lack of knowledge or causal explanation 
regarding to organisational life, for example the interplay of power, conflict and 
ideology. Clarke (2005) doubts the efficacy of stewardship theory, given it was 
exemplified in Enron’s demise.  
Resource Dependency Theory  
Pettigrew (1992) argues that both sociology and management doctrines are derived, in 
order to form the concept of resource dependence theory. This theory is based on the 
concept of cooptation, focusing in particular on the attempts by BoDs to create the 
appropriate linkage with the environment for the expansion of the enterprise. Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978) add that, “when an organisation appoints an individual to a board, 
it expects the individual will come to support the organisation, will concern himself 
with its problems, will favourably present it to others, and will try to aid it”. The BoD 
is deemed to hold the key role of being co-operative mechanisms for the organisation 
to link the environment to access important resources and to buffer organisations 
against adverse environmental change (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pearce and Zahra, 
1991; Goodstein et al., 1994).  
Ingley and Van der Walt (2001) state the nature of resource means the connection to a 
nation’s elite, industrial intelligence and competitors, market or capital. Further, inter-
organisational linkage such as the appointment of outside directors and boardroom 
interlocutors can also be used to manage environmental contingencies (Muth and 
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Donaldson 1998). Price (1963) and Zald (1967) state that the board is viewed as the 
helper to the organisation by influencing their other constituencies on behalf of the 
focal organisation. The professions and communities of the directors can provide the 
resources within organisations. Overall, resources linkage by means of boards is 
aimed to maximise its performance (Zald, 1969; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978).  
From such linkages, four types of organisational benefits are defined by Bazerman 
and Schoorman (1983):  
(a) Building reputation – Useem (1984) asserts that the BoD can affect the 
organisation’s reputation and the organisation is seen to be linked. 
(b) Expertise Accessing – Mizruchi and Stearns (1988); Stearns and Mizruchi 
(1993) state that directors are likely to possess skills that could be beneficial to 
the focal organisation in terms of financial, technological or prior work 
experience with competitors. The background of the directors among external 
directors is expected to support resource dependence theory (Van der Walt and 
Ingley, 2003).  
(c) Horizontal co-ordination – a level of environmental awareness not readily 
available to management is achieved by exchanging information on topics of 
concern, providing opportunities of communication among directors and 
management (Bazerman and Schoorman, 1983). 
(d) Vertical co-ordination – in order to reduce the uncertainty about the 
availability of resources and even perhaps secure favourable treatment for the 
organisation, vertical linkage to its suppliers is vitally beneficial to the 
organisation (Bazerman and Schoorman (1983). 
Criticisms about resource dependence theory have been raised: for example, the role 
of boards in potentially obtaining resources rather than being involved in exploiting 
them (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Hung, 1998). Therefore, it is suggested that 
boards serve as a “strategic consultant to top mangers rather than (or in addition to) 
exercising independent control” (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). Overall, the 
shortcomings of resource dependence theory centre upon several activities of the 
boards: namely, providing advice (Lorsch and dMaclver 1989; Westphal 1999); 
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monitoring (Fama, 1980; Bainbridge, 1993; Johnson, Daily et al., 1996); and 
strategizing (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989; Kesner and Johnson, 1990).  
3.1.4 The Reasons of Research Theories Applied in this Thesis  
Stiles and Taylor (2001) point out that no single perspective adequately explains this 
strategy role though managerial, stewardship, agency and resource dependence 
theories provide insight into the strategy role. They summarise that: “The view that 
one theory by itself does not illuminate the whole spectrum of board endeavour 
receives strong support from examination of their shortcomings”. “It is not a matter of 
agency theory or stewardship theory or resource dependence theory. Rather each 
theory has a contribution to make to governance debate” (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).  
The two principal theories relied upon in this thesis are Shareholder and Stakeholder 
theories. 
Shareholder Theory  
Shareholder theory implies a need for supervisory functions, as managers cannot 
be trusted to act in the interests of shareholders. Since 2002, China has allowed a 
voluntary choice for listed companies to establish the British or the American 
system of ACs. Wang (2005) argues that the AC’s CG system in the US and UK 
is categorised as shareholder agency theory. The proxy (shareholder) theory is key 
in the research of CG. In particular, the importance of ACs’ functions is 
highlighted by the assumptions of proxy theory. This research is based on the 
shareholders’ agency theory, as a foundation with which to understand the 
effectiveness and operations of the ACs in China. It is also hoped to consolidate 
this shareholders’ agency theory through this research. 
Stakeholder Theory 
Wang (2005) believes that the SB’s CG system in Germany and Japan is considered 
within stakeholder theory. This theory suggests the company’s supervisory function 
should be enhanced: in order to expand to related stakeholders on top of taking care of 
shareholders. Since the beginning of 1993, the internal supervisory mechanism of CG 
in China has adopted the German and the Japanese system of SBs. This research will 
be applied to stakeholder theory, so as to explore the existence of an internal 
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supervisory mechanism of CG in China, with the purpose of gaining benefits for all 
stakeholders: not merely the major shareholders.  
Shareholders and stakeholders are identified as the key links in the reliability of 
financial reporting quality, internal control3 and auditing. Most of all, they expect the 
SBs and ACs to supervise the tendency to manipulate the monitoring process of 
financial reporting, internal control and auditing. From the theoretical perspective of 
applying stakeholder and shareholder (proxy) theories, shareholders and stakeholders 
expect effective monitoring by the internal supervisory mechanism. They also expect 
the existing system of the SB in China to be adequate as a monitoring agency. Hence, 
the impact of the AC on the interaction with SBs of internal supervisory mechanism 
in China needs to be analysed and an assessment made of its effectiveness in practice, 
since a gap exists between the regulations and standards and actual practice (Spira and 
Page, 2003). 
Other Approaches:  
Managerial Hegemony Theory 
Managerial hegemony theory asserted that the BoD is really a legal fiction and is 
dominated by professional management in the organisation (Mace, 1971; Vance, 1983; 
Lorsch and Maclver, 1989). This thesis aims to understand whether SBs and ACs can 
develop their supervisory functions with effectiveness in China. In this thesis, 
managerial hegemony theory is viewed as a fair basis with which to examine whether 
SBs and ACs in China only provide a rubber stamp function; or whether they can 
fulfil their defined “control” function of effectiveness.  
                                               
3
  The definition of Internal Control by the COSO Report (COSO 1992): “Internal control is 
broadly defined as a process, effected by an entity's board of directors, management and other 
personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in 
the following categories: 1. Effectiveness and efficiency of operations. 2. Reliability of financial 
reporting. 3. Compliance with applicable laws and regulations.” 
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Political Model Theory 
Political model theory is “based on politics rather than finance” and introduces the 
significant impact of the political environment by influencing the policy. It is 
probably best viewed in terms of complementing stakeholder theory, by controlling 
the relative power of each group. In this thesis, by applying the Anglo-American ACs 
system and German SBs in China, their effectiveness in China may be found to be 
different from what might be expected. Therefore, the macro framework of the 
political background of China will be explored, to understand and explain her unique 
circumstances and structures.  
Institutional Ownership Theory  
Shareholder ownership status is more centralised in China than the US and UK. Yet, 
developing countries seem more driven by the Anglo-American model. Concentrated 
shareholding may impact upon the effectiveness of supervisory functions if 
developing countries successfully adopt the Anglo-American model. Institutional 
ownership theory enables this thesis to reveal concentrated shareholding status as a 
basis with which to study the impact and effectiveness of ACs and SBs in China.  
Stewardship Theory  
Stewardship theory stresses that managers are driven by self-motivation, opposed to 
that taken by shareholders and stakeholders theories. Donaldson and Davis (1994) 
summarise the main features of the stewardship theory as asserting that “Managers are 
principally motivated by achievement and responsibility needs” and “given the needs 
of managers for responsible, self-directed work, organisations may be better served to 
free managers from subservience to non-executive director dominated boards”. This 
thesis is focused on the monitoring function, which is not the idea behind stewardship 
theory.  
Resources Dependence Theory  
The resources dependence theory suggests that boards serve as a “strategic consultant 
to top mangers rather than (or in addition to) exercising independent control” 
(Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). It is hard to refute the expectations of the members 
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of ACs and SBs to bring benefits to their organisations, for it is an invisible asset, 
which may raise the enterprises’ reputation, expertise, co-ordination and connection, 
in order to earn more resources. But this thesis questions the role of the AC played in 
China. The AC is one of the sub-committees in BoDs. Resource dependency theory 
highlights that the role of boards expands the outward-looking boundary, in order to 
enhance a business. This theory will be applied, in order to assess whether the AC’s 
contribution in China can bring added value or provide extra service to the company, 
in addition to executing independent control. 
3.1.5 A Summary of Research Theories Applied in this Thesis 
The shareholder and stakeholder theories are the principal theories relied upon in this 
thesis while the other approaches of managerial hegemony, political, institutional and 
resources dependence theory have been included to provide background perspective 
on the approaches applied in the literature. This thesis aims to explore whether ACs 
are underpinned by a separation of ownership and control: the origin of agency theory. 
Fama (1980) comments that separation of ownership and control can be explained 
because of efficient forms of economic organisation. Furthermore, this thesis 
concentrates on the structure of the SB system, within which stakeholder theory is 
considered to take care of the interest of not only shareholders but stakeholders too. In 
turn, this will guide the thesis to study employee impact relative to the effectiveness 
of SBs and the co-ordination between SBs and ACs in China. Managerial hegemony 
theory forms the concept with which to study the effectiveness of supervisory 
functions, so it can be evaluated whether SBs and ACs in China merely act as rubber 
stamps. Political model theory and institutional ownership theory both lead this study 
to introduce the political and shareholding background for supporting the 
aforementioned and applied theories, in order to understand and explain the research 
findings. Resources dependence theory is used, to assess whether the contribution of 
ACs in China is limited in exercising independent control only; or whether ACs can 
verify resources dependence theory, by acting as consultant or providing extra 
services in China. 
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Table 10. A Summary of Research Theories Applied in this Thesis  
(Source: Author, as supported by reference contained within) 
Item Research Theory  The Reasons Applied in This Thesis 
Principal theories: shareholder and stakeholder theories  
1 Shareholder / 
Agency 
The AC is deemed to play a monitoring and control function in 
safeguarding the interest of shareholders because manager is 
assumed to act opportunistically to further their own interest 
before that of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
In this thesis, this theory forms the basis for introducing ACs into 
China, acting as the monitoring role to enhance the existing SBs 
with high expectation for AC’s performance in effectiveness.  
2 Stakeholder  Freeman (1984, page 31) defines “A stakeholder in an 
organisation is any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objective” 
Porter (1992, page 17) suggested to “nominate significant 
owners, customers, suppliers, employees, and community 
representatives to the BoD”. 
Wang (2005) analyses that the SB’s CG system in Germany and 
Japan is considered as stakeholder theory. 
In this thesis, this theory provides the basis for reasoning the SB 
serves as the key role of supervisory functions in China since 
1993 though AC has been introduced since 2002. 
The other approaches: managerial hegemony, political, institutional and resources 
dependence theory in this thesis 
3 Managerial 
hegemony  
The BoD is only a legal fiction and is dominated by professional 
management in the organisation (Mace 1971; Vance 1983; 
Lorsch and Maclver 1989). 
Hung (1998) adds that the governing board of a company 
serves simply as a “rubber stamp”. 
In this thesis, this theory is founded as the basis for studying the 
effectiveness of SBs and ACs in China.  
4 Political model  “..Governance based on politics rather than finance will provide 
a means of oversight” (Pound 1992). Therefore, “an 
understanding of the political marketplace is essential to 
appreciate the role that capital-market mechanism can play in 
CG” (Gundfest 1993). 
In this thesis, this theory provides the basis to introduce the 
background especially related to the internal supervisory 
mechanism of CG in China.  
5 Institutional 
ownership 
Institutional Ownership theory mainly defines the institutional 
shareholdings are so large that it is difficult to switch their 
invested capital from one firm to another. As a result, they play 
an important role in the decision-making processes of the firms 
in which they have invested (Changati and Damanpour, 1991).  
In this thesis, this theory uses this basis as part of the political 
model theory to enhance the understanding of the background 




The resources dependence theory suggested that boards serve 
as a “strategic consultant to top mangers rather than (or in 
addition to) exercising independent control” (Carpenter and 
Westphal 2001). It is used to assess whether the contribution of 
role-play of ACs in China is limited in exercising independent 
control. 
 
Pao-Chen Lee PhD Thesis, University of Manchester Page 75 
3.2 Literature Review  
3.2.1 Introduction 
In order to find the evidence for answering the research questions identified in the 
previous chapter, the literature reviews and related regulations on ACs will now be 
looked at.  
The literature review presented here will start with the definition of the AC, followed 
by an exploration of the composition of ACs, which will focus on their independence, 
expertise and responsibility. The scope of these aspects of the composition of ACs 
and their impact on its effectiveness will be further explored through a review of 
related academic works and related regulations.  
Western research findings published in the literature are referenced, in order to apply 
the proper attributes to the study of the effectiveness and the operations of the Chinese 
internal supervisory mechanism. Furthermore, there are areas in which further work is 
needed, and in which current regulation is in contradiction to the findings of the 
research. Based on the review of the regulations and research in these areas, the 
possible factors of dependent and independent variables for evaluation of the 
effectiveness, operations and co-ordination of the Chinese internal supervisory 
mechanism are therefore identified.  
3.2.2 Definition of the Audit Committee  
It seems there is no universally accepted definition of ACs that may be found in 
regulations, reports, surveys and research studies. Instead, different definitions are 
presented, such as Section 404 of SOX (2002), Klein (2002), Collier (1992), Marrian 
(1988), Peat Marwick McLintock (1987) and Braiotta (1981). Some examples of 
these definitions are quoted below:  
“The term ”Audit Committee'' means – a committee (or equivalent body) 
established by and amongst the BoD of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing 
the accounting and financial reporting processes of the issuer and audits of the 
financial statements of the issuer” (US Securities Exchange Act of 1934 #3 
(a)(58); SOX Section 404, 2002) 
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“Each member of the Audit Committee of the issuer shall be a member of the BoD 
of the issuer, and shall otherwise be independent.” (See US Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 #10 (m)(3); SOX Section 404, 2002) 
“Each issuer must have, and certify that it has and will continue to have, an Audit 
Committee of at least three members, each of whom must; (i) be independent as 
defined under Rule 4200(a)(15); (ii) meet the criteria for independent set forth in 
Rule 10A-3(b)(1) under the Act (subject to the exemptions provided in Rule 10A-
3(c); (iii) not have participated in the preparation of the financial statements of 
the company or any current subsidiary of the company at any time during the past 
three years…” (See Final NYSE CG Rules, Section 303A(7)(a)) 
“A committee of the board normally comprises three to five directors with no 
operating responsibility in the financial management. Its primary tasks are to 
review the financial statements, the effectiveness of the company’s accounting 
and internal control system, and the findings of the auditors, and to make 
recommendations on the appointment and remuneration of the external auditor.” 
(Marian, 1988) 
“An Audit Committee is a committee of the board of the directors established to 
give additional assurance regarding the quality and reliability of financial 
information used by the board. An Audit Committee of a company may be broadly 
defined as a committee of the board, composed wholly or predominantly of non-
executive directors, set up to oversee, review and monitor the financial reporting 
process and the audit activities.” (Peat Marwick McLintock, 1987) 
“An Audit Committee should be organised as a standing committee of the board 
composed mainly of non officer directors.” (Braiotta, 1981) 
Summary 
These definitions state that the AC is a sub-committee of the BoD; and confine the 
definition mainly to the composition and the key responsibilities of ACs. These 
definitions emphasise the composition of the AC by the participation of independent 
directors with the professional abilities to perform the key responsibilities of financial 
reporting, audit and internal control. In summary, all definitions of the AC tend to 
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emphasise two attributes of its composition, namely independence and financial 
expertise, as well as its responsibility or operations. 
3.2.3 Composition 
Since the AC’s independence and financial expertise of competence are the key 
factors that determine its performances (Beasley, 1996), any serious regulatory 
attempt should have specific requirements related to these factors, and different levels 
of regulatory requirements may result in different levels of supervisory performance. 
Hence the need for a comparison on the requirements on the charters of the AC across 
the American, British and Chinese systems: the findings presented in the table below.  
Table 11. Comparison on the Requirements on the Charter of the AC across the 
American, British and Chinese Systems  
(Source: Author, as supported by reference CSRC (2001), CSRC and SETC 
(2002), FRC (2008), FRC (2010), and SOX (2002)) 
Country US UK  China  
Requirements 
related to the 
independent 
directors 
All members:  
It should have at 
least three 
members, who 
should all be 
independent 
directors. 
All members:  
It shall have at least three 
members, or two in the case of 
smaller companies, who should all 
be independent non-executive 
directors. 
“C.3.1 The board should establish 
an audit committee of at least 
three, or in the case of smaller 
companies two, independent non-
executive directors. In smaller 
companies the company chairman 
may be a member of, but not chair, 
the committee in addition to the 
independent non-executive 
directors, provided he or she was 
considered independent on 
appointment as chairman”(FRC, 
2010) 
At Least half of 
the members:  







majority of the 
committees. 
Requirements 
on the level of 
expertise 
The firm is 
mandated to 
disclose in its 
filings whether 
the AC has a 
financial expert, 
and if not to 
explain why. 
At least one member of the AC 
has recent and relevant financial 
experience. 
“C. 3.1 The board should satisfy 
itself that at least one member of 
the audit committee has recent 
and relevant financial 
experience”(FRC, 2010) 
At least one 
independent 
director from the 
AC should be a 
professional 
accountant. 
As shown in this table, the Anglo-American model requires all members of the AC to 
be independent directors, while the Chinese model asks for only half of the members 
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to be independent directors. On the other hand, in the Chinese model, at least one of 
the members has to be a professional accountant, while the corresponding requirement 
in the Anglo-American model only asks for financial expertise or experience.  
The key attributes of independence and expertise are described respectively in the 
following sections.  
3.2.4 Independence  
Definition of the Independence of ACs  
Independence is highlighted as the one of the key compositions of ACs by the latter’s 
definitions. The independence of members of a supervisory governance structure from 
executive management has been widely regarded as a necessary precondition for its 
effectiveness and supervisory quality. For example, in the UK, the Code of Best 
Practice issued by the Cadbury Commission (1992) contains the following statement:  
“An independent director is independent of management and free from any 
business or other relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise 
of their independent judgment, apart from their fees and shareholding. Their fees 
should relate to their working time.”  
The UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010, June): on B 1.1 stipulates it to be 
independent from management, business, and relationships materially interfering with 
their independent judgments, apart from their fees and shareholdings. Their fees 
should relate to their working time.  
“B.1.1 The board should identify in the annual report each non-executive director 
it considers to be independent. The board should determine whether the director 
is independent in character and judgement and whether there are relationships or 
circumstances which are likely to affect, or could appear to affect, the director’s 
judgement. The board should state its reasons if it determines that a director is 
independent notwithstanding the existence of relationships or circumstances 
which may appear relevant to its determination, including if the director: has 
been an employee of the company or group within the last five years; has, or has 
had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the company 
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either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a 
body that has such a relationship with the company; has received or receives 
additional remuneration from the company apart from a director’s fee, 
participates in the company’s share option or a performance-related pay scheme, 
or is a member of the company’s pension scheme; has close family ties with any 
of the company’s advisers, directors or senior employees; holds cross-
directorships or has significant links with other directors through involvement in 
other companies or bodies; represents a significant shareholder; or has served on 
the board for more than nine years from the date of their first election.” 
Similarly, in the USA, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act regards independent directors as those 
having no “significant relation” with the company. This means they are [1] not former 
directors, [2] not occupationally related with the company, [3] not the clients or the 
suppliers of the company, [4] not recommended or appointed on the basis of personal 
relations, [5] have no close relation to any executive director, and [6] do not have a 
significant share or represent major shareholders. Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act also stresses the independence of the AC, stating that it must be formed by 
independent directors, who must not receive consultation fees or reward, and must not 
take part in any related transactions with the company or its subsidiaries.  
Related to the regulations of the independence of ACs, besides SOX act, the NYSE 
and NASDAQ also mention that any of the following will be deemed to constitute 
lack of independence: 
1. Directly or indirectly receive the remunerations or rewards of providing 
consulting or advising services (SOX act 、NYSE、NASDAQ – three regulators 
all stipulate this point at the same time.) 
2. The affiliates of the holding company or subsidiary company of the listed 
company (SOX Act, NYSE, NASDAQ – again, all three regulators stipulate this 
point at the same time) 
3. Who participates in making the financial reports of the holding company or 
subsidiary company of the listed company in the past three years (NASDAQ) 
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4. The directors or the family members4 were ever hired as the executive managers 
(or management level) in the holding company or subsidiary company of the listed 
company in the recent three years (NYSE, NASDAQ) 
5. The directors or the family members receive rewards over the limit, except the 
rewards of being directors in the recent three years (NYSE regulates 100,000 US; 
NASDAQ regulates 60,000 US) 
6. The directors or the family members are the executive managers in other 
companies, or the executive managers of this listed company have been the 
members of the remuneration committee in the recent three years. (NYSE, 
NASDAQ) 
7. Whoever acted as the members of the CPA firm hired by this listed company:  
－NYSE regulates: The directors or his/her most closest family members as experts or 
consultants directly or indirectly were hired to be the current or the prior internal 
auditors or external auditors in the recent three years. 
－NASDAQ regulates: The directors or his/her most closest family members are the 
current partners had ever been the partners or employees of the independent audit 
firm in the recent three years.  
8. Whoever had been the partners (excluding the limited company’s partners), control 
shareholders or executive managers, and this company receive the funds from the 
listed company over the limit. 
－NYSE regulates: Total operation revenue 2% or US$ 1 million (based on the higher 
one) 
－NASDAQ regulates: Total operation revenue 5% or US$ 200,000 (based on the 
higher one). 
The regulations in the US and UK require that ACs should be comprised of 
independent directors. This means it is not allowed for independent directors to 
                                               
4
  “Family Member”: means a person’s spouse, parents, children and siblings, whether by blood, 
marriage or adoption, or anyone residing in such person’s home.” (NASDAQ, 2010: Rule 
4200(a)(14)) 
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conform to any of the aforementioned eight conditions. But in China, it is only 
required that the majority of the committees members fit in with the requirement of 
independence according to the Guidelines for Listed Companies on the Establishment 
of the Institution of Directors, effective since 21 August 2001. These state that: 
The Independent Directors must be independent, and the following persons cannot be 
appointed as the Independent Directors: 
(1)  People who work for the listed company or its subsidiaries, their direct family 
line or their immediate family members; 
(2)  People, or their direct family, who either hold directly or indirectly 1% or more of 
the shares of the listed company, or are among the top ten natural person 
shareholders of the listed company; 
(3)  People, or their direct family, who work for the institution that either holds 
directly 5% or more of the shares of the listed company or among the top five 
shareholding institutions; 
(4)  People who have been included in the previous three categories in the previous 
year; 
(5)  People who offer consultancy services on finance or law to the listed company or 
its subsidiaries; 
(6)  Other people specified in the constitutions of the listed company; 
(7)  Other people specified by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. 
Summary 
The Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) (1999: 22) noted that “several recent studies have 
produced a correlation between AC independence and two desirable outcomes: a 
higher degree of active oversight and a lower incidence of financial statement fraud.” 
This statement indicates that more independent ACs could exercise better oversight of 
the quality of financial reporting. Looking at the UK, US and China’s regulations, the 
strictest standard is applied: the independent directors must not receive fees regarding 
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consultation or reward; must not have share holding; must not have any affiliations of 
having “significant relation” with the company by taking part in any related 
transactions with the company or its subsidiaries; must not work for the company or 
its subsidiaries in the current year or ever act as the “identified title or function” such 
as being the partner, executive or the maker of financial statements in the past three 
years. 
Academic Works on the Independence of Audit Committees  
These related studies support the contention that the independence of ACs can 
increase the company’s value and strengthen the quality of financial reporting and the 
effects of the earnings management (Beasley, 1996; Abbott et al., 2002; Klein, 2002a; 
Klein, 2002b; Carcello and Neal, 2003; Xie et al., 2003; Abbott et al., 2004; Bedard 
et al., 2004; Chiang, 2006; Tsai, 2009; Kao, 2009). 
Beasley (1996) 
Beasley researched the relationship among independent directors of ACs and 
concurrent financial manipulation, finding that those companies with a higher 
percentage of independent directors and those which had established ACs to have 
lower percentages of financial manipulation; whereas the companies which had not 
set up ACs had a higher.  
Abbott et al. (2002) 
Abbott et al. researched according to the proposal of BRC (Blue Ribbon Committee), 
dividing their samples between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ reporting companies, so as to 
explore the relationship with the ACs. The results indicated that the higher the 
independence and higher the frequency of supervising the company’s financial 
conditions, the smaller the possibility of financial manipulation. They report:  
“We find that the independence of the audit committee and whether the 
committee meets at least four times per year exhibits a significant and negative 
association with the occurrence of financial reporting restatements. Our results 
underscore the importance of the BRC's first two recommendations, both of which 
concern audit committee independence.”  
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Abbott et al. (2003) 
Abbott et al. (2003) explores the relations between the characteristics of ACs and the 
audit fee, by researching the independence, expertise and meeting times associated 
with the aforementioned fees. They use a review of the literature to assume that audit 
fee increase will increase the audit quality, and that ACs have the responsibilities of 
supervising the financial reports, management levels, and external auditors. They 
report:  
“Audit committees comprised solely of independent directors that meet at least 
four times annually are significantly, positively associated with audit fees. This 
evidence is consistent with audit committee members taking actions within their 
span of control to ensure a higher level of audit coverage, as well as facilitating 
auditor independence.” 
Klein (2002a) 
Klein (2002a) explored whether the AC and the characteristics of BoD relate to the 
earnings management of the company. SEC, NYSE and NASDAQ assert the positive 
relationship between the earnings management and a weak CG mechanism; but Klein 
revealed a negative relationship. Decreasing independence of the BoD and ACs 
increases abnormal accrual numbers. This has the most obvious impact when the BoD 
and ACs are composed with a minority of the external independent directors. This 
research suggested that the more the structure of the BoD is independent from the 
CEO, the more effective it is in supervising the process of financial reports.  
Klein (2002b) 
Klein (2002b)’s purpose is to explore the factors affecting the independence of ACs. 
S&P’s 500 listed companies between 1991 and 1993 provide the research samples. 
The findings reveal that the independence of ACs increase in tandem with enlarging 
the size of BoD, but decrease together with opportunities for growth if the 
shareholding by external directors who are also the member of ACs is over 5%. The 
AC has higher independence when the company has the bigger size of the BoD: the 
higher percentage of the external directors divided by the total director numbers of 
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BoD. Yet no relationship exists between the AC and the creditor’s demand for 
accounting information.  
Carcello and Neal (2003) 
Carcello and Neal (2003) explored the independence of ACs in cases of a CPA report 
doubting a going concern qualification of the company. Their results reveal those 
companies with more independent AC members to have a lower shareholding. AC 
members have the expertise to prevent from the CPA firm from being dismissed after 
releasing the report. The findings expressed that those members with the 
characteristics of independence and governance expertise will be more effective in 
developing the supervisory role. 
Bedard, Chtourou, and Courteau (2004) 
Bedard, Chtourou, and Courteau (2004) study the influence of the independence, 
expertise and activities of ACs on the quality of the financial reports: focusing in 
particular on relations between the aforementioned characteristics and earnings 
management. They use two groups of samples in 1996 covering 100 US companies, 
finding a negative relationship between aggressive earnings management and the 
independence of ACs. 
Chang (2006) 
Chang (2006) explores the deviation rate between controlling rights of the control 
shareholders and cash flow; and the relationship between the independence and 
expertise of ACs and retained earnings. He uses as his research sample 150 listed 
companies in each of Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia respectively. He used the 
research design of Fan and Wong (2002) to discover no positive influence between 
the deviation rate between the controlling rights of the control shareholders and cash 
flow. He also finds that companies with a higher independence of ACs gain more trust 
of investors on financial reports; have a positive influence on earnings information; 
and control the negative influence of over high controlling rights on information 
contexts. His research reveals that companies with high cash flow have the most 
positive relationship between higher independence of ACs and the earnings 
information context.  
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Tsai (2009) 
This study examines whether AC expertise and independence are related to earnings 
management by the firms in question. It finds that earnings management 
(discretionary accruals) is negatively associated with the of independent directors on 
AC. Tsai reports that the higher of independent directors divided by the total number 
of BoD leads to lower earnings management. This reveals that higher levels of 
independence can lead to more effective supervisory functions. 
Kao (2009) 
In this study, the quality of accounting information is divided into conservative 
accounting, stability, timeliness and continuity, in order to have set up in 2008 either 
the AC, or an AC of listed prospective cabinets. The result showed that the 
independence of the AC and conservative accounting information quality led to a 
smooth and continuous positive relationship in terms of timeliness. This study’s 
results show that the independent directors of the AC can improve the CG 
environment, and effective assistance and supervision of the company’s financial 
reporting process. 
The Size of the AC 
The SEC (1999) mandated that ACs consist of a minimum of three directors. 
Encouraged by the BRC and the accounting profession (IIA, 1991):  
A survey by Price Waterhouse (1993) reports that 57% of firms have ACs with three 
or four directors, and three to six directors seems to be the optimum number for an 
AC. Yermark (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) provide the evidence on the 
association between the number of directors on boards and the quality of financial 
reporting, generally suggesting a negative association, although this effect may begin 
only after an optimum number is reached. Xie et al. (2003) fail to find a significant 
association between the number of directors on the AC and annual earnings 
management.  
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Summary  
A notable body of research has investigated the independence of ACs. Klein (2002), 
analysing data for over 800 US listed companies from 1991 to 1993, reported a 
reduction in earnings management in the presence of large outside directors on ACs 
and suggested that the independence of ACs is negatively associated with earnings 
management. Abbott et al. (2002) find that AC independence exhibits a significant 
and negative association with the occurrence of financial reporting restatements.  
Two attributes that may reflect the independence of a supervisory body are the 
membership of outside directors and levels of members’ stock ownership. In the US, 
Beasley (1996) reported that the likelihood of fraud is higher when the percentage of 
AC members who are outside directors is low. Carcello and Neal (2003) suggest that 
the presence of affiliated directors on an AC is positively associated with auditor 
dismissals following a going concern qualification, i.e. that ACs with greater 
independence can better protect the auditors from dismissal in potential disputes with 
management.  
With respect to shareholding, the Cadbury Committee (1992) asserted that share 
option schemes for outside directors can reduce their independence. Bédard et al. 
(2004) examined the association between share option schemes for non-related 
outside committee members, which could reduce their independence, and the 
likelihood of aggressive earnings management. Yang et al. (2005) find that both 
independent and non-independent AC directors’ stock ownership are positively 
associated with earnings management. These research results are consistent with 
Carcello and Neal (2003) and Bédard et al. (2004), who conclude that compensation 
by stock options may undermine an internal supervisory mechanism’s independence.  
The findings of all these related studies provide empirical support for a positive 
association between the AC’s independence and its effectiveness in executing 
supervisory functions. Those ACs with higher levels of independence can prevent 
more earnings management. All studies conclude that higher levels of independence 
will increase the shareholders and stakeholders’ trust in corporate governance.  
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3.2.5 Expertise 
Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act stipulates the responsibilities of ACs including 
hiring and paying for the CPA firm and supervising its auditing work, and resolving 
disagreements between the management and the auditors. It can be seen that the 
responsibility of ACs is related to financial, auditing and internal control. Members of 
ACs should be equipped with financial experience or education; otherwise, it is hard 
to expect them to develop the required supervisory functions. 
Definition of “Financial Expertise” 
SEC Definition  
According to SEC’s Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (2002),  
(a)  The members of ACs should be equipped with the following experience: 
“The final rules define an Audit Committee financial expert as a person who has 
the following attributes: An understanding of generally accepted accounting 
principles and financial statements; The ability to assess the general application 
of such principles in connection with the accounting for estimates, accruals and 
reserves; Experience preparing, auditing, analyzing or evaluating financial 
statements that present a breadth and level of complexity of accounting issues 
that are generally comparable to the breadth and complexity of accounting issues 
that can reasonably be expected to be raised by the registrant’s financial 
statements, or experience actively supervising one or more persons engaged in 
such activities; An understanding of internal controls and procedures for 
financial reporting; and an understanding of Audit Committee functions.” (ibid.) 
(b)  The members of ACs need to develop financial experience through the following 
ways: 
“Under the final rules, a person must have acquired such attributes through any 
one or more of the following:  
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(1) Education and experience as a principal financial officer, 
principal accounting officer, public accountant or auditor or 
experience in one or more positions that involve the performance 
of similar functions;  
(2) Experience actively supervising a principal financial officer, 
principal accounting officer, controller, public accountant, auditor 
or person performing similar functions; 
(3) Experience overseeing or assessing the performance of companies 
or public accountants with respect to the preparation, auditing or 
evaluation of financial statements; or  
(4) Other relevant experience.” (ibid.) 
NYSE definition 
According to NYSE (2003), Section 303A(7)(a) Commentary,  
“Each member of the Audit Committee must be financially literate, as such 
qualification is interpreted by the company’s board in its business judgment, or 
must become financially literate within a reasonable period of time after his or 
her appointment to the Audit Committee. In addition, at least one member of the 
Audit Committee must have accounting or related financial management 
expertise, as the company’s board interprets such qualification in its business 
judgment While the Exchange does not require that a listed company’s Audit 
Committee include a person who satisfies the definition of Audit Committee 
financial expert set out in Item 401(e) of Regulation S-K, a board may presume 
that such a person has accounting or related financial management expertise.”  
NASDAQ definition 
According to NASDAQ (2010), Rule 4350(d)(2)(A),  
“Each issuer must have, and certify that it has and will continue to have, an Audit 
Committee of at least three members, each of whom must…(iv) be able to read 
and understand fundamental financial statements, including a company’s balance 
sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement. Additionally, each issuer must 
certify that it has, and will continue to have, at least one member of the Audit 
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Committee who has past employment experience in finance or accounting, 
requisite professional certification in accounting, or any other comparable 
experience or background which results in the individual’s financial 
sophistication, including being or having been a chief executive officer, chief 
financial officer or other senior officer with financial oversight responsibilities.”  
Summary 
A second major attribute considered necessary for effective supervision and 
maintaining investor confidence is the professional or technical expertise of members 
of the supervisory structures (Sweeney and Vallario, 2002). For example, in the US, 
the BRC stated that the “effectiveness of the Audit Committee is affected, first and 
foremost, by the expertise of members of Audit Committees in the areas of accounting 
and financial reporting, internal controls and auditing” (BRC, 1999). Commonly, 
particularly in requirements for ACs, expertise is expressed through the attribute of 
financial literacy. For example, SOX mandates that the firm discloses in its filings 
whether the AC has a financial expert, defined as someone with experience in 
preparing or auditing financial statements and the firm’s internal controls, and if not, 
explains why. Thus, firms must disclose whether the financial expertise in the AC is 
independent of management (SEC, 2002; SEC, 2003a). 
In US, UK and China, the requirements state that every AC appoints at least one 
person with financial expertise. Initially the definition of financial expertise included 
prior work experience in accounting, for example, or that (s)he is a CPA, former CFO, 
corporate treasurer or controller. However, that definition has expanded to include 
senior officers from other companies – investment bankers and venture capitalists 
amongst them – with the capability to read and understand fundamental financial 
statements.  
Academic Works on the Expert with Financial Background 
Appointing a financial expert could only improve financial reporting when 
accompanied by complimentary governance provisions (Blue Ribbon Committee, 
1999; DeFond et al., 2005; Dhaliwal et al., 2006). Firms with strong CG may exert 
stronger control over the firm’s financial reporting decisions, irrespective of the 
activities of the AC, thereby reducing the impact of AC financial expertise on the 
Page 90 PhD Thesis, University of Manchester Pao-Chen Lee 
firm’s reporting quality (Carcello et al., 2008; Bryan et al., 2007). DeFond et al. 
(2005) suggest that AC’s responsibilities often require significant accounting 
sophistication: in that they involve assessing the reasonableness of complex financial 
matters such as the company’s accounting reserves, and management’s handling of 
proposed audit adjustments suggested by the external auditors. AC members with a 
financial background can decrease the possibility of earnings management and the 
errors in financial reporting; and increase the quality of financial reports. (DeZoort 
and Salterio, 2001; Abbotte et al., 2002; Abbotte et al., 2003; Xie et al., 2003; Abbott, 
Parker, and Peters, 2004; Bedard et al., 2004; Defond et al., 2004; Defond et al., 2005; 
Tsai, 2009; Kao, 2009) 
DeZoort and Salterio (2001)  
Their research purpose is to explore whether the experience of CG, financial reporting 
and auditing knowledge impact upon the judgement of ACs. 68 representatives 
selected from 340 AC members in Canada were given tests of arguable cases related 
to accounting policy; as well as knowledge of accounting and auditing, to explore 
whether they influenced the judgement of ACs members. They report;  
“The results provide justification for calls that audit committees be composed 
completely of independent directors. The results also support auditor concerns that 
varying knowledge levels lead to systematic differences in audit committee 
member judgments in disputes between auditors and management.” 
Abbott et al. (2002) 
The purpose of this work was to divide the research samples into two groups of 
companies with normal and abnormal (not real) reports. The results indicate a lack of 
a professional background among AC members leads to a higher possibility of 
abnormal (not real) financial reports. They report:  
“We also document a significant positive association between an audit committee that 
lacks a member with financial expertise and the occurrence of financial reporting 
restatements. Our results also highlight the need for financial expertise as a means of 
strengthening the monitoring and oversight role that the audit committee plays in the 
financial reporting process.” 
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Xie et al. (2003) 
Xie et al. (2003)’s study takes 500 S&P listed companies from 1992 to 1993, 
excluding 48 no-data-provided companies but retaining a total of 282 companies as 
research samples. The purpose is to explore the relations between the composition of 
the BoD, ACs, executive committees and earnings management. It finds that the 
higher percentage of directors with experience as managers or with financial 
backgrounds, the lower the level of earnings management will be. This result proves 
that the US SEC was correct to stipulate the necessity for AC members to be equipped 
with a financial background. They report:  
“We conclude that board and audit committee activity and their members' financial 
sophistication may be important factors in constraining the propensity of managers to 
engage in earnings management.” 
Bedard et al. (2004) 
Bedard et al. (2004) studies the impact of expertise, independence and related 
activities upon aggressive earnings management. They indicate that aggressive 
earnings management may mislead the investors and influence the quality of financial 
reports. The ACs are responsible for the supervision and insurance of the quality of 
financial reports. Their results indicate that the financial background of AC members 
and the experience of CG can be effective in preventing earnings management. 
Defond et al. (2004) 
The purpose here was to test whether recruiting financial experts the AC will have a 
positive and good response on the market. They separate two groups of ACs – those 
with and without accounting experts – to test market responses to the information 
announcements made by ACs. In 702 research samples, external directors were 
assigned as the members of the AC based on three-day accumulated extraordinary 
returns, to test market response to the announcement of information. The findings 
conclude that recruiting financial expertise onto ACs will have a positive market 
response; whereas non-accounting or non-financial expertise leads to no market 
response. It reports that experts with financial knowledge and background will 
enhance the performance of ACs: so ensuring the quality of financial reports. 
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Defond et al. (2005) 
Defond et al. (2005) study the correlation between AC expertise and stock price. They 
discover that AC members with a professional accounting background have positive 
effect on stock price, whereas AC members without professional accounting 
background get no positive market response. Their research suggests that AC 
members with a professional accounting background are equipped with enough 
professional knowledge to ensure they have the capability to produce financial reports, 
so to have the better impact upon stock price. 
Qin (2006) 
Qin (2006) researches the influence levels of professional members of ACs, relative 
to earnings quality. Qin defined the professional background of accounting according 
to the SEC rule. The findings discover a positive relationship between the ACs with a 
higher percentage of accounting background and expertise, and to have a higher 
quality of earnings performance. 
Tsai (2009) 
This study examines whether AC expertise and independence are related to earnings 
management by the firm. It finds that earnings management (discretionary accruals) is 
negatively associated with the percentage of financial and accounting expertise on 
ACs. Tsai reports that AC’s members from higher financial profession are more able 
to prevent earnings management. 
Kao (2009) 
In this study, the quality of accounting information is divided into conservative 
accounting, stability, timeliness and continuity, in order to have set up in 2008 either 
the AC, or an AC of listed prospective cabinet. The result showed that the 
professionalism of the AC and conservative accounting information quality resulted in 
a smooth and continuous positive relationship. This study’s results show that 
professionals on an AC can improve the CG environment, and effective assistance 
and supervision of the company’s financial reporting process. 
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Summary 
The AC’s financial expertise has also been linked to more informative earnings. A 
number of studies have examined the governance outcomes associated with varying 
levels of financial expertise. For example, Abbott et al. (2002) contend that there are 
greater incidents of earnings restatements and fraud in companies where the AC lacks 
financial literacy. Carcello and Neal (2003) find no association between the existence 
of a financial expert and the likelihood that the auditor will be dismissed following a 
going concern qualified opinion. Carcello et al. (2006) find a significant relationship 
between the presence on the AC of a financial expert with prior work experience in 
accounting and lower levels of earnings management. In contrast, they find no 
significant relationship between earnings management and the SEC’s expanded 
definitions of financial expertise. More specifically, prior studies provide evidence of 
higher earnings response coefficients for firms having at least one financial expert on 
their AC (Bryan et al. 2007; Qin 2007) than firms without a financial expert. These 
results suggest that accounting expertise is associated with investor perceptions that 
earnings are persistent (Collins and Kothari 1989), and therefore of high financial 
reporting quality. 
Other studies, such as DeFond et al. (2005), and Carver (2005), have examined the 
contextual role of various AC characteristics – notably including financial expertise -
on aspects of financial reporting. Cohen et al., (2005) and Klein, (2002a) document 
the effects that SOX and market regulations have had on earnings management. 
Agrawal and Chadha (2005) provide evidence concerning fraud and earnings re-
statements, Felo et al., (2003) investigated financial reporting quality and Xie et al., 
(2003), earnings management. There are also documented associations between 
financial expertise and incidents of accounting ir-regulation. Prior studies suggest that 
firms with at least one general financial expert disclose fewer accounting re-
statements (Agrawal and Chadha 2005; Abbottee et al. 2004). The results of this body 
of research provide empirical support for focusing on financial expertise as a 
significant governance attribute in this study of supervisory mechanisms in China. 
DeFond et al. (2005) also provide evidence of a positive stock market reaction for 
firms that appoint a financial expert to their AC, with one interpretation being that 
accounting skills enhance the ability of the AC to oversee high quality financial 
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reporting. In addition, DeFond et al. (2005) find that firms that appoint a non-
accounting financial expert do not experience abnormal returns surrounding the 
appointment, which implies the premium on financial expertise is naturally limited to 
individuals with financial expertise backgrounds. In addition, Zhang et al. (2007) and 
Bedard et al. (2007) find that firms with a larger of financial experts (both accounting 
and non-accounting) are less likely to report an internal control weakness over 
financial reporting. These results support the idea that financial experts are associated 
with stronger supervisory mechanisms.  
The emphasis on AC members’ expertise in regulation together with the research 
results from academic studies provide empirical support for a positive association 
between AC financial expertise and its effectiveness in executing its supervisory 
function. They support the view that higher levels of financial expertise lead to greater 
capability to prevent earnings management; and higher levels of professional 
expertise increase the trust of shareholders and stakeholders, reflected in, for example, 
a positive stock market reaction. 
3.2.6 Responsibilities 
Definitions of the Responsibilities of Audit Committees  
The AC plays a central role in the monitoring mechanism of a firm. AC members 
maintain responsibility for oversight over accounting policies and judgments, as well 
as the quality of the overall financial statement (BRC, 1999; Bill, 2006). Furthermore, 
the AC is typically responsible for selecting outside auditors, and meeting with 
financial managers to gauge whether they are acting in the firm’s best interest (Klein, 
2002).  
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National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (Treadway 
Commission)5  
COSO (1987) of the US reported on “The Good Practice Guidelines for ACs” to 
formulate the concrete compositions and functions of ACs. This regulation has been 
applied broadly and this guideline has been the standard for evaluating the 
effectiveness of ACs. Its context is listed as the following:  
(1) The Treadway report was the first formal documentation of setting standards 
based on best practices about AC responsibilities (Beans, 1999). This report 
identified CG principles that would significantly reduce the potential for 
fraudulent financial reporting.  
(2) Management and AC should guarantee internal auditors properly participate in the 
audit process of financial report, and communicate with the independent auditors; 
(3) Authorise AC  
• Funding to retain outside legal counsel without approval from management.  
• Funding to retain an independent accounting firm if a second opinion is called for.  
• Ready access to all books, records and employees of the corporation.  
• Power to conduct any investigation appropriate to fulfilling its responsibility 
(4) Appraisal and oversight the independence of the certified accountant;  
(5) Verify the planning of the management and consulting plan to engage the certified 
accountant  
(6) The management should listen to the opinions of the AC in the treatment of the 
major accounting issue. 
                                               
5
  The Treadway Commission was formed by the common association of AICPA (American 
Institution of Certificate Public Accounting), AAA (American Accounting Association), IIA 
(Internal Audit Association) and FEA (Financial Executive Association) and MAA (Management 
Accounting Association) in 1998 is a national independent committee related to fraud of 
financial reports. 
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(7) Oversee the internal control activities of the company and assess the effectiveness 
of a corporation's internal control structure and detail the attributes of an effective 
control system.  
This COSO report emphasised the AC's role in establishing the tone at the top: 
explicit moral guidelines about right and wrong and the obligation to communicate 
ethical values to all employees. According to COSO (1987), the framework defines 
internal control as a process, enacted by an entity’s BoD, management and other 
personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of 
objectives in the following categories: 
• Effectiveness and efficiency of operation  
• Reliability of financial reporting  
• Compliance with applicable laws and regulations.  
• In 2004, COSO published Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework, 
expanding the initial COSO framework with eight components of Enterprise Risk 
Management (COSO, 2004). 
A. USA / COSO (1987) defined the responsibility of ACs: 
The basic responsibilities of ACs are to achieve three objectives: the accuracy of 
financial reports, maintaining the self-discipline of the enterprises, and perfecting 
internal control:  
1. Supervising financial reports: The purpose is to reflect the financial condition of 
the company, operation amount and long term strategy and plan. In order to 
achieve this goal properly, the ACs need to have the following rights and 
responsibilities:  
(1) Recommendation for the certificate public accounting (CPA) firm.  
(2) Supervising the process of auditing.  
(3) Understanding the accounting principles and their significant impacts to the 
companies and reviewing the changes of the accounting policies.  
(4) Inquiring about the significant forecasts, the judgemental issues and the other 
items that are easy to be neglected.  
(5) Supervising financial reports and audit results. 
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(6) Ensuring the independence of the CPA firm.  
(7)  Requiring the legal consultant to understand if there is any lawsuit pending for 
resolving or dispute cases related to tax payment.  
(8) Maintaining the self-discipline of the enterprise: the purpose is to ensure properly 
that the company complies with the regulations, the commercial conducts meet to 
moral guideline, and controls the fraud of the employee or the conflict to the 
benefit of the company. In order to ensure the company can achieve this goal, the 
ACs need to have the following rights and responsibilities:  
a) Review the regulations of the company  
b) Review the internal audit significant findings, and yearly audit scopes and 
context  
c) Review the misconduct or fraud events by the employee.  
d) Review the lawsuit or the cases under investigation by the judiciary. 
e) Review the expense process of allowance for entertainment and review the 
compliance of the management level including the usage of assets.  
f) Represent the BoD to investigate the special case. 
2.  Perfecting the internal control: the purpose is to understand the critical risk and 
the internal control framework through the monitoring by the internal audit. In 
order to achieve this goal, the ACs need to have the following rights and 
responsibilities:  
(1)  Supervising the charter of the internal audit to ensure the proper responsibility 
and the independence.  
(2) Supervising the dismissal and transferral of the head of the internal audit 
department.  
(3)  Supervising the audit plan and budget to ensure the adequacy of the auditing.  
(4)  Supervising the audit progress and audit reports. 
(5)  Requesting the auditors for project investigation at any time, and supervising the 
audit context and result.  
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(6)  Requesting the audit department to perform the peer review periodically for 
ensuring the audit quality. 
(7)  Supervising the internal control of internal audit, the control and security and 
reliability of the system information.  
(8)  Supervising the statement of internal control by the management level.  
In order to achieve the aforementioned responsibilities, the AC needs to have the 
following authorisations (rights): 
(1) Supervising the financial and business information and data of the company at any 
time, 
(2) Requesting the special project investigation according to the necessity. 
(3) Requesting the BoD and management level to provide sufficient resources such as 
requesting help from the outsourcing accountants, lawyers, and administrators. 
(4) Requesting the management level, internal auditors and independent auditors 
(certified accountants) to have the obligation to notify the ACs in case it is needed.  
B. USA / POB (1993; 1995) defined the responsibility of the AC:  
The POB report dated March 5, 1993 affirmed that “the integrity and reliability of 
audited financial statements are critical to the well-being of the American economy” 
and went on to recommend steps to regain public confidence in the accounting 
profession. 
This public watch function demands that the accountant maintain total independence 
from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust. 
The central suggestion of the 1995 report was that the independent auditor's 
engagement letter should specify that the client is the AC, making it clear that the 
auditor is not beholden to management; and the independent auditors should deliver 
forthright and candid reports in a timely manner in terms of both quality and 
acceptability. 
Its more detailed recommendations included: 
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(1)  Review the company’s annual financial report; 
(2) Communicate with the management and independent auditors to discuss the 
auditing regarding the annual financial report; 
(3)  Evaluate the completeness of the financial statement and the consistency of the 
information. 
 Independent accountants were encouraged in the public interest to help ACs 
understand their responsibilities and make recommendations to the committees to 
help them improve the internal controls of the corporations whose shareholders 
they represent—in other words, to go further than the minimum requirements of 
an audit by issuing a “management letter.” 
(4) To communicate with independent accountants to assure the relevant information 
in compliance with the auditing standard (GAAS);  
(5) To ensure the financial report is in compliance with the accounting standard 
(GAAP).  
C. USA / BRC (1999) defined the responsibility of the AC: 
The 10 recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on improving the 
effectiveness of corporate ACs (NYSE and NASD, 1999: Recommendations 1-10):  
Mr. Arthur Levitt, the previous US Securities and Exchange Commission Chairperson, 
proposed to strengthen the supervision of the financial reporting process by the BoD. 
In 1998, the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate 
AC, supported by the common association of the SEC National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange, put together a report 
on improving the functions of ACs and related issues. This committee reported the 
following year, and as well as confirming the problems regarding financial reporting 
disclosure, set out recommendations for enhancing the quality of financial reports and 
consolidating the importance of ACs. The 10 recommendations are summarised in the 
following three points:  
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(1) To review the financial reports and other financial information provided by the 
corporation to any governmental body or the public; and review the corporation’s 
auditing, accounting and financial reporting processes generally. 
(2) To oversee the work of the other actors in the financial reporting process – and 
require management, including the internal auditor and outside auditors to 
endorse the processes and safeguards employed by each. 
(3) To review the Corporation’s systems of internal controls regarding finance, 
accounting, legal compliance and ethics that management and the Board have 
established. In particular, the AC should encourage procedures that promote 
accountability among these players, ensuring that management properly develops 
and adheres to a sound system of internal control, that the internal auditor 
objectively assesses management’s accounting practices and internal controls, 
and that the outside auditors, through their own review, assess management and 
the internal auditor’s practices. 
The US Securities and Exchange Commission issued related rules in 1999 (SEC 
2003b) to request every company to disclose the functions of ACs including the 
charter regulating the responsibility of ACs, the independence of the AC members 
and related financial reporting information of the discussion between the BoD and the 
certified accountants.  
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issued in February 
2000 and revised in March 2004, the Practice Alert 2000-2 “Guidance for 
Communication with ACs Regarding Alternative Treatments of Financial Information 
within Generally Accepted Accounting Principles”, to request that certified 
accountants and the ACs discuss the quality of the applied accounting principles; not 
only its acceptability. The management also need to be involved in this discussion; for 
management should take the first responsibility for financial reports. 
D. USA / SOX (2002) defined the responsibility of the AC: 
“(1) The AC of each issuer, in its capacity as a committee of the BoD, shall be directly 
responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any 
registered public accounting firm employed by that issuer (including resolution of 
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disagreements between management and the auditor regarding financial reporting) 
for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit report or related work”, and  
“(2) Each such registered public accounting firm shall report directly to the AC. 
 “A committee (or equivalent body) established by and amongst the BoD of an 
issuer, has the purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial reporting 
processes of the issuer and audits of the financial statements of the issuer.” 
“(3) Complaints 
“— Each AC shall establish procedures for 
“(A) the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received by the issuer 
regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters”;  
“(B) the confidential, anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of 
concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.” 
“(4) Authority to engage advisers  
“— Each AC  shall have the authority to engage independent counsel and other 
advisers, as it determines necessary to carry out its duties.” 
E. UK / FRC (1992) and FRC (2010, June) defined the responsibility of the AC in 
terms of  
(1)  Making recommendations to the board on the appointment or the external auditor, 
the audit fee, and any questions of resignation or dismissal;  
(2)  Reviewing the half-year and annual financial statements before submission to the 
board;  
(3)  Discussing with the external auditor the nature and scope of the audit, co-
ordinating where more than one audit firm is involved, any problems or 
reservations arising from the audit, and any matters which the external auditor 
wishes to discuss, without executive board members present; 
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(4)  Reviewing the external auditor’s management letter; and reviewing any 
significant findings of internal investigations. 
(5) Reviewing the company’s statement on internal control systems prior to 
endorsement by the board. 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC (June 2010)) has more clearly defined the 
main role and responsibilities of the AC on C.3.2-3.7 as the following:  
“C.3.2 The main role and responsibilities of the audit committee should be set out in 
written terms of reference 19 and should include: 
- to monitor the integrity of the financial statements of the company and any formal 
announcements relating to the company’s financial performance, reviewing 
significant financial reporting judgements contained in them; 
- to review the company’s internal financial controls and, unless expressly addressed 
by a separate board risk committee composed of independent directors, or by the 
board itself, to review the company’s internal control and risk management systems; 
- to monitor and review the effectiveness of the company’s internal audit function; 
- to make recommendations to the board, for it to put to the shareholders for their 
approval in general meeting, in relation to the appointment, re-appointment and 
removal of the external auditor and to approve the remuneration and terms of 
engagement of the external auditor; 
- to review and monitor the external auditor’s independence and objectivity and the 
effectiveness of the audit process, taking into consideration relevant UK professional 
and regulatory requirements; 
- to develop and implement policy on the engagement of the external auditor to supply 
non-audit services, taking into account relevant ethical guidance regarding the 
provision of non-audit services by the external audit firm, and to report to the board, 
identifying any matters in respect of which it considers that action or improvement is 
needed and making recommendations as to the steps to be taken. 
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C.3.3 The terms of reference of the audit committee, including its role and the 
authority delegated to it by the board, should be made available. A separate section of 
the annual report should describe the work of the committee in discharging those 
responsibilities. 
C.3.4 The audit committee should review arrangements by which staff of the 
company may, in confidence, raise concerns about possible improprieties in matters 
of financial reporting or other matters. The audit committee’s objective should be to 
ensure that arrangements are in place for the proportionate and independent 
investigation of such matters and for appropriate follow-up action. 
C.3.5 The audit committee should monitor and review the effectiveness of the internal 
audit activities. Where there is no internal audit function, the audit committee should 
consider annually whether there is a need for an internal audit function and make a 
recommendation to the board, and the reasons for the absence of such a function 
should be explained in the relevant section of the annual report. 
C.3.6 The audit committee should have primary responsibility for making a 
recommendation on the appointment, reappointment and removal of the external 
auditor. If the board does not accept the audit committee’s recommendation, it should 
include in the annual report, and in any papers recommending appointment or re-
appointment, a statement from the audit committee explaining the recommendation 
and should set out reasons why the board has taken a different position. 
C.3.7 The annual report should explain to shareholders how, if the auditor provides 
non-audit services, auditor objectivity and independence is safeguarded.” 
F. PRC / SSE (2000) defined the responsibility of the ACs  
“(1) Reviewing the Company's accounting and financial reporting policies and 
practices, financial status as well as a review of the process of financial report; 
checking the accounting policy, financial condition and financial reporting 
process; 
(2) Discussing with the independent auditors (certified accountants) through the 
process of the independent auditors’ review; 
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(3) Recommendation and engagement of the independent auditors; 
(4) Reviewing the adequacy of the Company’s internal controls and internal audit 
functions;  
(5) Reviewing the Company’s policies with respect to legal compliance; 
(6) Reviewing and monitoring all types of the significant risks and exposures to the 
Company such as the financial risk and system security risk; 
(7) Reviewing and monitoring the company’s ethical code of conduct; 
(8) The Committee will undertake such other duties as the BoD delegates to it.” 
G. PRC / CSRC and SETC (2002) defined the responsibility of the AC  
“(1) To recommend the engagement or replacement of the company’s external 
auditing institutions;  
(2) To review the internal audit system and its execution;  
(3) To oversee the interaction between the company’s internal and external auditing 
institutions;  
(4) To inspect the company’s financial information and its disclosure; 
(5) To monitor the company’s internal control system.” 
Summary 
The research on the responsibilities of the AC in American, British and Chinese 
models listed in the above regulations is summarised below: 
• American documentary sources 
– The Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 
(“The Treadway Report”) (COSO, 1987) 
– In the Public Interest: A Special Report, (“The 1993 POB Report”) (POB, 
1993) 
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– Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate ACs: 
Report and Recommendations (BRC, 1999) 
– The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act, (“The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act”; “SOX”) (SOX, 2002) 
• British documentary source 
– Financial Aspects of CG, (“The Cadbury Report”) (FRC, 1992) 
– The UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, June 2010) 
• Chinese documentary source 
– Code of CG for Listed Companies in China (CSRC and SETC, 2002) 
– Shanghai Stock Exchange Guidelines for CG of Listed Companies (SSE, 2000) 
Despite the variations in the specifications of the functions of the AC in the Anglo-
American and Chinese models, their common aim of serving the management targets 
of the BoD and the reality of their independent evaluation operation are upheld. From 
the required responsibilities of the AC, the functions and position of the AC in the 
company’s CG structure is summarised in the following three categories: 
FUNCTION 1: Strengthening the oversight function of the BoD over the 
company’s financial reporting and disclosure: 
Based on the regulation, the AC’s key responsibilities are auditing the company’s 
financial information and its reporting; examining accounting policies, financial 
conditions and financial reporting procedures of the company. In summary, it includes:  
a. Overseeing the auditing results by the external independent accountants; 
b. Examining all the accounting policies of the company, and reporting major 
changes and other dubious points;  
c. Previewing the interim and annual financial reports and the reports of the BoD; 
d. Organising special investigations on the company’s financial activities. 
To enhance the truthfulness and reliability of the company’s financial reporting, it is 
the AC – being an important part of the company’s CG system formed mainly by 
independent directors-rather than the accounting firm selected by the management, 
that establishes an independent governance team in the BoD and evaluates the quality 
of the audits by the external accountants, thus avoiding the potential defects of having 
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the overseers controlled by the overseen. In other words, the implementation of the 
AC ensures the independence of the external audit and audit quality appraisal, and 
subsequently establishes the governance mechanism for the checks and balances of 
financial information that can promptly identify and correct inaccurate financial 
information, as well as improving the disclosure of the financial information of the 
listed company. In this manner, the control and oversight of the BoD over the 
management’s financial reporting through ACs is strengthened. 
FUNCTION 2: Strengthening the oversight function of the BoD over the 
company’s Auditing   
According to the regulation, it is required for AC to perform the following tasks: 
reviewing the internal auditing 6  functions, supervising the company’s internal 
auditing system and its operation; giving proposals on the recruiting or changing 
external auditory institutions; giving recommendations and hiring accounting firms; 
communicating with accounting firms following the auditing procedures; providing 
communication between the internal and external auditing bodies. In summary, these 
entail:  
(a) Strengthening the functions of the internal auditors 
Through the oversight function of the Internal Audit, overseeing key financial and 
management risks and internal control, examining the scope of the internal audit plans, 
appraising the skills of the internal auditors, and determining the financial budgets of 
the Internal Audit, etc. 
                                               
6
  “Internal auditing is an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add 
value and improve an organization's operations. It helps an organization accomplish its objectives 
by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk 
management, control, and governance processes. Internal auditing is a catalyst for improving an 
organization’s effectiveness and efficiency by providing insight and recommendations based on 
analyses and assessments of data and business processes. With commitment to integrity and 
accountability, internal auditing provides value to governing bodies and senior management as an 
objective source of independent advice. Professionals called internal auditors are employed by 
organizations to perform the internal auditing activity.” (Wikipedia, Internal audit, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internal_audit, as of July 2007) 
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(1) The oversight functions of ACs over internal auditors: 
Both the AC and the internal auditors have the function of monitoring internal control 
and independent evaluation of the financial reporting. The AC holds a higher position 
in the organisational structure than the internal auditors and oversees the latter. 
According to the regulation and guidelines, the oversight of the AC over the internal 
auditors should consist of the following categories:  
(a) To review and approve the Internal Audit charter; 
(b) To review audit plans and of the changes in planned activities; 
(c) To review the organisational structure of the Internal Audit; 
(d) To review the quality and training of the Internal Audit staff; 
(e) To approve the appointment or removal of the Internal Audit managers;  
(f) To review the audit findings. 
(2) The strengthening of the AC by the internal auditors: 
The AC has a low profile role in day-to-day operations and cannot participate in the 
regular auditing tasks, and not all members of the AC are experts in accounting or 
finance or can perform the evaluation of the internal control system in person. Hence 
for the AC to fulfil its duty of oversight, it is imperative for it to utilise the superior 
resources of the internal auditors.  
(b) Improving the independence of the external auditors 
Presiding over the affairs of the external audit, selecting the independent accountants, 
discussing the scope, process and plan of external audit, evaluating the capabilities of 
the independent accountants; in order to give suggestions for the appointments and 
dismissal of the external auditing institutions, the AC should be confined to 
supporting the sound suggestions made by the chartered accountants and actively co-
ordinate with the latter on major auditing matters, as well as co-ordinating the 
relations between the latter and the management to ensure the smooth operation of the 
auditing tasks. 
Having the AC responsible for co-ordination with external auditors, the selection of 
the chartered accountants and the determination of their reward can ensure the 
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independence of the independent audit and improve the quality of the chartered 
accountants. Additionally, the AC has the power to appoint or remove the external 
auditing agencies. The external audit is an important channel of the AC’s oversight 
over the management, but this channel could be rendered powerless if performed by 
an agency appointed by the management that is supposed to be overseen. This 
problem can only be avoided by reserving the power of appointing or removing the 
external audit agencies to the AC.  
FUNCTION 3: Strengthening the oversight function of the companies’ internal 
control and compliance 
According to the regulations, the key responsibilities of ACs cover examining the 
company’s observation of laws and regulations; examining and supervising the 
behaviours and regulations of the company; reviewing the internal control and its 
operation; examining the internal control of the company; examining and supervising 
all forms of risks, including financial risks and information systems security risks; 
other responsibilities given by the BoD. In summary, it includes: 
a. Overseeing the recommendations on internal control made by internal and 
external auditing. 
b. Overseeing the company’s compliance with regulations and business ethics, 
keeping effective control in revealing conflict of interest and errors through 
reviewing reports of outstanding litigations, major conflict of interests, and 
various policies of the company. 
It is anticipated that the establishment of the AC will strengthen the oversight of the 
management by the BoD. According to CSRC and SETC (2002), the implementation 
of the AC introduces oversight into the decision making process of the BoD. The 
purpose of having most positions on the AC taken by independent directors is to 
ensure the independence of the AC from the company’s management, so that it can 
evaluate the performance of the management with a fair and detached stance. In other 
words, through evaluation of the management’s awareness of the importance of 
internal control and risk management via an appraisal of the effectiveness of the 
company’s internal control system, the evaluation of the management’s planning of 
company activities can engage in production and operation according to the laws and 
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regulations. Equally, through an evaluation of the management’s attention to 
standards of corporate conduct, the AC can appraise the management objectively and 
neutrally, and the level of oversight of the BoD over the management is strengthened 
as a result.  
These functions include cooperating periodically with internal auditors and financial 
supervisors, utilizing qualified external accountants in effectively supervising the 
financial reporting process of the company, inspecting the internal audit procedure, 
discussing in detail the problems in auditing, collecting from the accountants the 
recommendations on audit management, evaluating the internal control system to 
ensure that the company’s wealth is in line with the requirements of the laws and 
regulations, and all the company’s accounting, finance and internal audit 
corresponding to the company’s operating condition.  
Academic Works on the Responsibilities of Audit Committees 
(1) Annual Number of AC meetings: 
McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) report that firms with financial reporting 
problems are less likely to have high frequency of the AC’s meetings. Wright (1996) 
finds that the number of meetings held during the fiscal year is not related to analysts’ 
disclosure ratings. Beasley (1996) reports no difference between fraud and no-fraud 
firms in the number of meetings held by ACs during the year preceding the fraud. 
Scarborough, Rama and Raghunandan (1998), in a survey of chief internal auditors of 
Canadian manufacturing companies, found that ACs comprised of outside directors 
met regularly with the chief internal auditor and reviewed the internal audit 
programme. Furthermore, Collier and Gregory (1999) studied the impact of insiders 
on the AC’s activity level. They found that ACs which consisted primarily of insider 
members met less frequently. Abbott et al. (2000) and DeZoort et al. (2002) 
document that companies where the AC meets less than the minimum threshold are 
more likely to restate earnings. Abbott et al. (2002) also find a significant and 
negative association with the occurrence of financial reporting restatements when a 
committee does not meet at least four times a year. Xie et al. (2003) also report that:  
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“We conclude that board and audit committee activity and their members' 
financial sophistication may be important factors in constraining the propensity 
of managers to engage in earnings management.”  
Abbott et al. (2000), DeZoort et al. (2002), Xie et al. (2003), Abbott et al. (2004) all 
support the contention that, when ACs meet at least four times a year, it improves the 
effectiveness of the supervisory function.  
Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) 
This study explored the BoD, AC, and executive committees associated with the 
prevention from the earnings management. They find that the activities of BoD and 
ACs may help control or limit the managers’ capacity to engage in earnings 
management. 
Abbott, Parker and Peters (2002) 
This study explored the characteristics and activities of the ACs, recording a negative 
association between the annual number of ACs’ meetings and the restatement of 
financial reports. They report: 
“We find that the independence of the audit committee and whether the committee 
meets at least four times per year exhibit a significant and negative association 
with the occurrence of financial reporting restatements.”  
(2) The processes associated with the practical operation of ACs 
It remains the case that the operating processes around ACs or other structures of 
supervisory governance in practice have been largely overlooked. Only a limited 
number of studies using in-depth fieldwork and interviews with significant actors in 
internal governance have addressed this issue (see, for example, Gendron et al., 2004 
and Turley and Zaman, 2007). 
A number of authors have pointed out that research investigating the processes 
associated with the practical operation of governance structures in companies has 
been limited. For example, Gendron and Bedard (2006) argue that, “Actors’ 
reflectivity especially is a neglected theme in the CG literature”, while Spira (2002) 
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notes that only a few studies have examined the perceptions of actors involved in 
ACs’ processes. Turley and Zaman (2004) commented that, “there is very little 
evidence on the processes associated with the operation of ACs and the manner in 
which they influence organisation behaviour”. There is only limited information 
available about what AC members actually do in meetings and whether, even in 
companies where the AC meets normative expectations regarding its composition, 
their behaviour satisfies external expectations about how they should execute their 
responsibilities (DeZoort et al., 2002; Gendron et al., 2004).  
Summary 
The Treadway Commission pointed out in “The Good Practice Guidelines for ACs” in 
1987 that ACs should hold a minimum of three or four meetings a year and special 
meetings when necessary (IIA, 1991; Price Waterhouse, 1993). Meeting frequency 
has been noted as a measure of an AC’s due diligence. 
The AC plays a central role in the supervisory aspects of governance. In the Western 
literature, the annual number of meetings is often employed as an indicator of the due 
diligence of ACs and BoDs. Most such studies support the thesis that more meetings  
of the supervisory institutions can improve their effectiveness.  
The research on the processes associated with the practical operations of governance 
institutions is limited, especially in terms of the empirical implementation of 
supervisory functions in China. Therefore, this thesis makes a contribution through 
providing an, presented in the chapter devoted to the operation of supervisory 
functions of SBs and ACs in China.  
3.2.7 The Effectiveness of Supervisory Functions 
Throughout the history of ACs, their effectiveness has been an issue of concern. A 
plethora of studies concerning AC effectiveness concentrate on the role played by 
mandated characteristics of the AC. These characteristics are independence, financial 
expertise and diligence. Previous studies have examined the impact of AC 
independence on financial report quality. Beasley (1996) compared firms 
experiencing financial statement fraud with non-fraud firms and found that the former 
had a lower  of outside directors on their boards. In addition, McMullen and 
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Raghunandan (1996) found that majority companies with no financial reporting 
problems had ACs primarily composed of outside directors. Likewise, Abbot et al. 
(2000) found that firms with independent committee members who met at least twice 
a year were less likely to have fraudulent financial mis-statements. Klein (2002) 
conducted an archival study involving 692 publicly traded United States firms, and 
examined the relationship between abnormal accruals (unexpected accruals due to 
earnings management) and boardroom or AC independence, discovering a strong 
negative association between these two variables (independence and abnormal 
accruals).  
Moreover, Carcello and Neal (2003b) reviewed the going concern discussions 
provided by companies in the notes, Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) 
sections of the financial statements. The results suggested that companies with a high  
of affiliated (non-independent) directors on their ACs exhibited greater optimism 
about the going concern issue. A study by Ho Young Lee (2003) revealed an 
association between the independence of AC members and lower accounting 
discretion by management. Carcello and Neal (2000) maintained that an independent 
AC would be more likely to support the external auditor in auditor-management 
disagreements involving going concern issues. Thus auditors of companies with 
independent ACs were more likely to issue going concern reports. Accordingly, 
companies with a high  of affiliated directors on their ACs were less likely to receive 
a going concern report from the external auditor. In addition, Archambeault and 
DeZoort (2001) found that companies with suspicious auditor changes also had a 
lower number of independent AC members.  
A second stream of research investigated the impact of financial expertise on AC 
effectiveness. A survey by McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) revealed that a 
majority of companies that reported no financial reporting problems had Certified 
Public Accountants (CPA) on their ACs. DeZoort (1998) found that AC members 
with auditing and internal control evaluation experience made judgements similar to 
experts (auditors), and the performance of experienced committee members was 
higher than their inexperienced counterparts in areas of judgement, self-insight, and 
consensus. McDaniel, Martin and Maines (2002) also compared the evaluations of 
financial reporting by financial experts and financially literate AC members. The 
results suggested that financial experts and financially literate AC members assessed 
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and identified certain reporting issues differently. For example, financially literate AC 
members concentrated more on non-recurring financial information; whereas the 
financial experts, based on the concept of relevance, selected more recurring activities 
for evaluation. 
Other studies focused on the role of AC expertise in affecting the position members 
take during auditor-management disputes. DeZoort and Salterio (2001) found that 
independent AC members with audit-reporting knowledge supported the auditor in 
disputes involving the external auditor and management. In addition, Carcello and 
Neal (2003a) examined the relationship between AC characteristics (independence, 
governance knowledge, financial expertise) and dismissal of the auditor following a 
going concern report. They found that companies with independent ACs were less 
likely to dismiss the external auditor. The results also suggested that companies 
whose AC members had governance expertise retained the auditor after issuance of a 
going concern report. Similarly, Lee, Mande and Ortman (2004) found that the 
financial expertise of AC members was negatively associated with auditor resignation. 
Likewise, Krishnan and Ye (2005) found that the presence of a financial expert on the 
AC was positively associated with the committee seeking ratification of the external 
auditor with the board, which signified that the presence of the expert enhanced the 
monitoring activities of the AC. 
Subsequent to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, AC research continued to 
concentrate on examining the relationship between the three AC characteristics 
(independence, expertise, and diligence) and AC effectiveness. Abbot, Parker, Peters 
and Raghunandan (2003b) postulated that independent ACs would limit the non-audit 
services of the external auditor in order to enhance auditor independence. Results 
suggested that independent and diligent (meeting at least four times a year) ACs were 
negatively associated with the non-audit fees ratio, signifying the members' 
reluctance to approve non-audit services by the external auditor. In another study, 
Abbot, Parker, Peters and Raghunandan (2003a) investigated the relationship between 
AC characteristics (independence, financial expertise, diligence) and audit fees, 
which serve as a proxy for audit quality. After examining 492 proxy statements, they 
found a significant association between the two characteristics (independence and 
expertise) and high audit fees.  
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Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004) discovered that independence and financial 
expertise of AC members were associated with lower aggressive earnings 
management, as measured by abnormal accruals (unexpected accruals due to earnings 
management). Additionally, Abbot, Parker, and Peters (2004) found that the 
independence, financial expertise and diligence of AC members were negatively 
associated with occurrences of financial statement restatements. Moreover, Krishnan 
(2005) investigated the relationship between AC characteristics (independence, 
expertise) and internal control problems. Since companies that changed auditors had 
to report the existence of internal control problems, he compared companies that 
changed auditors with companies that did not. The results suggested there to be a 
negative association between these characteristics and internal control problems. 
Mangena and Pike (2005) investigated the association of AC shareholding, financial 
expertise, and committee size with the level of disclosures in interim financial 
statements. They found a significant positive association between AC financial 
expertise and the extent of disclosure on interim reports.  
The above discussion of prior literature on AC reveals a possible overemphasis on 
AC characteristics as measures of effectiveness. Although these studies provide 
credible attempts to examine the boundaries of AC effectiveness, there is a need to 
look beyond these boundaries for a number of reasons. 
First, the performance of ACs in real life situations provides mixed signals about 
factors linked to effectiveness. Prior research confirms the need for financial experts 
on the AC. However, the performance of Enron's highly knowledgeable AC suggests 
that financial expertise may be a necessary but not sufficient attribute for AC 
effectiveness (Lublin, 2002). Additionally, even though the independence of the AC 
is highly laudable, there are numerous examples of companies that have exhibited 
impeccable financial reporting integrity despite having affiliated directors on their 
ACs (Sonnenfeld, 2002b). These examples suggest the presence of other factors, 
besides those most frequently investigated, may affect the decision-making quality of 
ACs. In addition, Paredes (2003) has stated that cognitive biases such as escalation of 
commitment and groupthink could affect board behaviour. Researchers, who have 
observed this gap in research on ACs, have called for "psychology-based 
experimental research involving AC member judgment and decision making" 
(DeZoort et al., 2002: 69).  
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 Independence, expertise and diligence are identified as the key attributes of the 
effectiveness of the supervisory functions in the literature and in regulations. This 
thesis will provide empirical evidence about the characteristics and effectiveness of 
two supervisory institutions in China.  
Earnings Response Coefficients (PER) 
If the governance institutions can implement effective supervisory functions well, it 
will increase investors’ trust in the company’s CG and its operations, reflecting 
positively on earnings. The ultimate test of earnings quality is the market’s response 
to earnings (PER), which provides a measure of the extent to which new earnings 
information is capitalised in the stock price (Kim and Kross, 2005; Ryan and Zarowin, 
2003).  
Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) documented a positive association between the 
magnitude of stock price responses and the precision of accounting information. Teoh 
and Wong (1993) and Balsam et al. (2003) suggested that investors’ responses to an 
earnings surprise depend on the perceived quality and credibility of the earnings 
reported.  
Specifically, Teoh and Wong (1993) hypothesised that that investors perceived Big 8 
auditors as providing higher quality audits. Examples of this include the reaction of 
the stock market towards unanticipated income reports of Big 8 clients. Thus, by 
linking financial reporting results to the PERs, they provide evidence that the 
financial statements audited by Big 8 are of higher quality and utility. Kao (2002)’s 
research reveals a higher stock pledge of supervisors and directors to have the lower 
fluctuation of stock price. Huang (2002) researches the association between stock 
market price and the effectiveness of the company’s operation: revealing a positive 
relationship between them.  
Earnings management entails the selection of accounting procedures and estimates 
that may induce a deviation to achieve certain objectives. Earnings management has 
the potential to decrease the perceived quality of earnings (Schrand and Wong, 2003; 
Watkins et al., 2004). Due to the fact that income management is expensive to detect, 
the agency theory forecasts that income management will rise when the benefit of 
manipulating earnings exceeds the relevant costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). A 
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large number of studies have documented that business managers have great 
motivation to handle earnings. These incentives result from the explicit and implicit 
contracts that link the management’s interest to accounting numbers (Anderson et al., 
2004; Bartov and Mohanram, 2004). 
The literature on earnings management makes three general predictions about the use 
of discretion relevant to a particular benchmark (Healy, 1985; Abarbanell and Lehavy, 
2003). First, if pre-managed earnings are well above a relevant benchmark, firms will 
make income-decreasing choices. Next, if pre-managed earnings are below a 
benchmark but reserves are available to meet it, firms will draw from accounting 
reserves to just edge past the benchmark. Finally, if pre-managed earnings and 
available reserves are insufficient to meet any benchmark, firms will engage in 
extreme, income-decreasing behaviour that will pay off in the future. Healy (1985), 
Das and Zhang (2003), and Dechow et al. (2003) all reported evidence from the US 
market that firms might undertake extreme, income-decreasing earnings management 
to maximise accounting reserves for future use. 
Prior research also documents other incentives for earnings management. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990) contended that larger firms would make income-decreasing 
accounting choices in an attempt to minimise political costs. Other empirical studies 
(Cahan, 1992; Han and Wang, 1998; Jones, 1991; Cahan et al., 1997; Monem, 2003) 
also document that business managers use income-reducing discretionary accruals to 
minimise the political costs. Litigation concerns discourage firms from managing 
earnings upward because of the asymmetrical loss function on firms who exaggerate 
their earnings. Perry and Williams (1994) reported the evidence of downward 
earnings management in the year before the management buyouts in the US.  
A large body of recent literature indicates that management has strong incentives to 
report earnings growth (e.g., Kothari, 2001). Studies by Hayn (1995), Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997), and Degeorge et al. (1999) documented unusual patterns in the 
distribution of earnings levels, earnings changes, and earnings surprises. For instance, 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) reported that an unusually large number of firms 
report small profits and an unusually small number of firms report small losses. These 
patterns are widely interpreted as evidence of earnings management. These findings 
have spawned many studies to investigate various aspects of the management’s 
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incentives to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, including Healy and Wahlen (1999), 
Dechow and Skinner (2000), Fields et al. (2001), Bartov et al. (2002) and Kasznik 
and McNichols (2002).  
The survey evidence in Graham et al. (2005) indicates that reporting increases in 
quarterly earnings per share is an important goal for management, and may even be 
more important than either beating analyst forecasts or reporting profits. Meanwhile, 
Degeorge et al. (1999), provided evidence that the management’s first objective was 
to report positive earnings, then to increase quarterly earnings, and then to beat 
analyst forecasts. Myers et al. (2005) demonstrated that many more firms reported 
long strings of consecutive increases in earnings per share than would be expected by 
chance. They interpreted this phenomenon as an evidence of earnings management 
and provided the evidence that business managers had incentives to maintain their 
firms’ earnings trends. 
Hence, in the US and other Western countries, as management is generally motivated 
to manipulate earnings upward, there are also incentives for them to manipulate 
earnings downward. However, incentives and behaviours of earnings management are 
different in China because the structures of ownership and motivation scheme of the 
Chinese listed firms are quite different from their counterparts in the Western world 
(Haw et al., 2005).  
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) suggest that firms with poor performance may not take 
an ‘earnings bath’ if they want to maintain good investor relations. Chinese listed 
firms usually have a highly concentrated ownership structure, which makes 
opaqueness gains possible for the controlling owners of the firms. In order to maintain 
opaqueness gains, the controlling shareholders may try hard to package the listed 
firms so as to avoid being monitored by outside shareholders. They are very unwilling 
to take an ‘earnings bath’ since such an action will badly damage the investor 
relations and very probably lead to much stricter surveillance by market regulators7. 
                                               
7
   In fact, Chinese listed firms took a market-wide big bath in 2001, as the listed firms are required 
to make provisions for eight items to follow more conservative accounting treatments. However, 
this action is initiated by the change of accounting standards but not by the management of listed 
firms. 
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Chinese listed firms are willing to take a “big bath”8 only if they are labelled as ST 
firms9 by the stock exchanges.  
As Chinese listed firms are usually controlled by the government or parent state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), they face much fewer political costs compared with their 
US counterparts. Threat of litigation is less likely to deter Chinese business managers 
from reporting optimistically when it is difficult to successfully sue them for doing so. 
In China, the legal system is not highly independent, often influenced by the 
government; and law enforcement is weak. In addition, class legal action is not 
allowed in China at present. As controlling shareholders are usually the government 
agencies or parent SOEs, it is very difficult for Chinese investors to effectively sue 
business managers (usually appointed by the controlling shareholders) and controlling 
shareholders. Management buyout is nearly impossible as business managers of 
Chinese listed firms are usually appointed by the government and they hold none or 
an insignificant amount of the firm’s shares. Kim et al. (2003) found that, in the US, 
share-decreasing firms have the intention of managing earnings downward; however, 
share-decreasing action is generally not allowed in China. 
Considering the facts and arguments above, Chinese listed firms have few incentives 
to manage earnings downward. However, they do have strong incentives to 
manipulate earnings upward. In order to maintain opaqueness gains from a weak CG 
                                               
8
  “Big Bath in accounting is an earnings management technique whereby a one-time charge is 
taken against income in order to reduce assets, which results in lower expenses in the future. The 
write-off removes or reduces the asset from the financial books and results in lower net income 
for that year. The objective is to ‘take one big bath’ in a single year so future years will show 
increased net income. This technique is often employed in a year when sales are down from other 
external factors and the company would report a loss in any event. Corporations will often wait 
until a bad year to employ this ‘big bath’ technique to ‘clean up’ the balance sheet. Although the 
process is discouraged by auditors, it is still used. The objective is to take these loses all at once, 
so future periods can show positive net income.” (Wikipedia, Big bath, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_bath, as of July 2007) 
9
  Special Treatment (ST) stock is designed for a listed company on the Shanghai or Shenzhen 
stock exchanges when it demonstrates an abnormal financial situation. The ST firms will be 
delisted if they suffer three consecutive years of loss, so they have the incentive to take big baths 
to avoid making a loss in the third year. The ST firms are not many (around 5% of all listed firms) 
and happen to fall outside of my sample. 
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mechanism, the controlling owners (through the management) are motivated to 
manipulate earnings upward to avoid stringent market surveillance and monitoring 
from public investors. For example, controlling owners have been actively involved 
in a lot of related party transactions to boost profit or decorate below-the-line items as 
operating income. Listed firms need to manipulate earnings upward to avoid being 
de-listed or being capped with ST status.  
As business managers are usually appointed by the government or controlling SOEs, 
there are incentives for them to overstate earnings to please their superiors and 
maximise their own benefits. Business managers are also motivated to manipulate 
earnings upward to fulfil certain political agendas, in order to get promotion in their 
political career. In addition, the bonus system also motivates business managers to 
overstate earnings. 
Hence, in China, listed firms have a much stronger intention to manage earnings 
upward than to manage them downward. The author conjectures that the earnings 
management in China is dominantly unidirectional. Haw et al. (2005) suggested that 
Chinese investors would make a distinction to the quality of income and not set as 
much value on the income assumed to be subject to a larger extent of manipulation. 
Their results imply that the Chinese investors, to some extent, can make rational 
adjustment for the quality of earnings.  
The above discussion illustrates that many research studies have used an earnings 
based measure as a proxy variable. The market’s response to earnings (PER) is likely 
to vary with the stockholders perceptions of the effectiveness of supervisory 
institutions. This thesis therefore applies the market’s response to earnings (PER) as 
the dependent variable to evaluate the effectiveness of SBs and ACs in China.  
3.2.8 The Relevant Attributes Applied in this Thesis 
This research is focused on three objectives relating to the effectiveness of the 
supervisory institutions, operations of supervisory functions and the co-ordination 
between the governance institutions.  
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Objective 1: To understand the effectiveness of SBs and ACS in China 
Currently, two groups of listed companies exist in China. Some choose to establish 
ACs in addition to SBs; some to have only SBs. It is expected that the companies 
with ACs have less confidence in their SBs, and so add an AC to improve the 
effectiveness of supervisory functions. The following two hypotheses are therefore 
formed, in order to answer key research questions 1 and 2:  
Q1:  Which system, with or without ACs, has more effective supervisory functions in 
China? 
H1:  Firms with SBs plus ACs (G2) are more likely to effectively engage in the 
supervisory functions than the firms without ACs (G1).  
The Effectiveness of Supervisory Functions:  G2(WithAC) ≥ G1 (WithoutAC) 
The effectiveness of supervisory functions of the two groups of companies will be 
investigated by comparing the proxy variable and control variables for the 
effectiveness of the supervisory institutions.  
The Proxy Variable of the Effectiveness of the Supervisory Institutions:  
Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) documented a positive association between the 
magnitude of stock price’s market responses and the precision of accounting 
information. Kim and Kross (2005), Ryan and Zarowin (2003), Huang (2002) and 
Kao (2002) all support a positive relationship between stock market price and 
earnings. Stock price reflects the confidence of investors in the effectiveness of 
supervisory institutions; and their faith in the implementation by the CG. Therefore, 
this thesis applies the market response to earnings (PER) as a proxy variable for the 
effectiveness of supervisory institutions of SBs and ACs in China.  
In addition, firm size, growth rate of assets, return on assets and decrease in debt ratio 
are taken as control variables of the effectiveness of the supervisory functions to 
prove which system of listed companies with or without ACs can have more effective 
supervisory functions. This approach is discussed further in the chapter on The 
Empirical Studies – Section A – The Effectiveness of the Supervisory Functions of 
SBs and ACs in China in this thesis. 
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Q2:  Will the AC contribute to the effectiveness of the supervisory functions in China? 
H2:  In companies adopting an AC, the AC exhibits characteristics and 
responsibilities that are likely to contribute to the effectiveness of supervisory 
functions.  
Firms with higher levels of independence, greater expertise among members, of a 
larger size and with more active meetings, lower centralised shareholding structure 
and separation between executive and oversight positions are more likely to enjoy 
effective supervisory functions when adding ACs. This hypothesis is tested through 
comparing the impact of variables for independence, expertise and diligence on the 
the proxy variable for effectiveness of the supervisory institutions between two 
groups of listed companies.  
Independent Variables:  
As discussed above, the composition of the ACs, independence and expertise, and the 
frequency of meeting have shown a positive association with effectiveness of 
supervisory institutions  
Independence 
This thesis will apply four indicators of independence:  
(1) The percentage independent directors: The Anglo-American model requires that 
all directors should be independent. On the other hand, the Chinese model only 
stipulates that those independent directors shall constitute the majority on the 
committees among listed companies. Hence, the requirements in these systems 
differ in the required percentage of independent directors. The number of 
independent directors as a percentage of the total number of BoD is used as an 
independent variable for evaluating the independence of composition of 
supervisory institutions.  
(2) The SB’s shareholding: the shareholdings of SBs as a proportion of the total 
shareholdings is used as a second variable for evaluating the independence of 
supervisory institutions.  
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(3) & (4)  SBs and independent directors receiving remunerations:  
 On the basis that remuneration, fees or reward could affect the independence with 
which independent directors execute their roles, further variables reflecting 
whether SBs and independent directors receive remuneration are included to test 
for the independence of supervisory functions.  
Expertise 
Four indicators of expertise are included as independent variables:  
According to the regulations in China, at least one expert with financial or accounting 
background and legal background is required. Both financial or accounting and legal 
backgrounds are included as independent variables in this research. In addition, 
another two variables representing internal audit literacy and the presence of party 
member employees are included. The party member employee without financial or 
legal background was incorporated as a supervisor when SBs were first formed in 
China (see discussion in the chapter on the Background of the Supervisory 
Mechanism).  
Internal audit literacy is defined as possessing internal auditing skill and experience in 
the audit process. Experience of external auditing and a background of financial or 
accounting expertise will be counted as evidence of financial and accounting expertise, 
as supervisors with an internal auditing background may not have the education or 
experience relating to a financial, accounting or legal background.  
Diligence 
(1) The frequency of meetings: Four meetings of ACs in one year are required by the 
regulations in the Anglo-American system but only one meeting of SBs annually 
is required by Chinese regulations. The due diligence by supervisory institutions 
is assumed to impact on the effectiveness of their supervisory functions. This 
study uses the number of meetings of supervisory institutions as independent 
variables for their operational diligence in carrying out their supervisory 
functions.  
(2) The size of supervisory institutions:  
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 The number of members of SBs and BoD are also treated as variables reflecting 
the level of diligence, which can impact on the effectiveness of the supervisory 
functions in China.  
Other variables 
(1) The shareholding structure in Chinese listed companies: US regulations state that 
independent directors must not have a significant shareholding or represent major 
shareholders, but in China, the shareholding structure is different. Therefore, 
shareholdings of 50% or more by the largest three shareholders in Chinese 
companies are also included as a possible influence on the effectiveness of 
supervisory institutions.  
(2) CEO dual positions: BRC (1999) suggested that the position of CEO should be 
separate from the president of BoD to prevent a loss of supervisory functions. 
Abbott et al. (2000) showed that if the CEO holds a concurrent position of 
President of BoD, it would increase the risk of fraud or negligence in financial 
reporting. Liu and Lu (2002) also proved that dual positions held by the CEO 
would lead to less independence, so increasing levels of earnings management. 
Lin (2005) used a dummy variable, and assumed that if the CEO holds the 
concurrent post of President, the company would have less willingness to 
establish ACs. My thesis also applies capture whether the President of the BoD 
serves concurrently as the CEO. 
Objective 2: To understand how the operations of SBs and ACs improve the 
effectiveness of supervisory governance functions in China. 
Key Question:  What are the operational processes, problems and difficulties 
faced in the implementation of the supervisory functions by SBs 
and ACs in practice in China? 
Sub-questions:  
Sub-Question 2.1:  What is the role played by the AC in China? 
Sub-Question 2.2:  What are the overlaps and omitted items in terms of functions 
between the SBs and the ACs?  
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The above literature review reveals a limited basis for understanding the processes 
associated with the operation of ACs and SBs in China. It also suggests that problems 
and difficulties in applying the dual structures of SBs and ACs at the same time are 
likely. Therefore, this study endeavours to explore the implementation of supervisory 
functions including the operational processes and the problems and difficulties faced 
in China.  
The role of the ACs as defined by the regulations provides a basis with which to 
understand the intended role to be played by ACs in practice in China. This will be 
explored, in order to establish whether the AC not only executes basic functions of 
supervision, but also provides added value of consulting and training services.  
The AC’s responsibility is rooted in the three key functions of financial reporting, 
auditing and internal control. This thesis therefore focuses on these three key 
functions to better understand the overlapping status between the two supervisory 
institutions of SBs and ACs in China.  
Objective 3: To understand the co-ordination between SBs and ACs as 
governance organisations.   
Question 3.1:  How will the systems with and without ACs exist in the future 
according to framework of legislation and government 
management? 
Question 3.2:  What is the preferred linkage of interactions between the SBs and 
the ACs in terms of organisation in China? 
In order to investigate how to solve possible problems of overlapping supervisory 
functions given the coexistence of SBs and ACs, this study will research co-
ordination between the SBs and ACs as dual supervisory institutions in China from 
the viewpoints of legislation and government management. This investigation will be 
rooted in the political model theory as well as the empirical practice of listed 
companies in China, and explore the preferred linkage of interactions between these 
two supervisory institutions as a basis for future development.  
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Chapter 4 The Background – The Development of 
Supervisory Mechanisms of Corporate 
Governance in the West and China 
4.1  Introduction 
Shareholder theory forms the basis for introducing ACs into China, acting as monitors 
enhancing existing SBs with a high expectation for AC performance in effectiveness 
and operations. Meanwhile, stakeholder theory provides the basis for establishing 
whether the SB has played the key role of supervisory functions in China since 1993, 
even though ACs were introduced in 2002. In addition, managerial hegemony theory 
is used as the basis with which to study the effectiveness of SBs and ACs in China.  
This thesis applies political model theory and institutional ownership theory to 
enhance understanding of the background relating to the shareholding structure in 
China. Both theories lead this thesis to provide an overview of the political 
environment and shareholding background in this chapter. 
The structure of this chapter is based on an understanding of four features of four CG 
models, revealing peculiar problems they face in the supervisory mechanism. 
Meanwhile, the features of three models in the West are referenced, in order to 
provide a comparison. The existing model of China’s CG is then revealed. 
Furthermore, an overview of how China’s political environment influences the 
development of supervisory mechanisms of CG, and the relationship between the 
shareholding structure and internal supervisory mechanisms in China are introduced.  
The objective of the chapter is to emphasise the contextual nature of what will be 
effective in governance structures, the particularity of what China has done in 
combining alternative approaches from other systems, and the need for research to 
investigate the effectiveness, operations and co-ordination of this combination.  
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4.2 The Definition of Corporate Governance 
It has been generally argued that the 21st Century is that of global CG. CG structures 
have been in place in countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom for 
many decades, but their adoption in Asia gathered momentum in the aftermath of the 
regional financial crisis of 1997.  
CG covers a large number of distinct economic phenomena and affects the legality 
and effectiveness of a company’s powers worldwide, so a universally agreed 
definition or scope is yet to be established. However, as a starting point for the 
discussion in this chapter, the following definition from the OECD provides a useful 
reference:  
Corporate Governance is the system by which business corporations are directed 
and controlled. The Corporate Governance  structure specifies the distribution of 
rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such 
as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the 
rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it 
also provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance. (OECD, 1999; 
OECD, 2004a) 
The promotion of global governance is illustrated by the World Bank’s efforts to 
encourage countries to voluntarily comply with formal and informal systems of rules 
and arrangements. The concept of CG refers essentially to the mechanisms of 
governance and supervision. With respect to CG, it seeks to establish a mechanism to 
maximise the corporate value of promoting what is beneficial, such as pursuing 
maximum return for stakeholders, shareholders, creditors and employees. With 
respect to supervision, CG strives to minimise the chance of the occurrence of events 
or incidents harmful to the company, such as the potential for wrongdoing and 
fraudulent practices.  
Separation of ownership and control has presented a challenge to the profit 
maximisation of cooperation. As one of the main purposes of CG is to facilitate 
maximisation of shareholders’ value, and to increase the stock price of the enterprise, 
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it needs to establish both an effective strategic management for making decisions on 
corporate affairs to maximise corporate value, and an effective supervisory 
mechanism to minimise the potential risk to the corporation, in which managers are 
accountable to the shareholders, to align and to protect the interests of both 
shareholders and managers. Hence, it has become an extremely important task to 
design and execute both an effective strategic management and an effective 
supervisory mechanism. 
Yeh et al. (2002) defined that one of the functions of CG is to “strengthen a 
company’s competitiveness and management effects”. Olivier et al. (2008) analysed 
26 years of strategic management research, and provided an overview of the 
development of strategic management, in order to understand future strategic 
management research. They proposed that the integration of corporate and 
competitive strategies should be related to future research of strategic management. 
Hence the promotion of the competitiveness of a company has become the key 
common purpose of implementing both CG and strategic management.  
Moreover, globalization provides motivation in both fields as well. Pol (2005) 
researched the need for new dominant designs of strategic management in the future, 
and identified that globalization increasingly determines that the capability of firms to 
innovate is essential to their competing successfully. Yet the research on strategic 
management by Ikujiro and Ryoko (2007) described an entity pursuing universal 
ideals and a particular reality at the same time, rather than merely profit. They 
concluded that an entity has to build up the standard of “ideal” for making judgements 
in particular situations when building and practicing a strategy. However, “transitional 
economies” are necessary to create new research and expand entrepreneurial 
challenges in the field of strategic management (John, 2007). 
CG in China is characterised by weaknesses of strong insider power, highly 
concentrated ownership of the state, and a weak legal system for shareholder 
protection (Udo et al., 2005). These weaknesses affect China’s strategic management. 
Moreover, Chinese company law stipulates that both the CEO and the SB have to be 
elected by the shareholders’ meeting: the controlling shareholder is responsible for the 
appointment of these positions.  
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The ownership of CG may affect levels of control of the management. Guy and Pei 
(2005) concluded that class of shareholdings does matter in terms of company 
performance. Their study revealed that, as the controlling shareholder of public 
corporations, indirect state control of wholly industrial companies with focused 
business is the least inefficient shareholding class among eight different ranked 
classes. Their finding suggests that supervisory mechanism of CG control over the 
management could be further enhanced, especially through CG reform under a 
transition economy in China.  
The supervisory mechanism of CG in China is peculiar in terms of establishing AC in 
the board and SB simultaneously. China adopted two tier boards, with SB based on 
the German CG model in 1993, and China adopted AC based on the Anglo-American 
CG model in 2002. China therefore combined two models’ supervisory mechanisms 
of CG at the same time. Zhezong et al., (2004) studied the role of the SB in China, 
and revealed a “two tier board is also fraught with problems”. Meanwhile, no 
evidence exists to show that SB performs effective monitoring functions over the 
management. The only function seems to be the allocation of the “right” people in 
strategically important positions, regardless of their level of, or lack of, economic 
expertise (Zhezong et al., 2004).  
From 1995 to 2000, about 15% of listed companies received modified audit opinions 
(MAOs) on their annual reports every year. Xijia et al. (2005) identified weak CG as 
one of the contributory reasons for the large number of MAOs in China. The Chinese 
government required both the BoD and SB to take responsibility for monitoring the 
quality of financial reporting, especially when a MAO is involved. Xijia et al. (2005) 
found that neither board performs an effective monitoring function.  
4.3 The Development of Supervisory Mechanisms of Corporate 
Governance  
Shareholders and creditors who invest their assets in a company may suffer losses if 
the company fails (Spira and Page, 2003) and seek to safeguard their interests by 
setting up mechanisms of CG. Hence, international organisations and various 
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countries’ CG criteria generally require or propose some external and internal 
supervisory mechanisms to be established.  
The external supervisory mechanism: Environmental factors such as policies and 
systems included in established legal frameworks for firms impose discipline and 
demand accountability of the firm’s directors and management (Yeh et al., 2002). 
These factors provide the foundation for the external supervisory mechanism, which 
includes administrative regulations as well as accounting and auditing criteria. This 
involves a combination of various professional groups, such as accountants, lawyers, 
investment banks, financial and economics media, investment consultants and 
research institutions and personnel analysing CG. 
The internal supervisory mechanism: A narrow focus for CG is that of relations 
between shareholders and management layers within the company (Yuan, 2005). The 
core of CG lies in the BoD, are accountable to shareholders and creditors as well as 
the whole company. Here, the focal point of CG lies in designing a set of systems to 
enable the external shareholders to supervise the company’s management. Hence, a 
company’s internal supervision mechanism constitutes a critical part of CG in 
constraining the controlling management from looking after only their own interests, 
taking advantage of their position and power, at the expense of the interests of the 
stockholders. 
In general, the supervisory mechanism, the company’s management and the BoD 
constitute three important mainstays for a stable governance framework, and the 
reliability of control and financial information. The inclusion of an AC in the process 
of supervision is intended to offer a more holistic view of CG and ensure the co-
ordination of external and internal responsibilities, by enhancing the integration of CG, 
business management, the audit functions and internal controls. 
Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) asserted that the CG model used in both the US and 
the UK, focusing on shareholders’ benefit, is most effective, and referred to this 
Anglo-American model as the standard CG one. The findings of the Governance 
Metrics International (GMI), an international management appraisal organisation that 
evaluated companies in 38 countries, seem to confirm this viewpoint. Several 
countries with similar CG models, such as the UK, the US, Canada, Australia and 
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New Zealand, have been consistently highly ranked on the GMI rankings, and 
occupied the top six places in the 2007 ranking (GMI, 2007).  
To appreciate the merits of this model, it is useful to review the historical 
development of supervisory mechanisms of CG in both countries. Tables 14 and 15 
list chronologically the major events and their impacts on the development of the 
supervisory mechanisms of CG in the UK and the US.  
When reviewing the history of CG, we find that each stage of development was often 
a reaction to an economic crisis or corporate failure. For example, the South Sea 
Bubble of 1720 in the UK, Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, Enron scandal of 2001 and 
WorldCom scandal of 2002 in US all triggered public demand for reform of the CG 
system. These scandals also persuaded both enterprises and authorities to re-
emphasise the importance of strengthening the supervisory mechanism of CG in 
response to the rapidly changing economic environment and the manipulative 
behaviour of elements of management.  
A survey of the historical development of CG also illustrates the risks associated with 
failure to improve its supervisory mechanism. Without some form of supervisory 
mechanism, discipline and order in the capital market would be difficult to maintain, 
investors’ interests would be encroached upon, and the structure of CG would be mere 
decoration. Therefore, criteria for effective quality in the supervisory mechanism 
continually increase; and for this reason, requirements for supervisory bodies in 
various countries have become stricter over time.  
4.4 Corporate Governance Models and Principles of Supervision 
4.4.1 The Supervisory Mechanism in Models of Corporate Governance 
What then is the ultimate goal of Corporate Governance? Is it to maximise the 
shareholders’ interests, the managers’ interests, or the company’s interests as a whole? 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) CG should devote itself to solving 
problems in the relations between the owner and the management. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) further pointed out that the central issue of CG is how to reduce agency costs. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provided a comprehensive survey of this issue by 
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reviewing the literature of Corporate Governance. They concluded that the core 
objective of CG is to guarantee the interests of the suppliers of capital. Yeh et al. 
(2002), Tian and Feng (2004) and Yuan (2005) have all undertaken comparative 
studies of governance structures internationally. All concluded that, since no perfect 
system of CG can be found anywhere in the world, each system should draw lessons 
from the strength and weaknesses of others, in order to develop a system befitting the 
specific considerations of the country of interest.  
Thus, the goal of CG is closely related to the CG model. Countries at different stages 
of economic development have gradually established their own unique CG model. 
Solomon and Solomon (2004) pointed out that the ownership structure of the 
company is a key factor for a government, when determining the CG model. 
Thompson (1999) found differences between externally and internally driven systems, 
and this, he asserted, has become a general criterion used for categorising CG models. 
La Porta et al. (2000) have not only identified two kinds of thoroughly different CG 
models in the world – namely the dispersed ownership model and the concentrated 
ownership model – but also suggested that the legal system is the key variable for 
explaining the existence of these two kinds of models. They further stressed that 
providing legal protection for investors, especially for minority stockholders, is the 
most fundamental goal of Corporate Governance.  
Other scholars have attempted to search for an ideal type of CG model in the world. 
For instance, Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) observed that, though there are 
different types of models, the general trend of the development of CG is moving 
increasingly toward convergence worldwide. Coffee (2001) analysed the problem of 
convergence of CG models within various countries in the present era of globalisation, 
and pointed out that the ongoing transitional development of the ownership structure 
worldwide is a continuing process and is clearly moving towards the US and the UK 
models, characterised by advanced legal rules. Coffee noted that this trend is 
especially apparent among the various developing countries of the world.  
While Bedchuk and Roe (1999) recognised that differences among the various CG 
models have diminished, they nevertheless noted the fact that these differences still 
linger. Branson (2001) concluded that, although a convergence of the various CG 
models may have taken place in some specific areas – such as financial accounting 
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principles and information disclosure standards – the scope of convergence thus far 
has been regional rather than global. Branson, however, disapproved of the notion of 
global convergence, because he viewed it as a limited phenomenon: arguing that the 
crux of the problem lies in cultural diversities among nations. He therefore proposed 
studying the impact of Confucian culture on the emergence of clan capitalism in 
China and overseas Chinese communities.  
In this regard, it can be said that East Asia has developed its own governance model, 
by mixing the Anglo-American model and the German and Japanese ones. In the 
aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, several scholars including Li (2007), 
Feng (2005), Huang (2005) and others focused on analysing how East Asia countries 
have endeavoured to reform their CG systems, and characterised the East Asian 
model as family controlled, because most of the ownership is concentrated in the 
hands of family clans.  
The relevant studies of Buchanan (2007), Hu et al., (2000), Huang (2005), Shi (2006), 
Strikwerda (2003), Tan et al. (2007), Tian and Feng (2004), Ye (2001), and Yuan 
(2005) have identified the following four influencing factors as the main cause of 
differences between systems internationally:  
Governance culture: Cultural background shapes people’s behaviour and their way of 
thinking, which in turn influences the formation of their CG models.  
Legal environments: The law is a factor in shaping people’s behaviour. Normally 
people tend to observe legal provisions, which in turn influence the establishment of 
their CG models.  
Ownership structure: This dictates the ratio of shares owned by the small and big 
shareholders, which affects the influence these shareholders can have over the 
corporation. This in turn influences governance structure.  
Governance structure: Whether established on a single- or double-pronged board, the 
governance structure influences the construction of the supervisory mechanism.  
Despite these differences in the establishment of a supervisory mechanism, it is still 
possible to identify the following three major models of CG in the world:  
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- The Anglo-American ownership-oriented externally driven model; 
- The German and the Japanese organisation-oriented internally driven model, and 
- The East Asian family-oriented clanship driven model. 
These three major models of corporate governance can be analysed and compared 
with one another based on the aforementioned determining factors in order to identify 
their respective supervisory mechanisms, as well as specific problems with the system 
and measures taken for reform, according to the relevant studies of Bhasa (2005), 
Blair and Maclaury (1995), Branson (2001), Buchanan (2007), Buchanan and Deakin 
(2007), Coffee (2001), Fama and Jenson (1983a), Gulinello (2004), Hu et al. (2000), 
Huang (2005), Li (2007), Nakamura (2007), Shi (2006), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
Singh and Zammit (2006), Solomon and Solomon (2004), Strikwerda (2003), Tan and 
Wang (2007), Tan et al. (2007), Thompson (1999), Tian and Feng (2004), Ye (2001), 
Yeh et al. (2002), Yuan (2005). 
The Anglo-American Ownership-Oriented Externally Driven Model 
Governance Culture  
There are several characteristics that underpin the underlying capitalist system. The 
ownership is separated from the management. There is a large-scale circulation of 
capital. The stock market is well developed. Shareholders’ equity that concentrated in 
the pension fund and specialised management fund is managed by institutional 
investors. Proper governance is crucial to corporations as managerial under 
performance may lead to the failure of the corporation. 
Legal Environment  
Under a free market economy, there are strong legal provisions, through the company 
law and securities law, etc., to make the CG structures provide a stronger check and 
balance role, management’s duty is clearly defined, and the rights and interests of the 
employees, creditors and shareholders, especially the minority shareholders, are 
upheld.  
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Ownership Structure  
Shares and associated rights are highly distributed and frequently exchanged amongst 
numerous small investors. In other words, the direct influence of individual investors 
over the corporation is relatively small compared with that of the management, but 
shares can be easily exchanged, which can lead to fluctuation of the stock price. This 
needs to be taken into consideration when making managerial decisions, and thus 
provides a mechanism of aligning the interests of the management to those of the 
ownership.  
Governance Structure  
To prevent the erosion of the right of the ownership, a unitary BoD, also known as the 
independent directors’ system, is established at the top of the managerial hierarchy of 
the company, to represent the shareholders’ interest and directly report to the 
shareholders’ meetings. The board may establish several committees such as the AC, 
the remuneration committee and the nomination committee. 
 
Figure 2. The Anglo-American Single-Pronged Governance Structure 
(Source: Author, referenced to the named studies) 
Supervisory Mechanism  
The AC, formed by the independent directors, is the core of the internal supervisory 
mechanism. The AC is appointed by the BoD, but has no authority over the 
management. It is not guaranteed that the performance of the AC will meet the 
shareholders’ expectation.  
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Peculiar Problems 
The power of individual shareholder is weakened by the large number of minority 
shareholders. This makes it difficult to safeguard their interests against the relatively 
strong power of the management.  
Reform Measures 
The interests of shareholders are safeguarded by minimising information asymmetry 
with measures such as information transparency and the prohibition of insider 
transactions, to ensure the proper functioning of the supervisory mechanism.  
German and Japanese Organisation-Oriented Internally Driven Model 
Governance Culture  
In this model, enterprises are hugely influenced by the government, the organisational 
structures, the unions and the banks. The stock market is less active, and circulation of 
capital is of a lesser scale. It is more difficult for mergers, acquisitions or takeovers to 
take place. This makes the banks the main source of the enterprises’ financing, and 
gives financial creditors greater power over the shareholders.  
Legal Environment  
Because of the indirect manipulation of the market economy by the government, the 
regulations that protect shareholders’ equity are weaker compared with those in the 
Anglo-American model. There is an emphasis on the interests of various stakeholders, 
and there are stricter regulations restricting the stock market, so the influence of 
market forces on the enterprises is reduced. There is less restriction on majority 
shareholders such as the banks. Hence, executives are selected and appointed by the 
majority shareholders. This further strengthens the majority shareholders’ influence 
on the enterprise.  
Ownership Structure  
The stock is relatively concentrated and less frequently exchanged. The company’s 
shares are mainly held by the corporation and the banks. Enterprises rely more on 
loans from creditors rather than on capitals from shares sold on the stock markets. 
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Hence, financial institutions such as the banks play a major role in the enterprises, 
which in turn pay more attention to protecting the interests of the major shareholders 
than those of the minority stockholders. As a result, the stock market is less developed 
as there is less incentive to do so. 
Governance Structure  
The governance structure is based on a two-tier board. These are the SB and the 
Management Committee in Germany, or the Board of Auditors and the BoD in Japan.  
In the Japanese model, the shareholders’ meeting holds the supreme power within the 
enterprise, and appoints the auditors. In the German model, the general meeting holds 
the supreme power within the enterprise and appoints the members of the SB, which 
is responsible for appointing the members of the Management Board. There are 
employee representatives on the SB who directly report to the general meeting. Hence, 
the shareholders, the banks and the managers all play significant roles in the 
governance structure.  
 
Figure 3. The German Two-Tier Governance Structure 
(Source: Author, referenced to the named studies) 
Big Shareholders Small Shareholders Banks Employees 
The General Meeting 
Supervisory Board 
Management Committee 
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Figure 4. The Japanese Dual Governance Structure 
(Source: Author, referenced to the named studies) 
Supervisory Mechanism  
The key role in the supervisory mechanism of CG is played by the SB in Germany 
and the legally assigned auditors in Japan. There are reservations on the extent to 
which these boards can function and doubt over the independence of the Board of 
Auditors in the Japanese model.  
Peculiar Problems  
The minority shareholders do not usually participate in the general meeting, so the 
banks naturally become the representatives of the shareholders, and have enjoyed an 
increase in their power. Consequently, only the interests of the banks and the 
corporation are safeguarded.  
Reform Measures  
Attempts have been made to protect the interests of minority shareholders, such as 
strengthening the external supervisory mechanism on the capital market, as well as 
improving information transparency in the functioning of the SB.  
East Asian Family-Oriented Clanship Model 
Governance Culture  
Tian and Feng (2004) state that the East Asian family-oriented clanship system has 
been built on the following three factors: the influence of the Confucian tradition, the 
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Board of Directors 
Management Board 
Board of Auditors 
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economic role and support of the government, and the unhealthy market system. 
Family members will do their best to operate the company with a long-term objective, 
but the need to raise large amounts of capital will cause the CG structure to change.  
Legal Environment  
The economy is guided by the government, the management style is determined by 
the family, and this leads to a synthesis of a traditional paternalistic managerial style 
and modern organisational form. Ownership and management are not totally 
separated, and there is an overlap between the organisational and clan structures. 
Hence, operations can be accomplished by means of these alternative structures, and 
actions do not necessarily comply with organisational rules or laws. In this situation, 
family ethics becomes the only form of restraint on behaviour of the management.  
Ownership Structure  
Stock rights are heavily concentrated in the hands of members of a few families, who 
are also the owners and employees of the company. This means, generally, the 
interests of shareholders and management are naturally aligned, so there is less need 
for additional incentives or control. Capital comes primarily from funds provided or 
controlled by the family or the government, and secondarily, from bank loans.  
Governance Structure 
As ownership and management are usually inseparable, the principal families 
generally participate in both the management and the investment decisions of the 
company. The parental style is adopted in decision making, the relations amongst the 
kindred are influential on the management style, and the succession of power 
naturally follows the succession system of the principal family.  
Supervisory Mechanism  
A clanship system has the holding family as the core of its supervisory mechanism of 
Corporate Governance. External control is weak, with minimal engagement between 
the bank and the company. The lack of effective market restraints leads to criticism 
that the supervisory mechanism is merely symbolic.  
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Peculiar Problems  
Such a company tends to exhibit patriarchal behaviour and arbitrary and subjective 
policy making. Overlapping between the ownership and the management means the 
members of the holding family have unreasonably strong power over the company 
and can easily encroach on the interests of the shareholders who are not the members 
of the family, and have little protection in this model.  
Reform Measures  
Attempts have been made to curtail the power of the primary family by encouraging 
or forcing it to open its shares to the market so that market forces can be used to 
protect the interests of the minority shareholders. Alternatively, regulations could be 
used to encourage or enforce organisational reform to separate the ownership and the 
management.  
4.4.2 The Principles of Corporate Governance 
The origin of the principles of CG illustrates some of the important problems in the 
operation of CG. Non-mandatory CG principles have an imperceptible function in the 
formation of a kind of benign shareholder culture. CG principles are not actually 
intended to substitute the existing laws and regulations, but to offer principles for 
formulating concrete and effective regulations.  
CG concerns itself with the soundness of enterprise operations as well as the stability 
of the global financial system. For this reason, many international organisations such 
as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World 
Bank and others have given considerable attention to the development of CG around 
the world. 
The OECD-initiated Principles of Corporate Governance, first published in 1999, 
have been widely adopted as a benchmark amongst OECD countries and beyond. In 
April 2004, the 30 member-states of OECD approved the revised version of the 
OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance. Veronique Ingram, chairperson of the 
OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, said:  
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“The revised Principles emphasise the importance of a regulatory framework in 
Corporate Governance that promotes efficient markets, facilitates effective 
enforcement and clearly defines the responsibilities between different supervisory, 
regulatory and enforcement authorities. They also emphasise the need to ensure 
transparent lines of management responsibility within companies so as to make 
boards and management truly accountable.” (OECD 2004b) 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, adopted in 2004, highlighted the 
following six main aspects of concern:  
Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Construction of CG Framework 
The CG framework should promote transparent and efficient markets, be consistent 
with the rule of law, and clearly define the division of responsibilities among different 
supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities. 
The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 
The CG framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights. 
The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
The CG framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, 
including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have equal 
opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. 
The Role of Stakeholders in CG 
The CG framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders prescribed by law or 
through mutual agreements, and encourage active co-operation between corporations 
and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises. 
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Disclosure and Transparency  
The CG framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all 
documents regarding the corporation, including its financial situation, performance, 
ownership, and governance of the company. 
The Responsibilities of the Board 
The CG framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective 
monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the 
company and the shareholders. 
Other issues addressed by the revised Principles include matters pertaining to:  
Institutional Investors  
Institutions should disclose their CG policies, how they decide the use of their voting 
rights and how they manage conflicts of interest that may compromise their voting. 
Restrictions on consultations between shareholders about their voting intentions 
should be eased to reduce the cost of informed ownership. 
Shareholder Rights  
The rights of investors must be strengthened. Shareholders should have the right to 
remove poorly performing board members and to participate effectively in the 
nomination and election processes. They should also have the right to voice their 
views regarding executive and board remuneration policy and any equity component 
should be subject to their approval. 
Conflicts of Interest and Auditor Responsibility  
A new principle calls for rating agencies and analysts to avoid conflicts of interest, 
which could compromise their advisory role.  
The duties of the auditor must be strengthened and include accountability to 
shareholders, and a duty to the company to exercise due professional care when 
conducting an audit. 
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Auditors should be wholly independent and not compromised by other relations with 
the company.  
 Stakeholder Rights and Whistle-Blower Protection  
The Principles refer to the rights of stakeholders, whether established by law or 
through mutual agreements. 
A new principle advocates protection for whistleblowers, including institutions 
through which their complaints or allegations can be addressed, and provides for 
confidential access to a board member. 
 Board Responsibilities  
The duties and responsibilities of the board have been defined as fiduciary in nature; 
this is particularly important where company groups are concerned. 
The principle covering board independence and objectivity has been extended to 
avoid conflicts of interest and cover situations characterised by block and controlling 
shareholders, as well as the board’s responsibility for oversight of internal control 
systems covering financial reporting. 
4.4.3 Summary  
At present, there is no single ideal CG model in the world because of the diversity of 
cultural, social and economic settings, different historical traditions and levels of 
development. Considering economic globalisation and the interaction among the 
aforementioned three CG models, it is apparent that each of these three models has its 
unique characteristics and problems, prompting them to seek to converge with each 
other, and absorb the strong points of other models in order to remedy shortcomings. 
Though existing CG models are essentially different from each other, nevertheless 
some common principles do exist which could further improve the effect of the CG in 
each of three models.  
Common CG principles can be highlighted in the following four areas: [1] 
Accountability and Responsibility: by strengthening the function and obligations of 
the BoD; [2] Fairness: by strengthening the framework of Corporate Governance; [3] 
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Transparency: by strengthening the disclosure of information; and [4] Contestability: 
by strengthening the distribution of surplus value. The common feature of the 
principles is equal treatment of stakeholders’ interests.  
Meanwhile, the two new principles adopted in 2004 were intended to strengthen audit 
duties and insure the protection of whistleblowers, representing a significant departure 
from the past. Strengthening effective supervisory mechanisms has become the 
priority. No matter which CG model is in place, the function of a supervisory 
mechanism of governance has been given greater emphasis, in order to promote its 
development.  
4.5 The Existing Model of China’s Corporate Governance 
The works by Yu (2002), Shi (2006), Huang (2005), Feng (2005), Li (2007), Yeh et al. 
(2002), Zhia (2004), Wu and Li (2006), Wu et al. (2006), and Yang et al. (2007) all 
suggested that China should develop a comprehensive CG model, suiting its actual 
and unique conditions, by looking at the strengths and weaknesses of the existing 
three world models. The paragraphs that follow offer a brief synthesis of the existing 
model of China’s CG system with respect to its governance culture, legal environment, 
ownership structure, supervisory mechanism, peculiar problems and reform measures.  
4.5.1 Governance Culture  
China’s economy is a planned economy, transitioning to a market based one. This 
transitional period tends to assume a core of neo-liberalism, characterised by 
privatisation, mercerisation and liberalisation. Its culture is one of trial, constraints on 
issues being fully debated, full of uncertainty, and the system is struggling to find its 
new orientation.  
4.5.2 Legal Environment  
China’s legal environment has left much to be desired while going through the 
process of transition. There are many aspects for improvement, especially the serious 
lack of norms covering the supervisory mechanism.  
Page 144 PhD Thesis, University of Manchester Pao-Chen Lee 
4.5.3 Ownership Structure  
In the reform process towards privatisation, ownership structure is leased to workers 
and managers, etc. This structure is concentrated in the hands of insiders consisting of 
state-owned stocks and limited workers; and manager-owned stocks, which affects the 
mobility of the stock market.  
4.5.4 Governance Structure  
Large-scale state-owned enterprises are in need of reform, but there is a total lack of 
any legal norm. Thus, the company’s decision-making power is concentrated on the 
management layer. Additionally, the external environment of stock market 
competitiveness is not perfect. Overall, governance structure has a typical ‘insider 
control’ tendency.  
4.5.5 Supervisory Mechanism  
The control of state run enterprises aside, both the external and internal supervisory 
mechanisms are still under construction. Externally, there is a lack of any real market 
environment supervision, such as stockholders participating in Corporate Governance. 
Internally, there is a lack of management supervision: such as the functional 
integration of the SB, AC, Internal Audit and independent directors.  
4.5.6 Peculiar Problems 
The legislation is still not robust enough to accelerate the transition of the economic 
environment. There is a lack of a supervisory mechanism, and a high concentration of 
ownership of the state-owned enterprise, banks and major enterprises in the hands of a 
few.  
4.5.7 Reform Measures  
Reforms are needed to revise and improve the law and regulations, optimise the 
market environment, and review bank and enterprise relations, to improve the external 
environment and the conditions of minority owned companies.  
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Figure 5. The Chinese Duality Governance Structure 
(Source: Author, referenced to the named studies) 
Summary 
Such are the aforementioned characteristics of the CG model in China, it is imperative 
to probe their causes, summarised from the relevant studies by Li and Li (2007), Li 
(2004), Chang and Yan (2004), Jiang (2004), Yu (2002), Shi (2006), Huang (2005), 
Feng (2005), Li (2007), and Yeh et al. (2002) in terms of governance culture, legal 
environment, ownership structure and governance structure as follows:  
Governance culture 
One of the typical defects of the outmoded governance culture in China is that the 
directors of the company, supervisors and general manager are mainly appointed 
directly by state owned shareholders or the large shareholders. There is little effective 
supervision by the BoD or the SB. This kind of traditional governance concept is 
inadequate for modern enterprises, because of the need to emphasise not only the 
interests of the big shareholders, but also to give consideration to the interests of all 
shareholders and stakeholders, in order to facilitate the enterprises’ long-term 
development.  
Legal environment 
Stronger legislation is needed in order to prevent a few shareholders from operating 
maliciously, and to prevent power from being excessively concentrated in the hands 
of the BoD or the company’s President. China is still in the process of dispersing the 
ownership structure of large-scale state owned enterprises, and releasing state owned 
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stocks. Therefore, China should endeavour to set strict standards governing property 
relations for state owned holding companies and listed companies in the following 
two aspects: 
(1)  Strengthening the supervision dynamics to the management by using the force of 
the law to safeguard all investors’ rights and interests by investigating and 
punishing management who abuse their powers; 
(2)  Strengthening the supervision of financial managers by using the force of the law 
to ensure that financial managers produce true and accurate accounting reports. 
Ownership structure 
Ownership is excessively centralised, and the circulation of the stocks of listed 
companies is proportionately very low. As resolutions are passed by majority votes in 
shareholders’ meetings, middle and small shareholders in China are powerless and 
have little influence in the Board of Director’s meetings. It is very difficult to form 
effective and independent CG structures under such conditions.  
Governance structure 
The shape of the governance structure is imbalanced because of the centralised 
ownership. Most of the directors of state owned holding companies and the individual 
proprietorships are appointed by large shareholders, so directors representing medium 
and small shareholders and workers’ directors become disadvantaged. 
Presently, the external structure of CG in China still needs to be strengthened. The 
ownership structure of a company in China has remained highly centralised, the stock 
market is still underdeveloped, and the legal system is yet to be improved. Under 
these circumstances, the internal supervisory mechanism relies on the effectiveness of 
the CG structure to avoid the risk caused by weak internal control. As such, the 
development of an internal supervisory mechanism of CG should be the top priority in 
China’s development of CG. 
The work of the internal supervisory mechanism is difficult to establish due to the 
lack of clear stipulations in the relevant laws regarding the functions and powers of 
the supervisory mechanism. The status of the internal supervisory mechanism does 
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not allow it to apply supervisory pressure on the BoD, which possesses real powers 
and is seldom supervised effectively. Rather, the BoD is controlled by large 
shareholders. 
4.6 An Overview of the China’s Political Environment on 
Impacting to the Development of Supervisory Mechanisms of 
Corporate Governance 
Shortly after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the supervisory 
profession in China disappeared almost completely. Independent monitoring was 
virtually non-existent under the planned economy before the 1980s, when the State 
both owned and ran enterprises. The re-emergence of independent supervision was a 
result of mushrooming Sino-foreign joint ventures, conveyed by China’s open door 
policy, adopted in the early 1980s. Due to non-state owned interests in the joint 
ventures, demand emerged for the verification of capital contributions and audits of 
annual financial statements and income tax returns by registered non-government-
employed Chinese certified public accountants (Xiao et al., 2000). The progress of 
full-scale economic reforms, with the separation of ownership and management of 
enterprises, led to agency problems in business firms. Independent monitoring is thus 
called for, in order to alleviate these problems. 
The Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA) was established in the 
early 1980s. At the turn of the 1990s, the rapid development of shareholding 
companies (stock companies) in China led to a sharp increase in the demand for 
supervisory mechanisms. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
requires that all listed firms have their annual reports audited by certified public 
accountants (CPAs). The monitoring of both public and private enterprises by 
independent auditors has been employed by the government as an important 
supervisory mechanism in transforming the Chinese economy from the one directed 
by the “visible hand” of centralised set up and schedule towards the one directed by 
the “invisible hand” of market forces.  
Meanwhile, in legislation passed in December 1993, Chinese Company Law specified 
for the first time that every listed company establish a SB to supervise the company’s 
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financial activities and the conduct of directors. Subsequently, additional regulations 
involving the appointment of independent directors were introduced. Initially, starting 
in 1997, this was optional, but it became compulsory for listed companies from 2005 
(see Table 1:”Timeline of the Development of the System of Independent Directors in 
China” for the main stages in this development).  
In 1997, as China celebrated the historic return of Hong Kong to its rule, the occasion 
was suddenly dampened by the unexpected outbreak of the Asian financial crisis. This 
crisis was triggered after the Thai government decided to abandon the practice of 
thirteen years (1984-1997) of pegging the Thai Baht to the US dollar. As a result, the 
exchange rate of the Baht against the US dollar fell nearly 20%. Other Southeast 
Asian currencies soon plunged, and the financial storm quickly swept across the entire 
region. Ten years later, as Asia has once again become a crucial market that attracts 
international capital and the pressure of an international financial imbalance increases, 
there is great concern whether the Asian financial crisis of 1997 will happen again.  
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, while providing assistance to 
the crisis ridden and cash-strapped Asian economies, urged them to supervise their 
listed companies effectively by setting up CG systems. Since the 1997 crisis, the 
establishment of CG in the region has come to be regarded as one of the critical 
priorities for government. Subsequently, various Asian administrations initiated 
serious efforts to develop CG, in order to improve their international competitiveness. 
A survey by McKinsey (2000), which examined 188 companies in India, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan and Turkey, in order to test the link between market 
valuation and CG practices, found that, “institutional investors in companies based in 
emerging markets claim to be willing to pay as much as 30 percent more for shares in 
companies that are well-governed.” Similar findings were reported in the 2002 survey 
by ＭcKinsey.  
China applied to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in September 2001 and 
eventually was admitted in November of the same year. After accession to the WTO, 
China has strengthened its supervision of domestic listed companies in order to align 
itself with the international market, gradually move towards an export-oriented 
economy and eventually implement an open economic system. In recent years, for 
example, the shareholding structure of wholly state owned commercial banks such as 
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the Construction Bank, the Bank of China, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
have been reformed significantly. These three banks have been reconstructed into 
joint stock companies and have been listed in Hong Kong and various inland stock 
markets. The changes in their roles and functions have opened a new chapter in 
China’s history of financial reform. Presently, while China has left no stone unturned 
in luring foreign capital into the country, it has also encouraged local enterprises to 
focus on the global market and to be competitive internationally. To ensure success in 
both directions, the next milestone for China’s ongoing reform will be to actively 
promote the implementation of CG systems as the international trend dictates. 
In 2002, China announced the regulation of the Code of CG for Listed Companies in 
China (CSRC and SETC, 2002: Section 52), encouraging listed companies to set up 
an AC voluntarily, though its installation is not mandatory. This introduction of ACs 
is an attempt to compensate for the deficiencies of SBs. China expects that the 
implementation of the AC will improve the internal supervisory mechanism of CG, 
and also effectively oversee the internal directors as well as protect the interests of the 
investors, the functions of ACs are similar to those of SBs. Nevertheless, it expects to 
encounter problems or difficulties in trying to transplant the AC from the unary 
control system to the binary control system with the SB. In recent years, many listed 
companies in China have started establishing ACs alongside the existing SBs to form 
their own structure of internal supervisory mechanisms, combining the Anglo-
American and German-Japanese systems in one. 
China has experienced a period of unprecedented social and economic transformation 
since it embarked on a policy of reform and opening up to the outside world, initiated 
by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. Over the past three decades, business operation in China 
has become more complex, a process characterised by innovation and trial and error. 
With a view to exploring foreign practices that may be applicable to China’s unique 
internal supervisory mechanisms of CG model and context, it is necessary to consider 
how to enhance the governance mechanisms in its listed companies in order to 
develop China’s capital market; and also how to learn from the best reform practices 
of domestic and overseas CG, to improve China’s internal supervisory mechanism. 
The SB has been established in China since 1993, and its effective experience over 
the past 15 years can serve as a benchmark in launching the ACs successfully, as well 
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as in enhancing its smooth interaction with other institutions of the internal 
supervisory mechanism in the country.  
China’s response to the global trend for promotion of CG is illustrated in Table 16. 
The history of the development of the CG in China is rather short. China not only has 
had to learn from the experience of other countries, but also to take into account 
different national conditions such as economic systems and the stage of development 
of the capital market, etc. Singh and Zammit (2006) assessed the comparative merits 
of the US corporate model and traditional Asian model, from the perspective of 
developing countries. Their research provided little evidence to support the argument 
that the fundamental causes of the 1997 Asian crisis lay in weak CG and poor 
competitive environments in these emerging economies. On the contrary, they 
suggested that “a reformed Asian model that encompasses labour and other social 
groups, and promotes the cooperation between business and government would much 
more likely be conducive to economic development and broad-based social welfare 
than the speculative and conflicting US corporate model.”  
Tan and Wang (2007) undertook a study to construct a suitable model of CG for those 
listed companies in China that were formerly state owned enterprises. They concluded 
that both ‘outsider’ and ‘insider’ systems of CG are not suitable for application in 
China, because of its unique problems as a transitional economy. They suggested that 
China needs a system that is uniquely its own, shaped by the ‘socialist market 
economy with Chinese characteristics’.  
Summary  
China has entered a period of unprecedented transformation, within which business 
operation has become more complex and complicated. It is a process of innovation as 
well as trial and error. The relevant studies of Li and Wang (2007), Du and Tang 
(2006), Li and Chen (2006), Li and Liu (2005), Li (2003), and Chang (2001), all 
suggest that China must enhance governance mechanisms in its listed companies and 
the development of the capital market by refining the basic principles of “Corporate 
Law”, “Securities Law” and the “Rules for Listed Companies Governance” as well as 
by learning from the best reform practices of domestic and overseas Corporate 
Governance.  
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China’s internal supervisory mechanisms consist of the SB and the AC. This 
combination of structures is unique and different from the British, American, German 
and Japanese models. The functions and interaction between these two governance 
elements represent important subjects for research, to establish the impact of the 
Chinese approach; and the effectiveness and the co-ordination of combining both 
mechanisms within it. 
The Supervisory Board  
According to Article 126 in China’s Corporate Law, the SB in a Chinese company is 
the internal supervisory unit responsible for supervising the directors and managers’ 
behaviour. Corporate Law also stipulates the system of the SB and guides it on behalf 
of the shareholders to supervise the organisation of internal power, exercised by the 
BoD and the layers of management of the company. In practice, however, the SB does 
not have real power, and it only has limited authority to supervise. The SB in 
Germany has three major powers: to appoint and remove the Executive Committee 
members, sanction the company’s key decisions, and supervise the Executive 
Committee. In contrast, if the SB in China finds the behaviour of the directors and 
managers harmful to the interests of company, they can only suggest holding an 
Interim Shareholders’ Meeting, and if the directors and managers ignore this, the SB 
is rendered powerless.  
Obviously, China’s Corporate Law needs to be revised in order to give the SB 
concrete and real power, for example to be able to hold the Shareholders’ Meeting 
directly. At the same time, the law should be revised to demand that the SB fulfils its 
legal obligation. Compensation should also be made should the SB not fulfil its duties 
to improve the supervision of company managers. Efforts are still needed in China to 
prevent the SB from being a mere formality and failing to execute its supervision 
function.  
The Audit Committee  
According to Section 52 of the Code of CG for Listed Companies in China, the BoD 
of a listed company may establish an AC. China’s “Rules for Listed Companies 
Governance” set out five main duties of CG for the AC:  
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1. Provide suggestions for engaging or changing the external audit firm (CPA);  
2. Supervising the Internal Audit system and its implementation;  
3. Be responsible for the internal and external auditing communication;  
4. Verify and reveal the financial information of the company;  
5. Check the internal control system.  
The duties of the AC and the SB as stipulated in Corporate Law are essentially similar, 
involving supervising financial affairs and the directors and managers controlling the 
activities of the company. Both the SB and AC have responsibilities for supervising 
the company’s financial problems, internal accounting information and employment 
of the external certified accountant. However, organisationally they are not affiliated 
to each other, as the AC is under the jurisdiction of the BoD, while the SB is parallel 
to the BoD. This can cause confusion in their respective responsibilities if there is 
lack of clarification or co-ordination, and it may appear that many institutions are 
supervising but no unit actually performing that function. Clarification or co-
ordination includes defining the duties, functions and position of the AC in the 
organisation, and establishing a legal standard for the AC, but such clarification 
measures are still outstanding. 
4.7 An Overview of the Relationship between the Shareholding 
Structure and Internal Supervisory Mechanism in China  
Presently there are several company types in China. State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 
which are industrial enterprises where the assets or income are owned by the state; 
Collectively Owned Enterprises (COEs), which are industrial enterprises where the 
assets are owned collectively, including urban and rural (township and village 
enterprises) (TVEs); Private and Individual Owned Enterprises (IOEs), which are 
small private businesses; and Other Ownership Types (Others), which includes 
Shareholding Companies (or joint-stock, joint-share companies), which are Chinese 
companies converted into shareholding or limited liability companies, and Joint 
venture Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises (WFOES) (Clarke and Du, 1998).  
A listed firm in China usually has a controlling owner, being usually the government 
or a parent SOE. The controlling owner can exercise absolute control over the listed 
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firm. Four share types in China in the current security market are illustrated in the 
table below. An SOE share can be further divided into four types: shares owned by 
central or local governments; employees; individuals; and institutions. Normally 
governments are the controlling owners or parent SOEs that owned shares that are not 
tradable. B share is available for foreign investors; H share listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange; N share listed on the New York Stock Exchange. SOE (A) shares 
occupied the share market of over 91% in China between 2003 and 2009, as 
illustrated in Table 13. B shares of listed companies represent less than 10% in the 
Chinese security market at present. Therefore, the preceding discussion suggests that 
whether a firm introduces an AC to serve a CG function is controversial, depending 
on the potential costs and benefits to the controlling owner. 
Table 12. Share Types in China 
(Source: Author, as supported by CSRC and SETC (2002)) 
Share 
Types  
Description  Liquidity  
Shares owned by the central or local 
governments 
Non-tradable  
Share owned by employees  Tradable after holding for 
6 to 12 months  
Shares owned by individuals  Tradable  





4 types  Shares owned by institutions  Tradable  
B-share  Available for foreign investors only  Tradable  
H-share  Shares listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange  Tradable  
N-share  Shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange  Tradable  
Table 13. The Numbers of Listed Companies Owned By A (SOEs) and B Shares 
(Source: Author, as supported by CSRC and SETC (2002)) 
Year  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Number of Listed Companies in 
Mainland China including A and B 
Shares  
1287 1377 1381 1434 1550 1625 1718 
Number of Companies of B Shares 111 110 109 109 109 109 108 
Number of Companies of A Shares 1176 1267 1272 1325 1441 1516 1610 
% of B Shares 8.62% 7.99% 7.89% 7.60% 7.03% 6.71% 6.29% 
% of A Shares 91.38% 92.01% 92.11% 92.40% 92.97% 93.29% 93.71% 
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Figure 6. The Numbers of Listed Companies Owned By A (SOEs) and B Shares 
(Source: Author, as supported by CSRC (2010)) 
Number of listed SOEs














Figure 7. The Number of Listed SOEs in China  
(Sources: Author as supported by CSRC (2010)) 
State shares and legal entity shares are not tradable at present, so there is no 
motivation for controlling large shareholders to care about changes in value or share 
price of the listed firms in the market. In fact, the controlling shareholders of many 
listed firms, mainly government agencies or parent SOEs, are keen only on raising 
funds from the stock market (Xiang, 1998). For Chinese listed firms, the main benefit 
of introducing an AC is that firms may be able to raise funds in the capital market at a 
lower cost, or sell shares at a higher price, as the market may perceive that high 
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quality supervision will lead to better quality of information disclosure. And the costs 
will be the diminution of the opaqueness gains: the controlling owner may be 
inhibited in their ability to maximise self-interest through benefit transfer because of 
high standard monitoring by the AC.  
Basically, the controlling shareholders benefit from a lack of transparency: they 
engage in rent-seeking activities, at the cost of other shareholders (Leuz et al., 2001). 
In China, controlling shareholders have frequently intervened in the operations of 
listed firms to benefit parent companies, using the listed firms to guarantee loans for 
related entities, and exposing them to unnecessary financial and operating risks. They 
are frequently engaged in benefit transfer through misappropriation of funds or related 
party transactions, to expropriate the listed firms and infringe upon the interests of 
other shareholders, public investors in particular. 
In such a market, the benefits of lowering capital raising costs are insignificant: 
Chinese listed firms have little intention or possibility of offering new equity to the 
public; IPO (Initial Public Offering – meaning a new offer of shares from a company 
which was previously unlisted) firms can sell their shares with no difficulty, but are 
unable to offer new equity in the near future after listing. Therefore, opaqueness gains 
are supposed to outweigh the benefits of lowering the costs of raising capital. Hence, 
lower quality monitoring will be preferred by listed firms, especially those with 
weaker internal supervisory mechanisms, because they have relatively more 
opaqueness gains to protect (Beasley et al., 2000; Carcello and Neal, 2000; Felo et al., 
2001). 
The internal supervisory mechanism within a firm consists of various types of 
organisational arrangements or procedures to balance the power and responsibilities 
among the firm’s shareholders, directors, management and employees. Among them, 
the ownership structure, the BoD, SB, and the duality of the BoD chairman and CEO 
are of great importance in determining the effectiveness of internal supervisory 
mechanism, especially for listed firms in China (Liu and Sun, 2005). There are many 
multifaceted traditions that affect the value of the corporation as well as the CG 
because of ownership structures. Daniels and Iacobucci (1999) argue that more 
narrowly controlled firms may face greater agency costs because the controlling 
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shareholders would have a dominant influence on corporate affairs, and it is easier for 
them to bypass the monitoring of other shareholders. 
La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) showed that in emerging transitional economies, 
controlling shareholders might expropriate the minority shareholders through 
aggressive benefit transferring behaviours. They further argue that “the central agency 
problem in large corporations around the world is that of restricting expropriation of 
minority shareholders by controlling shareholders” (La Porta et al. 1999). This is 
particularly true for Chinese listed firms, where controlling shareholders, on average, 
hold a very large portion of the equity.  
There are two primary patterns of board structure: the unitary board system or Anglo-
American system, and the two board system or German-Japanese system. Under the 
unitary board system, a company has only one board, comprised of the executive 
directors and the independent directors. The executive directors are in charge of the 
company’s business operation, while the independent directors act as supervisors of 
the management. Under the two-board system, a firm has two boards – the BoD and 
the SB. The SB functions as the special monitoring organ and may have the same 
mandates as the BoD or even higher status than the BoD. Pursuant to Chinese 
Company Law, listed firms adopt the typical two-board system, thus having both the 
BoD and SB. 
The Code of CG for Listed Companies in China issued by the CSRC and State 
Economic and Trade Commission (2001) further requires that members of SB should 
have professional knowledge or work experience in such areas as business law and 
accounting. The SB shall ensure its capability to independently and effectively 
conduct its supervision over the activities carried out by the directors and 
management, as well as monitor or examine the financial affairs of the firm. The BoD 
is expected to perform in ways that guarantees shareholders that their interests are 
protected. The BoD is responsible for the execution of the resolutions passed in the 
shareholders’ meetings; appointing, removing and remunerating the general managers 
and other senior managers. On the other hand, there are quite a number of directors 
who, at the same time, hold the title of CEO or are considered as the firms top 
executives. Most of these top executives are naturally less likely to be detached in 
administering, appraising and assessing the management’s performance. For the BoD 
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to effectively perform a monitoring function, the separation of the positions of CEO 
and BoD chairman is essential in respect of an effective internal supervisory 
mechanism (La Porta et al., 1999). 
Extracting private control benefits, if detected, is likely to invite external intervention 
by minority shareholders, analysts, stock exchanges, or market regulators (Haw et al. 
2004). The desire to maximise self-interest through benefit transfer may drive listed 
firms to avoid being monitored. In general, the more concentrated the ownership 
structure, the weaker the internal supervisory mechanism; hence, there will be more 
opaqueness gains for the controlling shareholders (Chau and Leung, 2006). Therefore 
firms with larger controlling owners are more eager to choose a pliable auditor or 
supervisor, so they can easily benefit from tunnelling behaviours of benefit 
transferring under a lower level of monitoring.  
In addition, controlling shareholders enjoy a monopolistic position and influence, so 
they can easily control or dominate the nomination and appointment of directors and 
senior management officers, and virtually preclude other shareholders from 
participation in making operating decisions, including hiring of auditors or 
supervisors or members of ACs. Hence a larger controlling shareholder is more likely 
to maintain a low quality internal supervisory mechanism in order to realise and 
sustain opaqueness gains. 
4.8 Summary 
The structure of this chapter is based on understanding four CG models’ features of 
governance culture, legal environment, ownership structure, and governance structure, 
in order to reveal the peculiar problems faced by the supervisory mechanism in each 
model respectively. These four features were identified by studying the relevant 
literature on the supervisory mechanism of Corporate Governance. Meanwhile, the 
four features of the three international models respectively are used in order to study 
the supervisory mechanisms in China.  
This chapter begins by studying the historical development of the ‘standard’ CG 
model of the UK and the US, so as to illustrate the development of the supervisory 
mechanism. The next section contrasts different CG models, to illustrate how each 
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model’s supervisory mechanism reflects particular problems, and discusses the 
principles of CG regarding supervision from internationally, to review China’s 
internal supervisory mechanism.  
At present, there is no single set ideal CG model in the world because of diversity in 
cultural, social and economic settings, and different historical traditions and levels of 
development. Considering economic globalisation and the interaction among the 
aforementioned CG models, it is apparent that each of these models has its unique 
characteristics and problems, prompting them to seek to converge with each other, 
and absorb the strong points of other models in order to remedy shortcomings.  
Though existing CG models are essentially different from each other, nevertheless 
some common principles do exist which could further improve the effect of the CG in 
each of the three models.  
In addition, shareholder, stakeholder and managerial hegemony theories are applied as 
ground theories for evaluating the studies of operations and effectiveness of the 
supervisory functions of SBs and ACs in China. This thesis also applies political 
model theory and institutional ownership theory, leading it to provide an overview of 
the political environment and shareholding background in this chapter. Political 
model theory provides the basis to introduce the political background, especially 
related to setting the policy of the internal supervisory mechanism of CG in China. 
The above section in this chapter presents “An Overview of the China’s unique 
political environment on impacting to the development of supervisory mechanism of 
CG in China” because “Governance based on politics rather than finance will provide 
a means of oversight” (Pound, 1992). Therefore “an understanding of the political 
marketplace is essential to appreciate the role that capital market mechanism can… 
play in corporate governance” (Gundfest, 1993).  
This above section in this chapter also introduces “an overview of the relationship 
between shareholding structure and internal supervisory mechanism in China“, to 
respond to the key meaning of Institutional Ownership theory. This theory states that 
as institutional shareholdings are so large, it is difficult to switch their invested capital 
from one firm to another. As a result, they play an important role in the decision-
making processes of the firms in which they have invested (Changati and Damanpour, 
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1991). Institutional Ownership theory provides the basis as part of political model 
theory to enhance the understanding of the background relating to the shareholding 
structure in China. 
The main purpose of the analysis is to probe the supervisory mechanism of CG in the 
West and China: by providing an overview of both the international environment and 
China’s peculiar background, so as to understand the problems and potential causes of 
these problems. In essence, the objective of the chapter is to emphasise what China 
has done in combining alternative approaches from other systems; as well as the need 
for research to investigate the effectiveness, the operations and the co-ordination of 
this combination under China’s governance structures.  
The Chinese approach to an internal supervisory mechanism has combined British, 
American and German models while at the same time absorbing the characteristics of 
the East Asian model. Under the Chinese internal supervisory mechanism, the SB and 
AC were not introduced at the same point in China’s economic and business 
development. China’s internal supervisory structure involves a unique interaction 
between two mechanisms of ACs and SBs, and the functions and interaction between 
these two governance elements represent important subjects for research. 
1. The SB may be considered to have failed to fulfil its function in actual practice. 
Listed companies expect to have better effectiveness of supervisory functions after 
adding in ACs. Which system is more effective in China: SBs alone or SBs with ACs? 
This research question is then studied in the following empirical chapter. 
2. It is expected that the AC should provide the orientation for the supervisory 
mechanism in managing China’s listed companies. Yet ACs are still at an early stage 
of evolution. The improvement in the operation of supervisory functions also seems to 
be a goal of the reform and development of China’s securities market. So 
understanding “The operations of supervisory functions of SBs and ACs in China” 
provides a basis for suggesting improvements for the efeectiveness in the future. 
3. It is a process of innovation as well as trial and error. In order to explore other 
practices that are suitable to the unique CG setting and model in China, the research 
may be required to understand the interaction between these two institutions of 
internal supervisory mechanism on how to enhance governance mechanisms in listed 
Page 160 PhD Thesis, University of Manchester Pao-Chen Lee 
companies for the development of the capital market. Therefore, the co-ordination 
between SBs and ACs of internal supervisory mechanism after adoption of ACs is 
designed as another phase of empirical studies in this thesis. 
The following three empirical studies will find the evidence for answering these three 
research objectives with five key questions respectively.  
Table 14. The Development of the Supervisory Mechanism of CG in the United 
Kingdom 
(Source: Author, as supported by reference cited within) 
Year  Subject, Major Impact and Major Result  
1711 – 1720 
Subject The South Sea Bubble 10 
Major Impact Investors suffered heavy losses that seriously undermined the then 
developing economy of UK. This became the basic factor that subsequently 
generated the first company laws in Britain.  
Major Result Britain subsequently organised 13 people’s special committees to investigate 
the bankruptcy of the South Sea Company, and ordered licensed public 
accountants to audit the account of the South Sea Company, in order to 
expose frauds involving this company.  
1844 
Subject Having clearly defined the duty of the BoD, shareholders’ meeting and CPA 
in the company law.11  
Major Impact The BoD should announce the final financial statement to the shareholders’ 
meeting 
 The shareholders’ meeting appointed CPA and one or more shareholders to 
serve as supervisors for examining the financial statement.  
 The designated CPA should report the audit result to the shareholders.  
Major Result  The first time it was differentiated between partnership and shareholders in a 
company. Investors strengthen the supervisory mechanism of the 
shareholders; 
 A joint stock company could gain legitimacy simply through the official 
register. It was a necessary procedure when applying to register via the 
designated CPA which check its accounting stipulations; 
 Emphasised that the making of an “overall and just” balance sheet must be 
referred to each shareholders’ meeting; 
 The accounts and financial statement of the company must be examined by 
the supervisors who were elected by the shareholders, and who appointed 
one or several supervisors elected by shareholder to serve as the auditor 
based on agreement signed by shareholders.  
                                               
10  The South Sea Bubble episode created a big shock not only in Britain but the whole world as 
well. The entire episode has been documented intact and is kept in the Historical Museum of 
Central Bank of London.  
11  Ever since the Joint Stock Company Act of 1844, statutory company law has been amended and 
consolidated on a number of occasions, most recently in the Company Act of 2006.  
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Year  Subject, Major Impact and Major Result  
1845 
Subject Revision of the company law (Kuo 2004: vol.2, pp.196-199)  
Major Impact It further emphasised the importance of the supervisory mechanism in CG in 
providing protection to investors. 
Major Result A special chapter stipulated the company’s audits structure, made the 
company auditing concrete, and enabled it to carry out auditing with 
effectiveness;  
 Stipulated clearly that the supervisor of a company has the right to engage 
the accountant and other relevant personnel to help in auditing and 
stipulating that the auditor must write ‘audit report’ and refer the report to 
shareholder’s meeting before disbursing bonus. The auditor read out the 
accounts as well as the audit report approved by the auditors during the 
bonus-sharing meeting. 
 Regulations pertaining to accounting compiling and assembling were 
systematised, emphasising integrity and authenticity of the content of 
accounts, and adopted stricter rules for compiling, assembling and 
disclosure.  
1862 
Subject Revision on the company law (Kuo 2004: 202-204)  
Major Impact Supervisor’s duty is substituted by the designated CPA.  
Major Result The shareholder’s supervision to company’s director is not conducted by the 
representatives of shareholders but is substituted by the designated CPA.  
1948 
Subject  Revising the company law  
Major Impact Strengthening the supervision of the company as well as promoting the 
company’s responsibility toward the community.  
Major Result Strengthening the company’s Internal Audit function and elaborated the 
outside audit function as designated by CPA;  
 Guaranteed the authenticity, dependability and fairness and sound of the 
information disclosure.  
1961 – 1975 
Subject Releasing a series of audit instructions (Tsai and Tang 2006: 3)  
Major Impact The gap existed between regulatory instructions and practical construction.  
Major Result The auditing quality of auditors was severely criticised by all circles.  
1976 
Subject Establishing the Auditing Practice Committee (APC)  
Major Impact Appointing professional members to promote research on the audit function.  
Major Result Setting up the criterion for auditing  
1980 
Subject Stipulating the audit criterion and guide  
Major Impact Stipulating specialised criterion and guide for auditing  
Major Result The released audit criterion and guide became Britain’s first official document 
in recording development of the independent audit construction in UK. Since 
then Britain entered a new era in company’s supervisory mechanism and 
auditing quality.  
1992 – 1998 
Subject The peak period of study on CG in Britain (Hu et al. 2000) 
Major Impact Cadbury (1992)  
 Rutterman (1994)  
 GreenBury (1995)  
 Hampel (1998)  
Major Result The Combined Code formulated in 1998 consolidated the principles and 
recommendations of Cadbury, Rutterman, Greenbury and Hampel reports, 
which contributed greatly in developing the comprehensive criterion of 
Corporate Governance.  
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Year  Subject, Major Impact and Major Result  
1998 
Subject The Combined Code 
Major Impact The London Stock Exchange Council approved the Combined Code 
Major Result British incorporated companies listed on the UK Stock Exchange (not 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM)) are subject to the Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance. The UK Combined Code had become the 
supplementary rules of the exchange regulations for the listed companies. 
The UK Combined Code operates on what is known as a ‘Comply or Explain’ 
basis. In other word, companies may choose not to comply with specific 
provisions, but in that case, they will have to provide a proper public 
explanation of their decision.  
2003 
Subject The revised Combined Code, published in July 2003 was a direct result of the 
recommendations of the Higgs report and the Smith review concerning ACs. 
Major Impact As with the 1998 Under the Combined Code, companies are required to 
report on their compliance on the Code and should also explain areas of non- 
compliance. The revised Combined Code is effective for companies with 
financial years starting on or after 1 November 2003.  
Major Result The new Code amounts to a significant revision of the 1998 Code. In 
particular the Code calls for:  
 A separation of the roles of the Chairman and Chief Executive. The Chairman 
should satisfy the criteria for independence on appointment, but should not, 
thereafter, be considered independent when assessing the balance of board 
membership;  
 A Board consisting of at least half independent Non-Executive Directors 
(NEDs). The Code defines independence as recommended by the Higgs 
Report;  
 Candidates for Board selection are to be drawn from a wider pool;  
 The Board, its committees and directors are subject to an annual 
performance evaluation;  
 At least one member of the AC should have recent and relevant financial 
experience; and  
 In contrast to the Higgs Report, the revised Code permits the Chairman to 
preside over the nominations committee, except where the committee is 
considering the appointment of the chairman’s successor.  
2004 
Subject The British Company Act of 2004 (IT Governance 2010) 
Major Impact The UK’s Company Act of 2004 pertaining to audit, investigations and 
community enterprise placed a statutory duty on officers and employees 
(including ex-employees) to provide auditors with information (other than 
legally privileged information) and explanations in respect of any issue 
related to their audit of the company’s accounts. 
Major Result The directors are required to make a statement that they have disclosed 
(having taken appropriate steps to ascertain it) all relevant information to the 
auditors and that making a false statement is a criminal offence. 
 The British Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP), which was originally 
set up in 1990 to look into instances of corporate accounting non-compliance 
with UK GAAP, gained new powers to require companies, directors and 
auditors to provide documents, information and explanations when there 
accounts of non-compliance with regard to reporting requirements. With the 
exception of small and medium enterprises, UK companies will be required to 
make detailed disclosure of non-audit services supplied by their auditors. 
2006 
Subject The British Company Act of 2006 
Major Impact The British Company Act of 2006, which received royal assent at the end of 
2006, will be fully in effect by October 2008. This Act replaces virtually all the 
previous UK companies’ legislations. 
Major Result The first commencement order contained requirements on disclosure of 
company information and made provisions for the use of e-communications 
because this Act affects every single UK company. 
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2007 
Subject A review of the implementation of the Combined Code  
Major Impact The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) conducted consultations on a small 
number of changes to the Code. The FRC is an independent British regulator 
responsible for overseeing the Combined Code. The FRC is also responsible 
for the statutory oversight and regulation of auditors, the professional 
accountancy, and actuarial bodies. 
Major Result The most recent (2003) version of the Code combines the Cadbury and the 
Greenbury reports on Corporate Governance, the Turnbull Report on Internal 
Control (revised and republished as the Turnbull Guidance in 2005), the 
Smith Guidance on ACs and elements of the Higgs Report. In 2006, the 
Combined Code was subject to a review. These changes were subsequently 
incorporated in the updated version of the Code published in June 2006.  
Table 15. The Development of the Supervisory Mechanism of CG in the United States 
(Source: Author, as supported by reference cited within) 
Year  Subject, Major Impact and Major Result  
1929 – 1933  
Subject The Wall Street Crash of 1929, which led to economic crisis in the US in 
1930  
Major Impact The crash was one of the most devastating stock market downturns in US 
history. Accounting regulations were chaotic and accounting information 
quality has serious problems. The crisis awakens the people about the 
importance of creating unified accounting regulations.  
Major Result The crash was also the starting point of implementing important financial 
reforms and trading regulations in the US In1930 the American CPA 
association criticised the chaotic accounting regulation at that time, and 
established a special committee for co-ordination securities trading;  
 In 1932 the American CPA association sanctioned several companies based 
on six accounting principles that the special committee had drafted, and the 
augmented form, known as the approved accounting principles, subsequently 
became the foundation in. making accounting criterion in the US  
 The 1933 Securities Law:  
 This law was aimed to protect investors’ rights and interests. It puts emphasis 
on the function of independent auditing, on the requirement that financial 
statements must be based on auditing by the committee’s approved CPA, 
and on providing a certificate according to the result of auditing in order to 
confirm its authenticity.  
 The 1934 Securities Exchanges Act: Set up the securities trading committee 
(SEC) in order to strengthen the management of the securities market. This 
committee was tasked to reform the American accounting and audit system 
and it has carried out various reform as well as provide guidance 
authoritatively and decisively;  
 In 1936 the American CPA association published the modified version of “the 
checking of the financial statement” first published in 1929. From then on the 
approved accounting principles became the “generally acknowledged 
accounting principles,” allowing the examining points to be transferred for 
purpose of obtaining credit financing, especially for the shareholders. This 
change reflected the fact that the CG has now placed the creditors and 
shareholders in the centre.  
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Year  Subject, Major Impact and Major Result  
1938 
Subject The outbreak of the Mekesson and Robbins bankruptcy case. (Kuo 2004: 
446-447) 
Major Impact The result was the supreme stratum practices fraud, and made the appointed 
CPA fall seriously in auditing.  
Major Result It was not a perfect audit procedure, and the appointed CPA didn’t use the 
procedure of confirmation;  
 Robbins noted serious internal control problems in Corporate Governance, 
but he did not appraise or announce the status of this company’s internal 
control. That could be the important reason to invalid audits and make 
management practice frauds and get away with it.  
 This scandal became the main reason for promoting independent audit 
norms in the US  
1952, 1972 and 1978 
Subject 1952 issuing 
1972 and 1978 Revising and unifying Commercial Code 
Major Impact Replaced the original single trader’s code, and confirmed the three major 
principles of the contract legislation which included the free principle of 
contract, the principle of honesty, and the principle against swindle.  
Major Result This code has exerted a great influence on Corporate Governance, corporate 
accounting and auditing criterion. It subsequently also influenced the 
development of conceptual frameworks on financial accounting criterion in 
the US  
1988 
Subject Issuing SAS no. 53 and 54, replacing SAS no. 16 and 17 (SEC 2010; SOX 
2010)  
Major Impact These two announcements regarded prevention of fraud audits as one of the 
main auditing goals.  
Major Result Auditor regarded shareholders as the primary stakeholders. This is an 
inevitable outcome of progress in Corporate Governance.  
1997 
Subject Issuing the SAS no. 82.  
Major Impact  Issuing SAS no. 82: the audit financial statement alerted the concern 
regarding fraud practicing. In fact the outside CPA did not regard preventing 
fraud audit as its primary goal.  
Major Result Audit contract is signed by both sides of outside CPA and the company’s 
executor. But the outside CPA bears no responsibility for the prevalence of 
fraud practices that the high management carry out by abusing its authorities.  
2001 
Subject The outbreak of the Enron Scandal 
Major Impact The Enron Scandal triggered stronger public concern for Corporate 
Governance 
Major Result The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: 
 The listed US companies (amounting to more than 970 in 2001) with annual 
sales volume of over US$ 1,200 million. Besides, CEO of CFO made vows 
and guaranteed that their accounting information is true and reliable, and 
they also pledged to strengthen the accounting responsibility of the layers of 
management.  
 This law makes stricter demands on Corporate Governance, while also 
requiring the company to provide internal control report, which must be 
proved by the independent auditor.  
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Year  Subject, Major Impact and Major Result  
2002 
Subject WorldCom (WCOM) was the second largest long distance phone company in 
the US, and this scandal becomes the biggest financial fraud case in US 
history (CyberTelecom 2003) 
Major Impact Issuing SAS no. 99: the name is the same as the SAS no. 82: the audit 
financial statement raised public concern about fraud practicing. The 
issuance of SAS no.99 was to strengthen the responsibility of finding fraud 
practices of the independent CPA as the outside auditors.  
Major Result Improving the audit effectiveness in preventing fraud practice and elevated 
the important status of the audit function in improving Corporate Governance. 
Table 16. The Development of the Supervisory Mechanism of CG in the People’s 
Republic of China 
(Source: Author, as supported by CSRC (2010)) 
Year  Key Promotion Issues of Corporate Governance 
1978 China undertook reform to transform its planned economic system into market 
economic system. Through the reform, economic control was channelled into the 
market mechanism, thus allow the collective or the private enterprise economic 
organisations to compete with the state-owned enterprises through the price 
competition. 
1984 China’s first Limited Company was formally established. 
1990 The Shanghai Stock Exchange Commission was set up.  
1991  The Shenzhen Stock Exchange Commission was inaugurated. 
1992 China Securities Regulatory Commission which is tasked with overseeing the 
securities market in the country was established. 
1993 This period marked a milestone in China’s reforming of its socialist economic system 
when it implemented reform of ownership, by separating the power of management 
under the new enterprise system. In December of the same year, China issued the 
‘company law’ which would also promote the concept of modern enterprise system. It 
was the first time for China to set up a solid legal foundation for establishing corporate 
management system. Subsequently, China set up the double layers systems of the 
BoD and board of supervisors under the shareholders’ meeting, and both boards also 
reported to shareholders’ meeting respectively. 
1997 Reforming state owned big enterprises to comply with the company system, while 
maintaining control over large enterprises and relaxing control over small ones and 
enabling large number of small enterprises to survive.  
1998 The “Securities Law” was adopted and went into effect in 1999. Since the listed 
company’s ownership was structured by large state owned stocks, which was unable 
to set up effective CG structure, further reform was necessary.  
1999 Established the check and balance relation between ownership and management of 
the company, and requiring the state-owned enterprises to reorganise and set up the 
regulated CG system.  
2001 Issued the Provisional Regulations on Reducing State Shares and Raising Social 
Security Funds. Required all companies’ directors to at least appoint two independent 
directors and one independent supervisor before June of 2002, and before June of 
2003, the BoD at least must consist of more than 1/3 of the independent directors.  
2002 Issued the “Code of CG for Listed Companies in China”. It standardised the operation 
of listed companies and became the first important document standardising the 
behaviour of listed companies in an all-round and systematically way in China.  
2003 The establishment of the State-owned Asset Supervision and Management Board 
under the State Council. 
2005 Issued the temporary provisions for state-owned enterprises transfer to management 
authorities, and the reform and management rule for dispersing ownership of listed 
companies. 
2006 The “Company Law” and the “Securities Law” were revised and adopted on the same 
day, went into effect beginning January 1, 2006.  
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Chapter 5 Research Design and Methodology 
5.1 Introduction  
The research steps of this thesis are illustrated by way of a flowchart in Figure 8 as 
follows. The research questions, theories, literature review and background 
introduction have been explained in detail before this chapter, and are also explained 
in the “introduction” chapter of this thesis. This chapter aims to design the research 
methods with which to find the evidence for answering the research questions, so to 
structure this chapter by the order of research questions in Table 17 as follows. The 
flow chart of research steps of this thesis is presented in Figure 8; and the research 
objectives, questions and methods are consolidated and presented in Table 17 as the 
roadmap to guide the empirical studies of the next chapter in this thesis.  
This research endeavours to understand the effectiveness, operations and co-
ordination of the two institutions of internal supervisory mechanism in China by 
employing both quantitative and qualitative methods. The data is collected from the 
CCER statistical database and financial statements, interview, survey and archival 
studies. The rationale in adopting both quantitative and qualitative methods is to focus 
on both scope and depth.  
If based on only a few pre-determined constructs, large sample studies could serve as 
a generalisable set of findings, but for a limited number of people and cases, in-depth 
studies such as field research can produce much more detailed information (Patton 
1990). This study will select both research methods, and more often than not involves 
a trade-off between generalisability and understandability. Considering the limited 
availability of resources on measurable features of ACs, as well as the scarcity of 
knowledge about concrete practices of ACs, the qualitative research method will 
therefore focus on better understanding. In depth methods such as interviews are 
particularly relevant when this study is sought to better understand the perspectives, 
impacts and phenomena in their naturally occurring settings (Patton, 1990). 
The quantitative research method will be designed to focus on generalisability. The 
data response volume for the quantitative method is over 50 for each question in this 
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thesis, and according to the assumption of Joseph et al., (2006), ''Small samples, 
usually characterised as having fewer than 30 observations, are appropriate for 
analysis only by simple regression with a single independent variable.'' Hence, it can 
be said that the collected data has met the requirements for using a quantitative 
method approach. However, it is expected that both research methods will 
compliment one another. Meanwhile, social science researchers such as Onwuegbuzie 
and Leech (2005: 375) encourage all graduate students to learn to utilise both 
quantitative and qualitative research in order to be pragmatic researchers. They also 
emphasised that the inclusion of qualitative data can help explain relationships 
discovered through quantitative data. 
A. (Chapter 2) 
Research Question 
B. (Chapter 3) 
Research Theory 
C. (Chapter 3) 
Literature Review 
D. (Chapter 4) 
Background Introduction 
E. (Chapter 5) 
Research Design & Methodology 
   
E1. Quantitative  E2. Qualitative 
   
E1.1 Samples: 
Three sets of samples 
 E2.1 Samples: 
Interview two companies and two governors & Survey 330 
listed firms and 5 listed firms with ACs 
     
Q1&2(Chapter 6.1) 
Effectiveness 
 Q3 &sub-Qs(Chapter 6.2) 
Operations 
 Q4&5(Chapter 6.3) 
Co-ordination 
     
Q1:  
Comparing T-test results of  
proxy (PER) and four control 
variables; and observing the 
trend of PER from 2003-7. 
 Q3: 
Interview SB/AC members 
of two companies 
 Q4: 
Interview two governors 
     
Q2: 
The test results from the 
regression of Panel model 
with significance are 
compared between G1 & G2 
 2 Sub-Qs: 
Two surveys of 330 firms 
and 5 firms with AC for 
overall understanding 
 Q5: 
One survey of 330 firms for 
overall understanding 
     
Summary A  Summaries of B and C 
   
Conclusion (Chapter 7) 
Figure 8. Flow Chart of Research Steps 
(Source: Author) 
Table 17. Research Objectives, Questions and Methods  
(Source: Author) 
Objective 1: To understand the effectiveness of SBs and ACs in China 
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Hypothesis H1: Firms with SBs plus ACs are 
more likely to effectively engage in 
the supervisory functions than the 
firms without ACs.  
The Effectiveness of Supervisory 
Functions: 
G2(WithAC) ≥ G1(WithoutAC)  
H2: The AC is assumed to contribute to the 
effectiveness of supervisory functions by 
the characteristics and responsibility of the 
AC.  
It is assumed that firms after adding in 
ACs have better coefficients in 
comparing the independence, 
expertise, diligence (size and annual 
number of meeting times), 
decentralising the shareholding 
structure and decreasing the dual 
positions of CEO and the president of 
the BoD with the firms without ACs. 
Questions 
(1&2) 
1.1 Which system with or without 
ACs has more effective supervisory 
functions in China? 
1.2 Will the AC contribute to the 
effectiveness of the supervisory 
functions in China? 
 
Methods 1.1  
By comparing two stages/groups of 
the listed companies having SBs 
alone (without ACs) and SBs with 
ACs (with ACs): market response to  
earnings (PER), firm size, growth 
rate of assets, return on assets and 
decrease the debt ratio as the 
proxy variable (PER) and four 
control variables of the 
effectiveness of supervisory 
functions. Meanwhile, the trend of 
PER from 2003-2007 is observed.  
1.2  
The evidence is collected from the 
regression test results of Panel model. 
The test results with significance are 
compared between two systems of SBs 
alone and SBs plus ACs in China: the 
better system being supplied with a 
better impact with significance after the 
comparison.  
Objective 2: To understand how the operations of SBs and ACs improve the effectiveness of 
supervisory governance functions in China. 
Question 3:  What are the operation processes, problems and difficulties faced in the 
implementation of supervisory functions by SBs and ACs in empirical practice 
in China? 
Method 2:  The findings for the operation processes, problems and difficulties faced in 
implementing the effectiveness of SBs and ACs in China are identified by 






What is role of the AC played in 
China? 
2.2  
What are the overlapping and missing 
items and percentages between the 
SBs and the ACs in terms of functions?  
Methods  2.1  
The evidence is collected from the 
telephone survey of 330 listed 
companies with ACs, the finding is 
analysed through the statistics of 
the roles defined by the regulated 
main functions of the AC in a listed 
company is calculated and then 
compared to the stipulated 
functions. 
2.2  
The operations items are defined 
through the studies of the related 
regulations and charters; and the 
overlap items and percentages 
between two supervisory bodies is 
researched through survey of five listed 
companies with having experience in 
implementing the ACs.  
 
Objective 3:  To understand the co-ordination between SBs and ACs in terms of 
organisation in China 
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Questions 
(4 & 5) 
3.1  
How will the two systems with or 
without ACs exist in the future 
according to framework of 
legislation and management of 
government? 
3.2  
What is the preferred linkage of 
interactions between the SBs and the 
ACs in terms of organisation? 
Methods  3.1  
The two systems with or without 
ACs exist in the future according to 
the understanding two governors’ 
assertions and opinions on the 
framework of legislation and 
management of government.  
3.2  
The preferred co-ordination is collected 
from telephone survey of 330 listed 
companies for improving the 
interactions between the SB and the 
AC in organisations.  
 
5.2 Research Method Designed For Answering Questions  
5.2.1 Quantitative Method  
Objective 1: The Effectiveness  
Goodwin and Seow asserted that “Further investigation into the effectiveness of AC is 
needed” (Goodwin and Seow, 2002: 220). Collier concluded that evidence of their 
effectiveness was very limited and certainly insufficient to support their rapid increase 
in popularity, describing this as a ‘curious phenomenon’ (Collier, 1996). So how is an 
AC’s effectiveness in performing its functions measured? For this and other reasons, 
further research into CG regarding AC effectiveness is called for. This study will 
evaluate the effectiveness of the alternative systems of SBs alone and SBs plus ACs, 
via the quantitative method. This phase is designed to achieve objective one: to 
understand the effectiveness of SBs and ACs in China. 
The variables, research models and samples designed for evaluating Research 
Question One and Two are summarised as follows:  
Variables 
The importance of ACs functions is highlighted by the assumptions of proxy theory. 
Therefore stakeholders generally rely on the effectiveness of the AC to be manageable 
to a significant extent through regulatory or self-regulatory approaches (Gendron and 
Bedard, 2006). The AC’s performance on effectiveness is expected to meet the 
stakeholder’s expectation, and the AC is expected to carry out its monitoring function. 
Owing to the concerns of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC), the 
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Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) sponsored by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), announced ten 
recommendations to strengthen the functions of ACs. The regulators highlighted their 
requirements regarding the characteristics and activities of AC such as independence, 
financial expertise, meeting frequency, size and so on. 
AC Characteristics and Activities (diligence) 
Regulations in the US and UK required that AC be comprised of independent 
directors. The BRC Report (1999) also raised the importance of financial literacy. 
Qualification rules for AC members are aimed at strengthening corporate governance, 
enhancing company accountability and maintaining investor confidence (Sweeney 
and Vallario 2002). Meanwhile, AC should hold a minimum of three or four meetings 
a year and special meetings when necessary (IIA, 1991; Price Waterhouse, 1993). 
DeZoort et al. (2002) express meeting frequency as a measure of the AC’s due 
diligence.  
The U.S. SEC and stock exchanges require that listed companies maintain AC 
members with at least three directors at the beginning of December 1999. Yet there is 
no threshold in China’s Code of CG, which merely mentions that “independent 
directors shall constitute the majority of the committees.” The variables of the 
characteristics and activities of supervisory functions affect the investors’ key concern 
of market response to earnings (PER). Meanwhile, special characteristics relating to 
Chinese political and economic environment, such as the shareholding structure and 
party-member employee will be considered to evaluate the effectiveness of 
supervisory functions in China. The research model and each variable’s hypothesis 
responses to the dependent variable will be listed in the chapter of empirical study, 
especially in the section of Phase I on effectiveness.  
The market provides a positive or negative reflection when a company announces its 
accounting’s earnings information, and reflects the trust and accountability of the 
shareholders to the listed companies. The market response to earnings (PER) is used 
as the dependent variable to evaluate the market reflections for performance of 
effectiveness indicators. This has been explained in the chapter on the literature 
review. 
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Ordinary Least Squares and Panel Data Regression Model  
This thesis will apply quantitative research by the linear regression of ordinary least 
squares (OLS) to examine the mean value of the proxy variables of effectiveness, and 
the Panel Data Regression Model to examine the independent variables representing 
the characteristics and activities of supervisory functions to the dependent variable of 
market response to earnings (PER). If the test result shows that the estimated 
coefficients and p value are positive and statistically significant across the sample 
years, this would suggest that investors positively recognise AC effectiveness in 
developing the monitoring function to the company. The more effective system will 
emerge following comparison between the two groups and two stages of the sample 
targets, in order to find the answers proving H1 and H2.  
Sample Target  
The research sample will focus on China. In October 2002, China enacted the 
Practical Regulations for CG for Listed and Over-the-Counter Companies. So this 
thesis will select the sample firms from listed Chinese firms by the same groups in 
two stages, and also the current listed companies with and without ACs in two groups. 
The first group consists of companies without ACs and the second group consists of 
companies with ACs. Three samples are designed:  
Sample 1: These samples compares two sets of data of four consecutive years (2000-
2003 and 2004-2007) of the same companies before and after the ACs were 
introduced in the year 2004.  
Sample 2: This thesis uses the comparisons between two groups of all of the listed 
companies with and without setting up ACs as of 2007, the year in which the research 
ends. There are two systems of oversight included in the text, namely the one with 
SBs alone and the one with both SBs and ACs.  
Sample 3: The expertise data of the supervisory institutions is not available in the 
CCER database. Accordingly, the expertise data is designed to retrieve from the 
financial statements of 100 listed companies, three years from 2005 to 2007 for each 
sampled company respectively. So, sample 3 is aimed to test the expertise of the SBs 
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by comparing two systems, in order to reveal the contribution of ACs in improving 
the expertise and enhancing the effectiveness of supervisory functions in China.  
Question 1.1:  Which system with or without ACs has more effective 
supervisory functions? 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with SBs plus ACs are more likely to effectively engage in the 
supervisory functions than the firms without ACs.  
The Effectiveness of Supervisory Functions:  G2(With AC) ≥ G1(Without AC) 
The research method is designed by comparing two stages(sample 1)/groups (sample 
2) of the listed companies having SBs alone (without ACs) and SBs with ACs (with 
ACs): market response to earnings (PER), firm size, growth rate of assets, return on 
assets and decrease in debt ratio as the proxy (PER) and four control variables of 
effectiveness of supervisory functions. The average (mean) of each proxy variable is 
used to test for two samples: Sample 1 and 2, and compare two stages/groups of two 
samples test results by t statistics and p value to evaluate whether p-value is less than 
10%, 5% and 1% (*,**,*** significant).  
Sample 1 uses t test with the model of The Difference of Average (Mean Value) Test 
by Pairs of Populations. Sample 1’s size is selected from the same companies with 
two different periods of years. Sample 2 uses t test by the model of The Difference of 
Average (Mean Value) Test by two populations. Assuming the variants are unequal 
for sample 2 in terms of size, it has different companies and numbers of groups by 
differentiating all of the companies into those with and without ACs.  
Furthermore, the trend of the average (mean) Market Response to Earnings (PER) 
from year 2003-2007 will be reviewed, in order to understand the increasing or 
decreasing tendency to forecast the two groups’ performances for the future as a base 
with which to evaluate the tendency to apply ACs in China in the future. Additionally, 
average growth trend of market response to earnings (PER) will be used to evaluate 
the performance of the supervisory functions by the two groups under consideration. 
Question 1.2:  Will the AC contribute to the effectiveness of 
supervisory functions in China?  
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It is intended to establish whether the listed companies, after adding in ACs, 
contribute to improving the independence, expertise, diligence (size and annual 
number of meeting times), decentralise the shareholding structure and decrease the 
dual positions of CEO and the president of the BoD. 
Hypothesis 2:  The AC is assumed to contribute to the effectiveness of 
supervisory functions by the characteristics and 
responsibility of the AC.  
Firms with higher levels of independence, greater expertise among members, of a 
larger size and with more regular meetings, lower centralised shareholding structure 
and lower dual CEO positions are more likely to provide effective supervisory 
functions when adding in ACs.  
The research data for proving H2 covers cross sections and timing sequences for the 
period 2005 to 2007. In order to resolve the possible problems related to correlation in 
analyzing timing series, the Panel data model has been chosen: which can analyse the 
data with cross-sections and time-series at the same time, decreasing the likelihood of 
problems of auto-correlation of the variables, as well as possible problems of 
heteroscedasticity of the samples in cross sections. Panel data is particularly good at 
catching more information and improving the efficiency of the estimated value. 
There are two types of fix and random effect models.  
(A) Fix effect model is also called least-square dummy variable model (LSDV) for 
the dummy variable may be put in the model. The different sample has a different 
intercept item, and the fix effect model can evaluate the impact of the unobserved 
variables to the model in order to understand the variation between the samples and 
decrease the common correlation coefficient of the model.  
(B) Random effect model is also called error component model. This model highlights 
the whole relation of the data. Its intercept is generated randomly but will not be 
changed by timing.  
Mundlak (1978) pointed out that if the correlation of the variables exists, it would 
have a deviation in using the random effect model; if no correlation between the 
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variables exists, this model should be selected. Hausman (1978) proposed the 
Hausman test as the standard with which to check whether the test result of random 
effect model could be accepted; if the overall result is rejected, the fix effect model 
should be chosen. Breusch and Pagan (1980) proposed LM (Lagrange multiplier) to 
check if its p value of random effect model is not significant, it means the fix effect 
model is the correct model and the random model is not selected.  
This research will first base itself on Mundlak’s (1978) study to check if the 
correlation coefficient exists over 0.8 by definition of the Pearson correlation 
coefficient. If so, the fix effect model will be selected. If not, this research will be 
based on both studies of Hausman (1978) and Breusch and Pagan (1980)’s proposed 
LM (Lagrange multiplier), for both studies direct to test the random effect model as 
the priority. If the result of p value is acceptable, random effect model will be chosen; 
if not, fix effect model will be selected. 
Comparative Data Analysis  
This thesis will process three layers of comparative data analysis for the two systems 
applied (with or without the AC): 
The data analysis will be based on the collected evidence of the quantitative research 
results, to perform the data comparison between the two systems. The evidence is 
collected from the regression test results of Panel model. The test results with 
significance are compared between two systems of SBs alone and SBs plus ACs in 
China: the better system being supplied with a better impact with significance after 
the comparison. Finally, the conclusions with findings will be generated to respond to 
the Research Questions 1.1 and 1.2; and also summarise the demands for further 
research in the future. 
5.2.2 Qualitative Method of Cases Studies and Interviews 
Objective 2 & 3: The Operations and Co-ordination  
This phase uses the qualitative method, for only very few field-based studies on AC 
processes have been done. Until very recently, “There is very little evidence on the 
processes associated with the operation of ACs and the manner in which they 
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influence organisation behaviour” (Turley and Zaman, 2004: 305). Gendron et al. 
(2004) suggested that this could be due to the fact that field studies of CG processes 
have encountered some serious difficulties, such as a demand for confidentiality and 
practitioners' time pressures, among others. They further suggested studying the 
judgemental processes of AC members to create opportunities in future researches.  
The research on the supervisory function’s aspects of operations and co-ordination – 
particularly the role played in China and the functional overlapping status of two 
supervisory institutions and analysis of the dynamic relationships between ACs and 
SBs in organisation – is necessary, but has not been clearly defined. Objectives 2 and 
3 are designed to achieve the understanding of the operations of supervisory functions 
and the co-ordination of supervisory organisations by SBs and ACs in China. 
This thesis will mainly reference the study of “Getting Inside the Black Box: A Field 
Study of Practices in “Effective” ACs” co-authored by Yves Gendron, Jean Bedard 
and Maurice Gosselin (2004), in order to interview two case studies. Scapens R. W. 
(1990) described the relations between a field study and a case study, suggesting that 
“fieldwork is usually taken to mean studies of social practices, such as accounting 
practices, in the field of activity in which they take place. This could be a study of a 
single company, or a number of companies. A case study, however, usually implies a 
single unit of analysis (Scapens, 1990: 264). Their research focuses on field study and 
in-depth interviews in the hope of enriching the knowledge of concrete practices of 
ACs, as field study is applied to better understand phenomena in their naturally 
occurring settings (Gendron et al., 2004).  
Interviewing may also be part of other research strategies such as case studies (Cassell 
and Symon 2004). Furthermore, they analysed the interview transcripts for the chosen 
three cases individually via grounded theory procedures (Gendron et al., 2004: 157). 
During the process of data analysis, they formed three conceptual matrices to 
summarise the main themes, examining the relationships and further ensuring the 
validity, to prepare the outline for their paper.  
Miles and Huberman (1994: 173) contended that “one aim of studying multiple cases 
is to increase generalisability, reassuring yourself that the events and processes in one 
well-described setting and are not wholly idiosyncratic. At a deeper level, the aim is 
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to see processes and outcomes across many cases, to understand how they are 
qualified by local conditions, and thus to develop more sophisticated descriptions and 
more powerful explanations”.  
This thesis applies two case studies and interviews to gain insights into the practices 
in the implementation of ACs and SBs in China. Specifically, this thesis sought to 
find answers from interviews of the members of two companies and two governors to 
the following two questions:  
Question 3:  What are the operation processes, problems and 
difficulties faced in the implementation of the 
supervisory functions by SBs and ACs in empirical 
practice in China? 
Question 4 (3.1):  How will the two systems with or without ACs exist in 
the future according to framework of legislation and 
management of government? 
To answer the Research Question 3 and 4 (3.1), the qualitative methodology is 
applied by referring to the work of Gendron, Bedard, Turley and Zaman, Spira and 
others. However, since they performed only limited research on internal processes, 
they have called for more research on it. Thus the qualitative methodology is used in 
response to calls by the relevant researchers to unravel the black box of the 
monitoring system by studying their process, as it cannot otherwise be achieved 
through the quantitative method.  
Generally, the qualitative method will be applied to two cases’ based examinations of 
companies, to discover the process from both sides of SBs, as well as ACs inside 
viewpoints on understanding SB/AC motive force; and evaluating the effectiveness of 
implementation by revealing the characteristics of supervisory functions in both 
sampled companies.  
More research is needed to open the AC black box (Gendron et al. 2004), in order to 
understand how AC undertakes its tasks and why its impact cannot be adequately 
assessed (Spira 2003). Normally this thesis stresses that AC/SB members should be 
qualified with independent outside directorships, financial expertise and so on. The 
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motive force of AC/SB members has rarely received much attention. Yet the motive 
force is vital to the success of exertion of SB/AC authority and the development of its 
function. This research will also examine whether the role played by SB/AC merely 
has symbolic meaning or actual substance.  
However, this research also aims to construct theoretical generalizations rather than 
statistical generalization (Ryan et al. 2002: 149) pertaining to AC’s operations and co-
ordination of the dynamic relationship with SBs. Actually, “Case studies can provide 
ways of thinking about problems” (Scapens, 1990: 279). Hence, this study uses case 
study and interview in order to examine the problems and difficulties involved in 
operations and co-ordination with the new regulations, and to evaluate the benefits of 
AC application. The study undertaken through the case studies and interviews is 
intended to point out findings for improving the effectiveness of supervisory functions 
in practice, through identifying the problems and difficulties faced in the 
implementation of the SBs and ACs in China.  
Sample Target  
Two case studies were conducted, in which interviews were held and two governors 
questioned about handling the framework of legislation and management of 
government in China. Data was then analysed and consolidated, in order to generate 
conclusions. For one company with SBs only, and one with ACs, the members of SBs 
and ACs and two governors were interviewed to understand their process of AC’s 
relationship with the related parties and the AC’s actual implementing situations; as 
well as future development on two systems on the framework of legislation and 
management of government in China. 
Conversation Analysis 
All interviews were video recorded and transcribed. Semi-structure interviews were 
used, to allow the interviewee to express their points of views for mutual 
understanding related to the AC’s relationships (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). The 
interview transcripts were analysed through qualitative procedures (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). Afterwards, for each corporation, a conceptual matrix was prepared, 
summarising the main themes discussed by the interviewees, before re-examining the 
interview material to gain a better understanding of the answers surrounding 
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implementation in motive force, process and problems and difficulties (Gendron and 
Bedard, 2006) and future expectations on the framework of legislation in China. To 
further ensure the validity of the interviews, the analysis ensured the interviewees’ 
answers within the same corporation converged (Gendron et al., 2004). The two case 
studies and two governors’ conceptual matrices provide a database in preparing an 
outline on the findings of the theses.  
Technique  
Data analysis of interview transcripts was processed in four steps as follows:  
1. To develop a coding scheme;  
2. To modify the scheme when new themes emerged from the data; 
3. To develop a conceptual matrix to summarise the main themes; and  
4. To examine the relationships that might exist among these themes.  
“The analysis has selected feelings, problems, and so on according to some explicit 
decision rules and has clustered discrete but similar items” (Miles and Huberman, 
1994: 178). This phase study clarified similar variables along with two investigated 
case studies, interviewed two governors, in order to summarise the findings. 
5.2.3 Qualitative Method of Survey by Telephone and Face-to-Face 
Interviews 
Surveys are designed to answer the following questions: 
Sub-Questions 1 (2.1):  What is role of the AC played in China? 
Sub-Question 2 (2.2):  What are the overlapping and missing items and 
percentages between the SBs and the ACs in terms of 
functions? 
Question 5 (3.2):  What is the preferred linkage of interactions between 
the SBs and the ACs in terms of organisation? 
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The design of the surveys is described below. 
Survey by telephone  
The theory behind applying the survey by telephone 
China started to introduce ACs by promulgating the Code of CG for listed companies 
in 2002. The AC was established in China only in the last five years. In 2002, only 
20% of 312 listed companies had already established ACs; this number increasing to 
41% (635) in 2007, though data such as financial statements or relevant database is 
still not available to the public. This research adopts the telephone surveys method 
for it facilitates collection of quality data in an efficient and timely manner. Lavrakas 
(1993) mentions telephone surveys as most closely approaching the level of unbiased 
standardization that is the goal of all good surveys.  
The Plan for surveys by telephone 
Survey research by telephone can be defined in this case as personal face-to-face 
interviews arranged in advance by telephone. “Skilful interviewing is important (Frey, 
1989) for an anxiety could be produced during the conversation and hanging up is 
irrevocable by the respondent of the telephone.” In a sense, an initial feeling of trust 
on the part of the interviewee can motivate the respondent to answer key confidential 
questions. Establishing such trust is critical, in order to obtain lower refusal rates and 
accurate information. Because of the limitation on complexity and length of the 
telephone interview, questionnaires should be designed to be no longer than 30 
minutes: the aim being to avoid respondent fatigue (Lavrakas, 1993). Fully structured 
questions were designed for telephone interview; questionnaires were designed based 
on the research objectives, related regulation, literature review and experience, and 
with the aim that the interviewee should be familiar with the questions before the 
start of the fieldwork. 
Sampling was via random selection from over 50% of the listed companies with ACs 
in China. The sample frame consists of 635 companies in 2007; from this, 330 
companies were contacted. The respondent in a sampling unit was identified as the 
General Secretary of BoD, whose key function is to be in charge of the arrangement 
of the BoD, including the AC’s business, and co-ordinator of ACs to the related 
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institutions. Telephone numbers for the sample frame were retrieved from the records 
on the information website of Chinese Listed Companies. A call sheet with a 
questionnaire for each number was prepared for use by the interviewer as the 
working paper for this research. The survey interview procedure was refined 
according to pilot testing of the first 50 selected companies, in order to ensure the 
validity and applicability of the survey. The working papers were collected to 
calculate the statistical number for each question as evidence of this research, once 
the sample calls were completed.  
The execution of the telephone survey  
First, pilot surveys with 50 companies were carried out in advance, in order to fine-
tune the conversation towards efficient progress and research questions with an 
efficacious result. 12 of the 50 companies received the phone calls but only 3 out of 
these 12 companies were willing to respond to the survey questions. The major 
reason for rejecting the survey could be assumed to revolve around leaking 
confidential information. Some companies suspected the interviewer could be a 
potential investor seeking to obtain first hand information about their supervisory 
performance; while others even went as far as suspecting the interviewer to be an 
undercover agent from the Security Exchange Commission or other related Chinese 
government agencies. In light of this experience, the subsequent survey method was 
then adjusted: first by sending out emails featuring a biography of the interviewer, 
and which indicated sincere willingness to have positive mutual interactions with the 
responding companies, by sharing experience and exchanging knowledge about the 
subject matter. 
Secondly, in 2007, fully structured questionnaires were sent out by email in five 
batches to the remaining 585 companies with ACs in China for the following two 
objectives: 1) to get their voluntary responses by email and 2) to introduce the 
interviewer in order to gain their trust and confidence, and inform them in advance 
that the interviewer may call them over the following days, so as to give them ample 
time to prepare answers to the survey should they be willing to respond.  
Thirdly, the interviewer made calls to the sampled companies to whom the 
interviewer had sent out emails in advance in batches. An average of around 10 
Pao-Chen Lee PhD Thesis, University of Manchester Page 181 
sampled companies was called each day, so every batch of 117 companies had been 
called within two or three weeks. It took four months to complete calls to all the 635 
listed companies, including the pilot surveys of 50 companies. 305 out of 635 listed 
companies were called, but no one at the level of General Secretary of BoD could be 
contacted. There were various reasons for this, for example: no one answered the 
phone call; the wrong telephone number was used, or the General Secretary of the 
BoD was either not in the office or too busy to answer the call. However, these 305 
listed companies may be considered as having the potential to respond to related 
questions as part of similar research in the future. For 330 of the listed companies, 
the General Secretary of BoD was contacted and over 50 responded to every survey 
question.  
The survey questions were designed to gain sufficient understanding of the first sub-
question of objective 2 (2.1) and objective 3 (3.2): the role of ACs in China and the 
co-ordination between ACs and SBs regarding their preferred interaction within the 
organisation. All survey questions are explained in detail to describe each related 
research purpose. The detailed descriptions are given in chapters of empirical study 
Phases II and III of this thesis. 
Survey by face-to-face interview 
The plan for survey by face-to-face interview 
Gendron et al. (2004) found that most archival studies do not provide any meaningful 
information on the actual activities of ACs. To improve on such shortcomings, a 
survey based on face-to-face interviews was applied, focusing on identifying 
overlapping status by understanding the ACs’ functional implementation with the 
SBs, in the hope of enriching knowledge about the concrete practices of ACs.  
In order to clarify overlapping and gaps in the functions of the two institutions 
caused by their co-existence in the same system for the realization of effective 
supervision, the survey of five listed companies in Shanghai, China, was designed to 
discover the practice of the supervisory functions in each individual company. 
Furthermore, the functions of the SB and the AC at the practical level were compared. 
The purpose of conducting this survey by face-to-face interview is to complete the 
checklist of operation items of supervisory functions, which is defined by the study 
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of archival study of related regulations and charters presented in the empirical study 
chapter of phase II.  
Prior to fieldwork, questionnaires were specified as checklists based on the research 
objective, literature review and experience of three themes of financial reporting, 
auditing and internal control related to key functions of ACs; while being flexible 
enough to explore new approaches during the interview. Semi-structured interviews 
allowed the interviewee to express their point of view for mutual understanding 
related to the ACs’ co-ordination by function with SBs (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). 
Therefore, semi-structured questions were designed for in-depth interview based on 
the checklist for each sample company, to arrive at the general understanding of the 
co-ordination between ACs and SBs. Questions were prepared in order to design a 
checklist of supervisory functions including three aspects: (1) Financial reporting; (2) 
Auditing including internal audit and external audit; (3) Internal control, including 
compliance. The questions were made known to each category of interviewees before 
the fieldwork commenced. The General Secretary of the BoD was identified as the 
interviewee, as he is in charge and the co-ordinator of the BoD and SB, including 
ACs and its related parties. Each interviewee was asked about the process of typical 
supervisory functions, and the extent to which the company’s AC fulfilled its 
mandate. In order to make data collection more systematic for each interviewee, it 
was intended to keep the interview fairly conversational and situational. 
All surveys by in depth field study interviews were recorded by the checklist and 
partially video-recorded. The interview was processed through rigorous theoretical 
procedures in four steps as follows,  
1.  To develop a functionality checklist of supervisory functions as the main theme 
for each interview;  
2.  To mark on the functionality checklist through the interview and modify it when 
a new function emerges from an interview; 
3.  To consolidate the checklists from five surveys by in-depth interviews of five 
listed companies as a consolidated matrix of five checklists to summarise the 
main themes by matching and integrating the function items after completing the 
interview;  
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4.  To arrive at statistics on overlapping, missing items and percentages among the 
five sampled companies.  
A consolidated matrix of five checklists was prepared, in order to summarise the 
main themes discussed by the interviewees, then re-examine the interview material to 
gain a better understanding of the meanings surrounding the functions’ overlapping 
and omissions of ACs and SBs in the internal supervisory mechanism. Each 
interviewee’s answers were checked for consistency to ensure the validity of the 
interview. The data was then analysed through combining and consolidating the 
checklist results from all interviewees.  
After analyzing the interview data, the samples from the five companies were co-
ordinated and the statistics calculated to assess the degree of overlapping and omitted 
items. The experimental research was intended to point out what should be done in 
practice (Ryan et al., 2002). This research is aimed at helping the internal 
supervisory mechanism work more effectively in China by providing a benchmark, 
gained from experience of the five sample companies. It is also aimed at providing a 
reference for other emerging markets and corporations, and for future researchers to 
enhance and improve both their research and evaluation of ACs. 
The execution of the face-to-face interview 
The five sampled companies were all located in Shanghai, China, and appointments 
were made during the first batch of telephone surveys. The interviewer asked each 
responding company whether they would agree to being visited, to explore further by 
in depth face-to-face interview the functions of the AC’s empirical practices in their 
company. In July and August 2008, five of the companies allowed the interviewer to 
visit them. The interviews were subsequently conducted at the beginning of 
September 2008. 
Each face-to-face interview lasted more than three hours and every company’s 
interview was conducted on each functionality list, and marked on the checklist and 
partial conversation recorded on video. The interviewees were asked to describe their 
actual practices; the interviewees were encouraged to express their opinions when 
explaining their practices, especially on the items that were not listed on the 
functionality checklist, and the items on the functionality checklist that they did not 
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practice. During the interview, they were also encouraged to share their opinions 
freely on the interaction between ACs and SBs regarding the functions practised. 
After each interview, the interviewee received a copy of the functionality checklist to 
help them improve the practice of the AC in their company as a token of appreciation 
and reward for agreeing to be interviewed for over three hours. 
Each company’s functionality checklist was then consolidated into a matrix in order 
to check for overlapping and missing functions between ACs and SBs. The matrix is 
included in Table 42. The items were re-examined and re-classified to fit into the key 
aspects of financial reporting, auditing and internal control. Finally, the percentages 
and totals of the function overlaps and gaps were calculated from the total number of 
functions for each key aspect. These are the indicators for evaluating the overall 
impact across the three key aspects, to reveal the problems of function overlapping of 
co-ordination between ACs and SBs coexisting in China. 
5.3 Summary 
Based on the suggestions of shareholder’s theory, stakeholder’s theory and 
managerial hegemony theory, ACs may be expected to strengthen the effectiveness 
by the implementation of the monitoring functions. Composition of independence, 
expertise and operation are the three pillars used to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
internal supervisory mechanism, the key role of monitoring. From an international 
perspective, the adoption of the ACs in China can be brought about in a way that is 
different from that of the West and suited specifically to the context of China, or the 
ACs can merely be adopted as the standard form of CG introduced from the West. 
The goal of this study is to advance the knowledge about the effectiveness, 
operations and co-ordination of two systems of SB alone and SBs plus ACs in China. 
The framework of the research methodology adopted is divided into three phases 
integrated with the document review, survey by telephone interview, survey by face-
to-face interview and statistical data collection. The first phase is to understand the 
effectiveness; the second is to understand the operations and the final one is to learn 
about the co-ordination between ACs and SBs. Additionally, international guidelines 
are compared with those in China. Based on the findings of the key research 
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questions, each phase analyses gaps in practice and potential problems, and the 
findings presented in order to improve the effectiveness of the internal supervisory 
mechanism of CG in China. 
In summary, the quantitative research method is applied to test objective 1 of the 
effectiveness of the sample representing the overall cases according to the principle of 
logic ratiocination. The quantitative method’s test result is analysed by comparison of 
two systems to answer research questions 1 and 2 of this thesis. The main differences 
in companies before (without) and after (with) setting up the AC emerge following 
the research on this objective.  
The qualitative method is applied to interview two governors, in order to establish the 
future development of legitimate framework; and two case studies of two systems of 
SB alone and SB plus AC, about their monitoring system’s motive force, the 
operation processes, problems and difficulties faced in implementation, by exploring 
the characteristics and processes of factors in effectiveness, in order to identify a 
common explanation for overall cases in China. It is expected that the same feature or 
phenomenon in different cases may help to achieve the second research objective of 
the operations.  
Meanwhile, the qualitative method is applied to survey, via the approaches of 
telephone and face-to-face interview, the general secretary of BoD, to explore three 
aspects of questions of the role of AC played in China, functional overlapping and the 
preferred connection between SBs and ACs in China. The comparative data analysis 
after the quantitative test result and the conversation analysis of qualitative interview 
and statistics of surveys will be summarized and concluded as the findings in this 
thesis.  
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Chapter 6 Empirical Studies 
6.1 Effectiveness  
6.1.1 Introduction 
Some listed companies choose to establish ACs in addition to SBs; some to have SBs 
alone. The following two research questions therefore arise:  
Q1: Which system – with or without ACs – has more effective supervisory functions 
in China? 
It is intended to test which group of companies – with or without ACs – has more 
effective supervisory functions in improving market response to earnings (PER), firm 
size, growth rate of assets, return on assets and decrease of debt ratio as the proxy 
(PER) and control variables prove that companies – with or without ACs – improve 
their credibility to shareholders. 
Q2: Will the AC contribute to the effectiveness of the supervisory functions in China? 
It is intended to test whether listed companies, after adding in ACs, have improved in 
independence, expertise and operations, have decentralised the shareholding structure, 
and have decreased the number of dual positions of CEO and President of the BoD. 
It is assumed that the companies with ACs have less confidence in SBs, so they add in 
ACs to improve the effectiveness of the supervisory functions. The following two 
hypotheses are therefore formulated, in order to seek evidence in this phase study.  
This phase study is aimed to prove H1 and H2:  
H1: Firms with SBs plus ACs are more likely to effectively engage in supervisory 
functions than the firms without ACs.  
The Effectiveness of Supervisory Functions: G2(WithAC) ≥ G1(WithoutAC) 
H2: The AC is assumed to contribute to the effectiveness of supervisory functions  
Pao-Chen Lee PhD Thesis, University of Manchester Page 187 
It is assumed that firms after adding in ACs have better coefficients in comparing the 
independence, expertise, diligence (size and annual number of meeting times), 
decentralise the shareholding structure and decrease the dual positions of CEO and 
President of the BoD than firms without ACs. G2(WithAC) ≥ G1(WithoutAC) 
This phase study is structured by starting with an introduction of the hypotheses, 
before designing a description the definition of variables and measures; section three 
defines the empirical models; section four describes the sample by demonstrating the 
industry, correlation coefficient analysis, and descriptive statistics for the sample; 
section five proves H1 and section six provides the evidence to prove H2.  
6.1.2 The Definition of Variables and Measures 
(A) Dependent Variable  
Market responses to earnings (PER or P/E)  
The detail has been explained in the literature review of this thesis. According to the 
definition of the CCER database, market response to earning is calculated by dividing 
market value per common stock price by earnings per share (EPS), and is also called 
the times of earnings to cost (PER or P/E). The formula of PER or P/E is  
PER or P/E = stock price per common share market value / EPS 
Conversely, 
Reasonable stock price = EPS × reasonable market response to the earnings 
PER or P/E is an important indicator to evaluate the earnings ability of listed 
companies to reflect every investor’s willingness to pay the price per dollar of net 
earnings.  
Yang and Krishnan (2005) used the unexpected annual earnings scaled by stock price 
at the end of the year to control the incentives. Burgstahler and Eames (2002) and 
Abarbanell Lehavy (2003) suggest that earnings may also be managed to meet simple 
earnings expectations in the stock market. Jones (1991), Cahan (1992), Han and 
Wang (1998) and Yang and Krishnan (2005) use the natural logarithm of a firm’s 
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market value of equity as the proxy variable for political costs, for their studies 
assume that managers of politically sensitive firms may manage earnings to minimise 
political or regulatory scrutiny against them. My study applies their concepts to define 
market response to earnings (PER or P/E) of the firm as the dependent variable, and 
assumes that the better PER of the firm will have better effective performance of 
supervisory functions. So it is assumed that the PER of firms and the performance of 
the supervisory functions lead to a positive relationship. In order to prevent periodic 
earnings of the industries or the corporations, the value should not only use one year’s 
earnings. In this research, at least three years’ statistics are used, to avoid deviation.  
(B) Independent Variables  
(1) Independent Directors’ Percentage (ind%) 
Braiotta (1999) found that independent directors are more objective than non-
independent directors in performing supervisory functions. Deli and Gillan (2000) 
referred to the literature of CG intended to focus on the percentage of the external 
directors by the total BoD, and suggested that membership of ACs should be formed 
by the external directors. Klein (2002a) defined the independence of the ACs as the 
percentage of the independent directors of ACs compared to the total membership of 
ACs. By reference to their concepts, in my thesis, the independent directors’ 
percentage is designed as one of the independent variables to evaluate the 
independence of implementing the supervisory functions, as the total number of 
independent directors of the BoD compared with the total members of the BoD; and it 
is assumed that a positive relationship exists, for firms with more independence will 
perform more effective supervisory functions. . 
(2) The percentage of shareholdings by the supervisors: (ind2-sbsh%) 
Yang and Krishan (2005) regarded stock ownership as a negative association on the 
extent of stock ownership by independent AC directors and quarterly earnings 
management. Bedard et al. (2004) regarded stock options held by the directors as 
having a potentially adverse effect on independence, when evaluating the effect of the 
supervisory institution’s independence on aggressive earnings management. Lin 
(2005) applied the percentage of shareholdings by the supervisors as the proxy 
variable to measure the shareholding status of the SB. My thesis uses the percentage 
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of shareholdings by the supervisors as the independent variables to present the 
independence status of the SBs. A negative relationship is anticipated, for it is 
assumed that the higher percentage of the shareholding will lead to lower 
independence of the SBs and the BoDs, and a negative effect of supervisory functions. 
With respect to shareholding, the Cadbury Committee (1992) asserted that share 
option schemes for outside directors could reduce their independence. Bédard et al. 
(2004) examined the association between share option schemes for non-related 
outside committee members, which could reduce their independence, and lead to the 
likelihood of aggressive earnings management. Yang et al. (2005) find that both 
independent and non-independent AC directors’ stock ownerships are positively 
associated with earnings management. These research results are consistent with 
Carcello and Neal (2003) and Bédard et al. (2004), who conclude that the 
compensation by stock options may undermine an internal supervisory mechanism’s 
independence.  
(3) and (4) The number of the supervisors and directors receiving remunerations 
respectively; (Ind3-sbre; Ind4-indre) 
The UK Code of Best Practice issued by the Cadbury Commission (1992) contains 
the following statement:  
“An independent director is independent of management and free from any 
business or other relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of 
their independent judgment, apart from their fees and shareholding. Their fees 
should relate to their working time.”  
According to the SOX Act and to stress the independence of the AC, NYSE and 
NASDAQ stipulate that the AC must be formed by independent directors. They must 
not receive consultation or reward, and must not take part in any related transactions 
with the company or its subsidiaries. 
The independent directors must not receive fees regarding consultation or reward, 
and must not have a share holding. My research checks the number of SBs and 
independent directors receiving remunerations as independent variables for the 
independence of performing supervisory functions. A negative association is 
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expected between the number of the supervisors and directors receiving 
remunerations or rewards respectively and the effect on supervisory functions.  
 (5-8) Expert: (Exp1-fa%; Exp2-leg%; Exp3-ia%; Exp4-party%) 
According to the regulation in China, at least one expert of financial or accounting 
background and legal background is required. My research also checks the internal 
audit literacy and number of party-member employees. A positive association is 
anticipated: in other words, that a higher number of experts in accounting or with a 
financial, legal or internal audit background will lead to more effective performance 
of supervisory functions. On the contrary, party-member employees without any 
literacy related to accounting or a financial, legal or internal audit background is 
assumed to have a negative association on the effect of supervisory functions.  
(9) The number of SB supervisors and independent directors respectively (Num1-
SB) 
My research checks the size of SBs as the independent variables for the operation of 
supervisory functions. A positive association is expected between the size of SB and 
the effect of supervisory functions.  
(10-11) The number of meeting times (MT2-SB; MT2-BoD) 
My research uses the meeting times of SBs and BoDs as independent variables for the 
operation of supervisory functions. A positive association is expected between the 
meeting times of two boards and the effect on supervisory functions.  
(C) Others  
(12) The shareholding structure (SH123%) 
Owing to the background of special shareholding structure in China, it is aimed to 
examine the top 3 big stockholders’ shareholding, to understand its relationship and 
effect on supervisory functions. A negative association is assumed between the higher 
shareholding by top 3 shareholders and the effect on supervisory functions.  
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In general, the more concentrated the ownership structure, the weaker the internal 
supervisory mechanism; hence there will be more opaqueness gains for the 
controlling shareholders (Chau and Leung, 2006). Therefore firms with larger 
controlling owners are more eager to choose a pliable auditor or supervisor so that 
they can easily prosper from benefit transferring under a lower level of monitoring. In 
addition, the controlling shareholders have monopolistic position and influence so 
they can easily control or dominate the nomination and appointment of directors and 
senior management officers and virtually preclude other shareholders from 
participation in making operating decisions, including hiring of auditors or 
supervisors or members of ACs. Hence a larger controlling shareholder is more likely 
to maintain a low-quality internal supervisory mechanism in order to realise and 
sustain the opaqueness gains. 
(13) CEO dual positions 
BRC (1999) suggested that the position of CEO should separate from the President of 
BoD to avoid undermining the development of supervisory functions. Abbott et al. 
(2000) proved if the CEO holds the concurrent position of President of the BoD, it 
would increase the fraud or negligence rate of financial reporting. Liu and Lu (2002) 
also proved that dual positions held by the CEO would result in less independence, so 
as to increase levels of earnings management. Lin (2005) used a dummy variable and 
assumed if the CEO holds the concurrent post of President, the company will have 
less willingness to establish ACs. My thesis also applies a dummy variable to measure 
if the President of the BoD serves as CEO concurrently. 1 represents when the CEO 
holds the concurrent post; 0 represents no concurrent post. A negative association is 
assumed between dual positions held by the CEO and the effect on supervisory 
functions in terms of independence may be negative if dual positions are held 
concurrently. 
(D) Control  
(14) Debt by Equity = Total Liability / Total Equity (total liability divided by total 
equity) 
“Measuring closeness to the violation of debt covenant controls for lending contract 
incentives” (Yang and Krishnan, 2005). Tsai (2002) asserts that major agent problems 
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between stockholders and creditors are caused by debt. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 
(1996) pointed out that the higher proportion of liability, the stricter limitation on the 
debt contract, and the more management on retained earnings would occur, to avoid 
violation of the debt contract. Accordingly, the debt-monitoring hypothesis (Gul and 
Tsui, 1998 & 2001) asserted that higher percentage of debt would lead to more 
remarkable supervisory roles created by the creditors. On the contrary, if effective 
supervisory functions create higher confidence among the stockholders, the less debt 
results. In this thesis, it is assumed that the smaller percentage of total debt less total 
equities leads to more effective supervisory functions. An adverse relationship is 
expected between the debt percentage and the effect on supervisory functions in my 
thesis.  
(15) Growth Rate by evaluating the total asset’s growth rate = TA (t) – TA (t-1) / TA 
(t-1)  
According to the definition of the CCER database, this indicator reflects increases in 
status of total assets. The formula of the total asset increase rate is equal to the 
increase asset in this period minus the total assets in the prior period.  
Titman and Wessels (1988) used the total assets increased percentage to evaluate the 
growth rate; Chou (1992), Huang (1995), Bedard et al. (2004) and Lin (2005) also use 
the total asset increase rate as the proxy variable. My research applies the total asset 
increase rate, in order to evaluate the companies’ future growth potentiality. It is 
assumed that a better performance of the supervisory functions will lead to higher 
potential growth. Therefore, it is expected that the growth potentiality and 
performance of supervisory functions form a positive relationship.  
(16) Return on Asset (RoA) 
According to the definition of the CCER database, the RoA is measured by the 
percentage of net income divided by average total assets. The formula is  
RoA = (net income / average total assets) × 100% 
Where 
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Average total assets = (beginning balance of total assets + ending balance of total assets) / 2  
The analysis of RoA involves comparing net income and assets to demonstrate the 
effect of utilizing the assets by the companies. The higher rate of RoA is, the more 
effective usage of the assets will be. It also shows that companies achieve an effective 
result in increasing revenue and economising costs. The assets are a result of 
investment by the stockholders or debts to the creditors. So, the return on assets is a 
mixed variable related to the company’s net income (returns), assets, and the 
effectiveness of the operation and management of the companies. 
Bedard et al. (2004) applied RoA as a control variable to measure abnormal accruals 
and/or AC characteristics. It is assumed that more effective supervisory functions will 
result in better ability to use the assets, so that the return on assets (RoA) will be 
higher. A positive relationship is assumed to exist between RoA and the effect on 
supervisory function. My thesis applies RoA as a control variable to review the effect 
of supervisory functions and two supervisory institutions’ characteristics in China. A 
positive association is expected between the RoA and the effect on supervisory 
functions.  
(17) Firm Size 
Tsai (2009) and Bedard et al. (2004) applied the natural logarithm of the assets as the 
firm size to control for the variables possibly correlated with the deviations in their 
measure of earnings management. Lin (2005) also used the natural logarithm of the 
assets as the firm size as a control variable for measuring the economic determinants 
for voluntary AC appointments. Becker et al. (1998) and Lee and Chen (2004) 
mentioned the firm size may present many omitted variables; and Yeh (1999) pointed 
out that the bigger the size of the companies, the more notable was the manager’s 
performance. According to the aforementioned research, my work applies the natural 
logarithm of the assets representing the firm size as the control variable possibly 
correlated with the deviation in their measure of the effective performance of 
supervisory functions. It is assumed that listed companies have more effective 
supervisory functions and will have a bigger firm size. Yet their relationship is 
expected to be negative with market response of earnings, assumed that bigger firms 
will have a more stable market response to earnings.  
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Table 18. The Definition of Variables, Measures and Expected Sign.  
(Source: Author) 
 Code  Measured Method Relationship Assumption – 
Expected Sign (Direction) 
Dependant Variable    
Market response to 
earnings  
PER The formula of market 
response to earnings = stock 
price of per common share 









(1) IND1% The total number f 
independent directors by the 
size of the BoD 
+ (positive) 
The  percentage of 
shareholdings by the 





The shareholdings by the 
supervisors, divided by the 
total shareholding  
- (negative) 




rewards respectively  
(3) IND3-shre 
(4) IND4-dirre 
The number of the supervisors 
and directors receiving 
remunerations or rewards 
respectively 
- (negative) 




Legal background;  
Internal Audit 













The  of EXP1, 2, 3 and 4 by 
the size of SBs  
 
EXP1 + (positive) 
EXP2 + (positive) 
EXP3 + (positive) 
EXP4 – (negative) 





The size of the SBs + (positive)  
The annual number 
of meeting times of 




The meeting times of SB and 
BoD (proxy variable of AC) 
respectively 
+ (positive) 
Other variables     
The first, second, 
third, top 3 together 
stock holder’s 
shareholdings 
(12) SH123% Shareholdings by the top 1-3 
shareholders divided by the 
total shareholdings 
- (negative) 
CEO dual positions (13) CEO dual 1 – dual positions of CEO and 
President of the BoD 
concurrently  
0 – no concurrent post 
- (negative) 
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 Code  Measured Method Relationship Assumption – 
Expected Sign (Direction) 
Control variables     
Debt Equity  (14) DEBT % Total Liability /(divided by) 
Total Equity  
- (negative) 
Growth Rate  (15) GR% by evaluating the total asset’s 
growth rate = TA (t) – TA (t-1) / 
TA (t-1) 
+ (positive) 
Return on Asset (16) RoA% The RoA is measured by the 
percentage of net income by 
average total asset。The 
formula is calculated = (Net 
income / average total asset) * 
100%, Average total 
asset=(beginning balance + 
ending balance of total 
asset)/2 。 
+ (positive) 
Firm Size  (17) Ln(Asset) Ln(Asset): the natural logarithm 
of the assets as the proxy 
variable of firm size 
- (negative) 
6.1.3 Empirical Model 
Model 1 is designed for proving H1:  
( )meanGGtestAssetLnRoAGRDEBTPER 12)()5/()4/()3/()2/()1( −Τ=  
Five indicators are designed as proxy variables on effectiveness of supervisory 
functions including, market response to earnings (PER), debt ratio of total liability 
divided by total equity, total asset’s growth rate, return on asset of net income divided 
by the average assets, and the firm size of the natural logarithm of total assets. The T 
test of the mean value of G2 with ACs deducted the G1 without ACs is used to 
diagnose the significance on the designed proxy variables of five indicators.  
Model 2 and Model 3 are designed to examine the relationship between market 
response to earnings (PER) and governance characteristics by estimating the 
coefficients in the following multinomial linear regression of Panel data model: 
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Two models of model 2 and 3 are formed for the data is retrieved from different 
sources of the CCER database and financial statements respectively, so have a 
different sample size. The independence and activity data is retrieved from the CCER 
database as sample 2 to fit into Model 2 regression; the expertise data is retrieved 
from the financial statements as sample 3 to fit into Model 3 regression.  
The independence, activity, expertise and the other with 13 variables measure 
supervisory characteristics and constitute my test variables; the next 4 control 
variables for omitted variables in market response to earnings (PER) as the proxy 
dependent variables on the effectiveness of supervisory functions.  
6.1.4 Sample Description 
(A) Introduction to the three samples 
Three samples with two groups in each sample are selected to prove H1 and H2 in this 
research. Sample 1 and 2 are used to prove H1; and Sample 2 and 3 are applied to 
prove H2.  
(1) Sample 1: Vertical Evaluation (The same sample size covering different years): 
Sample 1 is generated by those listed companies which started to establish ACs since 
2004: 63 companies in total. The sample 1 is defined as a vertical evaluation in my 
thesis for two stages/groups are from the same sample size, identified by chronology. 
Stage 1/Group 1 is identified with SBs only (without ACs) before setting up ACs 
from 2000 to 2003; Stage 2/Group 2 is marked with SBs plus ACs after setting up 
ACs from 2004 to 2007.  
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(2) Sample 2: Horizontal Evaluation (The different sample size in same years):  
Sample 2 is generated by dividing all of the listed companies with ACs or SBs alone 
between 2005 and 2007. Sample 2 is defined as a horizontal evaluation in this thesis 
for group 1 with 891 companies, identified only to have SBs without ACs; Group 2 
with 624 listed companies identified as having both SBs and ACs. The sample size of 
Group 1 with SBs only is bigger than Group 2 with 59% and 41% respectively in 
2007. Group 2, those establishing ACs, is 47%; 45% and 41%, respectively, between 
2005 and 2007. 
(3) Sample 3: Expertise Variables:  
Sample 3 is created because no data of expertise is recorded in the CCER database. 
The level of expertise is randomly retrieved from financial statements from the 
websites of SSE with 100 listed companies’ financial statements from 2005 to 2007. 
The overall figure for Group 2 of companies with ACs is 44% in Sample 3. This fits 
with the average percentage of 44% of those setting up ACs between 2005 and 2007, 
namely 47%, 45% and 41%, respectively. Sample 3 is presented in the table below.  
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Table 19. SB Members’ Expertise and Party Status 
(Source: Author, sample 100 listed companies, as supported by data from 
yearly financial statements retrieved from the websites of Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange) 
*1: The data excludes 2 banking companies, and 7 companies whose records were unclear 
regarding the SB members’ expertise in 2005, 2006 and 2007. Therefore, the effective 
sample is 91 companies in 2006 and 2007. 4 companies were listed since 2006 and 2005 
financial statements were unavailable, meaning 87 companies’ data is presented for 2005.  
*2: Expertise is defined as having audit skill and experience in the audit process. Experience 
of external auditing and a background of financial and accounting expertise has been counted 
in the item of the financial and accounting expertise.  




2007 2006 2005 
 
(*1)
 No. % No. % No. % No. % 
0 40  44.33% 38 42% 41 45% 40 46% 
1 34  38.00% 35 39% 35 39% 31 36% 
2 12  13.67% 15 16% 10 11% 12 14% 
Companies having 
SB members with 
financial or 
accounting expertise  3 3  3.00% 3 3% 4  4% 2  2% 
 4 1  1.00% 0 0% 1  1% 2  2% 
Total   90  100.00% 91 100% 91 100% 87 100% 
0 78  87.33% 77 85% 79 87% 78 90% 
1 11  11.67% 14 15% 11 12%  7  8% 
Companies having 
SB members with 
legal expertise 2 1  1.00% 0 0%  1  1%  2  2% 
Total   90  100.00% 91 100% 91 100% 87 100% 
0 72  80.33% 76 84% 70 77% 70 80% 
1 14  16.00% 13 14% 17 19% 13 15% 
Companies having 
SB members with 
auditing expertise (*2) 2 3  3.67%  2  2%  4 4%  4 5% 
Total   90  100.00% 91 100% 91 100% 87 100% 
0 55  62.00% 58 64% 57 63% 51 59% 
1 24  27.00% 24 26% 23 25% 26 30% 
2 7  8.00%  5  6%  8  9% 8  9% 
3 3  2.67%  3  3%  3  3% 2  2% 
Companies having 




legal or auditing 
expertise.  
4 0  0.33%  1  1%  0  0% 0  0% 
Total   90  100.00% 91 100% 91 100% 87 100% 
Companies having 
SB members with 
accounting, financial 
and legal expertise at 
the same time. 
 8  9.00% 9 10% 7 8%  7  9% 
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(B) Industry types  
The samples are categorised according to the CCER database; the CSRC definition 
described; and the sample industries in this research numbered in the table below:  




S1:G1 and G2 
No. of listed co. 
S2:G1 
No. of listed co. 
S2:G2: 
No. of listed co. 
S3:G1 
No. of listed co. 
S3:G2: 
No. of listed co. 
A 1 25 13 3 0 
B 1 19 11 0 0 
C 27 529 353 33 22 
D 6 31 31 0 1 
E 0 20 13 0 3 
F 6 33 34 3 1 
G 2 57 39 2 3 
H 6 46 46 0 2 
J 5 34 29 3 0 
K 5 24 22 0 0 
L 1 9 5 0 0 
M 3 19 1 0 0 
Z 0 45 27 6 6 
Total 63 891 624 50 40 
* There are 13 industry categories for the listed companies:  
A:  Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery  
(Sample 1: 1); (Sample 2: G1: 25; G2: 13); (Sample 3: G1: 3; G2:0);  
B:  Mining industry (1; 1); (19; 11); (0; 0);  
C:  Manufacturing (7; 7); (529; 353); (33; 22);  
D:  Electricity, gas, and water production and provision (6; 6); (31; 31); (0; 1);  
E:  Building trade (0; 0); (20; 13); (0; 3);  
F:  Transportation and storage (6; 6); (33; 34); (3; 1);  
G:  Information skill (2; 2); (57; 39); (2; 3);  
H:  Wholesale and retail trade (6; 6); (46; 46); (0; 2);  
I:  Finance and Insurance (0; 0; 0);  
J:  Real estate (5; 5); (34; 29); (3; 0);  
K:  Social service (5; 5); (24; 22); (0; 0);  
L:  Advertising and culture industry (1; 1); (9; 5); (0; 0);  
M:  Others (3; 3); (19; 1); (0; 0);  
Z:  No Associated (0; 0); (45; 27); (4; 4). 
The three samples cover almost every kind of industry – except finance and 
insurance – for their request for supervisory functions is stricter than the others, 
because their businesses are strongly or even fully reliant upon the trust of the public. 
In this research, manufacturing industry occupies over 50% of sample companies in 
both groups of sample 1-3, paralleling industry allocation in China.  
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 (C) Correlation Coefficient Analysis 
The correlations coefficient test among the identified variables is to demonstrate 
tolerance between two variables. This research is aimed to probe the correlation 
degree rather than a positive or negative direction, so the absolute value is considered 
as follows: the higher coefficient means a closer relationship between two variables, 
whereas a lower coefficient suggests less of a relationship between two variables. If 
the coefficient’s absolute value is less than 0.3, it indicates a low correlation; a value 
between 0.4-0.7 indicates medium correlation; a value between 0.7-0.8 indicates high 
correlation; and a value above 0.8 indicates extremely high correlation. Where the 
correlation coefficient modulus (absolute value) is bigger than 0.8, it suggests a strong 
linear relationship and may have a harmful linear correlation (Chen, 2000; Tsai, 2004).  
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(1) Correlation coefficients for proving H1 
In this research, the correlation coefficients from the table below have values between 
-0.11 and +0.29. The absolute value of each variable is less than 0.3, which means 
that these are of very low correlation and will not generate a co-linear problem. There 
is therefore no need to delete any variable from sample 1 and 2 for proving H1. 
Table 21. Correlation Coefficients for Proving H1 
(Source: Author) 
S1:G1:SB only  PER1 DEBT1 GR1 RoA1 Ln(asset)1 
PER1 1     
DEBT1 0.064644 1    
GR1 -0.105 0.10858 1   
RoA1 -0.10548 -0.26677 0.290067 1  
Ln(asset)1 -0.11498 0.05228 0.054513 0.207656 1 
S1:G2:SB+AC PER2 DEBT2 GR2 RoA2 Ln(asset)2 
PER2 1     
DEBT2 0.038088 1    
GR2 -0.00532 0.02844 1   
RoA2 -0.0155 -0.0497 -0.08162 1  
Ln(asset)2 0.028454 0.082174 -0.07168 -0.0132 1 
S2:G1:SB Only  PER1 RoA1 GR1 DEBT1 Ln(asset)1 
PER1 1     
RoA1 0.000465 1    
GR1 -0.00709 0.061279 1   
DEBT1 0.020247 -0.00339 0.005922 1  
Ln(asset)1 -0.05344 -0.01181 0.187804 0.005156 1 
S2:G2:SB+AC PER2 DEBT2 GR2 RoA2 Ln(asset)2 
PER2 1     
DEBT2 0.012033 1    
GR2 -0.02191 0.019437 1   
RoA2 -0.00503 0.027934 0.193205 1  
Ln(asset)2 -0.11413 0.024194 0.247666 0.122812 1 
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(2) Sample 2: Correlation coefficients for proving H2 
In this research, the correlation coefficient from the table below for both groups in 
Sample 2 are all less than 0.3. All in both groups have low correlations.  
Table 22. Sample 2 – Correlations among Possible Correlated Variables  
(Source: Author) 
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S2G1 per1 ind1 ind2sbsh ind3sbre ind4dirre num1sbsize mt1sb mt2bod ceo1 debt1 gr1 roa1 Ln(asset)1 
per1 1.0000             
ind1 0.0175 1.0000            
ind2sbsh -0.0169 0.0155 1.0000           
ind3sbre -0.0317 -0.0193 0.0945 1.0000          
ind4dirre -0.0145 -0.0860 0.0297 0.0981 1.0000         
num1sbsize -0.0519 -0.0878 -0.0448 0.1976 0.1438 1.0000        
mt1sb 0.0847 0.0215 -0.0220 -0.0201 0.0089 0.0418 1.0000       
mt2bod 0.0401 0.0063 -0.0395 -0.0063 0.0215 -0.0264 0.2788 1.0000      
ceo1 -0.0004 0.0196 -0.0040 -0.0319 0.0026 -0.0341 -0.0344 -0.0060 1.0000     
debt1 0.0203 0.0056 -0.0044 0.0121 0.0057 -0.0019 -0.0053 -0.0296 -0.0332 1.0000    
gr1 -0.0069 -0.0131 0.0085 -0.0170 -0.0025 -0.0001 0.0614 0.0304 -0.0211 0.0058 1.0000   
roa1 0.0005 -0.1095 0.0124 -0.0063 0.0080 0.0409 0.0315 0.0372 -0.0404 -0.0034 0.0614 1.0000  
Ln(asset)1 -0.0526 -0.0313 0.0172 0.1582 0.0894 0.0868 0.0932 0.0556 -0.0740 0.0049 0.1868 -0.0116 1.0000 
S2G2 per2 ind1 ind2sbsh ind3sbre ind4dirre num1sbsize mt1sb mt2bod ceo2 debt2 gr2 roa2 Ln(asset)2 
per2 1.0000             
ind1 0.0562 1.0000            
ind2sbsh -0.0221 -0.0218 1.0000           
ind3sbre -0.0567 -0.0155 0.1395 1.0000          
ind4dirre -0.0676 -0.0727 0.0519 0.0691 1.0000         
num1sbsize -0.0472 -0.1327 -0.0343 0.1017 0.0592 1.0000        
mt1sb 0.0301 0.0209 -0.0504 -0.0512 -0.0942 0.0297 1.0000       
mt2bod 0.0202 -0.0478 -0.0166 -0.0326 -0.0214 -0.0359 0.2598 1.0000      
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ceo2 0.0147 0.0215 0.0353 -0.0361 0.0405 -0.0210 -0.0539 -0.0581 1.0000     
debt2 0.0120 0.0029 0.0029 -0.0093 -0.0252 0.0239 0.0265 -0.0050 -0.0689 1.0000    
gr2 -0.0219 -0.0550 0.0301 -0.0257 -0.0352 0.0386 0.0858 0.1154 -0.0303 0.0194 1.0000   
roa2 -0.0050 -0.0240 0.0248 0.0145 -0.0370 0.0417 0.0836 0.0206 -0.0439 0.0279 0.1932 1.0000  
Ln(asset)2 -0.1141 -0.1217 -0.0583 0.0826 0.0457 0.1852 0.0920 0.1308 -0.0966 0.0242 0.2477 0.1228 1.0000 
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(3) Sample 3- Correlation coefficients for proving H2 
In this research, the correlation coefficients from the table below for both groups in 
sample 3 are less than 0.5. Most of the coefficients fall under the 0.3 low relation 
threshold except the relationship between firm size (Ln(Asset)) and  of party-member 
employee is 0.46 in Group 1; and the relationship between returns on assets (RoA) 
and the asset’s growth rate (GR) is 0.37 in Group 2. 
Overall, no value in both groups is bigger than 0.8. This will not generate a co-linear 
problem. There is therefore no need to delete any variable. 
Table 23. Sample 3 – Correlations among Possible Correlated Variables  
(Source: Author) 
S3G1 PER1 exp1%-fin exp2%-leg exp3%-ia exp4%-party Sh123%1 debt%1 gr%1 roa%1 Ln(A)1 
PER1 1.00          
exp1%-fin 0.10 1.00          
exp2%-leg 0.03 0.24  1.00         
exp3%-ia -0.11 0.00  0.16  1.00        
exp4%-party -0.16 0.02  -0.01  0.07  1.00       
sh123%1 -0.01 0.10  0.01  0.10  0.20  1.00      
debt%1 -0.06 -0.10  -0.05  0.00  -0.06  -0.01  1.00     
gr%1 0.00 0.16  -0.05  -0.06  0.04  0.07  -0.02  1.00   
roa%1 0.03 -0.06  -0.07  0.00  0.16  0.07  0.01  0.17 1.00  
Ln(A)1 -0.17 -0.15  -0.13  0.07  0.46  0.04  -0.11  0.28 0.27 1.00  
S3G2 PER2 exp1%-fin exp2%-leg exp3%-ia exp4%-party sh123%2 debt%2 gr%2 roa%2 Ln(A)2 
PER2 1.00          
exp1%-fin -0.12 1.00          
exp2%-leg 0.15 -0.06  1.00         
exp3%-ia 0.23 -0.31  0.05  1.00        
exp4%-party 0.05 -0.30  -0.08  0.20  1.00       
sh123%2 0.01 0.04  0.01  -0.09  0.14  1.00      
debt%2 -0.06 0.00  -0.03  -0.04  0.16  -0.08  1.00     
gr%2 -0.14 0.13  -0.08  -0.04  -0.10  0.09  0.03  1.00   
roa%2 0.01 0.21  0.06  0.01  -0.08  0.09  -0.11  0.37 1.00  
Ln(A)2 -0.20 0.07  0.20  0.07  0.01  0.30  -0.10  0.25 0.17 1.00  
Page 206 PhD Thesis, University of Manchester Pao-Chen Lee 
(D) Descriptive Statistics for the Sample 
The samples for proving H1 
It is intended to compare the outcome of the companies’ dependent variables and four 
control variables for two groups with and without ACs to reveal that with more 
effective supervisory functions, and to list the Descriptive Statistics for Samples 1 and 
2 in Tables 24-27: two groups of two samples with ACs or not. Sample 1 has 63 listed 
companies with 247 numbers of observations respectively. Group 1 is calculated from 
2000 to 2003, and Group 2 from 2004 to 2007. In Sample 2, Group 1 has 891 listed 
companies with 2155 numbers of observations from 2005 to 2007, and Group 2 has 
624 listed companies with 1873 numbers of observations from 2005 to 2007.  
Samples for proving H2 
In Sample 2, Group 1 and Group 2 consist of all listed companies with and without 
ACs, respectively. It is for the investigation the independent variables of 
independence, activity, and CEO dual position and control variables.  
In Sample 3, Group 1 consists of 140 observations and Group 2 consists of 115 
observations. This is for the investigation of the expertise and shareholding structure 
variables.  
As has been mentioned, no data provided are related to the expertise variables from 
the CCER database. The expertise variables are retrieved from the financial 
statements in Sample 3 to understand the impact of expert percentage of SBs to 
market response to earnings (PER).  
The shareholding structure, arrived at by measuring the top three shareholders’ 
shareholding percentage is placed here in order to avoid harmful correlation. It is a 
serious co-linear problem by testing the correlation coefficient over 0.81 between the 
relationship of shareholding structure and debt percentage if the shareholding 
structure variable (SH123%) is arranged in Sample 2. 
Both Sample 2 and Sample 3 are retrieved from 2005 to 2007, with three years’ 
statistics.  
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The most important statistics are mean, median, standard deviation, the minimum and 
maximum. Mean and Median are used as the parameters to describe the central 
position of the statistic data in reviewing the trend of centralization. The standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum is used as parameters to review the trend of 
dispersion. This research aims to probe the effect on supervisory functions by 
comparing the average of the identified one proxy and four control variables of two 
groups of vertical and horizontal samples respectively, to prove H1. The comparison 
of two groups with and without ACs average (mean) presents Group 2 (with ACs) 
PER, growth rate (GR). These “mean” values are less than those of Group 1 of 
Sample 1. This finding is adverse to Hypothesis 1. Further analysis of the trend 
analysis observation of PER from year 2003-2007 is therefore developed and is 
presented in the next section. 
Table 24. Sample 1 Descriptive Statistics for H1 
(Source: Author) 
Sample 1 Description 
S1:G1: SB only; 
G2:SB+AC PER DEBT GR RoA Ln(asset) 
G1:Mean 145.59 0.97 0.19 0.03 21.13 
G2:Mean 70.27 1.09 0.13 0.05 21.46 
G1:Median 52.29 0.73 0.08 0.04 21.03 
G2:Median 35.19 1.10 0.06 0.03 21.36 
G1:Std.Dev. 417.81 0.76 0.39 0.06 0.83 
G2:Std.Dev. 124.14 9.51 0.56 0.69 1.07 
G1:Min. -484.76 0.02 -0.31 -0.34 19.12 
G2:Min. -63.4 -132.22 -0.99 -1.87 14.16 
G1:Max. 4310 4.06 3.04 0.21 23.10 
G2:Max. 1280 61.90 7.53 10.53 23.92 
G1:No.of Samples 247 247 247 247 247 
G2:No.of Sample 247 247 247 247 247 
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Table 25. Sample 2 Descriptive Statistics for H1 
(Source: Author) 
Sample 2 Description 
S2:G1:SB only PER DEBT GR RoA Ln(asset) 
G1:Mean 83.79 1.80 0.162 0.02 21.25 
G2:Mean 78.04 0.32 0.15 0.03 21.40 
G1:Median 37.17 1.10 0.08 0.03 21.19 
G2:Median 35.18 1.12 0.08 0.03 21.33 
G1:Std.Dev. 222.68 18.32 0.76 0.27 1.17 
G2:Std.Dev. 209.90 40.21 0.47 0.12 1.14 
G1:Min. -2236.36 -316.14 -0.99 -1.72 12.31 
G2:Min. -733.25 -1579.72 -0.99 -1.68 14.94 
G1:Max. 3570 692.69 23.89 10.53 25.52 
G2:Max. 5903.23 233.43 8.15 2.25 27.30 
G1:No.of Sample  2155 2155 2155 2155 2155 
G2:No.of Sample 1873 1873 1873 1873 1873 
Table 26. Sample 2 Descriptive Statistics for H2 
(Source: Author) 
Sample 2: From 2005-2007 (All Listed Companies) – Ind. ,Activity and CEO Variables 
S2:G1&G2 PER1 ind1 ind2sbsh ind3sbre ind4dirre 
num1 
sbsize 
mt1sb mt2bod CEOdual debt gr roa Ln(A) 
Mean1 83.77  0.35  0.00  0.71  6.27  4.05  3.81  8.03  0.10  1.81  0.16  0.02  21.25  
Mean2 78.04  0.35  0.00  0.68  6.25  4.22  4.01  8.24  0.07  0.32  0.15  0.03  21.40  
Median1 37.12  0.33  0.00  0.00  6.00  3.00  4.00  8.00  0.00  1.10  0.07  0.03  21.19  
Median2 35.19  0.33  0.00  0.00  6.00  4.00  4.00  8.00  0.00  1.13  0.08  0.03  21.33  
Std.Dev.1 222.99  0.07  0.01  1.12  3.06  1.43  1.73  3.42  0.30  18.35  0.76  0.28  1.16  
Std.Dev.2 209.90  0.07  0.00  0.99  3.11  1.53  1.75  3.50  0.26  40.21  0.47  0.12  1.14  
Min.1 -2236  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  -316  -1.00  -1.72  12.31  
Min.2 -733  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  -1580  -0.99  -1.68  14.94  
Max.1 3570  1.00  0.27  7.00  20.00  18.00  16.00  35.00  1.00  692.70  23.89  10.53  25.52  
Max.2 5903  0.71  0.07  6.00  16.00  14.00  17.00  36.00  1.00  233.44  8.14  2.25  27.30  
No of Obv.1 2148  2145  2148  2148  2148  2148  2148  2148  2148  2148  2148  2148  2148  
No.of Obv.2 1873  1873  1873  1873  1873  1873  1873  1873  1873  1873  1873  1873  
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Table 27. Sample 3 Descriptive Statistics for H2 
(Source: Author) 
Sample 3: With Expert & Shareholding Structure Variables 
S3:G1&G2 PER exp1fin exp2  leg exp3ia 
exp4  
party 
sh123% debt% gr% roa% Ln(A) 
Mean1 73.03  0.22  0.04  0.03  0.16  0.47  2.94  0.27  0.02  21.29  
Mean2 71.23  0.19  0.03  0.10  0.11  0.53  3.46  0.17  0.02  21.61  
Median1 34.62  0.20  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.47  1.28  0.08  0.03  21.30  
Median2 40.38  0.20  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.57  1.22  0.08  0.02  21.45  
Std.Dev.1 135.03  0.22  0.10  0.10  0.22  0.17  13.80  0.97  0.15  1.53  
Std.Dev.2 115.84  0.21  0.08  0.16  0.16  0.19  21.72  0.35  0.07  1.21  
Min.1 -90.46  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.11  -2.38  -0.87  -0.90  17.12  
Min.2 -21.75  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.12  -8.37  -0.34  -0.35  19.33  
Max.1 805.88  0.75  0.40  0.50  1.33  0.85  161.06  9.09  0.78  25.35  
Max.2 818.52  1.00  0.40  0.67  0.60  0.86  233.44  1.77  0.26  25.96  
No. of 
Observation1 
140  140  140  140  140  140  140  140  140  140  
No.of 
Observation2 
115  115  115  115  115  115  115  115  115  115  
 
6.1.5 Evidence for Proving H1 
The objective is to find the evidence to prove in which group, with or without ACs, 
more effective supervisory functions are implemented, using the method described in 
the chapter on research method in this thesis.  
The outcome is reviewed by evaluating the following five variables as one proxy 
variable and four control variables to evaluate the effect of the supervisory functions: 
Market response to earnings (PER); debt (total liability divided by total equity; 
DEBT); asset growth rate (GR): return on assets (RoA); and firm size (Ln(asset)) 
evaluated by the natural logarithm of the assets. Average (mean) value is compared 
and t test is developed to evaluate the significance of impact.  
Furthermore, the t test is prepared to understand the significance of impact by 
comparing two groups’ “mean” value of five variables. The t test result and mean 
(average) comparison between two groups of the listed companies of SBs alone and 
SBs plus ACs are listed in Tables 28-30. 
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Table 28. T Test Result and Significance 
(Source: Author) 
Variables  PER DEBT GR RoA Ln(Asset) 
G1: Mean 145.59 0.97 0.19 0.03 21.13 
G2: Mean 70.27 1.09 0.13 0.05 21.46 
Dif. (G2-G1)  -75.32 0.12 -0.05 0.02 0.33 
T value  -2.70 0.20 -1.26 0.26 3.74 
P value  0.004 0.420 0.105 0.398 0.0003 
Expectation  + - + + + 
Sample 1:  
63 listed co.  
2000-2007 






Reverse ***    *** 
Variables  PER DEBT GR RoA Ln(Asset) 
G1: Mean 83.79 1.80 0.16 0.02 21.25 
G2: Mean 78.04 0.33 0.15 0.02 21.40 
Dif. (G2-G1) -5.75 -1.47 -0.01 0.00 0.15 
t value  -0.841 -1.466 -0.686 0.328 4.098 
p value  0.199 0.071 0.246 0.371 0.00002  
Expectation  + - + + + 
Sample 2:  
All listed co. 
2005-2007 












*,**,*** significant p-value is less than 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
PER= Market response to earnings;  
Debt = Total liability divided by total equity. 
GR = Growth rate of assets;  
RoA=Return on assets;  
Ln(Asset) = Firm size 
Table 29. T Test: the Difference of Average (Mean Value) Test by Pairs of Populations  
(Source: Author) 
Sample 1: 63 co. PER DEBT GR RoA Ln(Asset) 
G1 145.59 0.97 0.19 0.03 21.13 Mean  
G2 70.27 1.09 0.13 0.05 21.46 
G1 174561.8 0.571 0.152 0.003 0.693 Variants G2 15411.38 90.435 0.311 0.481 1.136 
G1 247 247 247 247 247 The no. of 
observations G2 247 247 247 247 247 
Pearson Coefficient  -0.024 0.092 0.016 0.023 -0.016 
T statistics -2.699 0.201 -1.259 0.259 3.742 
P(T<=t) single tail 0.004 0.420 0.105 0.398 0.0003 
Threshold limit value: 
single tail 1.651 1.651 1.651 1.651 1.651 
P(T<=t) double tail  0.007 0.840 0.209 0.796 0.0002 
Threshold limit 
value(TLV): double tail 1.969 1.969 1.969 1.969 1.969 
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Table 30. T Test: the Difference of Average (Mean Value) Test by Two Populations 
Assuming the Variants are Unequal  
(Source: Author) 
S2: all listed companies 
(2005-2007) PER debt GR RoA Ln(Asset) 
G1 83.79 1.80 0.16 0.02 21.25 Mean  
G2 78.04 0.32 0.15 0.02 21.40 
G1 49587.2 335.7434 0.572377 0.075441 1.360129042 Variants G2 44059.96 1616.652 0.222016 0.015142 1.289533 
G1 2155 2155 2155 2155 2155 The no. of 
observations G2 1873 1873 1873 1873 1873 
t statistics  -0.841 -1.466 -0.686 0.328 4.098 
P(T<=t) single tail 0.199 0.071 0.246 0.371 0.000021  
Threshold limit value: 
single tail 1.645 1.645 1.645 1.645 1.645 
P(T<=t) double tail  0.399 0.142 0.492 0.742 0.000042  
Threshold limit value 
(TLV): double tail 1.960 1.960 1.960 1.960 1.960 
Data Analysis for H1 
(1) The comparison of PER  
 This is measured by market response to earnings (PER).  
In sample 1, the difference between two groups’ PER is -75.32, t value is -2.70; and p 
value is 0.004. This means that after the companies with ACs decrease the mean value 
of PER and the impact is most significant with***, which is adverse to Hypothesis 1, 
the positive expectation for establishing ACs. 
In sample 2 (horizontal), the difference is -5.75, t value is -0.84; p value is 0.2. The 
impact is not significant.  
The PER test result of Sample 1 is different from Sample 2. Furthermore, the trend of 
PER is studied from 2003 to 2007, as presented in Tables 28-30. China started to 
announce regulations for encouraging the establishment of ACs at the end of 2002, so 
it is measured from 2003 to 2007 in this thesis. In Table 31 and Figure 9 below, the 
evidence from comparing the trend of average market response to earnings, two 
groups of the listed companies are in Group 1. The trend of market response to 
earnings from 2003-2007, Group 1 without ACs with mean value 94, 72, 53, 69, 121; 
the trend of mean value difference of the current year deducted by the prior year 
shows up -22, -19, +16, +52 and Group 2 with mean value 77, 61, 45, 69, 120; the 
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trend of the mean value difference of the current year deducted by the prior year 
shows up -16, -16, +24, +51.  
The two groups’ tendencies show Group 2 has a better performance of mean value 
tendency: in Group 2, the companies with ACs in 2004 and 2006 have a better 
performance over the mean value 6 than Group 1, although the mean value of Group 1 
is better than Group 2 with 1 mean value higher in year 2007, but by comparing the 
average of the tendency with Group 2 of 10.75 better than Group 1 of 6.75. So it is 
concluded that Group 2 with ACs has better tendency by comparing the average 
tendency of mean value and the tendency performance of mean value in 2004 and 
2006. 
It is concluded that in comparison of market response to earnings (PER), the result of 
Sample 1 is adverse *** significance to Hypothesis 1, but with no significant impact 
in terms of Sample 2. It may be explained that the shareholders still have better 
confidence in Group 1 – the listed companies without ACs (SBs alone) – than Group 
2 in response to earnings (PER) currently.  
Yet, Group2 with ACs is better than Group 1 by comparison of the trend of mean 
value of market response to earnings (PER). It may be explained that Group 2 of 
listed companies after adding in ACs have a better growth rate of mean value of 
market response to earnings (PER). It may encourage the listed companies to establish 
ACs in the future. 
Table 31. The Trend of Market Response to Earnings (PER) 
(Source: Author) 
PER Group 1(SB Alone) Group 2 (SB+AC) 
Number of 
Companies Group  YEAR (Mean) 
Tendency (Mean 
Dif. =Current – 
Prior  Year) 
Tendency (Mean 
Dif. =Current – 
Prior  Year) 
779 cos.  SB Alone 2003 94   
477 cos. SB+AC 2003 77   
747 cos.  SB Alone 2004 72 -22  
595 cos.  SB+AC 2004 61  -16 
710 cos. SB Alone 2005 53 -19  
631 cos.  SB+AC 2005 45  -16 
784 cos.  SB Alone 2006 69 16   
631 cos.  SB+AC 2006 69   24 
861 cos. SB Alone 2007 121 52   
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618 cos.  SB+AC 2007 120   51 
Average Tendency  6.75 10.75 
 
Figure 9. The Trend of Market Response to Earnings (PER) --(Source: Author) 
 
(2) The comparison of Debt  
Sample 1: the result of two groups comparison shows no significance for p value is 
0.42 higher than 0.1;  
Sample 2: the result of two groups comparison show * significance with t value -1.46; 
p value 0.071. This result is positive, proving that shareholders’ confidence in Group 
2 with ACs is higher than that of Group 1 without ACs. The shareholders are more 
willing to invest in companies with ACs than Group 1 without ACs. It should also be 
explained that Group 1 without ACs companies’ leverage capability is higher than 
Group 2 with ACs. 
(3) The comparison of growth rate of assets (GR) 
No significance for both samples.  
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(4) The comparison of returns on assets (RoA) 
No significance for both samples. 
(5) The comparison of firm size (Ln(Assets)) 
As discussed in the literature review  (page 194) firm size is often used as a control 
variable on the basis that that larger listed companies are more likely to have ACs 
with more effective supervisory functions. Therefore, the firm size (measured by total 
assets) is taken as one control variable to supplement the test of the proxy variable of 
the effectiveness of supervisory functions in China.  
The results in tables 28-30 show that for both samples companies with ACs (G2) have 
bigger firm size than those that do not have an AC (Ln (Assets) mean value Sample 1: 
G2:21.46>G1:21.13; & Sample 2: G2:21.40>G1:21.25), and a t test presents both 
samples (vertical and horizontal) with *** significance. The results thus present 
statistically significant evidence that that listed companies with ACs will have a 
bigger firm size than those without. To the extent that it can be assumed that size will 
be associated with greater attention to the effectiveness of supervisory functions this 
provides indirect support for H1 in this thesis. 
Sample 1: t value 3.74; p value 0.0003 less than 0.01, it presents *** positive 
significance; 
Sample 2: t value 4.10; p value 0.00002 less than 0.01, it presents *** positive 
significance. 
The test results for firm size with *** significance suggest that there would be value 
in further research in the future to test more directly the relationship between firm size 
and the effectiveness of supervisory functions. Such research could examine whether 
the bigger sizes’ companies have more effective supervisory functions and whether 
listed companies with ACs have more effective supervision which creates conditions 
for growth in firm size. 
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Summary 
Except two variables of Return on Asset (RoA) and Growth Rate on total Assets (GR), 
which are of no significance, the other three variables are of at least * significance.  
(1)Market response to earnings (PER) of Sample 1 shows a negative relationship with 
*** significance, adverse to H1 that G1 – the listed companies without ACs – have a 
higher market response to earnings (PER). Shareholders have more confidence in 
responding their earnings than the companies without ACs. Yet there is no 
significance found in Sample 2. The difference between Samples 1 and 2 is that 
Sample 1 with the same sample size but in different years – from 2000 to 2003 – 
formed as G1 and from 2004 to 2007 as G2; Sample 2 has a different sample size in 
two groups with and without ACs but in the same years. This finding from Sample 1 
may need to consider the time change issue including the economic and political 
environment from 2003 to 2007, in order to clarify the gap of these research results 
between Sample 1 and 2. The trend of market response to earnings (PER) is therefore 
observed from 2003 to 2007 for Sample 2 size of all of listed companies of two 
groups, with and without ACs in China. It shows that the tendency of G2 with ACs 
has average 10.75 growth trend; more than G1 without ACs with an average 6.75 
growth rate of market response to earnings (PER). G2 with ACs has an average 4 
mean value of market response to earnings (PER); higher than G1 without ACs, 
which may attract more companies to add in ACs in addition to SBs. It may be 
concluded that ACs in China may need more time to prove their effectiveness and 
need more listed companies to have confidence to add in ACs in their internal 
supervisory mechanism. 
(2) The debt ratio with * significance in Sample 2 but no significance in Sample 1. 
The findings from Sample 2 suggest that companies with ACs have a lower debt ratio 
than G1 without ACs. It may be explained the shareholders have more confidence and 
invest more in companies with ACs than G1, so G2 with ACs requires less debt than 
G1 without ACs.  
(3) The firm size (Ln(Assets)) with *** significance of both Samples 1 and 2 indicate a 
positive relationship to H1. Listed companies with ACs have a bigger firm size from 
the evidence of both samples 1 and 2: t test result of mean value. It may be an indirect 
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indicator to explain that listed companies with ACs may, as a result of more effective 
supervison, create conditions which help companies to grow and to enlarge the 
amount of total assets of the companies. It may also be an indirect indicator to explain 
that the companies after adding in the ACs will increase the investors’ trust and 
confidence to improve the effectiveness of the internal supervisory mechanism of CG.  
Both vertical (Sample 1) and horizontal (Sample 2) samples, except two variables 
which show no significance, prove H1 positively, and the average growth trend of 
market response to earnings (PER) also proves H1, though the findings from Sample 
1 t test result of mean value of market response to earnings (PER) is adverse to H1.  
Hypothesis 1 is the effectiveness of supervisory functions:   
 G2(WithAC) ≥ G1(WithoutAC)  
In this thesis, the evidence provides the following conclusion:  
Though the supervisory functions of G1 of listed companies without ACs are more 
effective than G2 with ACs by evaluating the market response to earnings (PER) in 
Sample 1 but with no significance in Sample 2, so the factor of time is considered in 
order to understand the gap between the findings. The test result finds that the average 
growth trend of market response to earnings (PER) also proves H1. The other two 
variables: significance of firm size, and debt ratio, also prove H1. In summary, 
according to evaluations of the average growth trend of market response to earnings 
(PER), firm size and debt ratio, G2 firms with both SBs and ACs are more likely to 
effectively engage in supervisory functions than G1 firms without ACs.  
The first question is examined using a T-test of five characteristics of the listed 
companies by evaluating the PER, Debt ratio, Growth Rate, RoA and firm size for 
two groups in two samples. There is no relationship between the independent 
variables and the dependent (proxy) variable present in answering the first question. It 
should be noted, however, that T-tests as a statistical test are subject to certain 
limitations, related to the assumptions about the shape of the underlying distribution, 
the assumed independence of the samples and the fact that the absence of a significant 
difference does not allow a conclusion that the samples are the same. In order to 
enhance and strengthen the understanding of question 1, question 2 is therefore 
designed: will the AC contribute to the effectiveness of supervisory functions in 
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China? The first and second questions are therefore complementary to each other for 
investigating the first research objective from two different angles: to understand the 
effectiveness of SBs and ACs in China. The limitations of simple comparisons mean 
that T tests on these five variables may not reflect the relationship between the proxy 
variable of PER and the independent variables. Question 2 is presented in the 
following section 6.1.6 to examine the relationship between the proxy variable of PER 
and the relevant independent variables for evidence that allows a conclusion to be 
drawn in respect of H2. So the results of tests of Questions 1 and 2 complement each 
other as a basis for investigating Objective one. 
6.1.6 Evidence for Proving H2 
A. Applied Effect Model 
The detailed reasoning of choosing suitable effect models for the related studies has 
been described in the chapter of research method. The model thus chosen for this 
research is as follows:  
Sample 2: The over all test results’ p values of both groups are 0.000 and 0.002. 
These indicate that it is acceptable to apply random effects ML regression on both 
groups.  
Sample 3: The over all test result’ p value of Group 1 is 0.000, which is acceptable to 
apply random effects ML regression on it. On the other hand, the over all test result’s 
p value of Group 2 is 0.2438, so it might not be applicable in theory to use the random 
effect model. Instead, the fixed effects ML regression is used on Group 2.  
Thus, the results of testing Groups 1 data with random effects ML regression and 
testing Group 2 data with fixed effects ML regression (Model 1) is as follows:  
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Table 32. Data of Effect Model 1 of Sample 3  
(Source: Author) 
G1: Number of Observations: 140; Number of Groups: 50  
G2: Number of Observations: 115; Number of Groups: 40 
Sample 3: with expertise 
variables  
Group 1: SB only 
(Without AC) 
Group 2: SB plus AC 
(With AC) 
Variables Exp Sign P Value Coef.1 G1:Sig. P Value Coef.2 G2: Sig. 
(5)exp1fin% + 0.402  48.16    0.838  -26.38   
(6)exp2leg% + 0.851  -23.54    0.046  577.59  ** 
(7)exp3ia% + 0.454  -93.85    0.041  443.15  ** 
(8)exp4party% - 0.277  -71.47    0.890  -23.19   
(12)SH123% - 0.747  -20.79    0.966  7.84   
However, there is the concern that the comparison of the resulting significance of 
these two regression methods might not be meaningful, so an alternative model 
(Model 2) is done using the random effects ML regression on the data of both groups. 
The results are shown in the table below:  
Table 33. Data of Effect Model 2 of Sample 3 
(Source: Author) 
G1: Number of Observations:140; Number of Groups: 50  
G2: Number of Observations 115; Number of Groups: 40 
Sample 3: with expertise 
variables  
Group 1: SB only 
(Without AC) 
Group 2: SB plus AC 
(With AC) 
Variables Exp Sign P Value Coef.1 G1:Sig. P Value Coef.2 G2: Sig. 
(5)exp1fin% + 0.428 48.16  0.871 -8.63  
(6)exp2leg% + 0.851 -23.54  0.045 268.70 ** 
(7)exp3ia% + 0.454 -93.85  0.008 178.38 *** 
(8)exp4party% - 0.277 -71.47  0.980 1.70  
(12)SH123% - 0.747 -20.79  0.235 67.57  
The test purpose of Sample 3 is to understand the impact of four expertise variables 
(finance, legal, internal audit and party employee) and top three shareholders (SH 
123%) to the PER. Both results of Effect Model 1 and Effect Model 2 indicate that 
items 5, 6 and 12 are better with G1 and items 6 & 7 with G2. Only the significance 
of Item 7 is slightly different in both models, i.e., ** in Effect Model 1 and *** in 
Effect Model 2. 
It is therefore concluded that either model of Sample 3 is acceptable in this research, 
so for simplicity, in this research, random effects ML regression is used on both 
Sample 2 and Sample 3.  
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It is also noted that the control variables’ test results of items 14-17 (DEBT%; RoA%; 
GR% and Ln(Asset)) are all based on Sample 2. This is because the sample size of 
Sample 2 includes all listed companies in China whereas that of Sample 3 is only 100, 
so the test results from the complete data with all listed companies is reasonably more 
reliable than those results with limited sample size.  
B. Panel Data Analysis  
Panel Data Analysis is applied for proving H2 in the table below:  
Table 34. The Results of Two Empirical Models (Sample 2 and Sample 3) to Prove H2 
(Source: Author) 
Sample 2: all listed co.  Group 1: SB only Group 2: SB plus AC 
Variables Exp Sign P Value Coef.1 G1:Sig. P value Coef.2 G2: Sig. 
(1)ind1% + 0.834  14.18   0.139  111.65   
(2)ind2sbsh% - 0.531  -395.4   0.445  -988.8   
(3)ind3sbre - 0.620  -2.23   0.144  -7.61   
(4)Ind4dirre - 0.917  -0.17   0.014  -3.93  ** 
(9)num1sbsize + 0.048  -6.96  Reverse** 0.545  -2.06   
(10)mt1sb  + 0.000  11.45  *** 0.269  3.21   
(11)mt2bod + 0.467  1.07   0.275  1.61   
(13)CEO dual - 0.819  -3.84   0.747  6.20   
(14)DEBT% - 0.501  0.18   0.607  0.06   
(15)ROA% + 0.890  2.38   0.660  17.51   
(16)GR% + 0.960  0.32   0.943  0.77   
(17)Ln(asset) - 0.026  -10.21  ** 0.000  -20.31  *** 
G1: Number of Observations:140; Number of Groups: 50  
G2: Number of Observations 115; Number of Groups: 40 
Group 1: SB only Group 2: SB plus AC 
(Without AC) (With AC) Sample 3: with expertise variables      
Variables Exp Sign P Value Coef.1 G1:Sig. P Value Coef.2 G2: Sig. 
(5)exp1fin% + 0.428 48.16    0.871  -8.63   
(6)exp2leg% + 0.851  -23.54    0.045  268.70  ** 
(7)exp3ia% + 0.454  -93.85    0.008  178.38  *** 
(8)exp4party% - 0.277  -71.47    0.980  1.70  
(12)SH123% - 0.747  -20.79    0.235  67.57  
Summary  
The purpose of the test of significance is to examine the relationship between the 
dependent variable (PER) as a proxy for the effectiveness of supervisory functions 
and the individual independent variables. After the test of Panal Data Analysis, 6 out 
of 17 independent variables show significant results, as summarized in Table 35. The 
siginifcance of these results is as follows:  
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(A) Independence  
Four measures of independence are included to examine if G2 companies with ACs 
have:  
(1) Higher percentage of independent directors out of total board size; 
(2) Lower shareholding percentage of SBs;  
(3) Lower numbers of supervisors receiving remunerations;  
(4) Lower numbers of directors receiving remunerations.  
The test result shows item 4 of Group 2 with ACs is statistically significanct. 
Itme 4: Here, a negative relationship is assumed, in that the greater number of 
directors receiving remuneration will lead to a lower market response to earnings. The 
results for Group 2 show a p value 0.014 and a negative coefficient -3.93 and 
positively support this assumption with **significance. This result supports the 
hypothesis that listed companies with AC will have higher levels of independence 
than companies without ACs.  
(B) Expertise  
Four indicators of expertise are included as items 5-8 to examine if Group 2 
companies with ACs have more financial, legal and internal audit expertise but lower 
numbers of party-member employee supervisors without financial, legal and internal 
audit expertise than Group 1 companies without ACs. The test shows significant 
result that for item 6-7, namely legal and internal audit expertise.  
Item 5: Legal expertise is measured by the percentage of supervisors to have legal 
expertise (exp2leg). A positive relationship is assumed, in that more supervisors with 
legal expertise of SBs will lead to higher market response to earnings. The result of 
Group 2 with p value 0.045 and coefficient 268.70 positively support this assumption 
with ** significance. 
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The result of this comparison supports the assumption that Group 2 companies with 
ACs have more legal expertise than Group 1 without AC. This result may be 
explained in that listed companies with ACs recognize that Chinese regulations 
require a legal background in performing supervisory functions. The companies who 
added ACs have increased the legal expertise of SB in implementing supervisory 
functions.  
Item 6: Internal audit expertise (exp3ia): a positive relation is assumed, whereby more 
supervisors with internal audit expertise will lead to a higher market response to 
earnings. The result of Group 2’s test with p value 0.008 and coefficient 178.38 
positively support this assumption at *** significance. The results show that in Group 
2, listed companies with ACs have more internal audit expertise in performing 
supervisory functions than Group 1 without ACs.  
(C) Activities  
Three variables for supervisory activities, items 9-11, are tested to compare between 
Group 2 with ACs and Group 1 without AC for the link between SB size and 
frequency of SB meetings and frequency of BoD meeting and supervisory 
effectiveness. The test result shows that item 9-10 with significance as follows:  
Item 9: The SB size (num1sbsize): A positive relationship is assumed, whereby larger 
SBs will enjoy higher levels of market response to earnings. The result for Group 1 
has a p value of 0.048 and a negative coefficient -6.96, which is contrary to the 
assumption with **significance. It may be explained that the quantity of supervisors 
cannot ensure the effectiveness of supervisory functions to increase market response 
to earnings. The quality of supervisory functions may be not decided by the quantity 
of SB members. It may be explained that SBs in Group 2 with ACs bear more 
supervisors and have more effective supervisory functions, judging by market 
response to earnings. The effectiveness of supervisory functions in China may be 
developed by the two institutions together. This finding suggests that after adding in 
ACs companies increase the size of SBs to enhance the effectiveness of supervisory 
functions, though the effectiveness of supervisory functions may not be decided 
specifically by the size of SBs. ACs cannot entirely replace the SBs in China at 
present.  
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Item 10: The SB meeting frequency (mt1sb): a positive relationship is assumed, 
whereby more regular meetings will result in a higher market response to earnings. 
The result of Group 1 without ACs – p value 0.000 and positive coefficient 11.45 – 
positively supports this assumption with *** significance. The explanation may be 
that listed companies without ACs have to run supervisory functions through SBs 
only. The operations of SBs in Group 1 without ACs are not merely rubber stamps, 
given more meetings than Group 2 with ACs. Yet the companies after adding ACs do 
not increase the activities of meetings of SBs to improve the effectiveness of the 
overall supervisory functions in China. It seems that ACs still cannot superceed the 
SBs in China at the current stage for the SBs in the G1 without ACs still work out its 
functions as reflected in more meeting times.   
(D) Others 
The independent variable items 12-13 assume that Group 2 with ACs has lower 
centralised shareholding structure and lower dual CEO / President of BoD positions 
than Group 1 without AC. The test results show no significant differences between 
two groups.   
It is expected that after adding ACs companies will decrease their centralised 
shareholding structure and dual positions. However the results for both groups of both 
samples do not suggest this is the case. A possible explanation is that companies after 
adding in ACs cannot neither decrease their centralised shareholding nor decrease the 
practice of dual CEO and President appointments.  
(E) Control Variables  
For the control variables at items 14-17, it is expected that the group 2 with ACs has 
better performance of supervisory function, leading to lower debt, higher growth in 
total assets, higher rate of return on assets, and bigger firm size than group 1 without 
ACs. A significant difference is found for item 17, firm size.  
Item 17: Firm size is evaluated through the natural logarithm of the assets (Ln(Asset)): a 
negative relationship is assumed, whereby larger firms will have lower fluctuation 
(more stable) market responses to earnings. The results of Group 1 with p value 0.026 
and negative coefficient -10.21 with ** significance and Group 2 with p value 0.000 
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and negative coefficient -20.31 with ***significance are consitent with the 
expectation that there is a negative relationship between firm size and market 
response to earnings: larger companies will have more stable market response to 
earnings.  
Table 35. The Summary of Hypothesis and Test Result  
(Source: Author) 
Hypothesis (H) Better Group  Impact Significance  
(A) Independence (1-4) –  
Group 2 with ACs has more 
independence item 1-4 than group 1 
without AC. 
√ Ind4-indre-G2 G1 G2 





1. The higher of independent 
directors out of BoD will have higher 
market response to earnings (the 
proxy variable of effectiveness of 
supervisory functions).  
G2    
2. The higher shareholding of SBs 
will have lower market response to 
earnings.  
G2    
3. The more supervisors receive 
remunerations will have lower market 
response to earnings. 
G2    
4. The more directors receive 
remunerations will have lower market 
response to earnings. 
G2 G2 √  P** 
(B) Expertise:  
Group 2 with ACs has more financial, 
legal and internal audit expertise but 
has lower of party-member employee 
supervisors without financial, legal 
and internal audit expertise than 
Group 1 without AC. 
 









5. The higher of financial expertise in 
SBs will have higher market value to 
earnings.  
G2    
6. The higher of legal expertise in 
SBs will have higher market value to 
earnings. 
G2 G2 √  P** 
7. The higher of internal audit 
expertise in SBs will have higher 
market value to earnings. 
G2 G2 √  P** 
8. The higher of party-member 
employee without financial, legal or 
internal audit background in SBs will 
have lower market response to 
earnings. 
G2    
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Hypothesis (H) Better Group  Impact Significance  
(C) Activities  
Group 2 with ACs (AC) has more 
active operations of bigger size and 
more meeting times of SBs and more 
meeting times of BoD than Group 1 
without AC.  









9. The bigger size of SBs will have 
higher market response to earnings. G2 G1 (R**) R**   
10.The more active meeting times of 
SBs will have higher market 
response to earnings  
G2 G1 (X) P***  
11. The more active meeting times of 
BoD will have higher market 
response to earnings 
G2    
(D) Others:  
Group 2 with ACs (AC) has lower 
centralised shareholding structure 
and lower dual positions of CEO and 
President of BoD acted by the same 









12. The higher centralised 
shareholding structure will have 
lower market response to earnings  
G2    
13. The higher dual positions of CEO 
and President of BoD acted by the 
same person will have lower market 
response to earnings 
G2    
(E) Control Variables 
The group 2 with ACs has better 
performance of supervisory function, 
so that to have lower debt rate, 
higher growth rate of total asset; 
higher rate of return on asset; and 
bigger firm size than group 1 without 
ACs.  
√ Ln(Asset)-G2   





14.The higher debt will have lower 
market response to earnings (DEBT) G2    
15. The higher return on assets will 
have higher market response to 
earnings (ROA) 
G2    
16. The higher growth rate of total 
assets will have higher market 
response to earnings (GR) 
G2    
17. The bigger firm size will have 
lower market response to earnings. 
(Ln(Asset)) 
G2 G2 √ P** P*** 
Note: √ means support the hypothesis; (X) means conflict to the hypothesis.  
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6.1.7 Conclusion on Effectiveness 
The answers to Question 1:  
The effectiveness of supervisory functions is expected to increase the confidence 
among shareholders, so increasing the market response to earnings (PER), the trend 
(growth) of mean value of market response to earnings (PER), the growth rate of total 
assets, the return on assets, the firm size; and decreasing the debt ratio (total liability 
divided by total equity). The test result shows that Group 2 of listed companies after 
adding in ACs increase the shareholders’ confidence in the companies by comparison 
to Group 1 without ACs in the growth trend of mean value of market response to 
earnings (PER), firm size (total asset) and debt ratio. Group 1 of listed companies 
without ACs has a better market response to the earnings (PER) with *** significance. 
Yet the trend of the market response to earnings (PER) from 2003-2007 shows that 
G2 with ACs is bigger than G1 without ACs. The t test results of mean values of firm 
size and debt ratio also prove H1. In summary, listed companies with ACs have a 
higher average growth trend of market response to earnings, bigger firm size, and a 
lower debt ratio than the Group 1 without ACs.  
Meanwhile, after the test to prove H2, One control variable indirectly proves that 
Group 2 with ACs has a better performance of supervisory function with larger firm 
size than Group 1 without ACs. Specifically, the test result of the firm size of total 
assets present significance ** in Group 1 and *** in Group 2 with positive impact. 
The control variable of firm size’s test result in H2 of both samples all are 
complimentary to answer Question 1 by proving H1: that companies after adding ACs 
have more effective supervisory functions by the significance response to market 
response to earnings (PER).  
The answers to Question 2 
(A) Independence 
It is hypothesized that Group 2 with ACs has more independence evaluated by 
variables 1-4. According to the test results for the independence hypothesis as the 
following: One of four independent variables that the G2 of independent directors 
receiving remunerations (ind4dirre) shows ** significance, yet no significance shows 
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in Group 1 without AC. Listed companies after adding in ACs have higher levels of 
independence to improve the effectiveness of supervisory functions by the test results 
of independent directors receiving remunerations positively supports this assumption 
with ** significance.  
(B) Expertise 
It is hypothesized that Group 2 with ACs has more expertise evaluated by variables 5-
8. The test results on legal and internal auditing expertise are the same as the 
hypothesis. Group 2 with ACs has a higher of legal and internal auditing expertise in 
SBs than Group 1 without ACs. Listed companies after adding in ACs do not increase 
their financial expertise nor decrease their of party-member employees on the SB; but 
increase the legal and internal auditing expertise in SBs with positive impact ** 
significance respectively.  
(C) Activities 
It is hypothesized that Group 2 with ACs has more activity evaluated by variables 9-
11. The test result on the sizes of SBs and the meeting times of SBs both present G1 
without ACs has more activity than G2 with ACs, which is adverse to the hypothesis. 
They may be explained as the following:   
The test result on the sizes of SBs shows that Group 1 without ACs is inverse to the 
impact assumption with ** significance. It may be explained that quantity of the size 
of SBs may not be factors impacting on the effectiveness of supervisory functions. It 
is concluded that companies after adding in ACs increase the number of supervisors; 
though the size of SBs may not be a factor to increase the quality of supervisory 
functions.  
The test result of meeting times of SBs shows adverse to the hypothesis with *** 
positive influence. Group 1 with SBs alone has more meeting times than Group 2: this 
is adverse to the hypothesis. This result suggests that companies without ACs have 
higher coefficients of market response to earnings as the proxy variable of the 
effectiveness of supervisory functions, than Group 2 with ACs. It is concluded that 
companies after adding in ACs do not increase the meeting times of SBs. It may be 
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explained that the companies after adding in ACs put more focus on strengthening the 
ACs but not SBs by increasing meeting times.  
(D) Others 
It is hypothesized that Group 2 with ACs has a lower centralised shareholding 
structure and lower numbers of dual positions of CEO and President of the BoD held 
by the same person than Group 1 without AC evaluated by variables 12-13. No 
significance shows in both of the test results. The results may be explained that 
companies after adding in ACs do not decentralise the shareholding structure or 
decrease the numbers of dual positions of CEO and President of the BoD in China. 
(E) Control Variables 
Four control variables of growth rate of total asset and return on assets, debt ratio and 
firm size are hypothesized that G2(WithAC) ≥ G1(WithoutAC). Group 2 with ACs is 
assumed to have a better performance of supervisory function, so has a higher market 
response impact to earnings of the asset’s growth rate and returns on assets; debt ratio 
and firm size. Specifically, the test results on firm size suggest a positive impact ** 
and *** significance in both Groups 1 and 2. The same result of the firm size control 
variable as the test result of H1 proves that the AC can contribute to effectiveness of 
supervisory functions, so companies after adding audit committees are more effective 
in engaging supervisory functions in China.  
Overall, 6 of 17 independent variables’ test results show that the AC contributes to 
the effectiveness of supervisory functions in China.  
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6.2 Operations 
6.2.1 Introduction 
Question 3 of this thesis is to understand:  
What are the operation processes, problems and difficulties faced in the 
implementation of the supervisory functions by SBs and ACs in empirical practice in 
China?  
This phase’s study aims to reveal the answer of this question by interviewing the 
members of two supervisory institutions in two case studies/firms. Two further sub-
questions are raised during the interviews:  
1.  What is the role of the AC played in China? 
2.  What are the overlaps and missing items and percentages between the SBs and the 
ACs in terms of functions?  
The structure of this objective’s study introduces two sampled companies and the 
interviewees through a background of the sampled companies, the features of SB/AC 
of both sampled companies, and the background of SB/AC members in the sampled 
corporations. Conversations by face-to-face interview are then presented for both 
sampled companies. The interviews are summarised following every individual 
interview and the two sub-questions above are answered by the findings from the 
surveys.  
6.2.2 The Sampled Companies and the Interviewees 
Two companies were invited to be the sampled companies for this research. One 
chemical industrial group with one SB chairman and two SB members were 
interviewed; and one engineering machinery company with one general secretary of 
BoD, one AC member, and one SB chairman were also interviewed. The AC of the 
sampled chemical company is under construction, and the sampled machinery 
company was only set up just over six months before the interview. The two sampled 
companies with six interviewees are listed in the table below:  
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Table 36. Sample Companies and Interviewees Contacted for the Interviews 
(Source: Author) 
Sampled Companies Interviewees  
• Corporation A: A Chemical Industrial 
Group Co., Ltd. (Without current AC) 
• One SB Chairman  
• Two SB members  
• Corporation B: An Engineering 
Machinery Co., Ltd. (With AC) 
• One General Secretary of BoD. 
• One AC member  
• One SB Chairman  
(I) Background of the sampled companies 
The table below contains the background of the two sampled companies. The sampled 
chemical company bears 24.3 billion Yuan and the sampled machinery company 
bears 757.205 million Yuan; both returned common shareholders’ equity of over 30% 
in 2006. State-owned equity percentage occupies over 10% of the sampled machinery 
company and 0% of the sampled chemical company, though her majority shares were 
owned by the state before being merged in 2006. Both bear 1 and 2 shareholders 
respectively possess more than 10% of the company’s voting shares. Both CEOs are 
also Presidents of the BoD. The current auditing firm has been in charge of the 
external audit engagement for 7 and 4 years respectively; and over 0.35% of the 
annual proportion of total fees (in the last three years) was charged by the external 
auditor.  
Both sampled companies are growing, according to their return on equity over the 
past three years, and both are in the process of transitioning from being state owned 
companies to the employee and the public. The independence of both is questionable, 
for both CEOs are also Presidents of the BoD. Both sampled companies should face 
no serious problems in implementing supervisory functions, given what both spend on 
auditing fees.  
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Table 37. Background of the Sampled Corporations 
(Source: Author) 
Feature Corporation A  Corporation B  
1. Industry  Chemical  Machine Manufacturing 
2. Financial Characteristics  
(1) Book value of total assets  24.3 billion Yuan 757.205 million Yuan 
(2) Return on common 
shareholders’ equity within 





(2005); 35.79% (2006) 
3. Dispersion of ownership 
(1) State-owned Equity  0 (The majority shares were 
owned by the state before 
being merged in 2006.)  
10% 
(2) No. of shareholders 
possess more than 10% of 
the company’s voting shares.  
1 2 
(3) CEO is President of BoD Yes Yes 
4. External Auditor    
(1) No. of years in which the 
current audit firm has been in 
charge of the external audit 
engagement  
7 years 4 years 
(2) Annual proportion (in the 
last few years) of audit fees to 
total fees charged by the 
external auditor 
From 2003 – 2005  
0.4% (2003); 0.3(2004); 
0.4% (2005) 
From 2004 – 2006 
0.4%(2004); 0.36%(2005); 
0.65%(2006) 
(II) Features of SB/AC of both sampled companies 
The following table is based on the data provided by the two samples companies and 
financial statements.  
(A) Composition 
(1) Independence: AC members are comprised of solely outside and unrelated 
directors in the sampled chemical company; yet 2 out of 3 members of the AC of 
Corporation B are external directors, who are not officers or employees of the 
corporation or any of its affiliates. Both corporations have one outside director in their 
SBs; yet none of the members of the SB of either company is independent, i.e. both 
SBs comprise zero unrelated outsiders as members. 
(2) Expertise: Both companies have at least one outside director in the AC; moreover, the 
sampled machinery company’s SB is a financial expert and has experience serving on 
other SB/AC as an outside director. Yet no such expertise exists within the SB of the 
sampled chemical company. 75% and 100% of members who sat on the SB/AC 
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during the last three years in both sampled companies respectively; and no data exists 
on the experience of AC members, for ACs have only been established within the last year. 
(B) Authority – Formal oversight responsibilities 
(1) Financial Reporting: both sampled companies’ SBs and the sampled machinery 
company’s AC are responsible for financial reporting. The responsibilities of 
Corporation A’s future AC are as yet unclear.  
(2) Auditing: both internal and external auditing functions are performed by the SB of 
the sampled chemical company but by the AC of the sampled machinery company. 
The SB of Corporation B performs no related auditing functions. The responsibilities 
of Corporation A’s future AC are as yet unclear. 
(3) Internal Control: the sampled machinery company’s SB and AC are involved with 
internal control; but there is no involvement of the SB of Corporation A, and the 
responsibilities of its future AC are as yet unclear. 
(4) Corporate Performance: the SB of the Corporation B is involved in corporate 
performance, but there is no such involvement by the AC of Corporation B or the SB 
of Corporation A. The responsibilities of the future AC of Corporation A are unclear. 
(C) Resources 
(1) Number of individuals serving on the SB/AC: Three members serve in both ACs 
and the SB of Corporation A. Four members serve in the SBs of Corporation B.  
(2) Direct access to auditors: This can allow the supervisory institutions to use the 
resources of the internal and external auditors. Only the AC of Corporation B can 
direct access to auditors. The SBs of both corporations do not have direct access to the 
auditors. The responsibilities of the future AC of Corporation A are unclear.  
(3) Access to legal advice: Direct access to legal advice can allow the supervisory 
institutions to use the resources of the legal advisor. Only the SB of Corporation B 
can direct access to legal advice. The AC of Corporation B and the SB of Corporation 
A do not have such direct access. The responsibilities of the future AC of Corporation 
A are unclear.  
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(D) Diligence 
(1) Number of meetings per year: Over three times by the SB of Corporation B, and 
over two and four times by the SB and AC, respectively, of Corporation A. The 
meeting frequency of the AC of Corporation A is unclear. 
(2) Number of private meetings per year: Apart from formal meetings each year, the 
SB of Corporation B also has private meetings; but no such private meeting occur in 
the SB of the sampled chemical company. The possible results of Corporation A’s 
future AC are unclear; and no data were provided for the AC of Corporation B.  
In terms of independence of both corporations, one conforms to the international 
standard of 100% independence; and the other to Chinese national regulations, with 
two thirds of its directors being independent. Both corporations have at least one 
financial expert, conforming to international guidelines.  
Corporation A’s AC is still under construction. It is therefore in the process of 
developing of its functions and regulations so its authority over formal overseeing 
responsibilities, resources and diligence were unclear when the interview was 
conducted. As the AC of Corporation B was in its second year after being established 
at the time the interview was conducted, it could provide more clear information than 
Corporation A, apart from two items: namely, the proportion of members who sat on 
the SB/AC during the previous three years, and the number of private meeting per 
year. In these two cases, no data were provided. The supervisory institutions have 
over three members, conforming with international guidelines; and in Corporation A’s 
case the number of meetings of SB is fewer than four. Corporation B total with 4 
times seems to be more active in the operations of its SB than Corporation A. 
Table 38. Features of SB/AC of the Sampled Corporations 
(Source: Author) 
Corporation A-Chemical Corporation B-Machinery A. Composition  (a1) SB (a2) AC (b1) SB (b2) AC 
1. Independence      
(1) Comprises solely 
outside directors 
If not, how many directors 
are there? (Note 1) 
1 Yes 1 2 
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(2) Comprises solely 
outside, unrelated directors 
(Note 2) 
If not, how many directors 
are there? 
0 Yes 0 2 
2. Expertise 
(1) At least one outside 
director on the SB/AC is a 
financial expert (Note 3) 
0 1 1 1 
(2) At least one outside 
director on the SB/AC has 
experience serving on other 
SB/AC as an outside 
director 
0 1 1 1 
Proportion of members who 
sat on the SB/AC during the 
last 3 years. 




100% No data provided 
B. Authority – Formal oversight responsibilities 
(1) Financial Reporting  Yes Not clear yet Yes Yes 
(2) Auditing – Internal / 
External  Yes Not clear yet No Yes 
(3) Internal Control No Not clear yet Yes Yes 
(4) Corporate Performance  No Not clear yet Yes No 
C. Resources     
(1) Number of individuals 
serving on the SB/AC 3 3 4 3 
(2) Direct access to 
auditors No Not clear yet No Yes 
(3) Access to legal advice No Not clear yet Yes No 
D. Diligence     
(1) Number of meetings 
per year Over 3 times Not clear yet Over 2 times Over 4 times 
(2) No. of private meeting 




(1) An external director is a director who is not “an officer or employee of the corporation or 
any of its affiliates”. 
(2) An unrelated director “is a director who is independent of management and is free from 
any business or other relationship which could, or could reasonably be perceived to, 
materially interfere with the director’s ability to act with a view to the best interests of the 
corporation, other than interests and relationships arising from shareholding”. 
(3) A member is classified as a financial expert when she or he holds a professional 
certification in accounting or in financial analysis, or when she or he has experience in 
finance or accounting. 
(III) Background of SB/AC Members in the Sampled Corporations  
Corporation A:  
There are three members in SB and AC respectively. Three members of SBs are 
interviewed: one chairman and two members. They are all employees of the affiliate 
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company, in charge of the internal audit department, and the administration 
department of the sampled chemical company respectively. The Chairman has a 
lawyer’s license, one supervisor is an experience auditor, and all have no financial 
expertise. No AC members were interviewed in the chemical company for the AC 
was not yet fully established on the day of the interview.  
Corporation B:  
There are four SB members and three AC members in the sampled machinery 
company. One general secretary of BoD, one chair of the SB and one AC member 
were interviewed. Three supervisors are all employees, and the Chairman is also in 
charge of the legal department. The second supervisor has the certificate of public 
accountant in charge of the accounting department. The third supervisor is employed 
as a mechanic. The fourth supervisor was not interviewed, but is independent and is 
CPA certified. Overall, two out of four supervisors have financial expertise.  
Among the interviewed members of the AC, one is an employee and shareholder in 
charge of the finance department; one is an independent director in the economics 
profession. Another independent director is a professor without a financial 
background. Overall, one of the three members of the AC has financial expertise.  
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Table 39. Background of SB/AC Members in the Sampled Corporations  
(Source: Author, as supported by the sampled corporations) 





Holds a Professional 
Accounting 
Designation or Any 
License 
Whether Member 




Corporation A – Chemical  
SB – Member 1 
(Chairperson) Yes  No (Was a Lawyer) 
Employee in the 
affiliate company.    
SB – Member 2  Yes  No (An experienced Auditor) 
Employee – in 
charge of Internal 
Audit dept.   
 
SB – Member 3 Yes  No (Keep on serving in SB)  





AC-Member 1 No   No data provided No data provided  
AC-Member 2 No No data provided No data provided  
AC-Member 3 No No data provided No data provided  
Corporation B 
SB – Member 1 
(Chairperson) Yes  No  
Employee (In 
charge of Law 
Dept) 
Lawyer  





SB – Member 3 No  No Employee  Mechanics 
SB – Member 4 No  Yes (CPA) Independent   
AC-Member 1 Yes  Yes (CPA) 
Employee and 
shareholders (in 
charge of finance 
dept) 
 
AC-Member 2 No No Independent Economist 
AC-Member 3 No No  Independent (Professor) Post-doctor 
Page 236 PhD Thesis, University of Manchester Pao-Chen Lee 
6.2.3 Interview of the Sampled Corporation A – Chemical Industry 
(Without the AC) 
The general secretary of the BoD is co-ordinated the individual interview meetings 
with members of the supervisory institutions. Mr. Qian introduced his company to the 
author before progressing into the individual interview, as transcribed below.   
Qian, Z-y. 錢之揚 (2007). Interview with Mr. Qian Zhi Yang (錢之揚), Secretary 
of the BoD of the Zhejiang Transfar Co., Ltd. (Chuanhua, 傳化公司), on 23rd July 
2007. Hangzhou. [Video recording in possession of author] 
1. How is the growth of your organisation? 
Wynca was established 20 years earlier than Transfar, and it floated earlier than the 
latter, too. It had its own culture. Since the merger in 2005, there has been a process 
of cultural integration. During the transition from being state owned to being 
privately owned, there is also the transition from the spirit of a party run enterprise 
to that of a private enterprise. 
2. What is the role of the independent directors in your company? 
The independent directors play the role of consultancies in the BoD. They have the 
responsibility of professional supervision. First, they have the right to suggest to the 
elite organisation in the enterprise on issues of the competence of the latter's 
operations. Secondly, they can indicate the level of operations of the elite 
organisation in comparison with its rivals. Since independent directors are external 
to the organisation, it is possible to expect them to play the role of supervising the 
supervisors internal to the organisation.  
The conversation with Mr. Qian provides a background on this company’s cultural 
integration from being state- owned to being privately owned, and from the spirit of a 
party run enterprise to that of a private enterprise. His personal viewpoints on the role 
of the independent directors naturally lead to curiosity regarding the implementation 
of supervisory functions in this sampled company A. The first interviewee, the Chair 
of the SB is then introduced as follows:  
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Zhao, 趙總 (2007). Interview with Mr. Zhao (趙總), Chair of the SB of Wynca (Zhe 
Jiang Xinan Chemical Industrial Group Co., Ltd., 新安公司), a subsidiary of the 
Zhejiang Transfar Co., Ltd. (Chuanhua, 傳化集團), on 23rd July 2007. Hangzhou. 
[Video recording in possession of author] 
1. What is the key to the rapid growth of Transfar? 
I am the Vice General Manager of Transfar and I have been on the SB of Wynca 
for about a year. Transfar was established in 1986, and it has floated since 2005. 
The key to its growth is the instillation of the desired culture. In the last two years, 
Transfar has bought the previously state-owned Xin-An Corp. As the organisational 
culture of a state-owned enterprise is different from that of a private company such 
as Transfar, the organisational culture of the former has to be transformed to that of 
the latter so as to bring new momentum to its operations, and an open, fair and 
honourable managerial culture is instilled. I was previously a legal consultant to 
Transfar when I was appointed by the management as the Vice General Manager. 
As a manager with a background in law, I think the manager of an enterprise must 
be diligent in obeying the law, as being law-abiding is the basis of management; 
after all, management and control are linked.  
2. What is your opinion on the supervisory system since its introduction in 1993? 
It is very important to have an independent supervisory system. It is especially so 
for our company. Since its flotation, the expectation from our investors has grown 
steadily as we improve the execution of the supervisory system in our company 
year on year. There is first the SB and then the independent directors in the Chinese 
system. Since I first served on the SB of Wynca, I have been neither a stockholder 
nor a beneficiary of the company. I do not receive supervisory fees from Wynca on 
top of my salary for my post at Transfar. The other members of the SB are 
employees of Wynca, and they do not receive any payment in addition to their 
respective salary except an annual traffic expense of RMB 5000. It is stressed that 
the BoD and the SB should operate independently. It is the responsibility of the SB 
to independently supervise the BoD, so it should not be led by the latter. Though 
my speciality is in law (rather than finance or accounting), there are several finance 
and accounting professionals in the auditing department of the company, and all 
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public financial reports and information have all been audited by the external 
auditor before their submission. The external audits of both Transfar and Wynca 
are provided by the Tianjian Accounting Ltd. (天健事務所).  
3. How does the SB operate? 
The SB holds the internal supervisory meeting before the meeting of BoD. I 
personally review the managerial report of the BoD before their meeting. I attend 
about 6 to 8 meetings at Wynca every year. These include the meetings of both the 
BoD and the SB. The main purpose of attending the meetings of the BoD is to 
listen to their proposals and resolutions. I call for the meeting of the SB once a 
season. The minimum number of such meetings every year required by law is two, 
and these are usually held after the meetings of the BoD (in other companies). I 
also keep regular contacts with relevant departments because problems cannot all 
be identified by merely reviewing financial data, as demonstrated by the Enron 
scandal. To supervise, therefore, involves physically visiting relevant department 
such as the financial and auditing departments to investigate on site. The auditing 
department is utilised heavily. The auditing of the financial reports is solely 
handled by the external auditor, whereas the main responsibility of the auditing 
department is to alert the SB of potential problems and perform necessary 
investigation. This is because the supervisory function of the SB should act as the 
radar system in the company that can detect problem in advance to prevent its 
occurrence and damages to the company. It is important to allow flexibility in the 
power of management within the confine of the law, but the SB should, like a radar 
system, sound the alarm and request control whenever the boundary is crossed. In 
short, the SB should perform its function of prevention.  
4. What are the foci of the SB’s supervision over the financial reports, auditing 
reports and internal control?  
These are truthfulness, the analysis of the rationality of data, and the proper 
operations of the SB. The reports of the SB are signed by the Chair of the SB 
before its submission.  
5. What is your view on acting as a member of the SB? 
It is a matter of organisational culture. The culture of our company stress “sincerity, 
innovation and development,” so we are not afraid to identify problems. As our 
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MD says, “it is our wisdom to identify problems, it is our attitude to face problems, 
it is our virtue to acknowledge problems, and it is our responsibility to solve 
problems.” By the end of this month, he is to hold a meeting asking every 
department to identify problems. This enterprise cannot develop if problems are not 
identified. Even though Wynca has been around for a long time and the SB has 
been installed for quite a while, the purpose that the MD appoints me to serve on 
the SB is to identify problems to prevent these causing damages to the company. 
6. Now that it is the government's policy to encourage the installation of the AC, 
Does your company plan to have one?  
We have considered installing the AC. If you come visiting us this time next year, 
our AC would definitely have been installed. It is determined that the MD will be 
its Chair and I will be the Executive Officer.  
7. Why do you want to install the AC?  
First, we value the work of auditing very highly. Secondly, we must have it, (as) if 
it functions properly; it shows that the top management is determined to execute 
(proper auditing). It can hardly function if the top management does not value it.  
8. Once the AC is installed, will there be organisational or functional overlap 
with the SB? 
There will not be any organisational overlap, as the AC is under the BoD whereas 
the SB is a peer of the BoD. The installation of the AC will only let the auditing 
function be valued more and make the operations more transparent, thus making it 
easier to identify problems, by utilizing the supervision of the public departments. 
Furthermore, as our enterprise grows and expands, there has to be an auditing 
department in each company and it is definitely necessary to have an AC in the 
umbrella company. As to the issue of functional overlap, the focus of the AC is on 
internal audit, whereas that of the SB is on the BoD.  
9. Do you think there is any space for improvement in the current supervisory 
mechanism? 
This is the focus of the government. There are cases of falsification all over the 
world. False reporting should be severely punished.  
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Summary 
Mr. Chao said, “I think the manager of an enterprise must be diligent in obeying the 
law”. Mr. Chao’s professional background makes him highlight the importance of 
compliance, for he views this as the foundation for management to have a tight 
connection between management and supervision. His viewpoint may explain the 
reasons why Chinese regulations point out the legal requirement for the member’s 
composition of the SB, according to the Code of CG for Listed Companies in China.  
Mr. Chao stresses two points on independence: first that he did not receive any 
remuneration, nor did the other two supervisors acting in the SB; second, that the SB 
should be independent from the BoD. Though Mr. Chao is not a financial expert, he 
recognises the requirement of financial expertise in implementing supervisory 
functions by using the resources of internal and external auditors. He thinks that the 
main responsibility of the auditing department is to alert the SB to potential problems 
and perform necessary further investigation. 
Mr. Chao implements the process of SB by attending the meetings of the BoD to 
listen to their proposals and resolutions. He also calls for the meeting of the SB once a 
season – over the minimum number of 1 time in every year required by law – after the 
meetings of the BoD. Besides attending or calling the meetings, he also keeps regular 
contacts with relevant departments to supervise, which involves physically visiting 
the relevant departments to investigate on site. He expects that the implementation of 
supervisory functions can detect problems in advance, in order to prevent its 
occurrence and damage to the company: in other words, he views it as a radar system. 
Mr. Chao, the Chair of the SB signs the report of the SB after ensuring the 
truthfulness and rationality of data according to the implementation procedure of the 
SB.  
Mr. Chao asserts that the purpose of the SB is to establish problems; and the culture 
of his company is sincere in facing problems from the top management to the bottom 
employee. His company’s President of the BoD holds similar meetings to search for 
problems. He underlines that establishing the success of implementing the supervisory 
functions involves sincerely welcoming and facing problems from top to bottom. 
Meanwhile, he points out that the AC exists in order to present the high concern and 
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determination of top management in implementing supervisory functions. This may 
explain why the company is willing to install AC in addition to SB. 
Mr. Chao said “there will not be any organisational overlap; as to the issue of 
functional overlap, the focus of the AC is on internal audit, whereas that of the SB is 
on the BoD.” He intends to follow the government’s encouragement to install ACs 
because he stresses once more the importance of strengthening the supervisory 
functions by installing dual supervisory systems at the same time.  
Regarding overlapping problems in implementation of supervisory functions, the two 
supervisors express their opinions as follows:  
(B & C) Bao, 包主任 & Jia, 賈主任 (2007). Interview with Mr. Bao, 包主任 and 
Ms. Jia, 賈主任, two members of the SB of Wynca (Zhe Jiang Xinan Chemical 
Industrial Group Co., Ltd., 新安公司), a subsidiary of the Zhejiang Transfar Co., 
Ltd. (Chuanhua, 傳化集團), on 24th July 2007. Hangzhou. [Video recording in 
possession of author] 
Mr. Bao, 包主任 has been a member of the SB for fifteen years, a representative of 
state owned stocks previously and employee owned stocks now, and Ms. Jia, 賈主任 
has been a member of the SB for five years.  
1. As your company is forming the AC, there will soon be both the SB and the AC 
in your company. Do you think these two institutions will have similar or 
identical characteristics? 
Bao: (The adoption of these two institutions is) adapted to the Chinese context, the 
functions and powers of these two institutions are different, and these will be 
clearly stated in the constitution of the company.  
2. Do you think it is necessary to form the AC? 
Jia: Judging from the specifications in the regulations, I feel there will be overlaps 
between the responsibilities and powers of the AC and the SB, but I personally 
think that the members that form these institutions will be different. The members 
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of the SB are internal representatives of employees, so they know about the 
situation of internal management better. The members of the AC are external 
independent directors, who have more involvement with external roles, and 
consequently have a better, more macroscopic view of the external environment, 
but they may not be as familiar with internal operations as the SB members. Thus, 
the existence of the AC can enhance the SB’s understanding of the external 
economic and supervisory environment. Therefore, I think the two institutions can 
be complementary to each other and work together to improve the supervisory 
mechanism.  
3. In your opinion, once the AC is formed, how should the functions of the two 
institutions be distributed in practice? 
Due to the different types of members forming the two institutions, the SB that is 
formed by internal staff should be responsible for the supervision of internal 
matters, whereas the AC that is formed by external independent directors could 
engage in the collection of external development related data for the development 
of the supervisory function. External independent directors engage in investigation 
only under special circumstances. Thus one works from without, one from within, 
with proper communication between them; the two institutions can complement 
each other in the supervision of the company.  
4. The AC and the SB are at different positions in the organisational structure. 
How should these two institutions interact with each other? 
The BoD, leading the whole management team, is responsible of the practical 
running of the business. The AC is under the BoD, and is responsible of assisting 
the BoD to confirm with laws and regulations. It can supervise before a 
decision/resolution is made by the BoD. It can also supervise during the operations, 
such as overseeing if the management is operating according to the 
decision/resolution of the BoD, or if the reporting confirm to the requirements of 
the laws and regulations. The SB is of equal rank with the BoD. It remains to be 
seen how these two institutions should interact with each other in organisation.  
5. What is the SB’s role in regards to supervising the financial report, the audit 
report and internal control? 
There are many regulations about the financial report, the audit report and internal 
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control of a listed company. It is essential to comply with the regulations. We have 
to keep up with the pace of innovation in order to progress.  
6. How does your company keep up with the pace of innovation? 
Our company has clear enterprise culture, transparency and continues to improve 
quality, engaging in creating global competitiveness. We believe that, to have 
sustainable management and development, we need to strive to enter the global 
market. It is our company’s core culture to “work and share together, preparing 
new wine for its future maturation”. Our four core business philosophies are as 
follows: “Wynca is the enterprise”. It used to be a state-owned enterprise, based on 
a communion production model, but now it is a privately run enterprise, it must be 
market-oriented, meeting market demand. “Wynca is the school”, so employees 
continuously learn and constantly update their knowledge. “Wynca is the family”, 
everyone should respect and love one another like in a family. “Wynca is the 
stage/platform”. There is internal competition on performance. There are tests for 
employees on the management. Once cannot be a leader without performance. So 
Wynca is a big stage for the staff to perform. This promotes the enhancement of the 
quality of each employee, and this makes the company competitive. This is because 
the staff is the most important assets for the development of the enterprise, and staff 
quality consists of qualities of both the operational capacity and the ideological 
character. To sum up, the staff should not only do their own work well, but also to 
treat the company like their own family.  
7. How does the SB of your company work? 
Jia: According to the responsibilities specified in the Company Act and the 
company’s constitution, we must read the data before each meeting of the BoD to 
ensure all data on the financial report are correct. We also audit before submission 
all quarterly, biannual and annual reports and all other data that need to be 
submitted. In case of any problem, we will first contact the relevant department 
before discussing it in our meetings. We meet at least three or four times. Each 
meeting lasts at least three hours. We check if the data reflects the actual situation 
of the company, make resolutions, and then submit the findings. In addition to 
holding SB meetings, we also attend the meetings of the BoD, during which we 
also make suggestions and ask questions.  
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8. What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of the current SB of your 
company? 
Bao: According to the Company Act, both the BoD and the SB are elected by the 
General Assembly Meeting. There are two stockholders’ representatives in the SB, 
who are elected by the stockholders, who hold votes according to their shares. 
There are stakeholders’ representatives in the SB, who are elected by the 
stakeholders. Additionally, according to our company’s constitution, there must be 
stakeholders on the SB, and at least one third of the members of the SB should be 
stakeholders’ representatives. I myself am a representative of both the stakeholders 
and the union, and I represent the stakeholders (on the SB). The purpose of the SB 
is to supervise the BoD. If the BoD supervises itself, there will be no independence 
(in supervision). There have been the Three Old Institutions and the Three New 
Institutions in the Chinese system. The Three New Institutions are the General 
Assembly Meeting, the BoD and the SB, whereas the Three Old Institutions in 
state-owned enterprises are Party Officers’ Committee, the Union and the 
Stakeholders’ Representatives’ Committee. Now there is the problem of bridging 
the Three Old Institutions and the Three New Institutions. The elected 
representatives are responsible to the stockholders and the stakeholders; they are 
supposed to take their responsibilities seriously even though there is no additional 
financial reward for taking up these responsibilities. Hence, the strength is that the 
SB members are elected. Whoever does not perform well will not be elected again 
next time. First, this suits the Chinese context and can cater for the spirits of both 
the Three Old Institutions and the Three New Institutions. Secondly, as it is 
mandatory to have the SB, it can perform its supervisory function. Furthermore, 
now that the company is to form the AC, so its organisational structure can comply 
with the international supervisory mechanism. The weakness is that all the SB 
members are “part-timers”. Their focus is on their paid works, so they cannot fully 
dedicate to their supervisory roles. After all, there are limits to one’s energy. If the 
supervisory role is a full-time paid position, the performance of the supervisory 
function can be expected to be better. Moreover, whenever the subject of 
supervision is the member’s main department, there will be conflict of interest and 
independence is lost. For instance, Ms. Jia is responsible of internal audit 
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department, so she loses his supervisory independence whenever the SB needs to 
supervise the internal audit department.  
9. How do you think the supervisory function will be improved? 
Once the AC is formed with independent directors in addition to the SB, the 
independent directors have the advantage of having an external and macroscopic 
viewpoint, so they can play the advisory role well, whereas the SB is more familiar 
with the company’s internal operations, so it can supervise better. The co-operation 
between them will enhance the supervisory function.  
10. How do you think can the supervisory function be executed in the current 
Chinese context?  
It is about the Three Old Institutions and the Three New Institutions. In the days of 
the state owned enterprises, the supervisory function was not realised in practice. 
After enterprise renovation, state owned enterprises are restructured to become 
private enterprises or even listed companies. The Three new Institutions are formed 
in addition to the Three Old Institutions. The BoD focuses on the development of 
the enterprise. The SB focuses the supervisory function. The existence of the SB 
itself makes a difference. Its existence represents the emphasis on the supervisory 
function. The SB has to perform its expected supervisory function in supervising 
the BoD and the higher management in any case. Furthermore, if the position of the 
SB in the organisational structure can enable it to perform its functions, its 
independence can help it perform better. Moreover, if it can evaluate operations 
during the audit process, this involvement can avoid the sense of powerless to 
correct existing problems that comes with retrospective audit. If the problem of 
having dedicated positions can be rectified, the supervisory personals can then 
dedicate more of their energy in the work of supervision. Experts can be appointed 
to help wherever there is lack of expertise. The dedication of the supervisory 
position and the enhancement of professional competence will be conducive to the 
performance of the supervisory mechanism.  
11. What is the motivation behind the forming of the AC? 
It is the emphasis on legitimacy. It is necessary to operate according to the 
regulations. It is obvious that such operations are good for the company. 
12. How, after its formation, should the AC interact with the internal audit 
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department? 
The positions in the internal audit department are dedicated paid positions. The AC 
is led by the independent directors, whereas the SB is independent to the BoD. 
Once the AC is formed, hierarchically, the internal audit department will work 
under the AC; functionally, it remains to be seen how these institutions should 
work together.  
13. Ms. Jia is responsible for internal audit department. Could you share with us 
how your department performs internal audit? 
Jia: It is mainly financial audit. It is based on the audit plan, and the focus is on 
rationality and legitimacy. If any problem in management or internal control is 
identified during the process, it will be followed through. Otherwise, the audit 
report is first double-checked by the relevant department to affirm its authenticity 
and accuracy, and submit its plan for improvement to the internal audit department. 
Once it is checked by the internal audit department, the audit report is then sent 
directly to the Managing Director, and any instruction of the Managing Director is 
executed. Then the management of the relevant department is asked according to 
the usual procedure to implement the suggestions and plans. The performance of 
the implementation is then audited again in the next month or, in the case of major 
changes, in three months’ time. 
Summary 
Ms. Bao points that applying two systems simultaneously is adapted to the Chinese 
context and both functions and powers are different, as stated in the regulation. But 
Ms. Jia said, “I feel there will be overlaps between the responsibilities and powers”. 
Ms. Jia describes that both members’ composition is different: for the supervisors are 
formed by the internal staff and the members of ACs are formed by external directors. 
She said, “Therefore, I think the two institutions can be complementary to each other 
and work together to improve the supervisory mechanism” with proper 
communication between them. They assert that the independent directors have the 
advantage of having an external and macroscopic viewpoint, so they can play the 
advisory role well, whereas the SB is more familiar with the company’s internal 
operations, so it can supervise better. “It remains to be seen how these two institutions 
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should interact with each other in organisation”. The next phase’s study therefore will 
investigate the co-ordination of organisation between these two institutions.  
These two supervisors highlight their role in implementing supervisory functions, 
according to the responsibilities specified in the Company Act and the company’s 
constitution, as the following: (1) read the data before each meeting of the BoD to 
ensure all data on the financial report are correct; (2) audit before submission all 
quarterly, biannual and annual reports and all other data that need to be submitted; 
(3) first contact the relevant department before discussing it at meetings; (4) attend the 
meetings of the BoD, during which they  also make suggestions and ask questions.  
Both supervisors recognise the strength of adopting two institutions simultaneously:  
1. This suits the Chinese context and can cater for the spirits of both the Three Old 
Institutions and the Three New Institutions.  
2. The SB can perform its supervisory function (they are formed by internal staff 
more familiar with the functions).  
3. The AC’s organisational structure can comply with the international supervisory 
mechanism. 
Both supervisors also identify weaknesses:  
1. The SB members are “part-timers”, their focus is on their paid work, so they 
cannot fully dedicate to their supervisory roles. 
2. Independence will be impacted upon whenever the subject of supervision is the 
member’s main department, leading to conflicts of interest and loss of 
independence. 
Both supervisors expect the co-operation between them, by way of SBs implementing 
supervisory functions and ACs advising this, to enhance the supervisory function. 
They also stress the reason to expect the implementation by the SB: for the existence 
of the SB reflects an emphasis on supervisory function. The position of the SB in the 
organisational structure of independence from the BoD and the higher management 
can enable it to perform its functions better. They also expect to be full time 
supervisors, dedicating more of their energy to the work of supervision, so that they 
can evaluate operations during the audit process in advance of problems occurring in 
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the company, and also promote the professional competence of the supervisors. 
Overall, they expect to improve the implementation of the supervisory functions by 
increasing their dedication and enhancing the professional competence of the 
supervisors. 
Regarding the formation of the AC, both view it in terms of legitimacy, and as good 
for the company. On operations after the formation of ACs, they said, “it remains to 
be seen how these institutions should work together.” Obviously, this sampled 
chemical company has decided and expect to install the AC but they are at the stage 
of exploring how to implement the supervisory functions afterwards.  
The reflection to these answers is thus: What is the role of the AC played in China? 
Both interviewed supervisors view it in an advisory capacity. Will other companies 
have the same viewpoint?  
6.2.4 The Roles of the AC Played in China 
A. Questionnaire Design: 
This is based on Resource Dependency theory, aimed at understanding the role of AC 
played in the listed companies in China. Telephone survey with the designed 
questionnaires on the main functions of the AC was employed, as follows:  
1. Does the AC involve itself in making important company policies? (Decision 
Maker) 
2. Does the AC diagnose and provide solutions as an expert to the problems facing 
the company during its development? (Advisor/consultant) 
3. Does the AC provide professional training to the middle and senior management 
of the company? (Trainer) 
4. Does the AC give professional opinions on related transactions? (Overseer of the 
process) 
5. Does the AC supervise and audit the company’s major information disclosure? 
(Financial Supervisor) 
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B. Sample and Survey Operations: 
The telephone survey sample was selected from listed companies with ACs. 330 listed 
companies have been contacted, and 65 of them – over 15% – were willing to respond. 
C. Findings from Survey  
The telephone survey based on the questionnaire presented in the table below was 
conducted in July 2008. From the responses, the statistics of the roles defining the 
regulated main functions of the AC in a listed company were calculated and then 
compared to the stipulated functions and summarised as follows: 
(1) 95 per cent of companies perform as the financial supervisor by providing the 
supervising and auditing the company’s major information disclosure, which is 
the key function of the AC defined by the regulation. 
(2) 92 per cent of companies perform as the overseer by giving professional opinions 
on related transactions, which is the extended function of ACs retrieved from the 
broad definition of regulation. 
(3) 60 per cent of companies perform the role of advisors by diagnosing and 
providing solutions as an expert on problems facing the company during its 
development, which service of advisor, which provides added value to the 
companies. 
(4) 49 per cent of companies’ ACs act as the decision maker through involvement in 
making important company policies, which seems in conflict with the 
independent supervisory functions of AC.  
(5) 23 per cent of companies act as the trainer by providing professional training to 
the middle and senior management of the company, which provides extra service 
to the companies.  
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Table 40. The Role of the AC Played in China 
(Source: Author - Findings are obtained from telephone surveys.) 
Role  Questionnaires Response %  
(# of Companies) 
Decision Maker Does the AC involve itself in making important 
company policies?  
49% (32/65) 
Advisor/consultant Does the AC diagnose and provide solutions 
as an expert to the problems facing the 
company during its development? 
60% (39/65) 
Trainer Does the AC provide professional training to 
the middle and senior management of the 
company? 
23% (15/65) 
Overseer on the 
process 





Does the AC supervise and audit the 
company’s major information disclosure? 
95% (62/65) 
Summary 
To implement the ACs under the dual layers governance structure in China, would 
impact upon the original practice and differentiate from what is internationally 
recognised. The AC in China is still at the rudimentary and experimental stage. It is a 
process of innovation as well as trial and error. Therefore the AC in every company 
seems in the process of exploring practices suitable to its unique CG setting and 
model in China. Over 92 per cent of sampled companies can meet the definition of the 
role of AC as overseers in their actual practices; 60 per cent of companies perform the 
role of advisors/consultants providing added value to the companies; 23 per cent of 
companies act as trainers providing the extra service to the companies; yet 49 per cent 
of companies’ ACs act as the decision maker through involvement in making 
important company policies, which seems in conflict with the independent 
supervisory functions of AC.  
It is concluded that this result supports the theory of Resource Dependency. The AC 
provides added value and extra services in addition to independent control of overseer 
in the actual process and the supervision.  
In order to know more about the operations of the supervisory functions, a sampled 
machinery company with the AC has been interviewed as the following:  
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6.2.5 The Sampled Corporation B – Machinery Industry (with the AC) 
The general secretary of the BoD arranged the interview between author and 
interviewees. Before conducting the interviews with the supervisors and the members 
of the AC, Mr. Wang was interviewed as follows:  
 Wang, F-x. 王阜西 (2007). Interview with Mr. Wang Fuxi (王阜西), Secretary of 
the BoD of the Hangcha Engineering Machinery Co., Ltd. (杭叉公司), on 25th July 
2007. Hangzhou. [Video recording in possession of author] 
1. Please describe the AC of your company. 
It was formed within the last year. It works under the BoD. According to the 
constitutions of the company, it audits the operations of the whole company and the 
performance of the higher management. Its goal on financial audit is the same as 
that of the SB.  
2. Since the goals of the AC and the SB are the same, is there overlap between 
their functions? Has there been any consideration on the cost of supervision? 
How do they share the workload of supervision? 
Because of the formation of the AC by the introduction of the independent directors 
was not done until the end of the previous year (2006), its operation does not fully 
comply with the requirement. The function of the AC has not been identified in the 
last half year or so. Whereas the SB publishes its supervisory report biannually, and 
is mainly retrospective supervision, so theoretically, there is a need to increase 
progressive and concurrent supervisions. As there is the additional supervisory 
institution, I suppose the scope of supervision can be widened. Our company has 
not yet looked into the issue of the cost of supervision, probably because the 
supervisory function of the AC has not yet been fully realised, and there is no 
monetary cost for the SB. Currently, there are two stakeholders’ SB members, who 
are paid nothing other than their salaries for their respective roles in the company. 
The stockholder SB member is appointed by the government, who receives his own 
salary from his own organisation. The company does not need to pay these 
members for their supervisory work. The company only needs to pay the 
independent directors. It is a fixed sum determined by the General Assembly 
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Meeting. The independent directors mainly attend the meetings of the BoD, and 
they tend to take the viewpoints of the minor and medium stockholders in their 
advice during the decision making process of the meetings of the BoD. On the 
other hand, the SB tends to take the viewpoints of the major stockholders in their 
retrospective supervision on the operations of the company. The functions of the 
two institutions are different.  
3. How does the SB operate? 
Its operation is simple. It does not operate much since its formation. Currently, it 
only reviews the financial and audit reports before the meetings, and discuss in 
their own meetings if there is any major problem. Apart from these, it does not 
perform any day-to-day supervision. Its focus is not the same as the internal audit 
department. The SB supervises mainly by reviewing reports, followed by oral 
enquiries if necessary.  
4. Which documents are provided for the members of the SB?  
Essentially, it is the same data available for the BoD before their meetings, such as 
the audit report, the BoD report, financial report, and the assessment of the 
performance of the higher management.  
5. Is there specific meeting agenda for the SB? Is there clear specification as to 
which documents should be reviewed by the members of the SB? Do its members 
meet before the meetings of the BoD?  
Yes, there is. I will give you a copy of the regulations on the meetings of the SB for 
your reference. This is compiled according to the responsibilities and procedures 
specified in the Company Act. The meetings of SB are held after the meetings of 
the BoD rather than before, but copies of relevant documents will be delivered by 
the Secretary of the BoD (me) to the Directors and SB members ten days before the 
meeting of the BoD.  
6. Are there areas for improvement in the current supervisory system?  
There are three areas (concerning the SB) for improvement. First, it is not a 
dedicated role. Improvement is needed to improve the level of participation. 
Secondly, there is need to enhance professional competence, especially for the 
stakeholder members, who might not be able to understand financial reports. 
Thirdly, its membership should be a dedicated position. Currently, it is overseen by 
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stakeholders, and it is difficult to realise its supervisory function. There is 
justifiable consideration behind having stakeholder members elected by the union, 
but there is the issue of independence. On the other hand, there is specific 
requirement on the professional level of the AC, and it consists of independent 
directors, so it is expected to be able to compensate the weakness of the SB.  
7. There are both the SB and the AC in Chinese system. How should these be 
organised in the organisational structure?  
The Chinese system has been through the history of the Three Old Institutions and 
the Three New Institutions. Combining with the global trends in the supervisory 
mechanisms, the special context of the Chinese system is formed. The Three Old 
Institutions (in state owned enterprises) are the Stakeholders’ Representatives’ 
Committee, the Management and Party Officers’ Committee. Our company was a 
Party-owned enterprise. The political atmosphere was a bit strong then. Now under 
the system of market economy, the economic tone is stronger. Currently, it is a 
semi-state-owned-and-semi-private enterprise. These characteristics need to be 
further integrated to suit the specific culture of China.  
8. How should the supervisory function be enhanced in practice in the future?  
First the professional competence of the members needs to be improved. Then the 
supervisory culture of the enterprise needs to be improved, and an environment 
conducive to proper supervision needs to be formed. The fundamental issue of 
independence need to be resolved, otherwise it is difficult to realise the supervisory 
function. 
9. Are there informal meetings between the SB and the AC?  
No. 
10. How long is a meeting by either the SB or the AC?  
A meeting of the SB is usually about half an hour, and it never lasts longer than an 
hour. It usually checks if there is any problem and then follow the motion of the 
specified agenda and procedures rather than investigating deeply into any problem. 
The AC has not met yet.  
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Summary 
This sampled machinery company established the AC only within one year of the 
interview day. It is in the process of completing the operation of ACs. Mr. Wang 
admitted that “its operation does not fully comply with the requirement.” Its co-
ordination with the SB is also under construction. He identified the functions of the 
two institutions as being different, and differentiated them in terms of the AC tending 
to take the viewpoints of the minor and medium stockholders into account during the 
decision making process of the meetings of the BoD, whereas the SB tends to focus 
on the viewpoints of the major stockholders in their retrospective supervisions.  
Mr. Wang said the operation of SB is simple, and does not operate much since its 
formation. A meeting of the SB is usually about half an hour when not investigating 
deeply into any problem. Currently the SB supervises mainly by reviewing reports of 
the same data available for the BoD before their meetings: such as the audit report, the 
BoD report, financial report, and the assessment of the performance of higher 
management, followed by verbal enquiries if necessary. Then the meetings of SB are 
held after the meetings of the BoD rather than before. Mr. Wang identified the areas 
for improvement in the current supervisory system as follows: 
1. It does not have dedicated supervisors. Improvement is needed to improve the 
level of participation. Its membership should be a dedicated position. Currently, it 
is overseen by stakeholders, and it is difficult to realise its supervisory function.  
2. There is a need to enhance professional competence, especially among 
stakeholder members, who might not be able to understand financial reports.  
3. There is justifiable consideration for having stakeholder members elected by the 
union, but this leads to issues of independence.  
4. Then the supervisory culture of the enterprise needs to be improved, and an 
environment conducive to proper supervision formed. 
Mr. Wang expects the installation of the AC to enhance levels of professionalism and 
independence, compensating for the weakness of the SB. He also mentioned that his 
company has been transformed from fully state owned to a semi-state-owned-and-
semi-private enterprise, and he recognises it is now part of a system of market 
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economy, so highlights the necessity of introducing the AC to fit into international 
practice, while simultaneously suiting the specific culture of China with the SB.  
In order to understand more about the operations of SB, the Chair of the SB was 
introduced by Mr. Wang for interview by the author as follows:  
Shen, J-h. 沈劍華 (2007). Interview with Mr. Shen Jianhua (沈劍華), Chair of the 
BoD and Legal Advisor of the Hangcha Engineering Machinery Co., Ltd. (杭叉公
司), accompanied by Mr. Wang Fuxi (王阜西), Secretary of the BoD, on 25th July 
2007. Hangzhou. [Video recording in possession of author] 
1. There are both the SB and the AC in the Chinese system. What is your view on 
the functions and operations of these two institutions? 
I have not been the Chair of the SB for long, but I have been involved in the 
process of company transition. Currently, both institutions have been formed in our 
company. This is to comply with the requirement of the Company Act, and 
concerns the legitimacy of the conduct of both the company and the higher 
management according to the constitution of the company. In my opinion, the AC 
is a more microscopic viewpoint. As to me, I am Chairs of both the SB and the 
committee of the Union, so the conduct of both the company and the higher 
management should be reviewed for their legitimacy and rationality. The 
consideration of rationality is from the angle of the Union, but this should not 
conflict with legitimacy.  
2. Is it your recommendation to have two stakeholders’ representatives on the 
SB? 
Yes. 
3. Having both the SB and the AC, there is the possibility that their functions 
may overlap. What is your opinion on this issue? 
In my opinion, there is not much overlap. The independent directors mainly 
participate in the operations of the BoD. The SB is parallel to the BoD. It is an 
independent institution; whereas the AC observes the operations of the company 
from a microscopic angle.  
4. What are the focal points when you call for the meetings of the SB? 
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First, it is the level of execution of the resolutions by the BoD after the General 
Assembly Meeting. Secondly, it is the supervision of the taking of major decisions 
by the BoD according to the Company Act, Stock Exchange Regulations and the 
constitutions of the company. Thirdly, it is the level of legitimacy of the conducts 
of the BoD and the higher management, supervised by the members of the SB. 
5. In your opinion, what is the level of professional competence of the SB 
regarding the auditing of the financial report?  
I myself am definitely not an expert. There are accounting professionals in the SB. 
As the SB needs to oversee financial reporting, this is mainly done by the member 
with expertise in accounting. If he raises any questions, other members will assist 
accordingly.  
6. Has the SB performed any supervision or interpretation about the assessments, 
including the internal auditing? 
The BoD is more mature in its operations in this regard. Since this term of service 
of mine (which is my first term), there have not been many questions raised. This is 
because the SB mainly supervises the BoD, and the BoD is the main decision 
making institution.  
7. How frequently does the SB interact with the management under the BoD? 
Not frequently, but I attend every meeting of the BoD. 
8. Your job description is the permanent supervisor. Do you hold any other post 
in the company? 
I am also the Chair of the union and the internal legal advisor. The latter is for the 
conveniences of internal operations even though the company has also appointed 
external legal advisors.  
9. In your opinion, what are the strengths and weaknesses of the current 
operations of the SB? 
Our company has gone through certain historic transitions. It transformed from a 
wholly state owned organisation to a semi-state-owned one by releasing its stocks 
to its stakeholders, so the strength of the SB is that it is more democratic, having a 
good people foundation. A strength and weakness is its members are both 
stakeholders and stockholders. There are members elected by the stockholders as 
well as by stakeholders, so the relationship with the BoD is not the simple 
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relationship between the supervised and the supervisor. Hence, there are 
interactions before problems reach the explicit process of supervision in which a 
common ground is reached and problems solved or hidden. As to the weakness of 
the SB, the professional level of the members of the SB, including I myself, need to 
be improved to the international standard. This applies to both financial and 
management professions.  
10. Are there areas in the mechanism and interaction between the two 
institutions where improvements are needed? 
The interaction between the two institutions should collect more regularly the 
operational information of the company. The BoD does respect the SB, and does 
notify the SB in advance about new policies and resolutions. Improvements are 
needed in the understanding of day-to-day operations. Enhancement in this 
understanding can further pinpoint the source of problems. I personally do not 
understand much of the operations of the AC, and I suppose they have the same 
problem towards us. For instance, upon the call for meetings, the independent 
directors might not be able to grasp the day-to-day operations of the company, and 
there are considerations on the qualities of their members.  
11. How do you expect the two institutions to interact and cooperate? 
The AC consists of independent directors and it is expected that they will sing a 
different tune. In some respect, it is good to have different voices. Having everyone 
singing in accord is not necessary a good thing. It is also expected that the 
independent directors can bring in the benefits of external links. This is because 
what they have experienced and encountered is different from those of our internal 
staff. They should be allowed to utilise their advantages to bring positive assistance 
to the company. To sum up, it is expected that they will bring in new ideas and 
links to the external environment, utilising their resources to enhance the company.  
12. What is the standard of supervision? 
For instance, the financial reports are audited according to the earnings conditions, 
following the GAAP, from structural items to practical items.  
13. Are you involved in appointing external auditors? 
No. It is determined by the BoD. 
14. In your opinion, what improvements are needed to realise the supervisory 
Page 258 PhD Thesis, University of Manchester Pao-Chen Lee 
mechanism of corporate governance?  
To further enhance or perfect supervisory effectiveness and function, first the 
quality of the members needs to be improved. Secondly, more attention is needed 
on the understanding of the process of the operations of the SB. Thirdly, the 
viewpoint of the SB is somewhat macroscopic; efforts might be needed to deepen 
and refine its view to be able to identify problems in advance and act as a problem 
prevention mechanism.  
Summary 
Mr. Shen is Chair of both the SB and committee of the Union, as well as the internal 
legal advisor. Like the SB Chair of sampled chemical Corporation A, he also has a 
legal professional background. The other two supervisors were recommended by Mr. 
Shen; and it may be assumed that, as its Chair, he has absolute power in implementing 
its supervisory functions in this sampled machinery Corporation B.  
Mr. Shen believes there is not much overlapping in these two institutions’ functions 
for they are located in different organisations. He stresses that the AC has a more 
microscopic viewpoint and the SB, a more macroscopic one. He also highlights key 
functions of the SB, namely: (1) Resolutions by the BoD after the General Assembly 
Meeting; (2) Supervising the major decisions by the BoD; (3) Supervising the 
compliance level of legitimacy of the conduct of the BoD and higher management. Mr. 
Shen is also aware that the SB needs to oversee financial reporting, which he admitted 
he has no expertise in. Accordingly, this is mainly carried out by the member with 
accounting expertise. The SB does not interact with or use the resource of internal 
auditing, nor frequently interact with the management: the SB merely supervises the 
BoD, and the latter is the main decision making institution. Thus he attends every 
meeting of the BoD. 
Mr. Shen asserts that a strength and weakness of the SB pertains to its membership 
being both stakeholders and stockholders. As members are elected by stockholders 
and stakeholders, its relationship with the BoD is not merely that between supervised 
and supervisor. Hence, one clear weakness of the SB lies in the interactions in which 
common ground is reached and problems solved or buried occur before an explicit 
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process of supervision becomes necessary. Moreover, it is urgent for it to have more 
members from a financial or managerial background to conform to international 
standards.  
Mr. Shen highlights two areas in which the co-ordination of the two institutions when 
implementing supervisory functions needs to be improved:  
(1) The interaction between the two institutions should collate more regularly the 
operational information of the company.  
(2) Improvements are needed in the understanding of day-to-day operations. 
Enhancement in this understanding can further pinpoint sources of problems.  
He also expects to utilise the independent directors, bringing in new ideas and 
external links to enhance the company.  
Mr. Shen summarises his comments as follows: first, membership quality needs to be 
improved. Second, more attention is needed on  understanding the processes of the SB. 
Third, the perspective  of the SB is somewhat macroscopic; efforts might be needed to 
deepen and refine its view, in order to identify problems in advance and act as a 
problem prevention mechanism. 
To understand the process behind the implementation of the AC, its Chair was 
introduced to the author by Mr. Wang, General Secretary of the BoD. The resulting 
interview was as follows:  
Xu, L. (2007). Interview with Mr. Xu Lida (許立達), AC member and Chief 
Financial Officer of the Hangcha Engineering Machinery Co., Ltd. (杭叉公司), 
accompanied by Wang Fuxi (王阜西), Secretary of the BoD, on 25th July 2007. 
Hangzhou. [Video recording in possession of author] 
1. Your company has just installed the AC. In your opinion, what is the reason 
behind its installation? 
I don’t think there is conflict between the SB and the AC. I think that the SBs in 
China’s enterprises have not yet attained the standard it should have been in theory. 
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Perhaps it is because of this, or because of the different operations in different 
countries, that we have observed some differences between our operations and the 
French companies that we came in touch with. Their SB operates at a different 
level than ours. The BoD has to report to the SB, and does not execute their plans 
without the approval of the latter. Whereas in our system, both the BoD and the SB 
report to the General Assembly Meeting. The BoD does not require the prior 
approval of the SB for its operations. Such a difference in corporate structure may 
have affected the effectiveness of the CG functions.  
2. Now that you have both the SB and the AC, how should these two departments 
share their supervisory roles? 
Theoretically, there must be some point in introducing the AC from the Anglo-
American model. There are several reasons why the SB has not functioned as 
expected. First, in the Chinese context, many things are just formalities. There is no 
actual cultural backing for supervision. The members of the SB might be wary that 
they would be shunned by the management and the colleagues if they try too hard. 
Without the backing of the proper cultural environment, they are powerless in 
supervision. Secondly, the members of the SB mostly take on the role on a part-
time basis, so they are reluctant in involving in the actual processes of supervision, 
so they probably do not really understand the onus of supervision, and ended up 
reviewing the final reports only. The main reason, basically, is that they don’t really 
want to supervise. Therefore, work should be done on changing the culture. The 
management should value the supervisory functions, and provide the members of 
the SB with necessary data and documents, rather than preventing the latter’s 
involvement in the operations.  
3. What do you think the main focus of the financial supervision of the AC would 
be? 
It would be to abide by relevant laws and regulations. Their evaluation and 
selection of external auditors should be based on the latter’s reputation and track 
record.  
4. How do you think should the AC function? 
Currently, there are three members of the AC. Two of these are independent 
directors, and I am the only internal member. The operation of the AC should be 
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led by the two independent directors to ensure the independence of the AC. I 
myself am the Chief Financial Officer overseeing financial reporting. I don’t think 
there is any regulatory concern over this, but if the independent directors think 
otherwise, we should follow their opinion, which account for two thirds of the AC. 
Also, current regulation dictates that more than half of the members of the AC 
should be independent directors, but I think it would be more in line with the 
consideration on the independence of the AC if all members would be independent 
directors.  
5. How should the AC operate? 
There is an internal constitution for the AC, so the AC should operate accordingly. 
The independent director should call for meetings. The members of the AC meet 
once a season, but there isn’t much communication amongst them otherwise.  
Secretary Wang: We have just formed our AC in the beginning of this year (2007) 
and its operation and promotion is still wanting. The convener is experienced (in 
auditing and supervision), and we expect him to direct us in the operations of the 
AC. We have focused on complying with the relevant regulations for the sake of 
being a listed company.  
6. Please elaborate on the relations between the AC and the internal audit in your 
company.  
Initially, the internal audit was under the direct control of the Managing Director. 
Now it is promoted to be directly under the BoD. Though both the AC and internal 
audit have the functions of auditing, each has its own emphasis. The internal audit 
focuses on the details such as the supervision of internal control, whereas the AC 
takes a more macroscopic view. In the future, the internal audit unit should be 
installed under the AC so as to facilitate their co-operations. My primary role is the 
Chief Financial Officer, which is supposed to be supervised (by the internal audit), 
yet I am also a member of the AC (which is above the internal audit), and this is 
somewhat unusual. There are only three employees in the internal audit. I think it is 
necessary to enhance its function. Now the regulation for this is in place, we should 
focus on its installation. This should start with the formation of a culture and 
mindset conducive to its proper operation to distil the sense of importance in the 
auditing functions and willingness of the colleagues in cooperating with auditing 
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departments in enabling their proper operations.  
7a. What are the problems facing supervision? 
As the AC has just been installed, it is still not fully functioning as specified by the 
regulations and expectations, so it is difficult to say if there would be any further 
problem in its operation. 
7b. Is there any area in its three main functions of the AC, i.e., financial 
reporting, auditing and internal control, in which improvement is needed? 
The crucial point, theoretically, is to instil the mindset throughout the organisation 
of the importance of supervision and to improve the quality of the auditing staff. 
The operation of the SB and the AC should focus on the levels specified by the 
regulations so as to identify problems. In the current operation, the SB mainly 
oversees the results rather than the processes, and the members do not really strive 
to perform properly as this is not their main roles in the company. It is lacking in 
the level of supervision of the processes and the level of support the company gives 
to supervision. 
8a. Does the members of the AC meet before the meetings of the BoD to review 
the reports? How does it overcome the neglects in supervising the processes? 
This is not done at the moment.  
8b. Will it be done in the future? 
The Chief Financial Officer stresses the importance of financial data, and the effect 
of internal control is shown in the data. The supervision of processes should have 
been done on a daily basis rather than waiting for the AC to evaluate it before the 
Board of Director meetings.  
(The Chief Financial Officer went to answer a phone call) 
Secretary Wang: Because of his unique position in the company, Mr. Xu needs to 
know the financial condition because of his main role as the Chief Financial 
Officer, and since he is also the Chair of the AC, it is not necessary for the AC to 
meet before the BoD’ meetings to know the situation of internal control. Actually, 
the financial unit itself provides certain level of daily control.  
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Summary 
Mr. Xu is a member of the AC and also the Chief Financial Officer overseeing 
financial reporting. He said: “My primary role is the Chief Financial Officer, which is 
supposed to be supervised (by the internal audit), yet I am also a member of the AC 
(which is above the internal audit), and this is somewhat unusual.” Yet he thinks that 
the supervision of processes should be done on a daily basis, rather than wait for the 
AC to evaluate it before Board of Director meetings. Secretary Wang added that 
because of his unique position in the company as Chief Financial Officer, and since 
he is also the Chair of the AC, it is not necessary for the AC to meet before BoD 
meetings in order to know the situation of internal control. Mr. Wang points out that 
the financial unit itself provides certain levels of daily control. Regarding the 
composition of the AC, its current status still meets with Chinese regulations, in that 
over half the members are independent directors. Mr. Xu concluded: “I think it would 
be more in line with the consideration on the independence of the AC if all members 
would be independent directors.” 
The other two members of the AC are independent directors. Explaining the reasons 
behind installing the AC, Mr. Xu stressed that the SB has not functioned as expected: 
(1) Because of different operations in different countries of direct line reporting, in 
China, the BoD does not require the prior approval of the SB for its operations. He 
therefore considers such a difference in corporate structure may have affected the 
effectiveness of CG functions. 
(2) The members of the SB might be wary that they would be shunned by the 
management and the colleagues if they try too hard. Without the backing of the 
proper cultural environment, they are rendered powerless.  
(3) The members of the SB mostly take on the role on a part-time basis, so are 
reluctant to involve themselves in the actual processes of supervision. 
Consequently, they probably do not truly understand the process of supervision, 
so end up reviewing the final reports only.  
Mr. Xu commented simply that, “the main reason, basically, is that they (supervisors) 
don’t really want to supervise; therefore, work should be done on changing the 
culture.” Mr. Xu has the same viewpoint on the question of implementing supervisory 
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functions, in order to comply with the relevant laws and regulations. Mr. Wang added 
that: “We have focused on complying with the relevant regulations for the sake of 
being a listed company.” It seems that complying with the regulations for being a 
listed company was another reason behind installing the AC.  
AC meetings are mainly called by the Chair (as well as once each season by the 
independent directors), but there is not much communication amongst the members; 
nor are any meetings held before meetings of the BoD. As the AC was installed just 
over half a year before the day the interview was conducted, Mr. Xu admitted, “it is 
still not fully functioning as specified by the regulations and expectations, so it is 
difficult to say if there would be any further problems in its operation.” Mr. Xu 
expects the internal audit reports of the AC to help facilitate better co-operation in the 
future. Mr. Xu focused on the formation of a culture and mindset conducive to proper 
operation of the AC: distilling a sense of importance in the auditing functions and 
willingness of colleagues to co-operating with auditing departments.  
Mr. Xu identified ways in which to improve the implementation of supervisory 
functions, by improving the level of supervision of the processes, and the level of 
support the company gives to supervision. He believes it is important to improve the 
quality of auditing staff, and remedy the current problem of members not really 
striving to perform their AC roles properly. 
The SB and AC are the supervisory institutions under different CG models. It is 
assumed that incorporating both into one model will result in functional overlaps and 
gaps.  
What is the overlapping status of the supervisory functions of two institutions? This 
sub-question has been raised during the interviews of two sampled companies. The 
following section is therefore intended to provide an answer.  
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6.2.6 The Overlapping Status of the Supervisory Functions of the SB and 
the AC in China 
Introduction 
According to the evidence of the six interviewees, two of them, Ms. Jia and Mr. Xu, 
believe the functions of the two institutions overlap in practice; whereas the remaining 
four, Mr. Chao, Mr. Bao, Mr. Wang and Mr. Shen, could not find common agreement. 
Some assert the levels of overlap are not much; some described one as the supervisory 
unit, the other as the executing unit. Considering that of the two sampled companies, 
one had only just begun to form the AC, whereas the other had formed it barely six 
months previously, the interviewees’ understanding of the overlap of supervisory 
functions may not reflect the reality: indeed, Mr. Shen specifically mentioned the 
need to better understand the day-to-day operations of the two institutions’ 
supervisory functions. Further investigation on operational aspects of these two 
institutions – the overlapping items and percentages between them – was therefore 
performed through a survey of five listed companies with experience of having 
implemented ACs.  
The operational aspects of supervisory functions by SBs and ACs  
It was found that there was overlapping in both financial oversight and compliance 
oversight. First, in 2006, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) specified the SB 
as the special institution for financial inspection and supervision, whereas in 2002 the 
Chinese Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) mandated that both the SB and the 
AC were responsible for financial supervision, and both have the same financial 
supervisory function of overseeing the authenticity and reasonableness of the 
disclosure of the company’s accounting information. Second, both are responsible for 
safeguarding against questionable conduct of the Directors, and related transactions of 
senior managers. Therefore, both try to operate within their functions on the same 
issue, identified as including financial reporting, auditing, internal control and 
compliance, as listed in Table 41.  
The following operational items of supervisory functions are itemised and 
summarised through research of the charters of the SB and the AC of the five 
Page 266 PhD Thesis, University of Manchester Pao-Chen Lee 
surveyed companies, survey by face to face interview of two sampled companies, and 
through related professional websites, mainly www.knowledgeleader.com; 
www.aicpa.org; www.nyse.com; www.sec.gov; and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Aspect A: Financial Reporting, totalling 23 items.  
This was broken down into three key supervisory areas: 
(A) Review the documents, meeting and discussion: 11 items.  
(B) Oversight of the interim financial report:  4 items; and 
(C) Oversight of the annual financial report: 8 items.  
(A) Review the documents, meeting and discussion:  
(1) To review the filings with the SEC and other published documents (1.1.1).   
(2) To review the chairman of the unit participate in a telephonic meeting among 
finance management and the public accounting firm prior to earnings release 
(1.1.2). 
(3) To review the Company’s critical accounting policies (1.1.3). 
(4) To have a full understanding of the composition of the company's balance sheet 
(1.1.4).  
(5) To review financial ratios and indicators (1.1.5). 
(6) To discuss significant/complex/unusual transactions (1.1.6). 
(7) To discuss assumptions/approaches regarding which areas represent high risk of 
material mis-statement of the financial statements (1.1.7). 
(8) To review any significant changes to GAAP and/or MAP policies or standards 
(1.1.8).   
(9) To review policies and procedures with respect to transactions which are not a 
normal part of the Company’s business (1.1.9).   
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(10) To understand and approve the Company's approach to providing earnings 
guidance, and to discuss financial information and earnings guidance provided to 
analysts and rating agencies with management, ideally before the 
information/guidance is released (1.1.10). 
(11) To review periodic reports on the appropriateness of executives', officers', and 
directors' expenses and perquisites (1.1.11). 
(B) Oversight of Interim Financial Reports:  
(1) The unit's involvement prior to release of earnings/filings (1.2.1).  
(2) All the unit’s members involved in overseeing interim reports (1.2.2).  
(3) To review and discuss the earnings releases and any significant issues, in order to 
be satisfied that disclosures are adequate, before the earnings are released (1.2.3).  
(4) To review and discuss with management (and the external auditors) the quarterly 
filings, any related issues, and any differences from earnings releases, before 
filing takes place (1.2.4).  
(C) Oversight of Annual Financial Reports:  
(1) To review with finance management and the public accounting firm at the 
completion of the annual audit: 
(a) The Company’s annual financial statements and related footnotes (1.3.1.a).  
(b) The public accounting firm’s audit of the financial statements and its report 
therein (1.3.1.b).  
(c) Any significant changes required in the public accounting firm’s audit plan 
(1.3.1.c). 
(d) Any serious difficulties or disputes with management encountered during the 
courses of the audit (1.3.1.d). 
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(e) Other matters related to the conduct of the audit, which are to be communicated to 
the Committee under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (1.3.1.e). 
(2) To commit sufficient time to review, discuss and consider the financial statements 
(1.3.2). 
(3) To discuss with selected corporate officers (e.g. compliance officer, legal counsel, 
tax director, Internal Audit etc.) and external auditors the substance and quality of 
reserves, judgements, and estimates used in the financial statements, and the 
issues that may have an impact on such reserves and estimates (1.3.3).  
(4) Based on its review and discussions with management and the external auditors, 
establishing whether the unit is comfortable in recommending to the 
BoD/shareholders that the audited financial statements be included in the 
company's SEC filing (1.3.4).  
Aspect B: Auditing: 21 items:  
There are two major functions on oversight auditing, broken down into:  
(A) Oversight of independent auditors: 12 items; 
(B) Oversight Internal Audit: 9 items. 
(A) Independent Auditor 
(1) To appoint, approve the compensation of and provide oversight of the public 
accounting firm (2.1.1). 
(2) To confirm annually the independence of the public accounting firm, and 
quarterly review the firm’s non-audit services and related fees (2.1.2). 
(3) To embrace its direct responsibility to oversee the engagement of the external 
auditors (2.1.3). 
(4) To pre-approve the audit work to be performed (2.1.4). 
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(5) To approve the proposed audit fees and be comfortable they are appropriate for 
the scope of work envisioned (2.1.5). 
(6) To discuss with the external auditors the scope of their annual audit, key risk 
areas, how the auditing plan responds to the risk of financial statement fraud and 
approves modifications to the annual auditing plan (2.1.6). 
(7) To review material written communications the external auditors provide to 
management and discuss any concerns (2.1.7).  
(8) To receive annually the letter disclosing all relationships between the external 
auditors and the company, discuss it with the external auditors, assess impacts on 
the auditor's independence, and make any recommendations needed to the 
board/shareholder for actions to ensure the auditor's independence (2.1.8). 
(9) To discuss with the external auditors difficulties encountered in performing the 
audit and improvements considered for future engagements (2.1.9).  
(10) To resolve disagreements between management and the external auditors 
regarding financial reporting, if needed (2.1.10). 
(11) To pre-approve all non-audit work to be performed by the external auditors, after 
considering its permissibility under SEC rules and its impact on auditor 
independence (2.1.11). 
(12) To set clear hiring policies for employees or former employees of the external 
audit firm (2.1.12). 
(B) Oversight of the Internal Audit 
(1) Does the unit consider and review with Finance management and the Internal 
Audit Director? 
a.  Significant findings during the year and management’s responses thereto (2.2.1.a). 
b.  Any difficulties encountered in the course of their audits, including any 
restrictions on the scope of their work or access to required information (2.2.1.b). 
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c.  Any changes required in planned scope of their audit plan (2.2.1.c). 
(2) To review and concur in the appointment, replacement, reassignment, or 
dismissal of the Chief Audit Executive (CAE) (2.2.2). 
(3) To ensure direct access to Internal Audit – either through a direct or dotted line 
reporting relationship with Internal Audit – supporting its independence from 
management (2.2.3). 
(4) To hold regular private meetings with the director of Internal Audit to allow frank 
discussion of issues and concerns (2.2.4). 
(5) To review with the Internal Audit Director, the public accounting firm and 
Finance management the audit scope and plan, and co-ordination of audit efforts 
to assure completeness of coverage, reduction of redundant efforts, the effective 
use of audit resources, and the use of independent public accountants other than 
the appointed auditors of MS (2.2.5). 
(6) ACs and SBs interact with the public accounting firm and the Chief Internal 
Audit as regards: 
(a) The adequacy of the Company’s internal controls including computerised 
information system controls and security (2.6.a). 
(b) Any related significant findings and recommendations of the independent public 
accountants and Internal Audit together with management’s responses thereto 
(2.6.b). 
Aspect C: Internal Control and Compliance: 22 items  
There are two major functions on oversight internal control and compliance, broken 
down into:  
(A) Oversight of internal control: 13 items. 
(B) Oversight of compliance: 9 items. 
(A) Internal Control  
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(1) To understand internal controls, their role in the organisation, and how they are to 
work (3.1.1). 
(2) To discuss with management any significant deficiencies or material weaknesses 
identified in the design or operation of internal controls, implications, steps 
management has taken to ensure the financial reports are reliable, and the 
adequacy of corrective actions underway; and as appropriate, the committee 
discusses these internal control issues with the internal and external auditors 
(3.1.2). 
(3) To meet regularly with Internal Audit and discuss internal control deficiencies 
discovered during the course of its work, its recommendations for addressing the 
deficiencies, and management's response. The committee then monitors the status 
of management's corrective action (3.1.3). 
(4) To discuss with the external auditors any significant deficiencies or material 
weaknesses discovered during the course of their work and control improvement 
suggestions. Does it discuss with management how the deficiencies are being 
addressed? (3.1.4). 
(5) To consider the need to engage outside advisors (e.g. counsel, forensic auditors) 
when concerns arise about significant fraud or impropriety on the part of 
management; the unit actively directs such advisors and expert in their 
engagements (3.1.5). 
(6) To review regularly the trends in complaints received about accounting, internal 
accounting controls, and auditing matters, and be satisfied with corrective actions 
taken by management and that management and the external auditors have 
adequately taken into account the impact of the complaints on the financial 
statements and the audit (3.1.6). 
(7) To ask members of management or others to attend the meeting and provide 
pertinent information as necessary (3.1.7). 
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(8) To enquire of Finance management, the Internal Auditor head, and the public 
accounting firm about significant risks or exposures and assess the steps 
management has taken to minimise such risk to the Company (3.1.8). 
(9) To have sufficient time provided for private meetings with Internal Audit, 
external auditors, and management (3.1.9). 
(10) To meet with the public accounting firm in executive session to discuss any 
matters that the unit or the public accounting firm believe should be discussed 
privately with the unit (3.1.10). 
(11) To meet with the Internal Audit Director in executive sessions to discuss any 
matters that the unit or the Internal Audit Director believes should be discussed 
privately with the unit (3.1.11). 
(12) To meet with Finance management in executive sessions to discuss any matters 
that the unit or Finance management believes should be discussed privately with 
the unit (3.1.12). 
(13) To prepare the agenda for the unit's meetings in consultation between the unit's 
Chair (with input from the Committee members), Finance management, the 
Internal Audit Director and the public accounting firm (3.1.13). 
(B) Compliance 
(1) To understand and periodically update its understanding of the major legal and 
compliance risks facing the company, how management addresses those risks; 
what impact the risks have on the financial statements; and how management 
monitors emerging risks (3.2.1). 
(2) To monitor the appropriate standards adopted as a code of conduct for the 
company. Does the unit review with Finance management and Legal and 
Corporate Affairs the results of the review of the Company’s monitoring 
compliance with such standards and its compliance policies? (3.2.2). 
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(3) To review legal and regulatory matters that may have a material impact on the 
financial statements, related Company compliance policies, and programs and 
reports received from regulators (3.2.3). 
(4) To discuss periodically with management policies with respect to risk assessment 
and risk management. This discussion includes an understanding of how 
management learns about emerging risks (3.2.4). 
(5) To provide an open avenue of communication between the Internal Auditors, the 
public accounting firm, finance management and the BoD; and to report the unit's 
actions to the BoD / shareholders with such recommendations as the unit may 
deem appropriate (3.2.5). 
(6). To overview the establishment of procedures for receipts, retention, and treatment 
of complaints received by the company regarding accounting, internal accounting 
controls, or auditing matters, including anonymous submissions by employees 
(3.2.6). 
(7) To have the power to conduct or authorise investigations into any matters within 
the unit’s scope of responsibilities; to be empowered to retain independent 
counsel, accountants, or others to assist it in the conduct of any investigation 
(3.2.7). 
(8). To report after each meeting to the board/shareholders’ meeting on the unit's 
activities, major issues discussed, and recommendations for board/shareholder 
actions (3.2.8). 
(9) To provide a report in the annual proxy that includes the unit’s review and 
discussion of matters with management and the independent public accounting 
firm (3.2.9). 
Table 41. The Supervisory Functions between the SB and the AC 
(Source: Author with data from charters & websites: 
www.knowledgeleader.com; www.aicpa.org; www.nyse.com; www.sec.gov; 
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) 
No. Appraisal Questions Overlapping(O) 
/ Missing (M) 
SB AC 
  O M Yes No U Yes No U 
1 Financial Reporting (Total O/M Items) 21 12       
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No. Appraisal Questions Overlapping(O) 
/ Missing (M) 
SB AC 
  O M Yes No U Yes No U 
1.1 Review Documents and Meeting and Discussion 
(Total O/M Items) 
10 7       
1.1.1 Does the unit review filings (including interim 
reporting) with the SEC and other published 
documents containing the Company’s financial 
statements and does it consider whether the 
information is accurate? 
3 2 3 2 0 3 2 0 
1.1.2 Will the Chairman of the unit participate in a 
telephonic meeting among Finance 
management and the public accounting firm 
prior to earnings release? 
0 3 0 4 1 1 3 1 
1.1.3 Does the unit review the Company’s critical 
accounting policies with Finance management 
and the public accounting firm at least annually? 
1 2 1 4 0 3 2 0 
1.1.4 Does the unit have a full understanding of the 
composition of the company's balance sheet, 
including the degree of management judgement 
inherent in the various accounts? 
1 0 1 4 0 5 0 0 
1.1.5 Does the unit understand which financial ratios 
and indicators are key to the company and 
industry, how the company's performance 
compares with its budgetary targets and its 
competitors, and how management plans to 
address any unfavourable variances? 
3 1 3 1 1 4 1 0 
1.1.6 Does the unit discuss 
significant/complex/unusual transactions with 
management and the external auditors? 
3 0 3 1 1 5 0 0 
1.1.7 Does the unit understand which areas represent 
high risk for material mis-statement of the 
financial statements, and discuss 
assumptions/approaches used with 
management and the external auditors? 
3 1 3 2 0 4 1 0 
1.1.8 Does the unit review with Finance management 
any significant changes to GAAP and/or MAP 
policies or standards? 
3 0 3 1 1 4 0 1 
1.1.9 Does the unit review policies and procedures 
with respect to transactions between the 
Company and officers and directors, or affiliates 
of officers or directors, or transactions that are 
not a normal part of the Company’s business? 
4 0 4 0 1 4 0 1 
1.1.10 Does the unit understand and approve the 
company's approach to providing earnings 
guidance?  Does the unit discuss financial 
information and earnings guidance provided to 
analysts and rating agencies with management, 
ideally before the information/guidance is 
released? 
3 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 
1.1.11 Does the unit review periodic reports on the 
appropriateness of executives', officers', and 
directors' expenses and perquisites?  
1 3 1 3 1 1 3 1 
1.2 Interim Financial Reports (Total O/M Items)  4 0       
1.2.1 Is the unit clear about its responsibilities for 
overseeing interim reports-discussing both 
earning releases and quarterly filings? Ideally, is 
the unit's involvement prior to release of 
earnings/filings? 
4 0 5 0 0 4 1 0 
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No. Appraisal Questions Overlapping(O) 
/ Missing (M) 
SB AC 
  O M Yes No U Yes No U 
1.2.2 Are all the unit’s members involved in 
overseeing interim reports? 
4 0 5 0 0 4 1 0 
1.2.3 Does the unit review and discuss the earnings 
releases and any significant issues, and is 
satisfied disclosures are adequate, before the 
earnings are released? 
4 0 5 0 0 4 1 0 
1.2.4 Does the unit review and discuss with 
management (and the external auditors) the 
quarterly filings, any related issues, and any 
differences from earnings releases, before filing 
takes place? 
4 0 5 0 0 4 1 0 
1.3 Annual Financial Reports (Total O/M Items) 7 5       
1.3.1 Review with Finance management and the 
public accounting firm at the completion of the 
annual audit: 
        
  a. The Company’s annual financial statements 
and related footnotes. 
3 0 3 2 0 5 0 0 
  b. The public accounting firm’s audit of the 
financial statements and its report thereon. 
4 0 4 1 0 5 0 0 
  c. Any significant changes required in the public 
accounting firm’s audit plan. 
3 1 3 2 0 4 1 0 
  d. Any serious difficulties or disputes with 
management encountered during the course of 
the audit. 
0 3 0 3 2 0 3 2 
  e. Other matters related to the conduct of the 
audit, which are to be communicated to the 
Committee under Generally Accepted 
Accounting Standards. 
3 1 3 2 0 4 1 0 
1.3.2 Does the unit commit sufficient time to review, 
discuss and consider the financial statements? 
4 1 4 1 0 4 1 0 
1.3.3 Does the unit discuss with selected corporate 
officers (e.g., compliance officer, legal counsel, 
tax director, Internal Audit, etc.) and external 
auditors the substance and quality of reserves, 
judgments, and estimates used in the financial 
statements, and the issues that may have an 
impact on such reserves and estimates? 
2 1 2 2 1 3 1 1 
1.3.4 Based on its review and discussions with 
management and the external auditors, is the 
unit comfortable in recommending to the 
BoD/shareholders that the audited financial 
statements be included in the company's SEC 
filing? 
5 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 
2 Auditing (Total O/M Items) 19 19       
2.1 Oversight Independent Auditor (Total O/M Items) 11 11       
2.1.1 Does the unit appoint, approve the 
compensation of, and provide oversight of the 
public accounting firm? 
1 3 1 4 0 2 3 0 
2.1.2 Does the unit confirm annually the 
independence of the public accounting firm, and 
quarterly review the firm’s non-audit services 
and related fees? 
2 2 2 3 0 3 2 0 
2.1.3 Has the unit embraced its direct responsibility to 
oversee the engagement of the external 
auditors? 
1 2 1 4 0 3 2 0 
2.1.4 Does the unit pre-approve the audit work to be 
performed? 
1 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 
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No. Appraisal Questions Overlapping(O) 
/ Missing (M) 
SB AC 
  O M Yes No U Yes No U 
2.1.5 Does the unit approve the proposed audit fees 
and is comfortable they are appropriate for the 
scope of work envisioned? 
2 2 2 2 1 3 2 0 
2.1.6 Does the unit discuss with the external auditors 
the scope of their annual audit, key risk areas, 
how the audit plan responds to the risk of 
financial statement fraud and approves 
modifications to the annual audit plan? 
2 2 2 2 1 3 2 0 
2.1.7 Does the unit review material written 
communications the external auditors provide to 
management and discuss any concerns? 
3 0 3 1 1 5 0 0 
2.1.8 Does the unit annually receive the letter 
disclosing all relationships between the external 
auditors and the company, discuss it with the 
external auditors, assess impacts on the 
auditor's independence, and make any 
recommendations needed to the 
board/shareholders for actions to ensure the 
auditor's independence? 
2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 
2.1.9 Does the unit discuss with the external auditors 
difficulties encountered in performing the audit 
and improvements considered for future 
engagements? 
2 1 2 3 0 3 1 1 
2.1.10 Does the unit resolve disagreements between 
management and the external auditors regarding 
financial reporting, if needed? 
0 2 0 5 0 2 2 1 
2.1.11 Does the unit pre-approve all non-audit work to 
be performed by the external auditors, after 
considering its permissibility under SEC rules 
and its impact on auditor independence? 
1 2 1 4 0 2 2 1 
2.1.12 Does the unit set clear hiring policies for 
employees or former employees of the external 
audit firm? 
1 3 1 3 1 1 3 1 
2.2 Oversight Internal Audit (Total O/M Items) 8 8       
2.2.1 Does the unit consider and review with Finance 
management and the Internal Audit Director: 
        
  a. Significant findings during the year and 
management’s responses thereto? 
1 1 1 1 3 2 1 2 
  b. Any difficulties encountered in the course of 
their audits, including any restrictions on the 
scope of their work or access to required 
information? 
2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 
  c. Any changes required in planned scope of 
their audit plan? 
2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 
2.2.2 Does the unit review and concur in the 
appointment, replacement, reassignment, or 
dismissal of the Chief Audit Executive (CAE)? 
0 3 0 4 1 0 3 2 
2.2.3 Does the unit ensure direct access to Internal 
Audit – either through a direct or dotted line 
reporting relationship with Internal Audit – 
supporting its independence from management? 
2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 
2.2.4 Does the unit hold regular private meetings with 
the director of Internal Audit to allow frank 
discussion of issues and concerns? 
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 
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No. Appraisal Questions Overlapping(O) 
/ Missing (M) 
SB AC 
  O M Yes No U Yes No U 
2.2.5 Does the unit review with the Internal Audit 
Director, the public accounting firm and Finance 
management the audit scope and plan, and co-
ordination of audit efforts to assure 
completeness of coverage, reduction of 
redundant efforts, the effective use of audit 
resources, and the use of independent public 
accountants other than the appointed auditors of 
MS? 
2 1 2 2 1 3 1 1 
2.2.6 Does the unit consider and review with the 
public accounting firm and the Internal Audit 
Director: 
        
  a. The adequacy of the Company’s internal 
controls including computerised information 
system controls and security? 
2 1 2 1 2 3 1 1 
  b. Any related significant findings and 
recommendations of the independent public 
accountants and Internal Audit together with 
management’s responses thereto? 
3 0 3 0 2 4 0 1 
3. Internal Controls and Compliance (Total O/M 
Items) 
22 9       
3.1 Internal Control  (Total O/M Items)  13 7       
3.1.1 Do the unit's members understand internal 
controls, their role in the organisation, and how 
they are to work? 
4 0 4 0 1 4 0 1 
3.1.2 Does the unit discuss with management any 
significant deficiencies or material weaknesses 
identified in the design or operation of internal 
controls, implications, steps management has 
taken to ensure the financial reports are reliable, 
and the adequacy of corrective actions 
underway, and as appropriate, the committee 
discusses these internal control issues with the 
internal and external auditors? 
1 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 
3.1.3 Does the unit regularly meet with Internal Audit 
and discuss internal control deficiencies 
discovered during the course of its work, its 
recommendations for addressing the 
deficiencies, and management's response? 
Does the committee then monitor the status of 
management's corrective action? 
1 2 1 3 1 2 2 1 
3.1.4 Does the unit discuss with the external auditors 
any significant deficiencies or material 
weaknesses discovered during the course of 
their work and control improvement 
suggestions?  Does it discuss with management 
how the deficiencies are being addressed? 
1 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 
3.1.5 Does the unit consider the need to engage 
outside advisors (e.g. counsel, forensic auditors) 
when concerns arise about significant fraud or 
impropriety on the part of management?  Does 
the unit actively direct such advisors and experts 
in their engagements? 
1 1 1 1 3 1 1 3 
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No. Appraisal Questions Overlapping(O) 
/ Missing (M) 
SB AC 
  O M Yes No U Yes No U 
3.1.6 Does the unit regularly review the trends in  
complaints received about accounting, internal 
accounting controls, and auditing matters, and is 
it satisfied with corrective actions taken by 
management and that management and the 
external auditors have adequately taken into 
account the impact of the complaints on the 
financial statements and the audit? 
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 
3.1.7 May the unit ask members of management or 
others to attend the meeting and provide 
pertinent information as necessary? 
5 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 
3.1.8 Does the unit enquire of Finance management, 
the Internal Auditor head, and the public 
accounting firm about significant risks or 
exposures and assess the steps management 
has taken to minimise such risk to the 
Company? 
5 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 
3.1.9 Is sufficient time provided for private meetings 
with Internal Audit, external auditors, and 
management? 
4 0 4 0 1 4 0 1 
3.1.10 Does the unit meet with the public accounting 
firm in executive session to discuss any matters 
that the unit or the public accounting firm believe 
should be discussed privately with the unit? 
3 0 3 1 1 4 0 1 
3.1.11 Does the unit meet with the Internal Audit 
Director in executive sessions to discuss any 
matters that the unit or the Internal Audit Director 
believes should be discussed privately with the 
unit? 
2 1 3 1 1 2 2 1 
3.1.12 Does the unit meet with Finance management in 
executive sessions to discuss any matters that 
the unit or Finance management believes should 
be discussed privately with the unit? 
4 0 4 0 1 4 0 1 
3.1.13 Will the agenda for the unit's meetings be 
prepared in consultation between the unit's chair 
(with input from the Committee members), 
Finance management, the Internal Audit Director 
and the public accounting firm? 
3 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 
3.2 Compliance (Total O/M Items) 9 2       
3.2.1 Does the unit understand and periodically 
update its understanding of the major legal and 
compliance risks facing the company, how does 
management address those risks, what impact 
the risks have on the financial statements, and 
how does management monitor for emerging 
risks? 
2 0 2 2 1 4 0 1 
3.2.2 Does the unit monitor the appropriate standards 
adopted as a code of conduct for the company? 
Does the unit review with Finance management 
and Legal and Corporate Affairs the results of 
the review of the Company’s monitoring 
compliance with such standards and its 
compliance policies? 
2 0 2 2 1 4 0 1 
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No. Appraisal Questions Overlapping(O) 
/ Missing (M) 
SB AC 
  O M Yes No U Yes No U 
3.2.3 Does the unit review legal and regulatory 
matters that may have a material impact on the 
financial statements, related Company 
compliance policies, and programs and reports 
received from regulators? 
2 0 2 2 1 4 0 1 
3.2.4 Does the unit periodically discuss with 
management policies with respect to risk 
assessment and risk management? This 
discussion includes an understanding of how 
management learns about emerging risks. 
1 0 4 0 1 1 2 2 
3.2.5 Does the unit provide an open avenue of 
communication between the Internal Auditors, 
the public accounting firm, finance management 
and the BoD? Does the unit report the unit's 
actions to the BoD / shareholders with such 
recommendations as the unit may deem 
appropriate? 
4 0 4 1 0 5 0 0 
3.2.6 Has the unit established procedures for receipts, 
retention, and treatment of complaints received 
by the company regarding accounting, internal 
accounting controls, or auditing matters, 
including anonymous submissions by 
employees? 
1 2 1 3 1 2 2 1 
3.2.7 Shall the unit have the power to conduct or 
authorise investigations into any matters within 
the unit’s scope of responsibilities? Shall the unit 
be empowered to retain independent counsel, 
accountants, or others to assist it in the conduct 
of any investigation? 
5 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 
3.2.8 Does the chair report after each meeting to the 
board/shareholders’ meeting on the unit's 
activities, major issues discussed, and 
recommendations for board/shareholder 
actions? 
5 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 
3.2.9 Does the unit provide a report in the annual 
proxy that includes the unit’s review and 
discussion of matters with management and the 
independent public accounting firm? 
4 1 4 1 0 4 1 0 
Note: O: overlapping; M: missing; U: un-applied 
Finding on the overlapping status of the supervisory functions through surveying 
five listed companies  
The definition of overlapping and missing items: 
Overlapping items: it is defined that at least one of the sampled companies performed 
the identified supervisory functions by ACs and SBs at the same time.  
Missing items: it is defined that at least one of the sampled companies did not perform 
the identified supervisory functions by ACs or SBs.  
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The overlapping and missing items were identified as follows: 
Aspect A: Financial Reporting 
23 items of supervisory functions of financial reporting are included, supervising 
the following four key areas:  
• Overseeing the auditing results by the external independent accountants; 
• Examining all the accounting policies of the company, and reporting major 
changes and other dubious points;  
• Previewing the interim and annual financial reports and the reports of the BoD; 
• Organizing special investigations on the company’s financial activities. 
The findings of overlapping and missing items and percentages (findings divided by 
total items) are summarised individually in the table below:  
Company 1: Overlapping with 3 items, 14%; missing 7 items, 30%. 
Company 2: Overlapping with 1 item, 4%; missing 2 items, 9%. 
Company 3: Overlapping with 9 items, 39%; missing 3 items, 13%. 
Company 4: Overlapping with 7 items, 30%; missing 0 items, 0%. 
Company 5: Overlapping with 1 item, 4%; missing 0 items, 0%. 
Companies 4 and 5 have no missing items, but every surveyed company has 
overlapping items.  
Table 42. The Overlapping and Missing Items and Percentages on Financial Reporting 
(Source: Author) 
Financial Reporting 
Sampled Companies  Overlapping Items Missing Items 
Survey Result Item Numbers  Item Numbers  
Company 1 3 14% 7 30% 
Company 2 1 4% 2 9% 
Company 3 9 39% 3 13% 
Company 4 7 30% 0 0% 
Company 5 1 4% 0 0% 
Aspect B: Auditing  
21 auditing items of supervisory functions were found, covering the following two 
key areas: 
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• Internal Audit: through the oversight function of the Internal Audit, overseeing 
key financial and management risks and the internal control, examining the 
scopes of the Internal Audit plans, appraising the skills of the Internal 
Auditors, and determining the financial budgets of the Internal Audit, etc. 
• External audit: presiding over the affairs of the external audit, selecting the 
independent accountants, discussing the scope, process and plan of external 
audit, evaluating the capabilities of the independent accountants; in order to 
give suggestions for the appointments and dismissal of the external auditing 
institutions, the AC should be confined to supporting sound suggestions made 
by the chartered accountants and actively co-ordinate with the latter on major 
auditing matters, as well as co-ordinating the relations between the latter and 
the management to ensure the smooth operation of the auditing tasks.  
The results are presented individually in the table below:  
Company 1: Overlapping with 7 items, 33%; missing 10 items, 48%. 
Company 2: Overlapping with 10 items, 48%; missing 6 items, 29%. 
Company 3: Overlapping with 2 items, 10%; missing 3 items, 14%. 
Company 4: Overlapping with 0 items, 0%; missing 0 items, 0%. 
Company5: Overlapping with 0 items 0%; missing 0 items, 0%. 
Both the fourth and fifth companies show no overlapping and missing items in 
auditing.  
Table 43. The Overlapping and Missing Items and Percentages on Auditing including 
Internal Audit and External Audit 
(Source: Author) 
Auditing 
Sampled Companies  Overlapping Items Missing Items 
Survey Result Item Numbers  Item Numbers  
Company 1 7 33% 10 48% 
Company 2 10 48% 6 29% 
Company 3 2 10% 3 14% 
Company 4 0 0% 0 0% 
Company 5 0 0% 0 0% 
Aspect C: Internal Control and Compliance  
22 items of internal control and compliance were found, including: 
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• Overseeing the recommendations on internal control made by internal and 
external auditing. 
• Overseeing the company’s compliance with regulations and business ethics, 
keeping effective control in revealing conflict of interest and errors through 
reviewing reports of outstanding litigations, major conflict of interests, and 
various policies of the company.  
The results are presented individually in the table below:  
Company 1: Overlapping with 6 items, 27%; missing 7 items, 32%. 
Company 2: Overlapping with 5 items, 23%; missing 2 items, 9%. 
Company 3: Overlapping with 2 items, 9%; missing 0 items, 0%. 
Company 4: Overlapping with 5 items, 23%; missing 0 items, 0%. 
Company5: Overlapping with 4 items, 18%; missing 0 items, 0%. 
The third, fourth and fifth companies show no missing items on internal control and 
compliance items of supervisory functions, yet every surveyed company has 
overlapping items.  
Table 44. The Overlapping and Missing Items and Percentages on Internal Control and 
Compliance 
(Source: Author) 
Internal Control and Compliance with total  
Sampled Companies  Overlapping Items Missing Items 
Survey Result Item Numbers  Item Numbers  
Company 1 6 27% 7 32% 
Company 2 5 23% 2 9% 
Company 3 2 9% 0 0% 
Company 4 5 23% 0 0% 
Company 5 4 18% 0 0% 
Summary 
A summary of the overlapping and missing items and percentages on the integration 
of the financial reporting, auditing, and internal control and compliance reports from 
five surveyed companies is presented in the table below: 
Company 1: overlapping with 16 items, 24%; missing 24 items, 36%. 
Company 2: overlapping with 16 items, 24% missing 10 items, 15%. 
Company 3: overlapping with 13 items, 20% missing 6 items, 9%. 
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Company 4: overlapping with 12 items, 18% missing 0 items, 0%. 
Company 5: overlapping with 5 items, 8% missing 0 items, 0%. 
Table 45. Summary of the Overlapping and Missing Items and Percentages on 
Financial Reporting, Auditing and Internal Control & Compliance  
(Source: Author) 
Financial Reporting, Auditing and Internal Control & Compliance 
Sampled Companies  Overlapping Items Missing Items 
Survey Result Item Numbers  Item Numbers  
Company 1 16 24% 24 36% 
Company 2 16 24% 10 15% 
Company 3 13 20% 6 9% 
Company 4 12 18% 0 0% 
Company 5 5 8% 0 0% 
The findings show that the five surveyed companies implemented the operation items 
with different distribution between SBs and ACs. No consistency exists among the 
listed companies as to the current status. Inter-dynamic relationships in functions will 
influence the effectiveness of the internal supervisory mechanism. The overlapping 
items reached 24 per cent in company 1 and 2, which may point towards redundant 
work in one organisation; the missing outcome reached 36 per cent of items, which 
may pose a risk to the organisation by omitting oversight of risky items. Both sampled 
companies’ interviewees said that “it remains to be seen how these institutions should 
work together.” The next chapter aims to reveal the co-ordination between the two 
institutions in terms of organisation. 
6.2.7 Conclusion on Operations 
The matrix of two case studies’ results on the main features is summarised in the table 
below (Table 46). 
A. Independence 
SBs: both cases of systems with and without ACs in China reveal that SBs’ members 
lack independence; The CEOs are also Presidents of the BoD; and shareholders 
possess more than 10% of the company’s voting shares. Meanwhile, Case B SB Chair, 
Mr. Shen, recommends the other two supervisors. It may be assumed that as Chair, 
Mr. Shen has absolute power of implementing the supervisory functions of the SB in 
Page 284 PhD Thesis, University of Manchester Pao-Chen Lee 
this sampled machinery Corporation B. Yet, in Case A, Mr. Chao reports that no 
supervisor receives remuneration.  
ACs: Current Chinese regulation only requests that a majority of AC members are 
independent. In Case B, two thirds of the AC members are independent, yet Mr. Xu 
concluded: “I think it would be more in line with the consideration of the 
independence of the AC if all members would be independent directors.”  
B. Expertise 
Case B (with ACs) equipped with 50% (2/4) expertise in accounting or a financial 
background is better than Case A (without ACs), with 0% such expertise on the SB. It 
may be concluded that Case B is more concerned with adding expertise of accounting 
or finance to improve the effective supervisory functions.   
Both SB Chairmen stress the importance of compliance. Both Chairmen are also legal 
experts. Mr. Chao views compliance as a foundation, by which management can 
maintain a tight connection between management and supervision. This may explain 
why Chinese regulations specifically points out the legal requirement for the 
composition of the SB: the Code of CG for Listed Companies in China. 
C. Diligence 
Case B’s SB met four times; and Case A, three times. This suggests that Case B is 
more active in due diligence.  
D. The role of the AC played in China 
The role of the AC played in China may be different from the acknowledged 
international norm. Both companies have different expectation of this role. Therefore, 
this research further conducts the survey of 330 listed companies in China: answering 
sub-question 1 by evaluating the common understanding of the listed companies.  
The telephone survey found that 92% meet the defined role of overseer, 60% and 23% 
acted as advisors and trainers respectively to provide extra services with added value 
to the ACs, but 49 per cent of ACs act as the decision maker through involvement in 
making important company policies, which seems in conflict with the independent 
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supervisory functions of AC. This result supports the assertions of Resource 
Dependency theory.  
E. Problems and difficulties of implementing SBs  
In Case B, Mr. Wang said that the operation of SB is simple, and had not operated 
much since its formation. A meeting of Case B’s SB is usually about half an hour, and 
does not investigate deeply into any problem. He indicated the improvements needed 
as follows:  
1. It is not a dedicated supervisory role. Improvement is needed to improve the level 
of participation. Its membership should be a dedicated position. Currently, it is 
overseen by stakeholders, and it is difficult to realise its supervisory function.  
2. There is a need to enhance professional competence, especially among 
stakeholder members, who might not be able to understand financial reports.  
3. There is justifiable consideration behind having stakeholder members elected by 
the union, but this leads to problems in terms of independence.  
4. The supervisory culture of the enterprise needs to be improved, and an 
environment conducive to proper supervision formed. 
Mr. Shen asserts that the representation of financial and managerial professions 
among SB members needs to be improved, bringing it into line with international 
standards.  
Mr. Xu acknowledged that the SB had not functioned as expected, for the following 
three reasons:  
1. Because of the different operations in different countries of direct line reporting, 
in China, the BoD does not require the prior approval of the SB. He therefore 
believes such a difference in corporate structure may have impacted upon the 
effectiveness of CG functions. 
2. The members of the SB might be wary that they would be shunned by the 
management and the colleagues if they try too hard. Without the backing of the 
proper cultural environment, they are rendered powerless.  
3. The members of the SB mostly take on the role on a part-time basis, so are 
reluctant to engage in the actual process of supervision. They probably do not 
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truly understand the process of supervision, so end up merely reviewing the final 
reports.  
In Case A, both supervisors identify the main weaknesses as follows:  
1. The SB members are “part-timers”; their focus is on their paid work, so they 
cannot fully dedicate to their supervisory roles. 
2. Independence will be impacted upon whenever the subject of supervision is the 
member’s main department: leading to conflicts of interest and loss of 
independence.  
F. Improve the operations of SBs by resolving to establish ACs (Motivation for 
establishing AC) 
Both companies (two systems with and without ACs) face difficulties and problems in 
implementing SBs. Both resolved to establish ACs to improve the effectiveness of 
supervisory functions.  
In Case A, Mr. Chao points that the AC exists in order to demonstrate the high 
priority and determination of the top management in implementing supervisory 
functions.  
In Case A, both Ms. Bao and Ms. Jia recognise the benefits of adopting two 
institutions simultaneously:  
1. This suits the Chinese context and can cater for the spirits of both the Three Old 
Institutions and the Three New Institutions.  
2. The SB can perform its supervisory function (being formed by internal staff, more 
familiar with the functions).  
3. The AC’s organisational structure can comply with the international supervisory 
mechanism. 
In Case B, Mr. Wang expects the installation of AC to enhance levels of 
professionalism and independence, compensating for the weakness of the SB. His 
company has been transformed from fully state-owned to a semi-state-owned-and-
semi-private enterprise, and he recognises it is now under a system of market 
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economy, so highlights the necessity of introducing the AC to fit in with international 
practice while suiting China’s specific culture simultaneously.  
Mr. Shen also expects independent directors to bring in new ideas and the benefits of 
external links, so enhancing the company.  
Mr. Xu focused on the formation of a culture and mindset conducive to the proper 
operation of AC: distilling a sense of importance regarding auditing functions, and 
willingness of colleagues to fully co-operate.  
Both cases expect the establishment of ACs to solve the problems and difficulties in 
implementing SBs. Yet there may be further problems after adding in AC. This issue 
is further explored as the follows: 
G. The co-ordination of two institutions in implementing supervisory functions 
In Case B, Mr. Shen highlights that “improvements are needed in the understanding 
of day-to-day operations. Enhancement of this understanding can further pinpoint the 
source of problems.” The SB and the AC are supervisory institutions under different 
CG models. It is suspected (sub-question 2) that incorporating both into one model 
will result in functional overlaps and gaps within the two sampled companies. 
Therefore, this thesis further investigates the day-to-day process of supervisory 
functions to define the checklist implemented by SBs and ACs; using this defined 
checklist to survey five listed companies by face to face interview, in order to reveal 
the overlapping items and percentages. The research results report overlapping items 
reached 24 per cent in company 1 and 2, which may point towards redundant work in 
one organisation; the missing outcome reached 36 per cent of items, which may pose 
a risk to the organisation by omitting oversight of risky items. 
H. The process of implementing supervisory functions between two institutions 
Overlapping and missing items between SBs and ACs exist in empirical practice in 
China, such as Company 1 with 24% overlapping and 36% missing items. In Case A, 
Ms. Jia and Ms. Bao said “it remains to be seen how these institutions should work 
together.” In Case B, Mr. Xu said that “it is important to instil the mindset throughout 
the organisation.” Also in Case B, Mr. Shen lists key supervising functions of the SB 
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as follows: (1) Resolutions by the BoD after the General Assembly Meeting; (2) 
Supervising of the making of major decisions by the BoD; (3) Supervising the 
compliance level of legitimacy of the conduct of the BoD and higher management, 
supervised by the members of the SB. Mr. Shen once again explains this is because 
the SB mainly supervises the BoD. Yet there is no vertical reporting line between SBs 
and ACs. Therefore, this thesis also endeavours to understand the co-ordination of the 
two institutions in the next phase study.  
Table 46. Matrix of the Comparison of Case A (system A – SB alone) and Case B 
(System B – SBs plus ACs) in China  
(Source: Author) 
A. SB–Alone  
B. SB+AC 
























1 2 (including state-owned 10%)  Same (Lack of 
Ind.) though A 
is better  
Independence  One is that he did not 
receive any 
remuneration nor the 
other two supervisors 
acting in the SB; 
another one is that SB 
should be 
independent from the 
BoD. 
(Mr. Chao) 
The other two supervisors are 
recommended by Mr. Shen, the 
chair of the SB. It may be 
assumed that the Chair of the 
SBs, Mr. Shen has the absolute 
power in implementing the 
supervisory functions of the SBs 
in this sampled machinery 
Corporation B. 
(Mr. Shen)  
Mr. Xu concluded “I think it 
would be more in line with the 
consideration on the 
independence of the AC if all 
members would be independent 
directors.” 
(Mr. Xu) 




0 2/4(50%) B is better  
Pao-Chen Lee PhD Thesis, University of Manchester Page 289 
A. SB–Alone  
B. SB+AC 
Case A (SB alone)  Case B (SB+AC) Conclusion  
SB- Legal 
Expertise  
Mr. Chao said, “I think 
the manager of an 
enterprise must be 
diligent in obeying the 
law”. Mr. Chao’s 
professional 
background makes 
him highlight the 
importance of 
compliance for he 
views the compliance 
is the foundation of 
management to have 
the tight connection of 
the management and 
supervision.  
Mr. Shen also reminds us that 
SB needs to oversee financial 
reporting which he admitted that 
he is not an expert in. So he 
mentions that this is mainly done 
by this member with expertise in 
accounting. 
His profession is also in legal 
background the same as the 
chair of the SB of the sampled 
chemical Corporation A. That 
may be the reason he highlights 
the legitimacy and rationality 
which should not conflict with 
legitimacy on the functions and 






















3 4 B is better  
SB-Meeting 
times per year 
3 4 (in addition 2 times of private 
meetings) 
B is better  
The 
expectation of 
the role of 
independent 
directors (AC) 
played in the 
company 
To play the role of 
consultancies in the 
BoD; 
 
To suggest to the elite 
organisation in the 
enterprise on issues 
of the competence of 
the latter's operations. 
(Qian, Z-y.) 
 
They assert that the 
independent directors 
have the advantage of 
an external and 
macroscopic 
viewpoint, so they can 
play the advisory role 
well, whereas the SB 
is more familiar with 
the company’s internal 
operations, so it can 
supervise better. 
(Ms. Jia)  
Mr. Wang identified the 
functions of the two institutions 
are different and he 
differentiated them in these 
terms: the AC tends to take the 
viewpoints of the minor and 
medium stockholders in their 
advice during the decision-
making process of the meetings 
of the BoD, but the SB tends to 
take the viewpoints of the major 
stockholders in their 
retrospective supervision on the 
operations of the company.  
(Mr. Wang)  
Mr. Shen once more stresses 
that the AC is a more 
microscopic viewpoint and the 




















by survey the 
common 
understanding 
of the listed 
companies.  
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A. SB–Alone  
B. SB+AC 






Case A, both 
supervisors also 
identify the weakness 
as the following:  
The SB members are 
“part-timers”, their 
focus is on their paid 
works, so they cannot 
fully dedicate to their 
supervisory roles. 
Independence will be 
impacted whenever 
the subject of 
supervision is the 
member’s main 
department, there will 
be conflict of interest 
and independence is 
lost.  
 
Case B, Mr. Wang said the 
operation of SB is simple and 
doe not operate much since its 
formation. A meeting of the SB 
is usually about half an hour 
without investigating deeply into 
any problem. He indicates the 
improvements needed as 
follows:  
It is not a dedicated role of 
supervisors. Improvement is 
needed to improve the level of 
participation. Its membership 
should be a dedicated position. 
Currently, it is overseen by 
stakeholders, and it is difficult to 
realise its supervisory function.  
There is need to enhance 
professional competence, 
especially for the stakeholder 
members, who might not be able 
to understand financial reports.  
There is justifiable consideration 
behind having stakeholder 
members elected by the union, 
but there is the issue of 
independence.  
Then the supervisory culture of 
the enterprise needs to be 
improved, and an environment 
conducive to proper supervision 
needs to be formed. 
 
Mr. Shen asserts that the 
weakness of the SB, the 
financial and management 
professions of the members of 
the SB need to be improved to 
the international standard.  
Mr. Xu said because the SB has 
not functioned as expected with 
three reasons:  
Because of the different 
operations in different countries 
of direct reporting line among 
China and the other countries. In 
China, the BoD does not require 
the prior approval of the SB for 
its operations is not like French. 
He therefore thinks such a 
difference in corporate structure 
may have affected the 
effectiveness of the CG 
functions. 
The members of the SB might 
be wary that they would be 
shunned by the management 
and the colleagues if they try too 
hard. Without the backing of the 
proper cultural environment, 
they are powerless in 
supervision.  
The members of the SB mostly 
take on the role on a part-time 
basis, so they are reluctant in 
The co-
ordination of 






s)and in terms 
of  organization 
is therefore 
raised for study 
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A. SB–Alone  
B. SB+AC 




He points out that the 
existence of the AC in 
the organisation to 
reflect the high 
concern and 
determination of the 
top management in 
implementing the 
supervisory functions. 




because he stresses 
once more to 
strengthen the 
supervisory functions 
by installing dual 
supervisory systems 
at the same time.  
(Mr. Chao)  
Both supervisors 
recognise the strength 
of adopting two 
institutions 
simultaneously as the 
following:  
This suits the Chinese 
context and can cater 
for the spirits of both 
the Three Old 
Institutions and the 
Three New 
Institutions.  
The SB can perform 
its supervisory 
function (they are 
formed by internal 
staffs and more 




structure can comply 
with the international 
supervisory 
mechanism. 
(Ms. Bao and Ms. Jia) 
Mr. Wang expects the installing 
of AC can enhance the 
professional level and 
independence to compensate 
the weakness of the SB. He 
mentioned another reason for 
his company to install AC. His 
company has been transformed 
from full state-owned company 
to a semi-state-owned-and-
semi-private enterprise, and he 
recognises it is now under the 
system of market economy, so 
he highlights that it is necessary 
to introduce the AC to fit in the 
international practice but suit to 
the specific culture of China with 
the SB simultaneously.  
 
Mr. Shen also expects to utilise 
the resource of the AC consists 
of independent directors to bring 
in new ideas and the benefits of 
external links to enhance the 
company.  
Mr. Xu said the focuses on the 
installation of AC by starting with 
the formation of a culture and 
mindset conducive to its proper 
operation to distil the sense of 
importance in the auditing 
functions and willingness of the 
colleagues in cooperating with 
auditing departments in enabling 






















reason why the 
company is 
willing to install 
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A. SB–Alone  
B. SB+AC 








The operation after 
forming ACs, they 
said, “it remains to be 
seen how these 
institutions should 
work together.” 
(Ms. Jia and Ms. Bao) 
Mr. Shen points out two areas 
for improvement of co-ordination 
of two institutions in 
implementing supervisory 
functions:  
The interaction between the two 
institutions should collect more 
regularly the operational 
information of the company.  
Improvements are needed in the 
understanding of day-to-day 
operations. Enhancement in this 
understanding can further 
pinpoint the source of problems.  
 
Mr. Shen sums up the points to 
further enhance or perfect 
supervisory effectiveness and 
function of SB, first the quality of 
the members needs to be 
improved. Secondly, more 
attentions are needed on the 
understanding of the process of 
the operations of the SB. 
Thirdly, the viewpoint of the SB 
is somewhat macroscopic; 
efforts might be needed to 
deepen and refine its view to be 
able to identify problems in 
advance and act as a problem 
prevention mechanism. 
(Mr. Shen)  
Mr. Xu identified the ways to 
improve the implementation of 
supervisory functions, by 
improving the level of 
supervision on the processes 
and the level of support the 
company gives to supervision. 
He views that it is important to 
instil the mindset throughout the 
organisation of the importance 
of supervision and to improve 
the quality of the auditing staffs 
and also to correct the current 
problem that the members do 
not really strive to perform 
properly as this is not their main 
roles in the company. 
(Mr. Xu) 












































by SBs and 
ACs; 
furthermore, to 
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Case A (SB alone)  Case B (SB+AC) Conclusion  






By attending the 
meetings of the BoD 




He also calls for the 
meeting of the SB 
once a season over 
the minimum number 
of 1 time in every year 
required by law after 
the meetings of the 
BoD . 
 
Besides attending or 
calling the meetings, 
he also keeps regular 




visiting the relevant 
departments to 
investigate on-site. 
(Mr. Chao)  
(1)read the data 
before each meeting 
of the BoD to ensure 
all data on the 
financial report are 
correct,  
(2) audit before 
submission all 
quarterly, biannual 
and annual reports 
and all other data that 
need to be submitted, 
(3) first contact the 
relevant department 
before discussing it in 
our meetings; (4) 
attend the meetings of 
the BoD, during which 
we also make 
suggestions and ask 
questions.  
(Ms. Bao and Ms. Jia) 
Mr. Wang said the operation of 
SB is simple and does not 
operate much since its 
formation. A meeting of the SB 
is usually about half an hour 
without investigating deeply into 
any problem. Currently, The SB 
supervises mainly by reviewing 
the reports as the same data 
available for the BoD before 
their meetings such as the audit 
report, the BoD’ report, financial 
report, and the assessment of 
the performance of the higher 
management, followed by oral 
enquiries if necessary. Then the 
meetings of SB are held after 
the meetings of the BoD rather 
than before. Mr. Wang identified 
the areas for improvement in the 
current supervisory system by 
the following points:  
(Mr. Wang)  
Furthermore, he points out the 
key functions of supervising the 
SB (1) the resolutions by the 
BoD after the General Assembly 
Meeting; (2) Supervising of the 
making of major decisions by 
the BoD; (3) Supervising the 
compliance level of legitimacy of 
the conducts of the BoD and the 
higher management, supervised 
by the members of the SB. 
(Mr. Shen)  
He points this is because the SB 
mainly supervises the BoD, and 
the BoD is the main decision-
making institution. So he attends 











Case B, Mr. 
Shen once 
again points 
the SB mainly 
supervises the 
BoD. Yet there 
is no vertical 
reporting line 
between SBs 










of key research 
objective 3 will 
be revealed in 
the next phase.  
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A. SB–Alone  
B. SB+AC 
Case A (SB alone)  Case B (SB+AC) Conclusion  
  The weakness are identified as 
the following:  
It is not a dedicated role of 
supervisors. Improvement is 
needed to improve the level of 
participation. Its membership 
should be a dedicated position. 
Currently, it is overseen by 
stakeholders, and it is difficult to 
realise its supervisory function.  
There is need to enhance 
professional competence, 
especially for the stakeholder 
members, who might not be able 
to understand financial reports.  
There is justifiable consideration 
behind having stakeholder 
members elected by the union, 
but there is the issue of 
independence.  
Then the supervisory culture of 
the enterprise needs to be 
improved, and an environment 
conducive to proper supervision 
needs to be formed. 
(Mr. Wang)  
Mr. Shen asserts that the 
weakness of the SB, the 
financial and management 
professions of the members of 
the SB need to be improved to 
the international standard.  
because the SB has not 
functioned as expected with 
three reasons:  
Because of the different 
operations in different countries 
of direct reporting line among 
China and the other countries. In 
China, the BoD does not require 
the prior approval of the SB for 
its operations is not like French. 
He therefore thinks such a 
difference in corporate structure 
may have affected the 
effectiveness of the CG 
functions. 
The members of the SB might 
be wary that they would be 
shunned by the management 
and the colleagues if they try too 
hard. Without the backing of the 
proper cultural environment, 
they are powerless in 
supervision.  
The members of the SB mostly 
take on the role on a part-time 
basis, so they are reluctant in 
involving themselves in the 
actual processes of supervision, 
and probably do not really 
understand the process of 
supervision, and ended up 
reviewing the final reports only.  
(Mr. Xu)  
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Case A (SB alone)  Case B (SB+AC) Conclusion  
  Mr. Wang expects the 
installation of AC to enhance 
professionalism and 
independence to compensate 
for the weakness of the SB. He 
mentioned another reason for 
his company to install AC. His 
company has been transformed 
from full state-owned company 
to a semi-state-owned-and-
semi-private enterprise, and he 
recognises it is now under the 
system of market economy, so 
the highlights that it is necessary 
to introduce the AC to fit in the 
international practice but suit to 
the specific culture of China with 
the SB simultaneously.  
(Mr. Wang)  
He also expects to utilise the 
resource of the AC consists of 
independent directors to bring in 
new ideas and the benefits of 
external links to enhance the 
company.  
(Mr. Shen)  
Mr. Xu said the focuses on the 
installation of AC by starting with 
the formation of a culture and 
mindset conducive to its proper 
operation to distil the sense of 
importance in the auditing 
functions and willingness of the 
colleagues in cooperating with 
auditing departments in enabling 
their proper operations.  
(Mr. Xu)  
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6.3 Co-ordination 
6.3.1 Introduction  
The system of ACs in addition to SBs is different from the Anglo-American or 
German model. How will the two systems with or without ACs exist in the future 
according to framework of legislation and management of government? The first 
section of this phase aims to answer this question by interviewing the SSE deputy 
director according to the framework of legislation and management of the SSE; and 
interview the Manager of the Property Right Management Department of the State-
Owned Hangzhou Industrial Assets Management Co. Ltd, to understand the assertions 
and opinions of the governor. 
By the comparison of the SBs and ACs presented in chapter 2, it is found that there is 
no vertical relationship between the SBs and the ACs. What is the preferred linkage of 
interactions between the SBs and the ACs in terms of organisation? The second 
section of this study aims to find the evidence for the constructive interactions 
between both supervisory institutions, by understanding the preferred linkage of 
interactions between the SB and AC.  
This study of Objective 3 is structured by presenting the interview of two governors 
of SSE and State-Owned Hangzhou Industrial Assets Management Co. Ltd., then 
presenting the preferred linkage by surveying 330 listed companies in China.  
6.3.2 Interviews of Two Governors  
How will the two systems – with or without ACs – exist in the future according to 
framework of legislation and management of government? Two governors’ opinions 
on the framework of legislation and the management of government now follow.  
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Shi Donghui (2007): Interview with Mr. Shi Donghui, Deputy Director of the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), email response on 24th Aug. 2007. Shanghai. 
Phone interview and response by email [Response by email recorded as the 
attached file of Appendix C1] 
1. What are the intended purposes of setting up the SB, the independent 
directors and the AC according to the framework of legislation and 
management of the SSE?  
The SB: because the ‘Company Law of the People’s Republic of China’ was 
initially based on the German system, the SB was specified. Yet because of some 
initial misunderstanding, the functions of the SB in Chinese law differ from those 
of its German counterpart, and its primary function is to supervise the directors and 
managers. In practice, the Chair of the SB is generally promoted from the internal 
staff of the company, and most of its members also come from within the company, 
so it is merely a deliberative body under the control of the BoD.  
The independent directors: the BoD is at the core of CG in China as far as the 
actual power of control is concerned. To ensure the independence of the BoD from 
the major shareholders, China introduced the system of independent directors from 
the US system for corporate governance. At least one third of the directors on the 
BoD should be independent directors.  
The AC: the AC is one of the special committees under the BoD. The majority of 
its members and its Chair should be independent directors, and one of these should 
be an accounting professional.  
2. What are the functions of the SB, the independent directors and the AC 
according to the framework of legislation and management of the SSE? How 
do these compare with one another?  
The SB: to check the finance of the company; to supervise the directors and 
managers against any behaviours that might violate laws or regulations or articles 
of the company; to demand correction when a director or manager does not behave 
in the interest of the company.  
The independent directors: to have the responsibility of being trustworthy and 
diligent to all shareholders; to safeguard the interest of the company; to protect the 
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legal rights of medium and small shareholders. 
The AC: to recommend the appointment or replacement of external auditors; to 
oversee the internal auditing system and its implementation; to sustain the 
communication between the internal auditing department and the external auditor; 
to audit the company’s financial information and its reporting; to audit the 
company’s internal control system. 
In practice, the functions of the SB, the independent directors and the AC overlap 
with one another. The independent directors and the AC are stronger than the SB in 
their supervisory roles. The power of the SB is superficial and cannot function as 
intended. Thus some scholars and professionals have suggested abolishing the SB 
in favour of letting the independent director to perform its supervisory role fully. 
3. How the supervisory rights and responsibilities are divided amongst the 
SB, the independent directors and the AC according to the framework of 
legislation and management of the SSE? How do these compare with one 
another? 
See above. 
4. In practice, what are the interactions and relations amongst the SB, the 
independent directors and the AC within the framework of legislation and 
management of the SSE? How do these compare with one another? 
See above. 
5. Does each member of the SB and the AC have to be an ‘independent 
director’ according to the framework of legislation and management of the 
SSE?  
The AC: the majority and the Chair have to be independent directors. 
The SB: the members are mainly the union Chair and employee representatives 
within the company, who act for the interests of the employees and the society to 
some extent. 
6. What is the definition of an ‘independent director’ according to the 
framework of legislation and management of the SSE?  
An independent director should be independent to the appointing company and its 
major shareholders, and must not take on any role other than being an independent 
director in the said listed company.  
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7. Do members of the AC need to be approved by an overseeing organisation 
such as the SSE or any specific regulation according to the framework of 
legislation and management of the SSE?  
The appointment of an independent director needs to be approved by the general 
meeting of shareholders, and the candidate needs to have received relevant 
professional trainings. 
8. According to the current Chinese regulations on the SBs, the independent 
directors and the ACs, the installation of the AC is not mandatory. Is there 
any corporation under any special circumstance for which the installation of 
the AC is mandatory? 
Such a scenario has not happened. Currently, two thirds of the companies have 
installed the AC under the BoD.  
9. Is there law or regulations that specify the constitutions, functions and 
operations of the SB, independent directors and AC according to the 
framework of legislation and management of the SSE?  
The operations of the SB are specified in the ‘Company Law of the People’s 
Republic of China’ and the operations of the independent directors and the AC are 
specified in the ‘Code of CG for Listed Companies in China’. 
10. In view of the current situation of China and Chinese culture, what in your 
opinion is the ideal supervisory function? How the company should operate to 
enable the CG mechanism to function well?  
The equity of listed companies in China is concentrated in the hands of major 
shareholders. The key to supervisory function is to reinforce the changes in the 
BoD. Specifically, these include: enhancing the independence of the BoD, 
establishing the self-appraisal system of the BoD, increasing the effectiveness of 
the operations of the BoD, perfecting the company’s internal control mechanism 
and supervisory system, improving the overall quality of the directors, and 
implementing the continued professional development of the directors.  
 
Xu, T-m. (2007). Interview with Mr. Xu (Xu Tian Min), Manager of the Property 
Right Management Department of the State-Owned Hangzhou Industrial Assets 
Management Co. Ltd. (國營杭州資產管理公司), on 25th July 2007. Hangzhou. 
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[Video recording in possession of author] 
1. How well does the SB of your company perform? 
It is not ideal, and its installation seems a mere formality.  
2. What is the reason behind this? 
Because of historic reasons, in a state owned enterprise such as ours, there is no 
evidence that the SB is functioning properly. There are 79 investment corporations 
under our enterprise, most of which has foreign investment, for which the 
mechanism of the AC applies, yet Company Law in China demands the installation 
of the SB.  
3. Since the SB cannot function in a state owned enterprise, do you think it is 
necessary to install it? 
Yes, it is definitely necessary.  
4. It is necessary to install it according to the regulations, but why do you think it 
cannot function as expected in practice? 
The main reason is that many of the members of the SB are internal staff, and it is 
impossible for internal staffs to supervise independently. Furthermore, they are 
under those they are supposed to supervise (in their daily role), how can that be 
done? So the main reason is a lack of independence. The second reason is a lack of 
expertise. Though the members of the SB enjoy high reputation and social status, 
the level of their expertise is questionable. Frankly speaking, most members of the 
SB are not well qualified. Thirdly, though there is specification in the relevant 
regulations, it is lacking in its implementation.  
5. What is your opinion in encouraging the installation of the AC? 
I think this is incredible that the regulation puts the AC under the BoD because it is 
questionable how it can operate independently in practice within such as model. 
The SB and the BoD are on the same level, so the former can supervise 
independently. The SB needs to have real power for it to play its role in 
supervision. If the AC is formed as an internal audit unit under the SB, then the two 
institutions can have meaningful relation. Yet in the current design, (in addition to 
the fact that) the AC is under the BoD, and the SB and the AC do not have direct 
hierarchical relation, yet both play the role of supervision. (That is incredible.) 
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6. It seems that there is overlap between the functions of the two institutions. 
How are these defined? 
The function of the supervisory function is to supervise the BoD, whereas function 
of the BoD and the Management is to execute. The former is the supervisory unit, 
and the latter the executing unit.  
7. How do you think the hierarchical relation between the SB and the AC should 
be? 
I think the AC should report to the SB to form a vertically integrated system that 
integrates functions as well as human resources, and together they can achieve the 
supervision within the organisation. 
Summary 
To review and compare both governors’ opinions on the key issues related to this 
research presented in the table below:  
Table 47. Matrix of Two Governors’ Interviews  
(Source: Author) 
Mr. Shih  Mr. Xu  Same/Difference 
1. Is the SB functioning well? 
“The power of the SB is superficial 
and cannot function as intended.” 
“It is not ideal, and its installation 
seems a mere formality.” 
Same  
2. What is the reason for the failing effectiveness of SBs? 
“In practice, the Chair of the SB is 
generally promoted from the 
internal staff of the company, and 
most of its members also come 
from within the company, so it is 
merely a deliberative body under 
the control of the BoD.” 
“The main reason is that many of 
the members of the SB are internal 
staff, and it is impossible for internal 
staff to supervise independently. 
Furthermore, they are underneath 
those they are supposed to 
supervise (in their daily role), how 
can that be done? So the main 
reason is a lack of independence.” 
Mr. Xu also highlights most of the 
supervisors lack expertise and 




Lack Expertise – 
Mr. Xu  
Lack of 
Implementation 
in practice – 
Mr. Xu  
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Mr. Shih  Mr. Xu  Same/Difference 
3. Is it necessary for SBs to exist in the future?  
Mr. Shih highlighted “The key to 
supervisory function is to reinforce 
the changes in the BoD.” 
Seemingly he expects the 
installation of ACs to improve the 
supervisory function.  
Mr. Xu still insists it is necessary for 
the existence of SBs. “Yes, it is 
definitely necessary. “ 
Mr Xu said “the SB and the BoD are 
on the same level, so the former can 
supervise independently. The SB 
needs to have real power for it to 
play its role in supervision.” 
Different  
Mr. Shih – 
reinforce BoD 
Mr. Xu – “Yes, it 
is definitely 
necessary. “ 
4. It seems that there is overlap between the functions of the two institutions. How are these 
defined? 
“In practice, the functions of the 
SB, the independent directors and 
the AC overlap with one another.” 
“The function of the supervisory 
function is to supervise the BoD, 
whereas function of the BoD and the 
Management is to execute. The 
former is the supervisory unit, and 
the latter the executing unit” 
Different –  
Mr. Shih – 
overlap 
Mr Xu – 
no overlap 
5. How do you think the hierarchical relationship between the SB and the AC should be? 
Mr. Shih said “the independent 
directors and the AC are stronger 
than the SB in their supervisory 
roles.” Mr. Shih mentioned “some 
scholars and professionals have 
suggested abolishing the SB in 
favour of letting the independent 
director to perform its supervisory 
role fully.” 
“I think the AC should report to the 
SB to form a vertically integrated 
system that integrates functions as 
well as human resources, and 
together they can achieve the 
supervision within the organisation.” 
Different –  











Both governors state the SB is not functioning well: 
Mr. Shih stressed: “The power of the SB is superficial and cannot function as 
intended.” And Mr. Xu acknowledged: “It is not ideal, and its installation seems a 
mere formality.” 
Both governors also highlighted a key reason failing effectiveness of SBs:  lack of 
independence among the supervisors.  
Mr. Shih: “In practice, the Chair of the SB is generally promoted from the internal 
staff of the company, and most of its members also come from within the company, 
so it is merely a deliberative body under the control of the BoD.”  
Mr. Xu: “The main reason is that many of the members of the SB are internal staff, 
and it is impossible for internal staffs to supervise independently. Furthermore, they 
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are underneath those they are supposed to supervise (in their daily role), how can that 
be done? So the main reason is a lack of independence.” 
Mr. Xu also highlights that most supervisors lack expertise and experience of 
implementation in practice.  
Though both governors do not regard SBs as effective, Mr. Xu still insists “Yes, it is 
definitely necessary. “Mr Xu said, “the SB and the BoD are on the same level, so the 
former can supervise independently. The SB needs to have real power for it to play its 
role in supervision.” Yet, Mr. Shih highlighted, “the key to supervisory function is to 
reinforce the changes in the BoD.” Seemingly, he expects the installation of ACs to 
improve the supervisory function especially in the case of ineffectiveness of SBs.  
Companies who add AC may overlap between SBs and ACs. Here, the governors’ 
opinions on this issue differ. Mr. Shih commented: “In practice, the functions of the 
SB, the independent directors and the AC overlap with one another.” Yet, Mr. Xu 
highlighted differences due to their hierarchical relationship. Furthermore, Mr. Xu 
indicated that, “I think the AC should report to the SB to form a vertically integrated 
system that integrates functions as well as human resources, and together they can 
achieve the supervision within the organisation.” But Mr. Shih said, “the independent 
directors on the AC are stronger than the SB in their supervisory roles.” Mr. Shih also 
mentioned that “some scholars and professionals have suggested abolishing the SB in 
favour of letting the independent director to perform its supervisory role fully.”  
Obviously, opinions on the co-ordination of the two supervisory institutions are 
different between the two governors and scholars. Mr. Shih thinks that ACs are 
stronger than SBs and also mentioned the scholars’ suggestion of “abolishing” SBs. 
But Mr. Xu merely called for the formation of a vertically integrated system.  
To understand the co-ordination between SBs and ACs is therefore set as one of the 
research objectives in this thesis. The following section presents the evidence, in order 
to achieve this objective. 
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6.3.3 The Preferred Linkage of Interactions between ACs and SBs in 
Organisation 
Possible Alternative Organisational Charts  
The Current Chinese Governance Structure  
In short, the core structure of a modern company involves a linkage of interactions 
going between stockholders and the stakeholders, through directors and supervisors, 
then the management, to the general workers. In a Chinese company, stockholders 
and stakeholders entrust their resources to the BoD as their agent for management, 
and delegate the tasks of supervising the BoD to the SB of the same hierarchical level. 
Several committees including the AC are established under the BoD as well as the 
management. This structure is illustrated in the figure below: 
 
Figure 10. The Current Chinese CG Structure 
(Source: Author) 
To solve the problems identified with this structure, several modification options are 
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Establishing a Vertical Link  
This option establishes a vertical link between the SB and the AC, so that the latter is 
subordinate to the former. In this option, the SB oversees the BoD, and the AC 
oversees the management. The resulting configuration is illustrated in the figure 
below:  
 
Figure 11. The Resulting Configuration of Establishing a Vertical Link between the SB 
and the AC 
(Source: Author) 
In the figure above, a downward arrow represents an administrative relationship 
between the superior and the subordinate; an upward curved arrow represents 
information feedback via business guidance and supervision in an administrative 
relationship; and a dotted arrow represents an oversight relationship. This 
configuration represents an internal supervisory system, having the organisational 
structure of two-way accountabilities, twin track reporting and maintaining dual 
relations.  
The specific points of this configuration are:  
• It can maintain the independence of the oversight institutions in relation to the 
overseen; 
• It can realise the business guidance and supervision between the oversight 
institutions and reduce the risk of information asymmetry for the superior 
oversight unit; 
• There is clarity between the levels of oversight and this is useful for determining 
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Integrating All Oversight Institutions  
This option integrates the SB and AC into one new oversight unit. The resulting 
configuration is illustrated in the figure below:  
 
Figure 12. The Resulting Configuration of Integrating All Oversight Institutions 
(Source: Author) 
The specific points of this configuration are:  
• Integration can strengthen oversight functions and save oversight costs; 
• Incorporating the regular elements prevents the integrated unit from being 
incapable of performing daily oversight tasks;  
• Having representatives of the stockholders, the stakeholders and other 
supervisory institutions places the integrated unit at a level not lower than the 
directors or the senior managers, crucial in preventing the integrated unit from 
















Pao-Chen Lee PhD Thesis, University of Manchester Page 307 
Promoting the AC  
This option promotes the AC to the same level as the SB and the BoD. The rationale 
is that counter balancing the members of the BoD is part of the scope of the functions 
of the AC. The resulting configuration is illustrated in the figure below:  
 
Figure 13. The Resulting Configuration of Promoting the AC 
(Source: Author) 
The specific points of this configuration are:  
• It frees and safeguards the independence of the independent directors by freeing 
them from the control and interferences of the BoD and enabling it to engage 
external accountants directly and independently; 
• It enables the SB to concentrate on the oversight and restraint of the BoD and 
the management and reaffirms its role by strengthening its functions.  
Abandoning the AC  
This option abandons the AC, and allows the SB co-ordinate and co-operate with the 
Internal Audit instead, each emphasising a separate area of supervision, where the 
latter can perform daily oversight for the former. The resulting configuration is 
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Figure 14. The Resulting Configuration of Abandoning the AC 
(Source: Author) 
The specific points of this configuration are:  
• It reverts to the organisation before the 2002 launch of CG. Listed companies 
will not face the interaction problem between SB and AC. 
• Investors may not have confidence in Chinese listed companies if they lack the 
internal supervisory mechanism of the prevailing CG models in modern society.  
Removing the SB 
The fifth option removes the SB. The resulting configuration is illustrated in the 
figure below:  
 
Figure 15. The Resulting Configuration of Removing the SB 
(Source: Author) 



































Pao-Chen Lee PhD Thesis, University of Manchester Page 309 
• It may strengthen investor confidence in listed companies, thanks to the 
adoption of the “standard” modern CG model, which relies upon AC to perform 
the overseeing function.  
• Chinese listed companies may be reluctant to adapting to this: for they set up SB 
in 1993, and Chinese governance culture is also distinctive in comparison to 
Western societies.  
6.3.4 Findings on the Preferred Linkage of Interactions between ACs and 
SBs  
The results from the telephone survey on the preferred linkage of interactions between 
ACs and SBs are presented in the table below: 
Table 48. The Results from the Telephone Survey on the Preferred Linkages of 
Interactions between the SB and the AC 
(Source: Author) 
Alternatives Number of companies  of companies 
a. Establishing the vertical link 5  8%  (5/61) 
b. Integrating all oversight institutions 22  36%  (22/61) 
c. Promoting the AC 13  21%  (13/61) 
d. Abandoning the AC 4  7%  (4/61) 
e. Removing the SB  9  15%  (9/61) 
f. Retaining the current status  8  13% (8/61) 
The findings from the telephone surveys reveal that the linkage of interactions in the 
internal supervisory mechanism that most companies in China prefer are as follows: 
36% want to “Integrating all oversight institutions” (figure 12), 21% “Promoting the 
AC” (figure 13) , 15% “Removing the SB”(figure 15); 13% for “Maintaining the 
current status” (figure 10); 8% for “Establishing the vertical link” (figure 11); and 
only 7% for “abandoning the AC” (figure 14). 
The preferred interaction linkage between the SB and the AC in organisation is listed 
and their characteristics analysed according to the order of preference as follows:  
Summary    
No. 1 Preference: “Integrating all oversight institutions” 
This option can establish an independent control system. In the current structure, 
promotions and relegations of the overseers are controlled by the major managers, 
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who are supposed to be overseen by the former, thus making the former lose their 
independence. The modification can eliminate this problem of independence together 
with the problem of substandard expertise, and can therefore reduce the problem of 
dereliction of duty or collusion of the overseer: an important measure establishing a 
protection system for the overseeing auditors and correcting current defects of 
promotion and relegation, so helping them achieve their role of counterbalance. 
No. 2 Preference: “Promoting the AC” 
This choice can eliminate the abnormality of self-oversight, as an AC under the BoD 
is easily fettered by the latter. This prevents the former from being fully functional in 
supervision, leading to financial scandals such as the case of Enron. Such defects can 
be rectified by promoting the function of the AC. 
No. 3 Preference: “Removing the SB” 
The role of SB in China is more symbolic in substance than the expectation in actual 
practice. Removing the SB may save the agent cost by fully applying AC based on the 
Anglo-American supervisory mechanism. There is no SB in the Anglo-American CG 
model, in which independent overseeing functions are performed by independent 
directors solely. The related regulations are adequate in the US and UK as compared 
to Chinese regulations, in which applied dual supervisory institutions is peculiar. 
China may directly benchmark the American and British supervisory regulations in 
applying this organisation chart.  
No. 4 Preference: “Retaining the current status” 
No direct reporting or interaction exists between AC and SB. Both can perform the 
functions as usual. There is no cost of co-ordination to the organisation. The sampled 
listed company may choose to remove ACs if the AC’s performance is not acceptable, 
because presently the AC’s establishment is a voluntary choice. 
No. 5 Preference: “Establishing the vertical link” – let AC reports to SB directly 
This option can integrate the oversight function because there is a complementary 
relationship between the SB and the AC. Placing the SB at the highest level of the 
control mechanism in the company, once authorised can exert supervisory power with 
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a more detached stance. Being a regular institution, it can perform daily supervisory 
follow-ups. On the other hand, being one of the committees under the BoD and 
having the mechanism for preventive and strategy supervision, the AC can 
counterbalance the major stockholders and internal representatives in the BoD, and 
subsequently improve the operational mechanism of the BoD, as well as being the 
link between the SB and the Internal Audit, and the backbone of the internal 
supervisory system.  
No. 6 Preference: “Abandoning the AC.” 
Since the SB is not effective in the current system, this choice concentrates on 
strengthening and improving the function of the SB and its co-operation with the 
Internal Audit in order to realise effective oversight. Co-operative relations can be: 
1. Unified: having the Internal Audit under the leadership of and reporting to the SB, 
incorporating the work of the former into the latter for unified planning and 
implementation;  
2. Controlled: keeping both at their current separate positions, but allowing the SB to 
supervise the content and quality of the work of the Internal Audit to reduce 
workload and strengthen the enterprise management system;  
3. Collaboration: keeping both at their current positions, but sharing the oversight 
workloads, having the SB concentrate on supervising the conduct of the directors 
and the management as well as the corporation’s overall financial balance, leaving 
the oversight of the business activities and financial balance of the administrative 
departments to the Internal Audit.  
This survey reveals the listed companies’ preference for integrating all in one entity. It 
shows that their first preference of integration was based on the belief that it can be 
beneficial in promoting independence, which is the most serious problem facing the 
effective performance of the supervision of CG in China; and also to solve the 
hierarchy reporting problems of internal supervisory mechanisms of all supervisory 
institutions, which may bring about a positive co-ordination of their functions, saving 
cost and smoothing out supervision.  
.  
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6.3.5 Conclusion on Co-ordination 
China's supervisory mechanism is peculiar in that it integrated the SB of the German 
CG model and simultaneously adopted the AC of the Anglo-American model. 
Therefore, how to synchronise these two models has become a particular challenge 
facing China today. In order to improve the supervisory mechanism of CG in China, 
this research elaborated on strengthening the relationship between the SB and AC. 
This study started by interviewing two governors, whose opinions differed in terms of 
the co-ordination of the supervisory institutions of the SB and AC. Mr. Xu wants to 
allow the AC to reports to the SB directly; yet Mr. Shih wants to abolish the SB. It is 
very apparent that the issue of co-ordinating the SB and AC remains to be resolved in 
the future. 
In terms of organisation, the telephone survey shows that the majority of Chinese 
companies prefer to integrate the AC and the SB into one unit. Most respondents also 
confirmed that the two institutions overlap in executing their supervisory functions 
simultaneously in one organisation. The second preference “Promoting the AC” is in 
sharp contrast to the least popular choice, “abandoning the AC”, which could be an 
indication that listed companies have higher expectations on the effective 
performance of ACs when the latter are integrated into their internal supervisory 
mechanism.  Some would even like to remove the SB so as to enable the AC to play 
its monitoring functions fully. This may explain why the influence of the SB is not 
essential in most organisations, and why most companies in China can adopt a 
sensible approach with or without SBs. The respondents’ third choice – “Removing 
the SB” – and their fifth choice – “Establishing the vertical link” – could indicate that 
listed companies have lost their confidence in the effectiveness of SB in China, and 
therefore, do not expect that SB can lead AC in improving the effective performance 
of supervision in the future. 
There is no direct inter-dynamic relationship between the AC and the SB at present, 
so it would seem sensible to co-ordinate their relationship. This preference, revealed 
by surveying 330 listed companies, formed a clear conclusion to the study.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
This research started by studying the difference between SBs and ACs, from which 
three key research objectives emerged. To achieve these objectives, research theories, 
literature reviews, and the background behind the internal supervisory mechanism in 
CG and the security market in China were therefore studied and addressed in Chapters 
2 to 4. Research methods were designed and presented in Chapter 5, they guide with 
which to find the evidence in order to achieve the three key research objectives. Three 
phases of empirical studies in Chapter 6 specified the effectiveness, the operations of 
supervisory functions and the co-ordination between ACs and SBs in terms of 
organisation. The findings from these empirical studies with reference to the related 
studies in Chapters 2 to 5 are summarised and presented in the final chapter of the 
Conclusion. 
This chapter begins by concluding the relationship between the theory and the 
research results by checking the research results against the applied theories. The 
findings are then presented, in order to reveal the answers on which system is more 
effective and on the contribution of the AC in China. Following this, the findings on 
promoting the effectiveness of the SB and AC in China respectively, and which 
suggest the preferred linkage for improving the co-ordination of the two supervisory 
institutions in China, are also presented. The limitations of this work are discussed in 
order to provide for more extensive researches in the future; and it is concluded by 
identifying the original contributions of this thesis. 
7.2 Theories and Results   
Six theories have been reasoned and relied on in this thesis. The empirical research 
results check whether these theories conflict or support the applied theories, 
summarised in the table below.  
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Table 49. The Relationship between the Applied Theories and Research Results. 
(Source: Author) 
No.  
The Theory (cf. 
the chapter on 
research 
theories) 
The Key Research Results in Relation to 
the Applied Theories 
The Relation between 
the Theory and 
Result 
(Support/Conflict) 
Principal theories: shareholder and stakeholder theories 
1 Shareholder  
The findings of question 1 and 2 present 
the establishing of the AC in the 
monitoring role can contribute to enhance 
the effectiveness of implementing 
supervisory functions in China. 
Support 
2 Stakeholder  
The findings of questions 3-5 all support 
the continuation of this system of 
establishing the SB in the future though it 
proves that SB effectiveness should be 
enhanced at present.  
Support 
The other approaches: managerial hegemony, political, institutional and resources 
dependency theories  
3 Managerial Hegemony  
The findings of question 1 and 2 prove the 
contribution of the AC is not only a legal 
fiction; and the SB is also demanded to 
continue enhancing the consolidation by 
the findings of question 3-5. The results 
conflicts the theory that governing board 
serves simply as a rubber stamp.  
Conflict 
4 Political Model  
The findings suggest China should explore 
its unique CG setting and model. The 
findings of question 4-5 of co-ordination 
study provide the suggestions for China’s 
suitable internal supervisory mechanism to 
suit its political environment. 
Support 
5 Institutional Ownership 
The findings of section (4.7) suggest an 
exploration of shareholding structure 
status by examining top 3 shareholders 
shareholding %; and also the CEO dual 
positions with President of the BoD as two 
variables to test the impact on the 
effectiveness the supervisory functions. 
The test results present no significance 
and the firms after adding in ACs did not 
decrease these two situations of CEO dual 
positions; neither did they decentralise the 
shareholding structures in China. It is 
therefore concluded that big shareholders 
can still play an important role even though 
the AC has joined the BoD in China. 
Support 
6 Resource Dependency 
The role of the AC played in China is 
proved to provide the added value as the 
advisor/consultant and trainer in addition 
to independent control.  
Support 
In addition to the two principal theories of shareholder theory and stakeholder theory, 
the other approaches such as managerial hegemony theory, political model theory, 
institutional ownership theory, and resources dependency theory were also discussed 
in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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Two principal theories:  
It has been argued that while shareholder theory forms the basis with which ACs have 
been introduced into China, acting as a monitor, creating in the existing SBs a high 
expectation for the impact of ACs on effectiveness, stakeholder theory provides the 
basis for the key role in supervisory functions that the SB has served in China since 
1993, even though ACs were introduced in 2002. The findings for questions 1 and 2 
in this study show that establishing the AC in a monitoring role can contribute to the 
effectiveness of implementing supervisory functions in China; and the findings of 
questions 3-5 support the continuation of this system in the future, although SB 
effectiveness needs to be enhanced first. Therefore, it is concluded that both theories 
of shareholders and stakeholders have empirical validity in terms of the research 
findings in this thesis.  
The other four approaches:  
Political model theory and institutional theory are applied to introduce the 
background – the supervisory mechanism of CG in the West and China - as well as 
providing an overview of China’s political environment in relation to the development 
of supervisory mechanism of CG, and the relationship between shareholding 
structures and internal supervisory mechanism. Institutional Ownership theory 
suggests that when the institutional shareholdings are large it is difficult to switch 
their invested capital from one firm to another; consequently, they play an important 
role in the decision making. In this thesis, institutional theory is also employed as part 
of political model theory to enhance understanding of the background relating to the 
shareholding structure in China. The findings suggest that China should examine its 
unique CG setting and model. The findings of questions 4-5 on co-ordination provide 
suggestions on China’s most suitable internal supervisory mechanism. The findings of 
section (4.7) examine shareholding structure, by looking at the top 3 shareholders 
percentage, and also instances of dual CEO / President of the BoD positions, as two 
variables to test impact on the effectiveness of supervisory functions. The test results 
show no significance, and firms find that adding in ACs does not help to decrease the 
regularity of dual positions, or to decentralise shareholding structures in China. It is 
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therefore concluded that big shareholders still can play an important role, even though 
the AC has joined the BoD in China. These research results are to some extent 
consistent with interpretations from the political model and institutional theories.  
Hung (1998) adds that the governing board of a company serves simply as a rubber 
stamp. Managerial hegemony theory is founded as the basis with which to study the 
effectiveness of SBs and ACs in China. The findings of question 1 and 2 prove the 
contribution of the AC is not a legal fiction; and the SB is also expected to continue 
enhancing the consolidation, according to the findings of questions 3-5. The results 
are therefore not consistent with the theory that the governing board serves merely as 
a rubber stamp or legal fiction. 
Resource dependence theory is used to assess whether ACs in China are limited in 
exercising independent control. The role of the AC played in China is shown to 
provide added value, as an advisor/consultant and trainer in addition to independent 
control, results which can be interpreted to some extent as consistent with the theory.  
The findings are considered from the perspectives of the applied theories in this thesis. 
These two principal theories and the other four approaches serve as foundations for 
appraising the effectiveness, operations and co-ordination of the internal supervisory 
mechanism. The applied theories guide this thesis to focus on the evaluation of a 
reliable degree of trust or the impact level of accountability, instead of a mere 
judgment of “good” or “poor” operations and co-ordination of supervisory functions.  
7.3 Findings 
7.3.1 Findings on Achieving Key Research Objective One: Effectiveness 
Q1: Which system – with or without ACs – has more effective supervisory functions 
in China? 
It is intended to test which group of the companies – with or without ACs – has more 
effective supervisory functions in terms of improving market response to the earnings 
(PER), firm size, growth rates of assets, returns on assets and decreasing the debt ratio, 
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as a proxy (PER) and four control variables to prove whether companies with or 
without ACs improve their credibility to shareholders. 
Answer to Q1: H1 can be proved by testing that Group 2 with ACs has more effective 
supervisory functions than Group1 without ACs, as proven by the average growth 
trend of market response to earnings (PER), the firm size (total assets), the debt ratio; 
and also proven by the comparison between two groups of four control variables of 
debt ratio, growth rate, return on assets and the firm size. However, the test result of 
market response to the earnings (PER) in Sample 1 was *** inverse to H1. It may be 
inferred that the period in which ACs have been built up has not been long enough for 
them to develop effective supervisory functions. As China announced the regulation 
encouraging the establishment of ACs in 2002, the longest possible period for its 
supervisory performance is only five years, and in many cases, considerably less. SBs, 
on the other hand, have existed since 1993, when they were introduced by the 
Company Law.  
Regardless, the test result on the average growth trend of market response of earnings 
(PER) shows that Group 2 with AC is better than Group 1 without ACs. These results 
may help persuade listed companies to implement ACs in the future.  
Q2: Will the AC contribute to the effectiveness of the supervisory functions in China? 
It is intended to test whether listed companies after implementing ACs can increase 
their independence, expertise, operations, and decentralize their shareholding 
structure; as well as decrease the number of dual positions of CEO and President of 
the BoD. 
Answer to Q2: The test results intended to prove H2 show that companies who had 
implemented ACs are significantly different on 6 out of 17 variables. This illustrates 
that listed companies that have implemented ACs are different with respect to 6 
variables of independence, legal and internal audit expertise and activities and the 
firm size in relation to market response of earnings (PER). These results suggest the 
possible contributions of ACs as follows:  
Independence: The more directors who receive remunerations will lead to a lower 
market response to earnings. According to the comparison result intended to prove 
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H2, listed companies after adding in ACs will decrease the proportion of independent 
directors receiving remuneration, so improving the effectiveness of supervisory 
functions.  
Expertise: The higher legal expertise on SBs will lead to a higher market value to 
earnings; and the higher internal audit expertise in SBs will also lead to a higher 
market value to earnings. According to the comparison of groups, listed companies 
after adding in ACs increase their percentage of legal and internal audit expertise, so 
enhancing the effectiveness of supervisory functions in China.  
Diligence: The number of supervisors (“Num1sbsize”) in Group 1’s test is contrary 
** to the hypothesis: that the bigger the size of SBs, the higher the market response to 
earnings (inverse *). It shows that the quantity of members of SBs may not be a factor 
impacting on the quality of supervisory functions. According to the comparison 
between groups, listed companies after adding in ACs increase the size of SBs but 
this factor may not impact upon the effectiveness of supervisory functions.  
The result for Group 1 for the variable of frequency of SB meeting shows that more 
active meetings of SBs will result in a higher market response to earnings (***). The 
diligence of more meeting times in implementing supervisory functions is recognised 
by shareholders. But according to the comparison result intended to prove H2, 
companies after adding in AC do not increase meeting times of SBs. The explanation 
may be that after implementing ACs companies put more focus on strengthening 
them, rather than SBs, to improve the effectiveness of supervisory functions in China.  
Firm size: The test result of the firm size (Ln(Asset)) presents ** significance in Group 
1 and *** impact in Group 2. Both groups’ test results show that larger firms will 
enjoy a more stable market response to earnings.  
7.3.2 Findings on Achieving Key Research Objective Two: Operations 
The findings are summarised from two case studies by interviewing the members of 
SBs and ACs and considering the studies of regulations and literatures for improving 
the effectiveness of the supervisory functions in China.  
A. Findings on Promoting the Effectiveness of SBs in China 
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In order to enable the internal supervisory mechanism of CG in China to perform 
more effectively, ineffectiveness of SBs, insufficient powers and lacklustre legislation 
are all worth heeding. The findings from the interviews and considerations relating to 
the study of the regulations and literature are summarised herein: 
Lack of Independence of SBs  
1. The problem of insider control and lack of external independent supervisors: the 
independence of members of the SB needs to be strengthened by instituting 
regulations which take into account the interests of the stakeholders of the 
company, by preventing the members being influenced by insiders, and setting the 
appropriate  of external independent supervisors. 
2. The problem of high concentration of shareholdings and lack of independent 
supervisors: protecting the interests of small and medium shareholders need to be 
enhanced by stipulating that SB members should be independent supervisors. This 
would offer a check and balance against the high concentration of shareholdings 
in listed companies in China.  
3. Problems of voting system and lack of independence: greater attention should also 
be given to the voting system for the election of shareholders representing 
supervisors, in order to increase the effective voting power of small shareholders 
and expand the opportunity for their voice to be heard in the SB.  
Lack of Expertise of SBs  
1. Lack of expertise: the requirements for professional expertise among SB members 
need to be regulated and enforced. Currently the Chinese Company Act requires 
SBs to examine the company’s finance, but has no requirement for financial or 
accounting expertise in the membership; this has resulted in boards lacking the 
competence needed to meet their responsibilities. Hence the Chinese Company 
Act should be improved by specifying requirements for financial or accounting 
expertise in the SB.  
2. The problem of dual positions of supervisors: restrictions on the number of 
supervisory positions a person may concurrently occupy would help ensure that 
each individual’s efforts are concentrated in supervising the company effectively.  
3. The party member employee: Due to the existence of company supervisors with 
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political party status but who lack accounting, financial, legal or auditing expertise, 
there is a need to reduce the  of membership based on political party connections. 
Lack of Operations of SBs 
1. There is a need for the rights and responsibilities of members of the SB to be 
enhanced and their operational procedures to be streamlined. As things stand, 
members have been unable to properly exercise their supervisory duties due to the 
lack of a clear definition regarding their authority on executive management. The 
foundation of effective supervision also lies in having rights of access to 
information. Having independent and unobstructed rights to supervise and review 
is crucial in assuring the reliability of the supervisory system. Some crucial areas 
where existing regulations in the Chinese Company Act should be revised include 
the following:  
a. The SB’s powers with respect to the right to propose the appointment and removal 
of members of the BoD should be increased, subject to approval by shareholders 
in a general meeting.  
b. The ability of the shareholders to impose effective sanctions on SB should be 
increased, for example through additional regulations on accountability and 
removal of the collective or individual members whose ineffective oversight or 
misconduct can cause serious losses to the shareholders. 
c. Following German measures protecting the right of access to information, similar 
regulations should be instituted in China to mete out penalties for obstructing or 
failing to protect the SB’s right to information. 
d. While certain activities may be carried out by the BoD only with the approval of 
the SB, the rights of supervision with respect to a number of areas of action should 
be strengthened, such as (1) major operational activities related to the expansion 
of the company, (2) the opening and closure of subsidiaries, (3) the opening, 
closure, merger or relocation of major production departments, (4) decisions 
regarding related companies that can have a significant influence on the parent 
company itself, (5) large investments, borrowings, loans or economic securities 
exceeding the amount previously approved, (6) real estate investment, (7) the 
appointment of plenipotentiaries, (8) major legal proceedings, and (9) major 
changes pertaining to the employees’ wages, benefits and other subsidies. Other 
points in the German system should also be considered to enhance the functions of 
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SBs in China.  
e. Currently the Chinese Company Act provides the SBs with the right to take 
corrective action but there is no specification regarding the approach and extent of 
such corrections. Hence, this provision should be revised to clarify the scope of 
SBs’ powers.  
f. Greater attention should be given to the operational procedures of supervision, for 
example regarding the standards for audits and the principles of operation for the 
supervision, such as the annual supervision plan, review methodologies, and the 
frequency and content of regular actions.  
2. The lower limit on the size of a SB is set at three members by the Chinese 
Company Act, but the upper limit is set by the company. Hence, there should be a 
greater role for the General Meetings of Shareholders to determine the size of the 
board according to the needs of the company’s business. 
3. Currently, the Chinese Company Act only specifies that at least one annual 
meeting should be held by the SB. The minimum frequency of meeting should be 
increased to one meeting per quarter and quarterly reports should be submitted to 
the General Meetings of Shareholders. 
In general, while SBs do not participate in the decision making of the company’s 
management, nonetheless their governance function can be enhanced by focusing on 
examining the company’s finances, supervising the regulated activities of directors, 
and last but not least, overseeing the reporting of information and the legal 
responsibilities of the directors and managers.  
According to two case studies’ interviews, both acknowledge the problems and 
difficulties in implementing the SBs and both expect the establishment of ACs to 
improve effective supervisory functions in China.  
B. Findings on Promoting the Effectiveness of ACs in China: 
The research findings indicate that there is still sufficient room for improving the 
AC’s independence and operation. The findings from the interviews and 
considerations of the related regulations and literature are summarised as follows:. 
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Lack of Independence:  
1: Lack of independence of AC:  
The regulations require only half of AC members to be independent directors. The 
two case studies illustrate that this number should be increased, and independence 
strengthened. Since the intention of introducing the AC into the Chinese CG structure 
is to strengthen checks against internal control by internal individuals, the 
independence of AC and its members should become the essential prerequisite in 
order to establish the supervisory function within Corporate Governance. 
2. Lack of a mechanism for professional training of members of the AC: 
Efforts should be made to guarantee the quality of members of the AC: it is important 
to establish a mechanism for professional training of AC members, to ensure their 
professional competence. 
3. Lack of operations of ACs:  
(1) The laws and regulations governing the AC should be improved. 
As the existing specifications governing AC in China are not clear enough, it is 
consequently very difficult to push for its smooth implementation. Furthermore, the 
lack of a well-defined operational guideline or assessment criteria has made it even 
more difficult, if not, impossible to establish an effective AC. Hence, the 
implementation and operation of the AC in China should be more concretely specified 
by laws and regulations. 
(2) The overlapping problem of supervisory functions:  
The nature and hierarchical relations of the AC and the SB should be specified. The 
introduction of the AC at a time when the SB still has not become fully functional has 
inevitably caused conflicts between their overseeing functions within the internal 
oversight mechanism. Further research findings regarding the co-ordination of the 
organisation is therefore presented in the next section, to remove the controversy 
regarding whether the AC should operate directly under the BoD or the SB in an 
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attempt to integrate the overseeing functions of the two bodies, as well as ensure that 
their functions are complementary to, rather than overlapping with each other.  
(3) A positive interaction between the AC and the internal auditors should be 
established. 
The AC relies on a large amount of information from internal auditing departments to 
guide the latter and to strengthen its organisational status, so as to guarantee its 
independence and effectiveness. To ensure the independence of internal auditing 
departments and the proper operation of the AC, the AC should at least have the 
power to review the appointments and removals of the Internal Audit managers, and 
the right to directly question the Internal Audit managers or request the internal 
auditors to carry out special investigations without the need to first obtain the 
approval from the management. 
(4) Measures complementary to the role of the AC in market disclosure should 
be established. 
The status of the AC should be included in the rules for market disclosure. There 
should be clear-cut regulations specifying its independence, professional capabilities, 
shareholding status, and appointments and removals of its members. Other 
complementary rules should include issues concerning the establishment of training 
and evaluation systems for independent directors on the AC, and the full publication 
of information related to the independence and professional capabilities of the 
members, such as a list of the members of the AC, their independence statements or 
the reason for not having one, and their certifications in accounting, auditing and 
securities. These rules are still missing in current Chinese regulations.  
(5) The functions and roles of the AC should be established. 
Since the AC belongs to the self-regulatory system of a company, its function should 
be for oversight and consultancy rather than checking on the company’s daily affairs. 
Also, its view should be macroscopic rather than microscopic. Nevertheless, at 
present it is rather unrealistic to expect ACs in China to assume a role of decision 
making instead of oversight, since it is the BoD, rather than any of its special 
committees, which makes the final decisions for the company. 
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(6) Specific rules defining the rights and responsibilities of the AC should be 
established. 
It is necessary to establish specific and clear-cut rules defining the rights and 
responsibilities of the AC and penalties or punishments to be meted out should it fail 
to carry out its responsibilities. Such rules will provide legal protection as well as the 
necessary restraint on the assertion of its rights and the execution of its functions. For 
instance, if the right to know is not clearly defined by law, the AC, having most of its 
members as independent directors external to the company, would not be able to get 
sufficient and up-to-date information on the company’s operation, and thus would 
have difficulty in effectively overseeing the quality of the financial reporting and the 
effectiveness of the internal control of the company. 
(7) A mechanism for encouraging and restraining members of the AC should be 
established. 
It is indeed a tough challenge for the AC in trying to obtain sufficient information for 
oversight or to have enough time and energy for it, considering that most independent 
directors are busy people with substantial social status and reputation. Therefore, a 
good mechanism is needed to encourage as well as retain members of the AC in 
executing its overseeing function despite certain restraints. 
After implementing ACs, listed companies face co-ordination problems and 
difficulties of overlapping and missing items in functions between SBs and ACs, 
according to the survey of five listed companies. According to two case study 
interviews, better levels of co-ordination may solve the problems of overlapping 
functions between SBs and ACs in China. The research result proves the problems of 
overlapping and missing status exist between the SBs and the ACs in China. Looking 
forward to the future, the coordination between two supervisory institutions in terms 
of organization is therefore studied and the findings are presented as follows:  
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7.3.3 Findings on Achieving Key Research Objective Three: 
Co-ordination  
In order to improve the supervisory mechanism of Corporate Governance, the 
findings after interviewing two governors, as well as research regarding co-ordination 
between the SB and the AC in terms of their organisation is summarised as follows:  
Both governors acknowledge the SB is not functioning well, and highlight the main 
reason behind its failing: lack of independence. Mr. Xu also highlighted that most 
supervisors lack expertise and experience of implementation in practice. Though both 
governors regard SBs as ineffective, Mr. Xu still argues that, “Yes, it is definitely 
necessary. “ Yet Mr. Shih highlighted, “the key to supervisory function is to reinforce 
the changes in the BoD.” Seemingly, he expects the installation of ACs to improve the 
supervisory function. 
Companies after implementing AC may face issues of co-ordinating them with SBs. 
Mr. Shih thinks that ACs are stronger than SBs, and he also referred to some scholars’ 
suggestion of “abolishing” SBs. But Mr. Xu asserted that a vertically integrated 
system would be a better idea. Opinions on the co-ordination of the two supervisory 
institutions differ among the governors and the scholars. Understanding the co-
ordination between SBs and ACs was is therefore set as the third research objective in 
this thesis.  
A telephone survey was used to research the linkage in the hierarchy between these 
two different institutions of internal supervisory mechanism. The order of preference 
for the interaction linkage between the SB and the AC was as follows: the first 
preference is “Integrating all three oversight institutions” by combining AC, SB and 
IA in one entity; the second is “Promoting the AC”; the third is “Removing the SB”; 
the fourth is “Maintaining the current status”; the fifth is “Establishing a vertical 
link” – allowing AC report to SB directly- the last is “Abandoning the AC.” 
The survey also reveals listed companies’ opinions on their preference to integrate all 
three in one entity. It shows that choosing integration as their first preference is based 
on the belief that it can be beneficial in reducing lack of independence, the most 
serious problem impacting upon the effective performance of supervision of CG in 
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China, and can also solve hierarchical reporting problems of the internal supervisory 
mechanism of all the institutions in one organisation. In this way, integration may 
bring about a positive co-ordination of their functions, to reduce costs and improve 
the effectiveness of the internal supervisory mechanism. 
The second preference, “Promoting the AC” is in sharp contrast to the last choice, 
“Abandoning the AC”, which could be an indication that listed companies have 
higher expectations of the effective performance of AC as part of the internal 
supervisory mechanism. With regard to their third choice, “Removing the SB”, and 
their fifth choice, “Establishing a vertical link”, both choices could indicate that the 
listed companies have lost their confidence in the effectiveness of SB in China, and 
therefore, they do not expect that SB can lead AC in improving the effective 
performance of supervision in the future.  
Given the phenomena of functional overlapping and missing operations, it becomes 
pertinent to redefine their functions on the basis of division of work in order to 
promote mutual co-ordination between the SB and the AC. Their functions should be 
complementary. The two institutions have different requirements for members’ 
independence, professional literacy and working time. These different characteristics 
should be considered when allocating their functions because the members’ 
independence and professional knowledge structure will undoubtedly influence the 
quality of their monitoring function, while the members’ working time and meeting 
frequency will influence their participation in, and dedication to, monitoring progress. 
The survey indicates an expectation of co-ordinating all the institutions as one as 
much as it reflects the request for establishing an independent control system to 
strengthen oversight functions, save oversight costs, enable the supervisors and 
members of the ACs to execute oversight tasks by avoiding the potential problem of 
independence, and empower them against the directors and senior managers by 
establishing a protection system regarding their promotion in status.  
If the proposal for modification to improve co-ordination among the institutions of the 
internal supervisory mechanism and merge them into one entity is carried out, it will 
eliminate the problems of overlapping or missing functions. At the same time, it will 
not impact upon the checks and balances between the BoD and the SB in improving 
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the deficiencies existing in the internal supervisory mechanism of both the German 
and the Anglo-American CG models. To co-ordinate the organisation of the SB and 
the AC into one entity will make the co-ordination of their functions much easier. The 
recommended pattern is an innovative breakthrough, which will remove the limitation 
and the constraint inherent in the supervisory mechanism of CG in China. 
7.4 Limitation and Discussion 
There remains room for more discussion and suggestions for more extensive research 
in the future, for limitations of research framework and data may exist in this thesis. 
7.4.1 The Evaluation of “Good” and “Poor” Performance  
The AC had already been in place in the United States and United Kingdom long 
before it was introduced and implemented in China. However, despite their differing 
periods of existence, comprehensive, systematic regulations and norms govern ACs in 
these three countries. International regulations and norms for supervision are used as 
the criteria to examine the performance of the internal supervisory mechanism in 
China, and for appraising whether the supervisory performance in China has attained 
international standards. This research is based on the three characteristics of 
supervision covering independence, expertise and operation as a foundation with 
which to appraise the respective performance of AC and SB in China. The findings in 
appraising the performance of the SB in China suggest that in practice it is really not 
as “good” as expected, and still far below the requirement of international regulations 
and norms. The AC in China still faces difficulties and problems in how to meet the 
three indexes of supervision in effectiveness, operations, and co-ordination of 
supervisory functions. Overall, the performance of the two supervisory institutions of 
the internal supervisory mechanism in China may be defined as “poor” compared to 
the regulations of Western countries. 
Nevertheless, it is essential to return to the initial points mentioned in the chapter on 
“The Development of Supervisory Mechanism of CG in the West and China”, in 
which the four key features of 1) governance culture, 2) legal environments, 3) 
ownership structure and 4) governance structure are identified as background factors 
influencing the formation of their respective CG models. These different factors have 
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also generated peculiar problems faced by the internal supervisory mechanism of CG 
in the West and China. The potential causes of these problems can be analysed 
according to the aforementioned four key factors, and then be further illustrated in 
each model individually. Therefore, in this respect it may seem reasonable to ask 
whether the appraisal of “good” or “poor” performance is appropriate or suitable, 
when assessing the performance of the internal supervisory mechanism of CG in 
China. 
7.4.2 How to Define “Standard” Corporate Governance?  
In recent years, the Anglo-American CG model has gained a high rating on the GMI 
ranking. Meanwhile, other studies such as Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) have also 
asserted that the CG model as practiced in both the US and the UK has been rated as 
most effective, leading them to refer to the Anglo-American model as the standard 
CG model. This thesis examined the historical development of the “standard” CG 
model of the UK and the US to illustrate the development of the supervisory 
mechanism. The findings suggest that the progress of a supervisory mechanism was a 
reaction to economic crisis and that, since the criteria for effective quality in the 
supervisory mechanism have continually increased, it has also become stricter over 
time. This explains why the “standard” keeps on moving forward: to meet the 
requirement of effectiveness based on the reaction to the corporate failure to prevent 
the occurrence of risk impact to both companies and markets. 
This thesis studied chronologically the major economic events in more recent years 
and their impact on the internal supervisory mechanism report, and found that AC in 
the “standard” CG has not proven to be a perfect system, as was revealed in the Enron 
scandal of 2001 and the WorldCom scandal of 2002. The surveys by McKinsey (2000 
and 2002) indicated that, following the scandals in the US, various Asian 
governments initiated serious efforts to improve the supervisory mechanism of 
Corporate Governance. In this context, the relevant question to ask is: will the 
reformation of the internal supervisory mechanism of CG in emerging markets such 
as China supersede the current “standard” model and the forerunners of the Western 
countries? Apparently, there is still scope for future research to continue monitoring 
the development of supervisory mechanism of CG, especially in terms of its 
improvement and impact. 
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7.4.3 The Expansion of the Samples  
In this thesis, the samples of telephone surveys of 330 listed companies and the in-
depth interviews with the two listed companies in China do not cover all of the listed 
companies in the country. Moreover, there are gaps in responses between 
comprehensive and random samples. Though the telephone surveys have covered 
over 50 per cent of the listed companies with ACs, and over 50 listed companies 
answered each survey question, it was unrealistic to expect all the sample companies 
to agree to participate in the survey. The in-depth interview was designed to 
understand the implementation status, so as to find the problems of the operations and 
co-ordination between the ACs and SBs. Although this thesis has done its best to 
balance the trade-off between generalisability and understandability, it still leaves 
room for further research by expanding the sample size and range. 
7.4.4 The Extension of Research Target Area  
In addition to it being applied to the Chinese model,, the research structure and 
research design of this thesis can also be applied to study the practices and 
performance of the internal supervisory mechanism in other areas, such as the Greater 
China Area which includes Taiwan and Hong-Kong, and the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN), comprising the ten nations in the region: Vietnam, 
Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia 
and Singapore, which has emerged as potentially the greatest regional economy and 
market. 
7.4.5 The Extension of Research Specification by Industries  
This research can be further extended through specification by industries, especially 
for financial institutions and banks, whose credit is the foundation for them to acquire 
and retain business. It may be assumed that they have more requirements for internal 
supervisory mechanisms than other industries, but it is a topic worth studying to 
discover whether comparison by industries proves the assumption. The lack of 
internal supervisory mechanisms of financial institutions and banks may result in 
escalating the financial crisis to national level. More progress on extending this 
research will contribute to better protecting investors at times of social chaos. 
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7.5 Research Contributions 
The contributions of this thesis’ research may be identified as follows:  
(1) This research has illustrated the effectiveness of two systems – SBs alone 
and the SBs plus ACs – of CG in China. The understanding of the 
effectiveness between two systems of internal supervisory mechanism of CG 
in China is proven by the evidence collected from analyzing the quantitative 
test results of t tests of five proxy variables of effectiveness, and the 
observation of the growth trend of market response to earnings.  
(2) This research has presented the AC’s contributions in improving the 
characteristics of supervisory functions in China. The evidence is collected 
from the regression test results of Panel model by comparison of every 
character’s coefficient of independent variable response to market response 
to earnings (PER-dependent variable) of supervisory functions of the two 
systems of SBs alone and SBs plus ACs in China.  
(3) This research has gained an understanding about the implementation of SBs 
and ACs in China. The findings and suggestions for solving the problems 
arising in implementing the effectiveness of SBs and ACs in China are 
identified by interviewing the members of two supervisory bodies of two 
cases and by studying regulations and literature. 
(4) This research has reported the role of ACs played in China. The evidence is 
collected from the telephone survey, responded to by 65 out of 330 listed 
companies with ACs. The finding was analysed through the statistics of the 
roles defined by the regulated main functions of the AC in a listed company, 
calculated, and then compared to the stipulated functions. 
(5) This research has identified the day-to-day operations of these two 
institutions’ supervisory functions and has reported the overlapping and 
missing operation percentages and items of supervisory functions between 
SBs and ACs in China. The operations items are defined through studies of 
the related regulations and charters; and the overlapping items and 
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percentages between two supervisory bodies are researched through the 
survey of five listed companies, with experience in implementing the ACs.  
(6) This research has pointed out the preferred linkage of co-ordination between 
SBs and ACs in China. The two systems with or without ACs will both exist 
in the future according to the two governors’ assertions and opinions on the 
framework of legislation and management of government; and the preferred 
co-ordination is collected from the telephone survey of 330 listed companies, 
with over 60 responses commenting on interactions between the SB and the 
AC in organisations.  
(7) This research has gained a better understanding of the regulation gap by 
comparing the standards between the related international and Chinese 
regulations. 
(8) This research has gained a better understanding of the gaps in practice by 
comparing the regulations and standards, and actual practice in China.  
(9) The research results of this thesis may serve as a useful reference point for 
carrying out similar studies on this topic in the future. 
Meanwhile, this research may have made the following contributions to academic 
works:  
(10) Input the understanding for the effectiveness of ACs  
Goodwin and Seow asserted that “Further investigation into the effectiveness of AC is 
needed” (Goodwin and Seow 2002: 220). Collier concluded that evidence of their 
effectiveness was very limited and certainly insufficient to support their rapid increase 
in popularity: describing this as a ‘curious phenomenon’(Collier 1996). Spira appeals 
for research on how AC undertakes its tasks and why its impact cannot be adequately 
assessed (Spira 2003). Accordingly, further research into CG and AC effectiveness is 
called for. This thesis has evaluated the effectiveness of two systems – SBs alone and 
SBs plus ACs in China – by answering research question 1.1; and this thesis has 
evaluated the contribution of ACs in improving the characteristics of supervisory 
functions in China by answering research question 1.2. This thesis has achieved 
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objective one: to understand the effectiveness of SBs and ACs in China. Hence the 
ACs’ performance measures on effectiveness input in this thesis may enrich the 
literature on academic work.  
(11) Input the understanding for the processes associated with the operation of ACs 
Turley and Zaman (2004) commented: “There is very little evidence on the processes 
associated with the operation of ACs”. This thesis has replied to their appeal by 
revealing the process of supervisory functions implemented by the SBs and ACs in 
China. The evidence is collected from the identification of operations items of 
supervisory functions, in the form of a checklist. This checklist can contribute to 
future research to understand the processes associated with the operation of ACs. It 
has also been used to survey the operation processes of ACs from five Chinese listed 
companies. The Chinese practice of processes associated with the operation of ACs 
has been revealed in this thesis.  
(12)  Input the understanding of the viewpoints of “actors” 
Spira (2002) noted that only a few studies have examined the perspectives of actors 
involved in ACs’ processes.  
This research was not only based on visits and field surveys arranged through the co-
ordination of the Secretary of the BoD of companies in China. (the Secretary of the 
BoD is in charge of the co-ordination of supervisory functions and related supervisory 
issues, including the SB and AC in China). This thesis also covers interviews with the 
real “actors” – the players in the internal supervisory mechanisms in China such as 
members of the SB and AC. This thesis has replied to Spira’s appeal by interviewing 
two listed companies’ members of SBs and ACs. The perceptions of actors involved 
in ACs’ processes in China have been revealed; their viewpoints recorded and 
summarised in the chapter on the operations. This input could help future research on 
the related topic.  
(13) Input the independent variables for enhancement the attributes of supervision  
The analysis in this thesis focuses on the three major attributes most relevant to the 
likely potential effectiveness of supervisory governance structures in companies: 
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independence, professional expertise and operations. These are highlighted in the 
related literature reviewed here such as Klein (2002), Carcello and Neal (2003), 
Bédard et al. (2004), DeFond et al. (2005), Turley and Zaman (2007), as well as from 
relevant regulations in the US and UK (Combined Code, Section 3.1), the Code of CG 
for Listed Companies in China (CSRC,2002, Section 52) and the Guidelines for 
Listed Companies on the Establishment of the Institution of Directors in China, which 
all refer to these factors in setting requirements for supervisory bodies.  
These three attributes have become the pillars with which to form the framework of 
internal supervisory mechanism of CG at present. Thus it has been a challenge to 
construct other frameworks to build up the effectiveness of supervision, to improve 
Corporate Governance. This is also an area awaiting future research exploration. 
This thesis has input party member employee numbers and shareholding structure, 
evaluated by the top three shareholders’  as two variables to evaluate the AC’s 
contribution to the characteristics of supervisory functions in China. Meanwhile, 
internal auditors may be transferred from the other departments with special skills in 
specific operations, but not equipped with a financial or accounting background. The 
internal audit without experts from a financial or accounting profession is defined as 
one single variable in this thesis to differentiate from the audit experience defined in 
the regulation of SEC, Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002.  
In addition to the defined three attributes of the literature and regulations, this thesis 
has also input three independent variables of party-member employees, shareholding 
structure, and internal audit, which may contribute to future research on evaluating the 
effectiveness of supervisory functions. 
(14) Input the understanding of applying both qualitative and quantitative 
methods in one thesis 
Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2005: 375) encourage all graduate students to learn to 
utilise both quantitative and qualitative research in order to be pragmatic researchers. 
They also emphasised that the inclusion of qualitative data can help explain 
relationships discovered through quantitative data. This thesis applied both qualitative 
and quantitative methods, which more often than not involves a trade-off between 
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generalisability and understandability. In this thesis, the quantitative research method 
is designed to focus on the generalisability of the effectiveness of supervisory 
functions in China; and the qualitative research method is designed to focus on the 
understandability of the operations and co-ordination, establishing the factors with 
which to improve the effectiveness of supervisory functions in China. Not only the 
consequences of both research methods turn out to be complimentary, but the 
inclusion of qualitative data can also help explain relationships discovered through 
quantitative data in this thesis. This thesis’s research design on methodology has 
proved the assertion by Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2005: 375), and could serve as a 
research model for similar study.  
7.6 Concluding Summary 
This thesis has explored the effectiveness of SBs and ACs in China and reported 
that,based on observation of the trend of PER and T-test results that establish that 
companies with ACs have lower debt ratios and bigger firm sizes, listed companies 
with ACs are more effective. Results 6 of 17 variables tested also provide statistically 
significant evidence that the AC contributes to the effectiveness of supervisory 
functions in China. However, the SBs still cannot be replaced after incorporating ACs 
into China because listed companies without ACs have more activities as measured by 
the meeting times of SBs; and listed companies with ACs still increase more the legal 
and internal audit expertise of SB. The results from the case studies and interviews 
with the members of SBs and ACs in China echo the results from the quantitative data. 
Though the actors implementing supervisory functions in China are not satisfied with 
the effectiveness of SBs they still insist on maintaining the system of the SB in China. 
It can be foreseen that co-existence of the two institutions of SBs and ACs is 
unavoidable in the future. Therefore, the evidence provided in this thesis regarding 
coordination between the SB and the AC in China is of particular relevance.   
In order to eliminate the potential problem of independence of the AC’s system under 
the BoD in the US and UK, this thesis has proposed modification to improve co-
ordination among the institutions of internal supervision and merge them into one 
entity. If this proposal can be carried out, it will eliminate the problems of overlapping 
or missing functions between SBs and ACs in China. At the same time, it will not 
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detract from the checks and balances between the BoD and the SB in improving the 
deficiencies existing in the internal supervisory mechanism of both the German and 
the Anglo-American CG models. To co-ordinate the organisation of the SB and the 
AC into one entity will make co-ordination of their functions much easier. The 
recommended pattern would be an innovative breakthrough, which could remove the 
limitations and the constraints inherent in the supervisory mechanism of CG in China. 
This suggestion could provide a basis whereby China’s internal supervisory 
mechanism could transcend the AC’s system in US and UK and overcome the in-
effective problems of current system of SB’s in China. 
In summary, the findings reported in this thesis, and related comments on the 
interpretation of those findings and suggestions based upon them, may be of 
assistance to users such as regulators, supervisors or Boards of Directors in 
considering what governance structures for internal supervisory functions within 
companies will be more effective, and the ways to improve the operations of effective 
supervisory functions in China. The findings from the study of co-ordination between 
ACs and SBs contribute to suggestions on how the functions of the two institutions 
should be co-ordinated to avoid redundancies and gaps in internal supervision. 
Additionally, this research provides practical understanding of the preferred linkage 
between the two institutions, with a view to proposing how they can improve 
interaction and co-ordination. Finally, the investigation and results reported in this 
thesis may offer a basis for continuing research on the effectiveness, operation and 
coordination of supervisory governance after introduction of an AC, and for studies of 
other monitoring functions such as audit and internal control. 
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Appendix A1 Qian, Z-y., 24th July 2007 
Qian, Z-y. 錢之揚 (2007). Interview with Mr. Qian Zhi Yang (錢之揚), Secretary 
of the Board of Directors of the Zhejiang Transfar Co., Ltd. (Chuanhua, 傳化公
司), on 24th July 2007. Hangzhou. [Video recording in possession of author] 












Appendix A2 Zhao, 23rd July 2007 
Zhao, 趙總 (2007). Interview with Mr. Zhao (趙總), Chair of the SB of Wynca (Zhe 
Jiang Xinan Chemical Industrial Group Co., Ltd., 新安公司), a subsidiary of the 
Zhejiang Transfar Co., Ltd. (Chuanhua, 傳化集團), on 23rd July 2007. Hangzhou. 
[Video recording in possession of author] 
2007 年 7 月 23 日訪新安公司監事會主席趙總 
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1. 傳化集團進步如此之快，請問你的訣竅是什麼？  































































Appendix A3 Bao and Jia, 24th July 2007 
Bao, 包主任 & Jia, 賈主任 (2007). Interview with Mr. Bao, 包主任 and Ms. Jia, 
賈主任, two members of the SB of Wynca (Zhe Jiang Xinan Chemical Industrial 
Group Co., Ltd., 新安公司), a subsidiary of the Zhejiang Transfar Co., Ltd. 
(Chuanhua, 傳化集團), on 24th July 2007. Hangzhou. [Video recording in 
possession of author] 
2007 年 7 月 24 日訪問新安公司二位監事會成員包主任及賈主任   
包－１５年的監事經驗，由國有股代表轉為員工股代表；賈－５年的監事經驗 
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Appendix B1 Wang, F-x., 25th July 2007 
Wang, F-x. 王阜西 (2007). Interview with Mr. Wang Fuxi (王阜西), Secretary of 
the Board of Directors of the Hangcha Engineering Machinery Co., Ltd. (杭叉公
司), on 25th July 2007. Hangzhou. [Video recording in possession of author] 

























































Appendix B2 Shen, J-h., 25th July 2007 
Shen, J-h. 沈劍華 (2007). Interview with Mr. Shen Jianhua (沈劍華), Chair of the 
Board of Directors and Legal Advisor of the Hangcha Engineering Machinery Co., 
Ltd. (杭叉公司), accompanied by Mr. Wang Fuxi (王阜西), Secretary of the Board 
of Directors, on 25th July 2007. Hangzhou. [Video recording in possession of 
author] 
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Appendix B3 Xu, L-d., 25th July 2007 
Xu, L-d. (2007). Interview with Mr. Xu Lida (許立達), Audit Committee member 
and Chief Financial Officer of the Hangcha Engineering Machinery Co., Ltd. (杭
叉公司), accompanied by Wang Fuxi (王阜西), Secretary of the Board of 
Directors, on 25th July 2007. Hangzhou. [Video recording in possession of author] 





































































Appendix C1 Shi, D-h., 24th August 2007 
Shi, D-h, (2007). Interview with Mr. Shi Dong-hui (施東輝), Deputy Director in 
the Research Center of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), on 24th Aug. 2007. 
Shanghai. [Email response to the telephone interview in procession of author] 
2007 年 8 月 24 日上海電話、電郵訪問上海證交所主任施東輝先生 
答复: 請教 您 
2007/8/24(五) 上午 8:44 
寄件者: "dhshi@sse.com.cn" <dhshi@sse.com.cn>檢視聯絡人詳細資料  
收件者: "寶珍 李" <lee_pao_chen@yahoo.com.tw> 
Message contains attachments 1 個檔案 (34KB) corporate governance.doc 
 
並未偵測到病毒或受感染。 .exe, .com, .bat, .scr, .pif, .msi 檔案建議不要下載，請先確認檔
案來源安全性。（網路安全說明） 
檔 案 : corporate governance.doc 下 載 夾 帶 檔 案  (See attached file: corporate 
governance.doc) 
Shi Donghui (施東輝) 
Deputy Director 
Research Center, Shanghai Stock Exchange 
528 South Pudong Road, Shanghai 200120,P.R.C 





























設計上, 三者 -監事或委員與獨立董事的職權及責任如何劃分呢？ 
见上面的回答。 
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4. 目前中國設立之監事會、獨立董事及審計委員會,上海證交所於立法及管理的































Appendix C2 Xu, T-m., 25th July 2007 
Xu, T-m. (2007). Interview with Mr. Xu (Xu Tian Min 徐天明), Manager of the 
Property Right Management Department of the State-Owned Hangzhou Industrial 
Assets Management Co. Ltd. (國營杭洲資產管理公司), on 25th July 2007. 
Hangzhou. [Video recording in possession of author] 
2007 年 7 月 25 日訪問國營杭州資產管理公司徐天明先生 
Xu Tian Min – Property Right Management Dept. Manager – Hangzhou Industrial 
Assets Management Co. Ltd 
1. 目前貴公司監事會的功能發揮的如何呢？ 
答：不盡人意且形同虛設。 
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7. 您認為監事會及審計委員會的隸屬應為何呢？ 
答：我認為若是由審計委員會直接報告給監事會，則可以達到一條鞭的功效，
功能整合及人力資源整合，組織內的監督功能互動達到統合綜效的目的。 
 
 
 
